


,5^"-. 




























. -11. 







c" 



o V 



t ,/V^), 



s^^._'-v ^ 



N 



^""^ 



* ^ 






^^. 



'^_ 



^^. 



* 



'^o^ :%: 







.-?- 



^^'.•^»"/ 












CvV 






Blue Jackets of '98 



Blue Jackets of '98 

A History of the Spanish -American 
War 

By Willis John Abbot 

Author of " Blue Jackets of '76," " Blue Jackets of 181 2," 

"Blue Jackets of '61," The Battlefields Series 

** The Life of Carter Henry Harrison " 

It 



New York 

Dodd, Mead and Company 

1899 



Liorary cf CcTigrfe«% 
Office of \}it 

Register of Copyright*, 



Copyright, 1899, 
By Dodd, Mead and Company. 



Ali rights reserve J. 



0'^ ' ., 



SECOND COPY, 

Enibtrsitg ^Prrss : 
John Wilson and Son, Cambridge, U.S.A. 



i3>^t;.v\^<^*i 



Contents 



CHAPTEE I 

Pagb 

The Far-reaching Causes of the War with Spain — 
How THE Spanish Empire in America was Founded 
AND Forfeited — The United States as Spain's 
Guardian — The Diplomacy of the Cuban Ques- 
tion — The Views of Jefferson and Monroe — 
The Ostend Manifesto — The Threat of the Holy 
Alliance — The United States Saving Cuba for 
THEIR Own ° 1 



CHAPTEE II 

Why Spain and the United States Clashed — The 
Island of Perpetual Kevolutions — The " Soles 
DE Bolivar " and the " Black Eagle " — Lopez 
AND his Filibusters — How a Kentuckian died — 
The Ten Years' War — The Compromise of Zanjon 
AND ITS Repudiation — The Execution of the " Vir- 
ginius " Prisoners — Jose Marti and his Conspira- 
cies — The New Revolution of 1895 — Campos again 
and his Failure — Weyler, " the Butcher," and 
his Failure — Character of the Cuban Leaders 

— What Reconcentration meant — The Appoint- 
ment of Blanco — American Aid to the Starving 

— The Complications that led to the Visit of 
the " Maine " 13 



CHAPTEE III 

The Disaster to the " Maine " — Captain Sigsbee's 
Despatch — The State of Public Opinion — Why 
THE " Maine " was sent to Havana — Her Recep- 



vi Contents 



Pasb 



TION THERE — PRECAUTIONS AGAINST ATTACK — ThE 

Explosion — Frightful Loss of Life — Personal 
Narratives of Survivors and Eye-Witnesses — 
The Official Investigations — Attitude of the 
Spaniards — The Finding of the Court of Inquiry 
— " Remember the ' Maine ' " 41 



CHAPTER IV 

At the National Capital — The Course op the 
Cuban Question in Congress — Its Treatment by 
President Cleveland — It Confronts President 
McKiNLEY — The Mission of General Stewart L. 
Woodford — Fair Promises op the Spanish Min- 
istry — The Failure of Autonomy — The De Lome 
Letter and its Result — Preparations for War 
— Congress Votes a $50,000,000 Extraordinary 
Credit for Purposes of National Defence — The 
Report of the "Maine" Court of Inquiry. . . 67 



CHAPTER V 

The Navies op Spain and the United States — The 
Gloomy Estimates of the Experts — Ship Hunt- 
ing in Europe — Why a Navy cannot be Extem- 
porised — Yachts and Auxiliary Vessels — The 
Blockade of Cuba — Lieutenant Rowan's Expedi- 
tion—The First Capture— Hot Work at Matan- 
zas — The Attack on Cardenas — Death of Bagley 
— The Fight at CiENFUEGOS 89 



CHAPTER VI 

Spain's Possessions in Asia — Unexpected Scene of 
American Naval Activity— The Philippine Isl- 
ands AND THEIR PeOPLE — RENDEZVOUS OF THE 

Asiatic Squadron at Hong Kong — Commodore 
George Dewey — The Departure for the Philip- 
pines — The Spanish Fleet at Manila — The 
Battle and Complete Victory of the Americans 
— No Men Lost — Dewey Made an Admiral — 



Contents vii 

Paob 

Aguinaldo and the Insurgents — Trouble with 
Germany — A Vigorous Message — The Friend- 
liness OF England 117 



CHAPTEK VII 

Spain's Cape Verde Fleet — The Coasts of the United 
States Menaced — How the Naval Force of the 
United States in the Atlantic was Employed — 
The Search for Cervera — Bombardment of San 
Juan de Porto Rico — Entrapped in Santiago de 
Cuba — The Sampson-Schley Controversy — The 
Voyage of the " Oregon " — The Blockade of 
Cervera • . . 141 



CHAPTER VIII 

Santiago de Cuba — The Plan to bottle up Cervera 
— The Volunteers — Preparations for the Sacri- 
fice — The Stations of the Men — Under Fire — 
The Steering Gear Disabled — The Torpedoes 
Shot away — Sinking of the " Merrimac " — 
Surrender of Hobson and his Men — Admiral 
Cervera's Courtesy — In Morro Castle — The 
Bombardment 162 



CHAPTER IX 

The Army in the War — Prejudice against a Stand- 
ing Army — Regulars and Militiamen — Charac- 
ter OF THE United States Soldier — The Calls 
for Volunteers — The Rough Riders — The " Sons 
of Somebody" — Mobilisation of the Troops — The 
Fifth Corps at Tampa — The " Gussie " Expedi- 
tion—Preparing FOR the Invasion of Cuba — The 
Delays and the Start — Arrival at Santiago — 
Conference of Shafter, Sampson, and Garcia — 
The Landing .... 17? 



viii Contents 

CHAPTER X 

Paob [ 

The Landing at Daiquiri — Flight of the Enemy — 

Good Fortune attending the Invaders — Diffi- ; 

CULTY OF LANDING StORES — ThE ADVANCE INTO THE ; 

Interior — Conference at Siboney — March of the 
Rough Riders — Fight at Guasimas — Bravery and 
Heavy Loss of the Americans — The Regulars 
IN Action — The Losses and the Value of the ^ 

Victory 199 L 

CHAPTEE XI I 

San Juan, El Caney, and Aguadores — Waiting for I 

Supplies — The Position at El Caney — General I 

Lawton's Dispositions — Effect of Mauser Bul- 
lets — Stories OF the Battlefield — The Capture 
OF El Caney — The Attack on San Juan — Plan 
OF the Battle — The Slaughter in the Sunken | 

Road — The Charge on the Hill — Exposed Posi- 
tion of the Americans — The Question of Retreat 
— The Scenes at Bloody Bend — The Demand for 
the Surrender of Santiago — News of Cervera's 
Defeat 218 



CHAPTER XII 

Rigidity of the Blockade — The Bombardments — 
The Marines at Guantanamo — Cervera's Dash 
FOR Liberty — The Fleet Alert — Absence of the 
Flagship and the Admiral — The Controversy 
OVER THE Honours — Destruction of the " In- 
fanta Maria Teresa " — Capture of Admiral Cer- 
vera — Gallant Figut of the "Gloucester" — 
The Annihilation of the Torpedo Destroyers 
— The "Almirante Oquendo " Beached — The 
End of the " Vizcaya " — Magnificent Work of 
THE "Oregon" and "Texas" — The "Cristobal 
Colon's " Fight for Life — The End of the Spanish 
Squadron — Effects of American Gunnery — The 
Disposal of the Prisoners 248 



Contents ix 



CHAPTER XIII 



Pa&b 



Closing in — The Sufferings op Beleaguered Santi- 
ago The Lagging Negotiations for Surrender 

— The Outpouring of Refugees — The Bombard- 
ment — Surrender of the Spaniards — The Stars 
and Stripes above Santiago — The Wrecking of 
THE Army by Sickness — The Flight to the 
North — The Infamy of the Transports — MoN- 
TAUK Point and Camp Wikoff — Fever Camps in 
THE United States 292 



CHAPTER XIV 

The Porto Rico Campaign — Troops Employed — The 
Bombardment of Nipe — Landing at Guanica — 
Plan of the Campaign — Capture of Ponce — 
Friendliness of the Inhabitants — Capture of 
Guayamo, Coamo, and Mayaguez — The Enemy's 
Stand at Aboncito — The News of Peace — Com- 
plete Success of the Campaign — The Peace 
Negotiations — The Protocol — Evacuation Com- 
missioners 309 



CHAPTER XV 

The Philippines again — Dewey's Position in Manila 
Harbour — His Work in Diplomacy and War — 
The Part played by Aguinaldo — The Coming 
OF the American Troops — The Quarrel with 
the Germans — The Capture and Occupation of 
Manila — Growing Discontent op the Filipinos 
and their Final Revolt — The Problems pre- 
sented TO the United States by the Situation 
rN the Philippines 325 



X Contents 

CHAPTER XVI 

Paqb 

The Peace Commission at Paris — The Completion 
OF TUE Treaty — The Stkdggle in the American 
Senate — Some Lessons of the War — The Work 
OF the Torpedo Boats — The Need for a Perma- 
nent Staff Organisation — The Part plated by 
the Militia — The Future of the Army .... 355 



Blue Jackets of 98 



CHAPTEE I 

The Far-reaching Causes of the War with Spain — How 
THE Spanish Empire in America was Founded and 
Forfeited — The United States as Spain's Guardian — 
The Diplomacy of the Cuban Question — The Views 
OF Jefferson and Monroe — The Ostend Manifesto — 
The Threat of the Holy Alliance — The United States 
Saving Cuba for their Own. 

THE Spanish war of 1898 was the result of inexorable 
causes which had their manifestations as early as 
the opening of the nineteenth century. The phrase " mani- 
fest destiny " has been sorely abused and degraded to a 
partisan cry, but half a century ago the destiny of the 
Spanish possessions in this hemisphere was manifest. The • 
causes which impelled a peace-loving nation to declare 
war upon Spain in April, 1898, existed even in the time 
of Pizarro and of Cortez. Spanish cruelty and rapacity 
have ever been at odds with the dominant spirit of our 
western hemisphere, and the decree for Spain's expulsion 
from the "West Indies was writ large in the history of 
the nineteenth century long before the destruction of the 
" Maine " and the starvation of the reconcentrados hastened 
its execution. A free and enlightened republic and a 
mediaeval despotism are inevitably quarrelsome neighbours. 
To the Cuban victims of Spanish tyranny the United 
States offered always an example of the blessings of a 
democracy and of the fruits of successful revolution, while 
to the people of the great republic the condition of Cuba 
was a constant irritant, resulting in repeated unlawful 

1 



2 Blue Jackets of '98 

but well-meant private expeditions planned to overthrow 
Spain's authority in that island. 

One hundred years ago the Spanish authority was 
supreme over all South America except Brazil and Guiana. 
In North America, the Floridas and all that vast expanse 
of territory west of the Mississippi and extending to the 
golden shores of California were recognised by all nations 
as Spanish. In twenty-five years this noble domain had 
dwindled to the islands of Cuba and Porto Eico, with a 
few near-by islets. To-day even that pitiful remnant of 
the empire which Columbus won for Spain is lost. With 
everytliing in its favour, with its customs, its language, and 
its sons still dominating more than half of the western 
hemisphere, Spain can no longer exercise authority over 
one foot of American soil. The sons of Spaniards threw 
off the Spanish yoke, for the free air of America stimu- 
lated their ambition and taught them that the political 
and social ideas of the Dark Ages have no place among 
the nation builders of to-day. The pathetic phase of the 
obliteration of Spain as a world power is justly obscured 
by the fact that Spanish power has always stood for 
oppression, cruelty, rapacity, and ignorance. When Spain 
has been great the progress of the world in science, art, 
and industry has stood still until the fighting men could 
administer a check to Spanish aggressions. In our own 
hemisphere, Cortez and Pizarro destroyed civilisations 
more advanced than any which Spain has founded in their 
stead. The ravaged fields and burned cabins of " paci- 
fied" Cuba are but the latest evidences of that national 
spirit of savagery which three hundred years ago left a like 
impress on Peru in ruined palaces and obliterated cities. 

The story of the foundation and the overthrow of 
Spanish power in America, the narrative of the series of 
successful revolutions which resulted in the establishment 
of the galaxy of republics in Central and South America is 
not to be told here. It demands volumes of its own 
— volumes of which page after page will necessarily be 



Blue Jackets of '98 3 

given over to stories of such revolting cruelty as stain the 
annals of no other people. The bigotry of the Inquisition 
accompanied the greed of the spoliator. The fagot and 
the stake awaited such of the aborigines as refused to 
yield up their simple beliefs, while the sword or the tor- 
ture was the portion of the chiefs who stubbornly clung 
to their treasures demanded by the men of Velasquez, 
Cortez, or De Soto. The Indian chief bound to a stake by 
Velasquez, and awaiting the fiery death decreed by a 
remorseless couquerer, expressed bitterly the hatred with 
which the Spaniards had inspired his people : 

" Do not you wish to go to Heaven ? " asked the priest 
who stood at his elbow. 

" Are there Spaniards there ? " asked the victim. 

" Certainly." 

" Then let me go somewhere else," cried the unhappy 
savage, who could conceive of no hell more cruel than that 
which Spanish cruelty had ordained for his people on earth. 

I have said that the United States and Spain were by 
the very antagonism of their institutions quarrelsome 
neighbours, but had it not been for the United States, 
Spain would have been deprived of her West Indian pos- 
sessions long before the event did actually occur. It has 
long been the conviction — usually unexpressed — of our 
leading statesmen that Cuba was naturally a part of our 
territory and would inevitably become a part of the United 
States. Thomas Jefferson more than seventy-five years 
ago discerned this fact and declared of that island that 
" her addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanted 
to round out our power as a nation to the point of its 
utmost interest." And John Quincy Adams, when Sec- 
retary of State, wrote in a letter to the United States 
minister at Madrid that, " It is scarcely possible to resist 
the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal 
republic will be indispensable to the continuance and 
integrity of the Union itself." 



4 Blue Jackets of '98 

But though the question of the control of Cuba and the 
relations of the United States to the nation owning the 
island have furnished themes for the state papers of almost 
every President and Secretary of State since the times of 
Jefferson, the actual question of annexation either by force 
or by purchase has seldom had frank treatment. Eeading 
between the lines, we may well discern that it was in the 
mind of every public man, but international comity, for 
one reason, prevented its utterance. Moreover, the ques- 
tion of slavery came in later days to complicate the prob- 
lem and to divide public opinion. If there was to be 
annexation, how would Cuba enter the Union ? The 
North vowed as a free state only ; the South insisted that 
the existing institution of slavery — it was destroyed m 
Cuba only as lately as 1886 — should be accepted with 
the island. This radical difference between the sections 
of the United States long prevented annexation, though 
more than one President urged such a policy upon Con- 
gress. In 1848, when Europe had its hands full, trying 
to repress a wave of republicanism which seemed likely 
to sweep all thrones away before it. President Polk in- 
structed the minister at Madrid to offer one hundred 
million dollars for the sovereignty of the island. It is 
characteristic of the Spanish temperament that the offer 
was not only refused, but treated as an affront, though 
even then the Cubans were in revolt, as indeed they have 
been, with but brief intermissions, ever since. And again 
Presidents Pierce and Buchanan urged upon Congress the 
wisdom of annexation by purchase, but were unable to 
enlist the favourable attention of the national legislature, 
which feared the slavery issue involved. " It is required,'' 
wrote President Buchanan in his message of 1859, "by 
manifest destiny that the United States should possess 
Cuba, not by violence, but by purchase at a fair price." 
This President spoke from a knowledge of his subject 
based on careful and prolonged study, for in 1854 James 
Buchanan, then minister to England, joined with the 



Blue Jackets of '98 5 

ministers to Spain and France in the celebrated " Ostend 
Manifesto." This document, prepared by the three diplo- 
mats after a conference at Ostend, declared that if Spain 
should stubbornly refuse to sell Cuba, national prudence 
and national self-preservation would make it imperative 
for the United States to conquer and annex the island, 
lest it be made by successful negro revolt a second San 
Domingo. Notwithstanding this vigorous representation, 
the Congress to which the Ostend manifesto was sent was 
as unwiUing to authorise Cuban annexation as was that 
of six years later, when Minister Buchanan had become 
President. It is apparent that however favourably the 
Presidents have looked upon the project of annexation, — 
and many have either recommended or discussed it, — 
Congress has always regarded it with suspicion or even 
with hostihty. 

The annexation of Cuba to the United States has, there- 
fore, never become a matter of international discussion. 
However earnestly it may have been desired by individual 
statesmen, it never attained such force as a national move- 
ment as to compel the attention of foreign governments. 
But the relations of the United States to Cuba, and to 
Spain in her capacity of owner of Cuba, have been the 
matter of grave diplomatic consideration abroad, and have 
more than once threatened serious complications. The 
position assumed by the United States until the year 
1898 was much that of the fabled dog in the manger. As 
a nation, we have persistently declared that we did not 
want Cuba, but that, under no circumstances, would we 
ever permit any nation other than Spain to acquire it. 
More than this, and more indefensible unless on the 
ignoble ground of national selfishness, we have at all times, 
until after our own civil war, frowned upon the efforts of 
the Cubans to win independence. The antagonism of the 
governing powers of the United States to the aspiration of 
the Cubans for independence sprung, of course, from the 
consciousness that a repubhc in which slavery was pro- 



6 Blue Jackets of '98 

hibited, despite the presence of great numbers of blacks, 
would be an annoying neighbour to the slave states of the 
Union. This opposition to Cuban independence dis- 
appcEired with slavery in the United States, and it is per- 
haps fair to say that if the South was so long potent in 
delaying Cuban freedom, its representatives far outdid the 
spokesmen of our Northern communities in urging action 
in behalf of the patriots in 1898. To-day, by the act of 
the United States, Cuba is offered an opportunity to essay 
self-government. Whether the trial shall end in that 
annexation to the United States which Jefferson hoped 
for and Buchanan foresaw, immediate history will tell. It 
will not take another century to determine the final con- 
stitution of Cuba. 

American opposition to the independence of Cuba — 
opposition which it must be remembered was that of 
prudent statesmen rather than of the masses of the people 
— ended with our own civil war and the destruction of 
slavery. But antagonism to the acquirement of sov- 
ereignty by any other power was more deeply rooted and, 
having its first expression in a famous state paper by 
President Monroe, has continued until the present day. 
This feature of the relations of the United States to its 
island neighbour has been of such supreme importance in 
the national code of the United States that it merits 
special attention from all who would understand the 
motives and principles which have animated and still 
direct the United States in its dealings with neighbouring 
powers. It is the story of the origin and development 
of a clause in our national creed scarcely less revered than 
the preamble to the Declaration of Independence itself, — 
the story of the Monroe Doctrine. 

In 1815 Europe, having crushed Napoleon, vmdertook 
the task of undoing the work of the French Eevolution, 
and extirpating what the despotic monarchs were pleased 
to consider the pestilential germs of democracy from all 
European lands. Eussia, Austria, and Prussia formed a 



r 



Blue Jackets of '98 7 

coalition to this end, giving it a title which would be 
blasphemous if it were not ridiculous, — " The Holy 
AUiance." In 1818 France, being again under the rule of 
the Bourbons, joined the coalition, and England secretly 
approved its purposes, though without giving open ad- 
herence to it. The embers of the fire of republicanism 
which had blazed so fiercely during the opening years of 
the nineteenth century were still smouldering. In Naples 
and Piedmont the people were in revolt, and in 1821 
Austria performed her part of the " holy " agreement by 
suppressing with the sword these embryonic efforts for 
popular government. In 1823 France joined in taking 
away from the Spanish people the small measure of 
liberty which a constitutional monarchy secured for them, 
and restored absolutism in the Iberian peninsula. Nor 
was the Holy Alliance content to confine its endeavours 
to its own side of the Atlantic. Its intervention in Spain 
suggested to its members that in the Spanish-American 
colonies there were menacing signs of the republican 
spirit which should engage the thoughtful and forceful 
attention of a league devoted to the protection of all the 
divine rights of kings, — and all rights of kings must be 
divine, else they cannot be rights at all, as the people 
have no share in granting them. Throughout the Span- 
ish states of South America, revolution was at that time 
in the high tide of successful accomplishment. Bolivar, 
the Washington of South America, was at the most glori- 
ous period of that wonderful career of agitation and 
generalship by which so much of South American terri- 
tory was wrested from European control. Cuba was 
honeycombed with republican conspiracies, though no 
open revolt was then in progress. The secret association 
of the " Soles de Bolivar " had enlisted the sympathies 
and co-operation of the best and most patriotic of the 
white natives of the island. A correspondence with 
Bolivar was in progress, his sympathy and aid assured, 
and a day set for striking the first blow. The blow was 



8 Blue Jackets of '98 

not struck, however, for treachery betrayed the leaders, 
and the conspiracy went to pieces ; but the investigation 
that followed alarmed the champions of absolutism by 
the evidence it gave of the extent and force of the 
democratic heresy in Cuba. 

It occurred, therefore, to the zealous servitors of mon- 
archy in Europe that Cuba offered a point of vantage 
whence to conduct the war upon democracy in America. 
An allied army there would effectually discourage any 
further spread of the pernicious doctrines of Washington, 
Jefferson, and Bolivar in that island, and thence expedi- 
tions might be despatched to regain the ground lost in 
South America. A hint of this plan reached our depart- 
ment of state as early as July, 1818, when Richard Rush, 
the American minister at the Court of St. James, was 
told by Lord Castlereagh of a proposition made by Spain 
for the mediation of England, in association with the 
Holy Alliance, with the rebelhous Spanish colonies. 
" Mediation," being a milder word than coercion, is much 
in favour with diplomats ; but the real essence of the 
proposition was that the Spanish colonies should be 
reconquered for Spain, and the purpose of Lord Castle- 
reagh's communication was to find out what the United 
States thought of the project. The answer of Rush, 
which was that the United States would have no part 
in the afiair unless its purpose was to secure the inde- 
pendence of the colonies, suggests that the habit of frank- 
ness, which in the latter end of the nineteenth century 
has been described as diplomacy in shirt-sleeves, is not 
wholly a new development of American diplomatic 
methods. 

That the United States would neither permit other 
nations to strengthen the hands of Spain in the western 
hemisphere, nor allow the Spanish colonies to be trans- 
ferred to stronger sovereignty, may have been a doctrine 
new to European diplomatic circles, but it had been 
definitely determined upon at home. In the Jefferson 



Blue Jackets of '98 9 

manuscripts, preserved at the national capital, is a memo- 
randum of action taken at a cabinet meeting in 1808. 
The cabinet then, wrote Jefferson, " unanimously agreed 
in the sentiments which should be unauthoritatively 
expressed by our agents to influential persons in Cuba 
and Mexico ; to wit : ' If you remain under the dominion 
of the kingdom and the family of Spain, we are con- 
tented ; but we should be extremely unwilling to see you 
pass under the dominion or ascendancy of France or 
England. In the latter case, should you choose to declare 
independence, we cannot now commit ourselves by say- 
ing we would make common cause with you, but must 
reserve ourselves to act according to the then existing 
circumstances ; but in our proceedings we shall be in- 
fluenced by friendship to you, by a firm feeling that our 
interests are intimately connected, and by the strongest 
repugnance to see you under subordination to either 
France or England, either politically or commercially ! " 

This, it will be noted, was the determination of Jeffer- 
son's cabinet, not openly declared in any state paper. It 
clearly holds the germ which after various stages of evo- 
lution finally developed into the Monroe Doctrine. 

In 1822 Lord Castlereagh, who had been rebuffed by 
Eush in the matter of " mediation " with the Spanish 
colonies, committed suicide. His successor. Canning, a 
more adroit diplomat, approached ]\Iinister Eush anew, 
but with vastly more skill. The story of the diplomatic 
advances by which the British minister sought to ingrati- 
ate himself with the American diplomat is an amusing 
one. No social art, no warmth of flattery, no professions 
of admiration for republican principles and for the men 
who were giving them effect in America was left untried. 
But at the end came the same proposition, " Would the 
United States join England in a European Congress to 
determine what should be done with Spain's rebellious 
American people ? " Eush declined, declaring that the 
United States had already recognised the independence 



lo Blue Jackets of '98 

of the South American states, and had, furthermore, no 
intention of entangling itself in European politics. 

" You could not have met Canning's proposals better," 
wrote President Monroe to the envoy, on learning of this 
colloquy, " if you had had the whole American cabinet at 
your right hand." But having posted this despatch to 
the American minister at London, Monroe wrote to 
Jefferson and Madison to ask them what they thought 
of Great Britain's proposition and of Eush's reply. 

Madison replied cautiously. Jefferson sent a letter, 
parts of which have been incorporated in what may be 
caUed our code of national political wisdom. " Our first 
and fundamental maxim should be," he wrote, " never to 
entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, 
never to suffer Europe to meddle in cis- Atlantic affairs. 
America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct 
from those of Europe and peculiarly her own. She 
should therefore have a system of her own, separate and 
distinct from those of Europe. While the last is labour- 
ing to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavour 
should surely be to make our hemisphere that of free- 
dom." Nevertheless Jefferson, a man of inconsistencies 
as varied as his talents, was w^illing to make an exception 
to his sweeping declaration against foreign entangle- 
ments in behalf of Great Britain which he was popularly 
supposed to regard with especially distrust and aversion. 
" Cuba alone," he wrote in another letter to Monroe, 
"seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. Its 
possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calam- 
ity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing 
its independence against all the world, except Spain, it 
would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own. But 
should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for 
it; because the first war on other accounts will give it 
to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to 
do so." 

Shortly after this President Monroe sent to Congress his 



Blue Jackets of '98 1 1 

famous message in which, referring to the supposed designs 
of the Holy Alliance upon the integrity of the new or 
embryonic states of South America, he declared that, " We 
should consider any attempt (of the allied powers) to 
extend their system to any portion of our hemisphere as 
dangerous to our peace and safety." 

Thereafter the position of the United States toward Cuba 
and the Spanish domination therein was clear and easily 
to be understood. We were ready to defend Spain's au- 
thority against all interlopers — did indeed defend it 
against Mexico and Colombia, which in 1825 formed a 
project for the invasion of Cuba. In 1830 Van Buren, 
Secretary of State under President Jackson, gave formal 
notice that Mexico would not be allowed to acquire 
Cuba. In 1825 Henry Clay, in a circular to the American 
ministers in Europe, said : 

" You will now add that Ave could not consent to the occupa- 
tion of these islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) by any other Euro- 
pean power than Spain, under any contingency whatever." 

Five years later, as though to show that the aversion of 
the United States to any change in the governmental con- 
ditions of Cuba wr.s not directed against European aspi- 
rants for conquest alone, Martin Van Buren, Secretary of 
State under Andrew Jackson, warned off Mexico with a 
curt notification that the United States would not permit 
her to acquire Cuba. And so, year after year, and admin- 
istration after administration, the word went forth to all 
the peoples and courts of the world that the United States 
would defend the title of Spain to Cuba against all comers. 
But it made no pledge to protect Spain against her own 
subjects, nor did it promise to abstain from taking the 
island for itself. Edward Everett, Secretary of State in 1852, 
in restating the American position, announced frankly that 
the United States would not bind itself not to take the 
island if, because of the evils of Spanish rule, this should 
become necessary or prudent. " But," he wrote, " the Presi- 



12 Blue Jackets of '98 

dent would consider its acquisition by force, except in a 
just war with Spain (should an event so gravely to be 
deprecated ever take place), as a disgrace to the civili- 
sation of the age." 

With this final word from Edward Everett, we may well 
let the story of diplomatic discussion in which our Spanish 
neighbour has involved the United States rest. Our national 
course in this matter has been singularly straightforward 
and consistent since the days of Jefferson. The latter half 
of the century brought no change in the policy which had 
been formulated in its youth. Our civil war and the prob- 
lems growing out of it quieted Cuban agitation for thirty 
years ; but when it became acute once more, and the war 
which Everett more than hinted at became inevitable, the 
despatch of the Secretary of State in 1852 might have been 
put in the preamble of the resolutions by which war was 
declared, without in any degree misrepresenting the popu- 
lar sentiment which compelled that challenge to Spain. 



CHAPTEE II 

Why Spain and the United States Clashed — The Island 
OF Perpetual Revolutions — The '' Soles de Bolivar " 
and the " Black Eagle " — Lopez and his Filibusters — 
How A Kentuckian died — The Ten Years War — The 
Compromise of Zanjon and its Repudiation — The Exe- 
cution OF the " ViRGINIUS," PRISONERS — JoSE MaRTI AND 

HIS Conspiracies — The New Revolution of 1895 — Campos 
Again and his Failure — Weyler, " the Butcher," 
and his Failure — Character of the Cuban Leaders 
— What Reconcentration meant — The Appointment of 
Blanco — American Aid to the Starving — The Compli- 
cations that led to the Visit of the "Maine." 

THERE are many kinds of bad neighbours. The ag- 
gressive and quan-elsome fellow who intrudes 
upon the rights of those who live about him may be the 
worst, but he is not the only undesirable one. There are 
the family that maintains a constant nuisance, the family 
that quarrel perpetually among themselves to the dis- 
turbance of peace and the scandal of the neighbourhood, 
and the family whose children are untrained and undisci- 
plined, a terror to neighbouring young people and a menace 
to everything breakable in the vicinity. The policy of the 
United States was successful in preventing a neighbour of 
the aggressive sort from settling down in Cuba ; but by pro- 
tecting Spain there we submitted ourselves to every other 
species of annoyance that a neighbour could inflict. From 
the beginning of the century, Cuba was m revolt. Spanish 
misrule and extortion made rebellion the normal condition 
of the island, and compelled the sympathy of Americans, 
even if considerations of state did make the active inter- 
vention of the government impossible. A colony which is 



14 Blue Jackets of '98 

regarded only as a mine to be worked, a cow to be milked, 
a field from which all produce is to be taken and nothing 
returned for fertilising, a slave whose portion is all hard 
work and lashes, — such a colony is naturally rebellious 
and justified in rebellion. 

It was upon such principles that Spain administered her 
colonies, and particularly Cuba. 

Never was there more biting irony than the confer- 
ring upon Cuba of the title " The Ever Faithful Isle." 
The phrase had its origin in 1808, when Napoleon 
drove the Bourbon dynasty from Madrid. In Havana 
then the Spanish officials met and declared their loyalty 
to the exiled sovereign, and defied the conqueror, — 
things perhaps not very audacious when done at 4,000 
miles distance from the seat of war. But even at that 
moment a conspiracy for the overthrow of Spanish author- 
ity was in progress, and they who affirmed their loyalty 
to the exiled Bourbons were not Cubans but Spanish 
officials, — carpet-baggers, as we should call them in the 
United States, whose protestations meant only that they 
would be unflinchingly loyal to the power which had con- 
ferred upon them their positions. 

This distinction between the Spanish office-holders, 
mostly in Havana, and the Cubans should be kept con- 
stantly in mind. One of the great reasons for the persis- 
tence of the Cuban dissatisfaction with the Spanish govern- 
ment has been that the officials, even to the administrative 
clerks, have usually been Spaniards sent out to the colony 
and animated only by a desire to get rich and go home 
again. 

In 1823 the first serious attempt to overthrow the 
authority of Spain was made. Prior to that year the Cuban 
uprisings, such as they were, had originated with negroes, 
and had sprung from the agitation for the abolition of 
slavery. But it was the very flower of the young Cuban 
whites who joined in the plot of tlie " Soles de Bolivar" in 
1823, having for its purpose the independence of the island 



Blue Jackets of '98 15 

and her enrolment among the free republics which the 
genius of Bolivar had created on the great continent to the 
south. The conspiracy, as I have already noted, was short 
lived. Betrayed by traitors, the conspirators were appre- 
hended, and many of them executed. The spirit that ani- 
mated these young patriots, however, was not destined to 
perish. In three years, a new rebellion was planned, the 
ring-leaders being men who had figured in the abortive 
conspiracy in the name of Bolivar. This, too, was short 
lived, but it appears to have spread sufficiently to affright 
the Madrid government, which took steps to strengthen 
the hands of the colonial governor against future con- 
spiracies, by giving him unc|ualified power to put the island, 
or any part of it, under martial law whenever he saw fit. 
At any time he could order the arrest and trial by court- 
martial of any citizen or body of citizens whom he might 
suspect, and the courts were powerless to protect them. 
He could exert the right of search and seizure in time of 
absolute peace, as though the country were a town in a 
state of siege. Of course the effect of this grant of power, 
which was freely exercised, was to increase the dissatis- 
faction of the people with Spanish rule and to multiply 
conspiracies. It has ever been that the effort of des- 
potism to stifle discontent by becoming more despotic has 
failed. In Cuba, citizens who had held aloof from all 
previous revolutionary movements now joined in the plots 
against the Spanish power. The third of the organised 
conspiracies which quickly followed, was that of the order 
of the " Aguila Negra," or Black Eagle, and it met the same 
fate as its predecessors. 

It is perliaps not too early in tliis chronicle to say that 
from the first the Cubans showed themselves better at 
conspiring than in giving their conspiracies effect, better 
at rebelling against authority than in overthrowing that 
authority. In proportion to the number of Cubans who 
sympathised with Gomez, Maceo, and Garcia in the re- 
bellion which by the aid of the United States became 



1 6 Blue Jackets of '98 

finally the revolution, the army was surprisingly small. 
And in proportion to the size of the army, the number of 
men who actually appeared in battle was even more 
disappointing. 

We may pass hastily over the successive riots and 
revolts which kept Cuba in a turmoil for half a century. 
By 1840 the discontent of the islanders had come to be 
so general that adventurous persons in the United States, 
taking seriously the Cuban ambition for freedom, began 
to consider whether some advantage might not be gained 
by taking to the island armed bodies of men and inciting 
the Cubans to successful revolt. In the main these fili- 
busters, as they came to be called, were animated by selfish 
and mercenary motives. They were true soldiers of for- 
tune, attracted no doubt in part by the romantic notion 
of helping to build up a new nation, but not at all blind 
to possible profit for themselves in the government of it. 
The first of these expeditions was that of Narciso Lopez, 
in 1848. Lopez had made his essay at rebellion in Cuba 
with the usual results, and after escaping to the United 
Ftates, organised there a society of Cuban refugees. Among 
the members of this society, and among Americans who were 
actuated by motives as various as men have mental char- 
acteristics, Lopez organised a filibustering expedition. 
The United States authorities got wind of it, and sup- 
pressed it, as was clearly the duty of a nation friendly to 
the government de facto in Cuba. That was the begin- 
ning of the war of the United States government on men 
v.-ho were trying to make Cuba free, — a warfare which the 
practices of civilised nations made compulsory, but which 
was repugnant to the officials who directed it, the officers 
who were actively engaged in it, and the people who paid 
the bills. 

Undaunted by his first failure, Lopez made preparations 
for another effort. He gathered together some six hun- 
dred men at an island near Yucatan. Thence by steamer 
the expedition, well armed and provisioned for a cam- 



Blue Jackets of '98 17 

paign, proceeded to Cardeuas, where it landed and threw 
up entrenchments. Lopez was a visionary, — a man of 
the John Brown type in some respects. Like the hero of 
Harper's Ferry, he thought that a people suffering under 
tyranny would rise and fight for freedom. He did not 
know his own people. Instead of flocking to his stand- 
ard, they left him severely alone. They had neither cour- 
age for the fight, nor manliness enough to brave the martial 
law which they knew would be declared on the news of 
the landing of the expedition. Havana was full of sol- 
diers, and a railroad ran thence to Cardenas. If some 
patriot had destroyed a section of this road, Lopez might 
have had time to rouse the country and begin a Fabian 
warfare like that which Garcia and Gomez afterward made 
effective. But the patriots were all in the cafes, and two 
thousand and five hundred Spanish soldiers went down 
the railroad to attack the invaders. They retreated prac- 
tically without resistance, and the United States govern- 
ment seized Lopez's steamer and put him on trial, but 
failed to convict him of any punishable offence. Juries 
were not much moved by the crime of filibustering then. 

We must admire the persistence of Lopez, though his 
actual accomplishments were inconsequential. In 1851 
he was again equipped with a steamer, arms, provisions, 
and an army of four hundred and fifty men. This time 
he had a company of more formidable soldiers. Forty- 
nine were Americans, adventurous men from the West and 
South who knew how to fight and, as they proved, how to 
die. Several Hungarians, Germans, and Poles, flotsam 
from the European revolutions of '48, were in the party, 
one General Pragay being second in command. Bungled 
from the first, the expedition perished miserably. The 
pilot intrusted with the task of finding a landing place 
nearly took the filibusters into the lion's jaws at Havana, 
but, escaping this peril, landed them at Bahia Honda. As 
usual, the force of Cubans which had been expected to 
join failed to appear, and Lopez committed the fundamen- 



1 8 Blue Jackets of '98 

tal error of dividing his force in the face of the enemy. 
At the coast were left one hundred and fifty men under 
command of Colonel Crittenden, a Kentuckian of distin- 
guished family. Lopez, with the main body, pushed on into 
the interior, hoping to rally the natives to the banner of free 
Cuba. The Spanish soldiery were quickly on the heels of 
both parties. Crittenden's party, after a running fight in 
the woods in which they suffered severely, were captured. 
In accordance with the inhuman practice of the Spaniards, 
the survivors, some fifty in all, were sentenced to be shot. 
Blindfolded and kneeling with their backs to their exe- 
cutioners, they died wretchedly. Crittenden met his end 
with a flash of defiance on his tongue. " A Kentuckian 
never turns his back on an enemy and kneels only to his 
God," he said, when ordered to prepare like the others for 
death, and he faced his fate like a brave man. Lopez 
was overtaken by the pursuers at Las Pozas, where he 
repelled an attack of the enemy, but was so sorely weak- 
ened that in his retreat he was compelled to leave his 
wounded to be murdered by the Spaniards. At Las 
Frias, soon after, in another battle the filibusters fought 
bravely and won a second victory. But their little tri- 
umphs were without avail. In every fight they lost 
heavily, and no recruits came to their standards, while the 
Spaniards, re-enforced daily, kept up the pursuit. Gradu- 
ally the invaders were reduced to mere scattered bands of 
miserable fugitives, fleeing through the woods and in- 
capable of further resistance. Lopez and some of his 
companions were captured and died by the garrote at 
Havana. The fate of the rest is known only to the im- 
penetrable jungles of Cuba and to the hideous land crabs 
and loathsome vultures that rend the flesh of the helpless 
and the dead lying there. 

Too many Americans had fallen in the ill-fated Lopez 
expedition for its fate to be thought of with indifference 
in the United States, and the gallant words of Crittenden 
stirred the blood of many who thought such a youth too 



Blue Jackets of 98 19 

fine a type to be a victim to Spanish bloodtliirstiness. 
Henceforward the irritation of the United States was great 
whenever Spain offended in any degree, and offence was 
constant. Spain began suspecting a filibuster in every 
American ship in Cuban waters. The constant challenge 
of our merchantmen angered our sailors, and every inci- 
dent of this kind was made the most of by the anti- 
Spanish party, which was coming to be a recognised force 
in the United States. By firing upon United States ships, 
opening mail-bags at Havana consigned to this country, 
detaining merchantmen unlawfully, and seizing them on 
frivolous allegations of fraud upon the customs, Spain 
made herself obnoxious to an extent that threatened war. 
The Ostend Manifesto, abeady referred to, which frankly 
discussed the wisdom of taking Cuba from Spain by force, 
grew out of the irritation these repeated aggressions 
aroused among our people. But our own war between 
the States saved Spain for a time. 

In 1868 the discontented Cubans rose again in revolt, 
and this time proclaimed boldly the Cuban Eepublic. 
The island was full of soldiers, both the Spanish regulars 
and the so-called volunteers recruited carefully among 
the Spanish sympathisers. Nevertheless a lawyer of 
Bay am o, one Carlos M. de Cespedes, with the knowledge 
of all the rebellions that had miserably failed, took the 
field with one hundred and twenty-eight men, half-armed, 
and bade Spain defiance. But this time the Cubans who 
had so often disappointed those who strove to free them 
were readily roused. The years of comparative immunity 
from armed revolt had been employed by Spain only in 
making existence more intolerable for the people of the 
island. Taxes had been increased to a point bordering 
on confiscation, and the carpet-bagging tax-gatherers 
swindled the government as they fleeced the tax-payers. 
The force of " volunteers " was a heavy burden upon the 
colony. Though a militia body, its members were paid 
for service. It was recruited largely among the families 



20 Blue Jackets of '98 

of those holding office under the home government, and 
was carefully limited to men of whose loyalty to Spain 
there could be no question. Besides their military duties, 
the volunteers quickly began to assume political functions. 
They became what we call in the United States a machine, 
dictating nominations for the few electoral offices and 
monopolising for themselves all the offices of emolument. 
The native Cuban was practically denied all share in the 
government of his own provinee. He was the tax-payer ; 
the Spaniards, the tax-eaters. As the appetites of the 
latter were voracious, and as the government at Madrid 
was not without a zest for spoils, the debt of Cuba mounted 
up until its interest alone was $6.39 per capita, and the 
amount of revenue which it was sought to extract from 
the island for 1868 was 840,000,000. This was more 
than the people could raise, and payment was not made 
easier by the spectacle of enormous salaries paid to cor- 
rupt officials. A Captain-General with a salary of $50,000 
a year, when the President of the United States was get- 
ting $25,000, and two archbishops at $18,000 each, with 
other salaries of like extravagance, made the Cuban planter 
see that he was being impoverished for the enrichment 
of an office-holding aristocracy. Touched in the pocket, 
he responded more forcefully to this new appeal for 
action against the Spanish oppression than he had when 
the " Soles do Bolivar " had appealed to his desire for 
freedom, or when the brave and unfortunate Lopez had 
sought to set up an independent state. 

The war that followed was one of endurance rather 
than of action. The insurgents were confined mainly to 
the forest clad hills of the interior whence they descended 
on frequent forays, attacking some Spanish post, capturing 
and often burning some little town, desolating a province 
or killing at wholesale men known to be in league with 
the Spaniards. All the evils of guerrilla warfare were 
suffered by the unhappy islanders for ten years. The 
Cubans were weak, ill-armed, and poor. Their chief 



Blue Jackets of '98 21 

weapon was the machete, — a heavy sword-like knife. 
They knew that to give pitched battle to the enemy 
would be to invite annihilation, so they maintained an 
irregular warfare in the hope of exhausting Spain's re- 
sources of men and money. The Spaniards for their part 
did not push hostilities with any vigour. To Spanish gen- 
eral officers a war has always meant great profits, and the 
long duration of the Ten Years War is believed to have 
been due in part to the willingness of some officers in high 
command to make money in contracts and by falsified 
pay-rolls. But as it dragged along the cost to Spain be- 
came tremendous, while to the people of the island it 
meant ruin. Spanish statistics are notoriously incomplete, 
but not less than 150,000 men were sacrificed in this effort 
to make Cuba submissive. The Cubans suffered in pro- 
portion, and were made the victims of peculiarly cruel 
orders and murderous outrages at the hands of the Span- 
ish troops. In 1898 what was known as the " reconcen- 
tration policy " of General Weyler had much to do with 
producing the inhuman conditions which led to the inter- 
vention of the United States ; but Weyler was anticipated 
in 1869 by General Balmaceda, whose reconcentration pro- 
clamation included such cruel ordinances as this : " Every 
man from the age of fifteen years upw^ards found away 
from his habitation who does not prove a proper reason 
therefor will be shot." In the effort to crush the Cuban 
by cruel and murderous methods the volunteers of Havana 
took an active and infamous part. In 1871 they seized a 
number of school-boys accused of defacing the glass on a 
tomb containing the body of a Spanish soldier, tried them 
by a court-martial which had no official character, — a ver- 
itable mock court, — and shot eight dead the following 
morning in execution of the sentence. For these whole- 
sale murders the members of the politico-military organ- 
isation were never punished. They were indeed superior 
! to the law and had just forced a regularly appointed 
Captain-General to return to Madrid. 



22 Blue Jackets of '98 

In this insurrection, as in all others, the sympathy of 
the people of the United States was earnestly with the 
Cubans. Pressure was brought to bear on the adminis- 
tration from many sources for the recognition of the 
insursrents and for active intervention in their behalf. 
But then, as thirty years later, the insurgents suffered 
from being unable to show an organised government which 
could command respect, or a capital that could be reached 
by an envoy. These facts President Grant pointed out in 
his message of 1869, but shortly afterward the distressing 
situation in Cuba compelled him to send in to Congress a 
special message detailing the unhappy condition of the 
island and noting that if the insurgents had made no pro- 
gress in winning liberty, Spain had made none toward 
suppressing the revolt. There were then the same reasons 
for intervention that recurred in 1898, and the arguments 
against it employed by President Grant were almost 
literally those used later by Presidents Cleveland and 
McKmley. 

Not even the one great crime against the lives of 
Americans which, in the sinking of the "Maine," in 1898, 
had so potent a share in bringing on war, was without a 
prototype in 1873. Filibustering expeditions havmg for 
their purpose the supplying of arms, recruits, and muni- 
tions of war to the insurgents were common during the 
earlier revolt as in the days of the later one. In October, 
1873, an American side- wheel steamer, the " Virginius," was 
engaged in one of these expeditions. Off the southern 
coast of the island, she was sighted by a Spanish gunboat, 
and despite all efforts to escape was overhauled and cap- 
tured. One hundred and sixty-five men were taken pris- 
oners, and with the ship were taken in to Santiago de. 
Cuba. Then began a series of unlawful and cruel execu- 
tions which were in fact assassinations, and which should 
have resulted in an instant declaration of war by the 
United States. Within three days of their capture, three 
Cubans and one American were taken from amons their 



Blue Jackets of 98 23 

fellows in prison and shot, — not after trial, but summarily, 
upon order of the Spanish commander, General Burriel. 
Again three days, and thirty-seven more, including the 
ship's commander. Captain Frey, were lined up, blindfold 
and kneeling before a company of marines, and shot dead. 
Against this execution the consuls of both the United 
States and England protested in vain. Several of the 
victims were British subjects, but the Spaniards, with 
the fatuous indifference which has ever characterised 
them, gave as little heed to the nationality of the men 
they slaughtered, as they did to the international law bear- 
ing upon their cases. In the face of the combined pro- 
test of the consuls, twelve more men were shot on the day 
following. Then the executions abruptly ceased, for the 
captain of the British man-of-war " Lorraine " ran into San- 
tiago harbour with shotted guns and men at quarters, threat- 
ening to bombard the town if another prisoner was slain. 
Then followed diplomacy and delay, until the blood of 
the American people, roused rightly to the fighting point 
by these murders, had time to cool. In the end Spain 
agreed to surrender the " Virginius" — and did it by deliver- 
ing her in a filthy and sinking condition ; to punish the 
officials engaged in the massacre , — and did it by promot- 
ing Captain Burriel ; and to pay a small indemnity for the 
victims of the massacre, — as though lives could be paid 
for. There was hot indignation at the termination of the 
affair then, and it is not pleasing reading now, even after 
the bloody annihilation of Spain's proudest squadron 
within sight of the spot where the men of the " Virginius " 
were slain has in some degree atoned for the crime. In 
1873, however, the nation had no navy, and before a 
Spanish tribunal no cause not backed with show of force 
seemed to meet with justice. It cannot be maintained, 
however, that any considerations of fighting strength 
could have made the course of the United States in deal- 
ini,f with the government responsible for the " Virginius " 
outrage wise or prudent. The duty neglected then had to 



24 Blue Jackets of '98 

be performed thirty years later. It was necessary that at 
some time Spain should be taught to observe the customs 
of civilised peoples and to treat her neighbours with re- 
spect. It is a curious coincidence, by the way, that the 
public wish for the recognition of the insurgents, which 
naturally was very strong immediately after the " Virginius " 
affair, was balked by the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, 
whose grandson, bearing the same name, was the first 
man shot dead on Cuban soil in the Spanish war of 1898. 
When even the affair of the " Virginius " failed to result 
in intervention by the United States, the rebellion lagged. 
Then as in later years the Cubans recognised that their 
one hope of winning freedom lay in the possibility that 
their great neighbour would make their caiise its own. 
Disappointed in this hope, they fell to bickering among 
themselves, and at the same time the disordered conditions 
in Spain which had contributed much to the advantage of 
the insurgents were cleared up by the firm re-establish- 
ment of the Bourbon dynasty on the throne. With peace 
at Madrid, the suppression of the Cubans was believed to 
be easy, and a distinguished soldier. General Martinez 
Campos, was sent to the island with 25,000 veteran troops 
and the unqualified authority of the Captain-General. 
Campos was astonished at the magnitude of the task 
committed to him. The Cubans were as elusive as foxes 
in the thickets, and as fierce and unexpected in their at- 
tacks as panthers. With ambushes, night assaults, sud- 
den raids, the harrying of the country and the destruction 
of provisions, they demoralised the regulars, who were aU 
unused to guerriUa warfare. After a year of this sort of 
hostilities, finding the island no nearer pacification than 
at the outset, Campos determined to try the methods of 
compromise. The first Cubans with whom he commu- 
nicated and who undertook to present his overtures to their 
comrades were promptly killed by their fellows, who con- 
strued even a willingness to carry proposals from the 
enemy as a sort of treachery. In the end, however, an 



Blue Jackets of '98 25 

a'Treement was reached known as the treaty of Zanjon, 
which ended the Ten Years War. It promised on behalf 
of Spain radical reforms, a large measure of self-govern- 
ment, and immunity to aU who took part in the rebellion. 
It is unnecessary to enumerate in detail all the provisions 
of this treaty, for almost without exception they were vio- 
lated by Spain either in letter or in spirit. One clause 
provided that any persons who had participated in the 
recent insurrection who desired to leave the island might 
do so at the expense of Spain. This was taken advantage 
of by several of the leaders, including some of whom the 
world was destined to hear more, — Maximo Gomez and 
Antonio and Jose Maceo. Those who remained soon dis- 
covered that the blood shed in the Ten Years War had 
been wasted, for Spanish perfidy nullified all the conces- 
sions which had been exacted from the Madrid ministry. 
It was the recollection of the deception practised at this 
time which made the Cuban patriots and their friends in 
1898 absolutely deaf to the engaging promises of autonomy 
and reform with which the Spaniards sought to quiet the 
last revolution. 

A tricked and humiliated people will never rest quietly 
under the domination of their deceivers. Plans for a new 
Cuban revolution were under way before the wounds in- 
curred in the Ten Years War were fairly healed. Spain 
was quick to furnish the excuse. She sent out hordes of 
Spanish office-holders bent only on spoliation. She or- 
ganised anew the Spaniards in Cuba, making them a class 
apart from the Cubans and giving them all the profitable 
places. Spanish manufacturers were given a virtual 
rimnopoly of the trade of the island, and the bread of 
( 'nban children was made dear that Spanish millers might 
1)0 rich. Taxes went up again to the point of extortion, 
and indeed all the conditions which had led to the earlier 
revolt were renewed and made more burdensome. 

The patriots who had left the island under the provis- 
ions of the treaty of the Zanjon were the active organisers 



26 Blue Jackets of '98 

of the new outbreak. They formed revolutionary dubs 
in the United States, the West Indies, and South America. 
Funds were raised, an active correspondence maintained, 
arms purchased. Jose Marti, a graduate of the University 
of Madrid, was the active organiser in this work. He 
chartered ships, penetrated Cuba in disguise, — he would 
have been hanged if caught — went over to San Domingo 
to see the veteran Gomez and to Costa Kica to meet the 
Maceos. By February, 1895, his plots were sufficiently 
matured for the first blow to be struck. On the 24th of 
that month it was reported at Havana that another re- 
bellion had begun. A small band of rebels had appeared 
at Ybarra, in Matanzas, and the other sections of the 
island reported the defiance of authority by parties of 
armed men. " Only a negro uprising," said the Spanish \ 
authorities. It was preposterous to suppose that the 
authority of Spain, supported as it was by 20,000 regular 
troops and 60,000 enrolled volunteers, could be seriously 
menaced by a few bands of ragamuffins. But before that 
insignificant revolt had enlisted the aid of the United 
States, Spain, in the effort to suppress it, had put about 
200,000 men in the field, and had lost by death, wounds, 
and sickness not less than 105,000 of them, while the 
expense in money of the war had reduced the nation to 
the verge of bankruptcy. 

The story of this war, which within three years com- 
pelled the intervention of the United States, is much like 
that of its predecessor. The insurgents grew rapidly in , 
numbers and in confidence. The exiles of the Ten Years 
War returned enthusiastically to join in the new effort for 
free Cuba. First to come was Antonio Maceo, an educated 
mulatto and a born soldier, the only leader in the old 
days who had refused to concur in the treaty of Zanjon, 
but kept in the field for two months after all others had 
submitted. Soon after came Marti, and Maximo Gomez 
from San Domingo, the former to fall in the very first 
skirmish, the latter to fight to the end and to march 



Blue Jackets of '98 27 

proudly into Havana, the hero of the assembled Cubans, 
when that capital was entered by the soldiers of the 
United States and their allies. Third in importance 
among these devoted leaders, was Calixto Garcia, another 
veteran of the Ten Years War, a man of seventy years, 
whose soldierly bearing compelled the respect of all the 
trained soldiers who in later days met him. These leaders 
of high character and of long experience gave to the new 
movement for free Cuba a more impressive appearance in 
the eyes of the world. They remembered the weakness of 
their earlier effort, springing from the lack of a govern- 
ment and a capital, so they called a constitutional conven- 
tion, adopted a form of government, and elected a ministry 
of which Salvador Cisneros was president. In form the 
government was all that could be asked, in fact it was 
mainly on paper, and the capital was as elusive as a 
will-o'-the-wisp. No seaport town could be held by the 
Cubans for lack of a navy, nor could they establish them- 
selves permanently in any interior city which was easy of 
access to an enemy which outnumbered them. 

Skirmishes and raids made up the military history of 
this war as of the earlier one. The Spanish government, 
quickly taking alarm, recalled Captain-General Calleja, and 
sent in his place Martinez Campos, the negotiator of the 
repudiated compromise of 1878. This appointment did 
not tend to allay the irritation of the Cubans ; but Campos 
brought with him 25,000 Spanish regulars, a force which 
it was thought would suppress all disorder. Before the 
year had ended thrice as many more had come from Spain, 
and the rebellion was stronger than ever. Gomez, who 
was supreme in command of the insurgents, early adopted 
a general plan of campaign by which the innumerable 
bands of insurgents were to be guided. It was a plan of 
avoidance of pitched battles and of constant irritation to 
the Spaniards. All small posts were to be attacked to 
the end that arms might be captured, and every Spaniard 
who delivered up his arms was to be set free. Eailroad 



28 Blue Jackets of 98 

and telegraph lines were to be cut wherever found. All 
crops of sugar-cane and all cane mills were to be destroyed 
unless the owners contributed to the Cuban campaign 
fund. As in the latter event the Spaniards destroyed 
crops and mills, the making of sugar soon came to an end 
in Cuba. Finally the farmers were to be prevented from 
sending food to the city imless they paid a tax to the in- 
surgent treasury. Above all things, no band of insurgents 
was to risk a battle in which the odds were against them. 
A policy which would starve and weary the Spaniards, 
and so harass the country that it would become unendur- 
able was the Cuban plan of campaign, — the only one 
which with their limitations the insurgents could have 
made effective. Accordingly, we look unavailingly for 
battles. Even when considerable forces met, the fighting 
was not stubborn. Early in the war, Campos and ]\Iaceo 
came into conflict near Bayamo with from 1500 to 2500 
men each. An inconclusive battle was fought. " The 
enemy suffered severely," wqis the report of each side, for 
the statistical methods of both Spaniard and Cuban were 
alike in their endeavour to minimise their own losses and 
multiply those of the foe. The most notable thing about 
the accounts of the battles of the insurrection, from which- 
ever side emanating, is their complete inaccuracy. Major 
Grover Flint, a young American who joined Gomez, tells 
a story which fairly indicates the Spanish method of find- 
ing " victories " to chronicle. " There had been a court- 
martial in Lacret's camp the morning of the skirmish," 
writes Major Flint. " A mulatto lieutenant named Sanchez 
— a brave man, too, they told me — had been found 
guilty of assault on a negro girl of the neighbourhood and 
condemned to death. He was hung under the porch of a 
deserted cottage, with a placard on his breast giving his I 
name, the offence, and the finding of the court. I saw the] 
body and the Spaniards saw it too. A week later, in a I 
bundle of Havana newspapers that came to us, we read 
that the cabecilla (or chieftain) Sanchez had fallen in 



Blue Jackets of '98 29 

battle and had been left dead on the field by Lacret's re- 
treating bands." The mcident is of value, too, as showing 
how drastic was the discipline in the insurgent camps. 
They were rebels but not ruffians. Though outlawed by 
Spain, they were obedient to the laws which civihsed 
people impose. It is unhappily too well established that 
Spain judged her soldiers more leniently for the offence 
for which the rebel Sanchez was hanged. 

By the end of 1895 the revolution had spread to all 
parts of the island, and the Spaniards were secure in 
possession only of the large cities. The imported soldiers 
from Spain sickened and died in the deadly summer 
chmate, and the repeated drafts were beginning to make 
the Spanish people impatient. It was determined at 
Madrid that the policy of Campos lacked force and vigour, 
and General Valeriano Weyler y Nicalau, Marquis of 
Teneriffe, was commissioned in his place. Weyler was 
a man of infamous record. A professional soldier, he had 
made war murderous under the plea of making it deci- 
sive. He was notorious equally for the cold brutality of 
his nature and for his rapacity. He was no less a robber 
than a murderer.' In the previous war in Cuba he had 
gained an execrable name by the commission of unname- 
able barbarities. In the Philippines he had not only 
appalled the people by his utter indifference to the plain- 
est dictates of humanity, but had robbed the government 
by wholesale. His appointment to Cuba meant that the 
war would be conducted with the utmost barbarity, but 
did not promise speedy peace. Weyler found his profit 
in a state of war, and could not be expected to make haste 
to end it. 

In fact it was soon seen that the boasted energy of the 
new Governor-General was without results. The insur- 
gents continued as before harrying the country, checking 
all production, and thus cutting off Spanish revenues. 
Maceo burned Batabano and terrorised the province of 
Pinar del Eio after the Governor-General had pronounced 



30 Blue Jackets of '98 

it pacified. Gomez, at Camaguey, defeated General Castil- 
lanos, though the Spaniards outnumbered him four to 
one. Then Weyler adopted the celebrated device of the 
" trocha," a line of defence composed of trenches, barbed 
wire, and blockhouses extending across the island from 
Mariel to Majana. Two months were spent in building 
this trocha, and 15,000 men employed. The theory of 
it was that it would cut the insurgent forces iu two, that 
they could never cross it to unite, and that thus severed 
they would be easily defeated. As a matter of fact the 
troops both of Gomez and Maceo crossed it repeatedly. 
But m one of his expeditions, a most audacious one ex- 
tendincr into Havana Province itself, Maceo fell into an 
ambush and was killed. A surgeon on his staff, Dr. 
Zertuccha, is charged with having betrayed him, but of 
this there is doubt. A gallant soldier, a strict discipli- 
narian, a man of a high sense of honour and one who 
struggled unceasingly to prevent the revolution degen- 
erating into a mere outbreak of lawlessness, Maceo was 
a sore loss to the Cuban cause. He had been second in 
command to Gomez, and upon him the leader of the revo- 
lution had relied implicity. His place was to some degree 
taken by General Calixto Garcia, who reached Cuba soon 
after. 

While the warfare of General Weyler on the insurgents 
gave not the slightest promise of a suppression of the 
insurrection, it was his methods which hastened the end^ 
in the way it came. Upon the manner of warfare whicl 
came to be described as Weylerism, the people of the! 
United States looked with indignation and growing wrath| 
In the field his men were murderers more than soldiersJ 
Neither women nor children were spared on their raidsj 
and the desolate thickets of Cuba witnessed many 
scene of revolting cruelty that vied in horror with the 
incidents of our early Indian wars. But chief of all thej 
offences accredited to Weyler, and most potent in rousing 
the United States to action, was the policy of reconcen-^ 



Blue Jackets of '98 31 

tration which formed the subject of his first order on 
reaching Havana. 

The theory of this pohcy was simple. Weyler saw 
that certain provinces were held by the insurgents, who 
lived on the country. They refused battle except when 
in such numbers that their victory was certain. Lurking 
in the forests, they would dash out, strike, and disappear. 
Months of ordinary campaigning made no impression 
upon them, and there seemed to be no reason why they 
could not prolong this species of warfare indefinitely. It 
must be admitted that the problem which confronted 
General Weyler was one not easily solved. His method 
of treating it was to make the country in which the insur- 
gents were operating a desert, to destroy its crops and its 
homes, to remove its peaceable inhabitants to the neigh- 
bouring towns, to prohibit any further farming or cattle- 
raising until the rebels were starved out and ready to 
surrender. The results of this policy were shocking to 
the civilised world, but in itself it was not a new device 
in warfare. To ravage a country upon which the enemy 
is living is a primary proposition in strategy. Our own 
General Sheridan once reported that he had so desolated 
the Shenandoah Valley, " that a crow flying over it would 
have to take his rations with him." 

But the effect of this policy in Cuba was only to cause 
the deaths from starvation and disease of tens of thousands 
of unoffending people. The weak and aged, the women 
and children were the sufferers, while the insurgent ranks 
were swelled doubly by the men who had seen their 
fields laid waste and their roofs burned. The decree 
would have been cruel had it merely ordered the destruc- 
tion of homes ; but it went further and compelled the 
" pacificoes " thus brutally dispossessed to gather in the 
nearest towns, where there was no way for them to earn 
a living nor any methods, save those of mendicancy, for 
getting either shelter or food. One clause of the order, 
which was a mere invitation to murder, prescribed that 



32 Blue Jackets of '98 

all pacificoes who did not within eight days come into 
the towns would be treated like enemies, — that is, be 
outlawed and killed wherever found. 

The blood of Maceo, the life-long planning of Marti, 
the gallant service of Garcia and Gomez with all their 
followers did less for free Cuba than this one decree. 

From the moment the effects of reconcentration began 
to be apparent, the fortunes of the insurgents in the field 
were of no importance. They kept the field, for in a 
country so rich in vegetation as Cuba a persistent force 
of men willing to endure hardships cannot be starved out, 
and the Cuban patriots lived patiently on fruits and roots 
and fought on. But the people gathered in the cities 
died miserably, and soon the newspaper correspondents 
from the United States, instead of sending vague accounts 
of battles between the Spaniards and the Cubans, with a 
paucity of details and a loud claim on the part of the 
former that each had been a glorious victory, began visit- 
ing towns where the reconcentrados were gathered and 
telhng of their condition to the people at home with only 
too much detail. Babies starving to death in their 
mothers' arms, the bodies of starved women and little 
children lying in the filthy street where they had fallen in 
their last agony, helpless people by the thousand crowded 
together in filthy corrals without shelter, without food, 
and destitute of the ordinary decencies of life — condi- 
tions such as these, " in the very dooryard of the United 
States," as the phrase went, were intolerable. Our people 
were incredulous for a long time. Such barbarity was 
incredible in these days of civilisation, but the evidence 
multiplied day by day. To the testimony of the corre- 
spondents was added that of unprofessional observers who 
went to Cuba to satisfy themselves that the newspapers 
lied, and came back white with horror and with rage. 
The growing perfection and wide use of photography 
added materially to the volume of proof of Spain's barbari- 
ties. The camera does nut take things that do not exist, 



Blue Jackets of '98 33 

and the pictures of emaciated children showed one jDhase 
of the Weyler policy, while other photographs of pacificos 
tied hand and foot and bleeding from fatal wounds of the 
machete inflicted while they were thus helpless denoted 
another. Even in the enormous mass of exaggerated and 
often wholly imaginative stuff sent out from Cuba in the 
guise of news, there was enough which bore unmistakably 
the stamp of truth and which related stories of outrage, 
barbarity, and murder to inflame public opinion in the 
United States to the point of war. General Weyler saw 
the danger and tried to avert it characteristically, not by 
reforming his course, but by imprisoning and expelling 
from Cuba the correspondents who had exposed it. This 
was of no avail. Put on their mettle, the journalists re- 
doubled their activity, and by this time their reports had 
ample authentication from official sources. The endeav- 
ours of the charitable to care for the destitute gave convinc- 
ing indication of the extent of destitution. The Spaniards 
themselves were forced to join in the work of mercy. 
Early in the war the Spanish army, probably under com- 
pulsion, raised a fund for this purpose, Campos giving 
$2,000 and each soldier contributing one day's pay. After 
Weyler's departure. General Blanco, his successor, secured 
a fund of $100,000 for the starving, and the city of Havana 
by taxation raised nearly as much for the same end. In 
every considerable city of Cuba committees were formed 
for the relief of the reconcentrados, but the situation soon 
became too much for the utmost endeavours of private 
charity to cope with. When 400,000 people are beggared 
and starving, when all industry and commerce in the nation 
are wrecked by war, the few who have a livelihood left to 
them are neither numerous enough nor rich enough to re- 
lieve the unfortunate. There was but one way to restore 
even a semblance of prosperity to the island, and that was 
to permit the reconcentrados to return to their farms. 
That Weyler would not do, and when his successor, General 
Blajico, repealed the reconcentration order it was too late. 

3 



34 Blue Jackets of '98 

By that time the survivors had not means to procure seed 
for a new crop nor to support themselves while making it. 
Nor had many of them enough strength left to take up 
the tasks of life again even if permitted. Of about 400,- 
000 reconcentrados more than half had died when the 
United States intervened. How many perished thereafter 
cannot be told, perhaps never will be. Anticipating 
somewhat the course of the narrative, it may be said that 
the effort of the United States to rescue the reconcentra- 
dos from their impending fate was absolutely unsuccess- 
ful. We found it as impossible to wage war without 
inflicting suffering on innocent people as had Weyler 
himself. The first act of our war was to declare a block- 
ade of Cuba which lasted four months, thus literally in- 
creasing the difficulty of getting food for the unfortunates. 
Just prior to the beginning of the war some relief was 
effected by charitable contributions from the United 
States, from Spain secured through the urgency of the 
United States, and from the people of the United States 
acting through the Ked Cross society. But the declaration 
of war stopped this at once. 

In a succeeding chapter the progress of the Cuban 
question through Congress is traced. Here it is necessary 
to note only certain of the incidents which created and 
kept alive that public sentiment wliich impelled Congress 
to act. Chief of all these was the visit of Senator Eedfield 
Proctor, of Vermont, to Cuba and his report, delivered in 
a speech in the senate, of the scenes he had witnessed 
there. Other men had seen like horrors and had told of 
them. Journalists had been recounting tales Hke his for 
months ; a number of gentlemen representing both houses 
of Congress had made a trip to the " pacified " provinces 
as the guests of the owner of the " New York Journal " and 
had told of what they saw ; the consuls in various Cuban 
cities had described as graphically as the deportment of 
the state department would permit the agonies of the 
people. But Senator Proctor's speech carried more weight 



Blue Jackets of '98 35 

than all. He had been Secretary of "War, he was a man 
of substance in the nation, and had not been held a violent 
Cuban sympathiser. So when in the Senate he expressed 
himself in words like those herewith quoted, not only his 
colleagues but the whole people felt the time had come 
for action. Quoting Weyler's reconcentration order, the 
Senator said : 

' ' Many doubtless did not learn of this order. Others failed 
to grasp its terrible meaning. It was left largely to the guer- 
rillas to drive in all who did not obey, and I was informed that 
in many cases a torch was applied to their homes with no 
notice, and the inmates fled with such clothing as they might 
have on, their stock and other belongings being appropriated 
by the guerrillas. When they reached the town they were 
allowed to build huts of palm leaves in the suburbs and vacant 
places within the troclias, and left to live if they could. Their 
huts are about ten by fifteen feet in size, and for want of space 
are usually crowded together very closely. They have no floor 
but the ground, no furniture, and after a year's wear, but httle 
clothing except such stray substitutes as they can extemporise, 
and with large families or with more than one in tins little 
space, the commonest sanitary provisions are impossible. Con- 
ditions are unmentionable in this respect. Torn from their 
homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food, or 
none, what wonder that one half have died, and that one 
quarter of the living are so diseased that they cannot be saved. 
A form of dropsy is a common disorder resulting from these 
conditions. Little children are still walking about with arms 
and chests terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen 
bloated to three times the natural size. The physicians say 
these cases are hopeless. 

"Deaths in the streets have not been uncommon. I was 
told by one of our consuls that they have been found dead 
about the markets in tlie morning, where they had crawled, 
hoping to get some stray bits of food from the early hucksters, 
and that there had been cases where they had dropped dead 
inside the market, surrounded by food. These people were 
independent and self-supporting before Weyler's order. They 
are not beggars even now. There are plenty of professional 



36 Blue Jackets of '98 

beggars in every town among the regular residents, but these 
country people, the reconcentrados, have not learned the art. 
Rarely is a hand held out to you for alms when going among 
their huts, but the sight of them makes an appeal stronger 
than words." 

This condition was the fruit of Weyler's regime, but it 
continued long after the Spanish government, alarmed at 
the outcry against the " butcher," recalled him and sent 
the more humane General Blanco in his stead'. It must 
be remembered, too, that this state of indescribable misery 
and suffering existed at a time when the Spanish govern- 
ment insisted that there was no war in Cuba, nothing but 
a slight rebelKon which would speedily be suppressed, 
and declared that for our government to recognise a state 
of war and concede to the Cubans the rights of belliger- 
ents would be an unfriendly act. 

By December of 1897 the actual warfare between the 
Spaniards and the insurgents had ceased to be a matter 
of interest in the United States. In comparison with the 
colossal crime of starving a whole people into subjection, 
the raids and skirmishes which were dignified by the name 
of battles were regarded as of no importance. The Weyler 
regime too had been fruitful of actual outrages upon the 
persons and property of citizens of the United States. The 
most celebrated of these cases was that of the so-called " Com- 
petitor " prisoners, a number of men whom the Spaniards 
had captured on a filibustering vessel of that name, and 
whom Weyler proposed to shoot after their condemnation 
by a court-martial organised to convict. The stout protest 
of Fitzhugh Lee, the United States consul-general at 
Havana, saved the prisoners from this fate, but they were 
kept imprisoned for months without opportunity to see 
counsel for their defence, despite General Lee's vigorous 
protests. More unlawful still was the Spanish treatment 
of Dr. Ruiz, a naturalised American who for some sus- 
pected offence was thrown into prison and there brutally 
murdered by his guards. This case was so heinous that 



Blue Jackets of '98 '^^^ 

the United States government made of it a grave issue, 
with the result that thereafter Americans suspected of 
political offences were turned over to General Lee, who sent 
them forthwith to the United States. It is just to note 
here that so large a proportion of these Americans bore 
Cuban names and spoke English with difficulty it was 
apparent many had taken advantage of our liberal natu- 
ralisation laws to secure American protection in their 
enterprises against Spain. 

In August, 1897, Weyler was recalled. The assassina- 
tion of the Spanish premier Canovas had led to a change 
of ministry, and the new government determined to try 
methods of concession with the Cubans. But the time 
for concessions had passed. The evil that Weyler had 
done could no more be undone than the dead he had 
starved could be brought to life. General Blanco promptly 
cancelled the reconcentration order, but, as has been ex- 
plained already, the starving and dying multitude was in 
no condition to profit by this belated clemency. As Consul- 
General Lee said, " In the first place these people have no 
place to go to ; their houses have been burned down ; there 
is nothing but the bare land left, and it would take them 
two months before they could raise the first crop. In the 
next place they are afraid to go out from the lines of the 
towns, because the roving bands of Spanish guerrillas, as 
they are called, would kill them. So they stick right in 
the edges of the town, just like they did, with nothing to 
eat except what they can get from charity." Nor was the 
aid belatedly provided by Spain and the government of 
Cuba properly employed in alleviating the sufferings of the 
reconcentrados. There is only too much evidence that 
some of this money, and some of the provisions sent by 
cliaritable people of the United States, was diverted to the 
uses of the Spanish soldiery. 

General Blanco also endeavoured in good faith to check 
the growing antagonism between the United States and the 
Spanish in Cuba. The efforts for the amelioration of the 



38 Blue Jackets of '98 

reconcentrados were part of this effort. The release of 
the " Competitor" prisoners was a second step in the pro- 
gramme, but it came too late. Curiously enough, the effort 
to feed the starving had much to do with making the rela- 
tions of the two nations more critical, for the Spaniards in 
Havana — uncompromising and haughty at all times — 
looked upon the acceptance of contributions from the 
United States and the permission to the Red Cross Society 
to engage in relief work as a sort of implied admission of 
American right of intervention. They manifested their 
disapproval by riots in the streets of Havana and by 
threats of mobbing the American consulate. Out of this 
grew the visit of the " Maine " and the calamity that made 
war inevitable. 

Chief, however, of the features of the new policy upon 
which Blanco relied to avert the impending conflict was 
the offer to Cuba of a system of autonomy. This was in 
some degree a concession to American demands, as will be 
seen, but the concession, however pleasing to the adminis- 
tration at Washington, was received with suspicion and 
positive hostility in Cuba. There was complaint that a 
mere semblance of home rule was offered and that the 
whole purpose of the revolution would be lost if the over- 
tures were accepted. But more effective even than this 
argument was the appeal of the insurgent leaders to his- 
tory. Garcia and Gomez both had fought in the Ten Years 
War. Both had accepted then in good faith the promise of 
reforms with which Spain had purchased peace. Both had 
seen the promise violated, the reforms withdrawn or de- 
prived of all beneficial effect by the methods of adminis- 
tering them. With this bitter knowledge fresh in their 
memory these Cuban leaders did not waste time in discus- 
sing the apparent merits of the plan of autonomy which 
Spain proffered, but rejected it at once. " Nothing but 
absolute independence " was their cry, and they declared 
that for a member of the insurgent army to discuss 
autonomy would be equivalent to treason. They declined 



Blue Jackets of '98 39 

to receive envoys from Blanco, and announced that anyone 
sent to offer a compromise based on the new concessions 
would be treated as spies. It was difficult for the Spanish 
authorities to believe that this threat was seriously meant, 
but the insurgents soon proved they were in deadly 
earnest. Colonel Joaquin Euiz was selected to make the 
first effort to win over an insurgent band to peace and 
autonomy. Under a flag of truce he proceeded to the 
camp of the Cuban leader, Aranguren, choosing him because 
of a personal friendship dating back to before the war. In 
spite of the old-time friendship, in spite of the flag of 
truce, the messenger was seized and shot in accordance 
with the general order which had been given pubHcity, 
and which Euiz had ignored. " A savage murder," cried 
the anti-Cuban party in the United States. " A justifiable 
act of war," responded the Cuban sympathisers. Which- 
ever it was, it at least showed that Spain's belated offer of 
autonomy had no chance of acceptance. 

Events such as these, occurring day by day, kept the 
attention of the people of the United States riveted on 
Cuba. Every day the popular demand for recognition of 
the insurgents or for actual armed intervention grew more 
forceful. It was seen that Spain could never suppress the 
revolt, and it was evident that while the effort continued, 
the United States navy would be employed in chasing 
fihbusters, our interests in the island, which were heavy, 
would go more and more to ruin, our citizens would be 
jexposed to insult and actual injury at the hands of 
iSpanish soldiers, and above all, the inhuman and intoler- 
jable spectacle of a whole nation being wantonly starved to 
[death at our very doors without protest on our part would 
be presented to the world. The voice of the people arose 
almost as that of one man in the demand that this condi- 
jtion should be remedied, cost what it might. Only from a 
tvery few, and tliose mostly men who were controlled by 
the ignoble influences of the stock-market, did there rise a 
sound of dissent. A group of men of enormous wealth. 



40 Blue Jackets of '98 

and of corresponding political influence, fought strenuously 
against any action which might " unsettle values " — their 
conception of the one unbearable thing. Long they held 
the Washington government back from the plain discharge 
of its duty to man and to God. But in the end, they fell 
back, and the American people marched on in an unbroken 
column to fulfil its mission — to purge the new world of 
the last vestige of Spanish power and Spanish brutality. 



/ 



CHAPTEE III 



The Disaster to the " Maine " — Captain Sigbee's Despatch 

— The State of Public Opinion — Why the " Maine " was 
SENT TO Havana — Her Reception there — Precautions 
AGAINST Attack — The Explosion — Frightful Loss of 
Life — Personal Narratives of Survivors and Eye- Wit- 
nesses — The Official Investigations — Attitude of 
the Spaniards — The Finding of the Court of Inquiry 

— " Remember the ' Maine.' " 

THE American newspapers of the morning of February 
16, 1898, blazed with news that stirred the hearts 
of the people as had no intelligence since the first shot 
was fired at Fort Sumter ; news of a calamity so great 
as to plunge a nation in mourning — a disaster so un- 
precedented, so mysterious, surrounded with so many 
suspicious circumstances as inevitably to suggest to the 
most judicial mind the instant thought of treachery 
blacker and more infamous than any of which Cortes or 
Pizarro was guilty. The official information, hurriedly 
given out by the Washington authorities in order that its 
more restrained tone might counteract the wrathful sur- 
mises of the press, was given in this despatch to the Navy 
Department from Captain Sigsbee, commanding the United 
States battle-ship " Maine " : 

" ' Maine ' blown up in Havana harbour at nine-forty to- 
night and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more 
hilled or drowned. Wounded and others on hoard Span- 
ish man-of-war and Ward Line steamers. Send light- 
house tenders from Key West for crew and the few pieces 
of equipment above water. None has clothing other than 
that upon him. Public opinio7i shoidd be sus2iended until 
further report. All officers believed to be saved. Jenhins 



42 Blue Jackets of '98 

and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, 
including representative of General Blanco, now with me to 
express sympathy. Sigsbee." 

Captain Sigsbee's appeal for a suspension of judgment, 
greatly as it redounded to his credit as a cool and prudent 
man in an hour of awful strain, was but partly acceded 
to. There was suspension of action but not of opinion. 
In Congress, while all men were discussing in private 
conversation the frightful deed, official utterances were 
confined to resolutions of sympathy and regret. The 
executive authorities, beyond making the necessary ar- 
rangements for saving whatever of value remained on the 
wreck, caring for the survivors, burying the dead, and 
providing for a searching inquiry into the cause of the 
disaster, showed no sign of recognising in the event a new 
and potent factor in the Spanish-American problem. But 
the masses of men were swift to judge, and to-day there 
are but few to question the righteousness of their judg- 
ment. They recalled the nature of the Spaniard, cruel 
and treacherous from all historic times. They told each 
other that never in the history of the United States navy 
had a ship been destroyed by the accidental discharge of 
her own magazine, and they grimly suggested that the 
coincidence of a superheated magazine operating for the 
first time in a Spanish harbour was a little too much for 
credulity. And as day after day the newspapers, search- 
ing indcfatigably for clews, unearthed this or that sus- 
picious circumstance, the public conviction hardened in 
the form that it took instantly upon getting the news — 
a stubborn, ingrained belief that the battle-ship had been 
destroyed and her crew assassinated by the deliberate 
and prearranged plan of a Spaniard. A popular navy 
officer, Captain Evans, widely known as " Fighting Bob," 
was credited in the newspapers with a remark which 
well expresses the public sentiment. He was said to 
have been talking to the Secretary of the Navy. 



Blue Jackets of '98 43 

" If I had been in command of the fleet at Key West 
instead of Admiral Sicard," said he, " I would have taken 
my entire squadron into Havana harbour the next morning, 
and then I would have said to them, ' Now we '11 investi- 
gate this matter and let you know what we think about 
it at once.' " 

" If you had done that you would have been severely 
reprimanded," responded Secretary Long. 

" Perhaps so," was the response, " but the people would 
have made me President at the next election." 

Possibly the story is apochryphal. At any rate the 
officer referred to has always refused to authenticate it. 
But it serves its turn in showing what was the popular 
feeling at the time of the destruction of the " Maine," for 
it was told and retold with hearty approval all over the 
land. 

Let us go back now a little and consider the reasons 
for the presence of the " Maine " in Havana harbour and the 
foundation for the general belief, which probably will 
never be changed, that she was blown up by the enemy. 

In an earlier chapter some reference has been made to 
the increasing friction between the Spanish authorities 
and the Americans whose business interests kept them in 
Cuba. It has been the custom of civilised nations since 
the earhest days of international relations to send war- 
ships to protect their citizens resident in foreign lands 
whenever a disordered state of society or the collapse of gov- 
ernment makes protection by the local authorities impos- 
sible or improbable. The United States, by reason of 
their comparative freedom from foreign complications, 
have seldom had this duty to perform, though occasionally 
revolutions in South American states have compelled the 
sudden despatch of a protecting man-of-war. At no time 
has such a precaution as this been regarded as indicative 
of hostility toward the established government of the 
state to which the vessel has been sent. It is probable 



44 Blue Jackets of 98 

that no montli passes without the employment of a British 
or French man-of-war to protect the interests of the citi- 
zens of that nation in some foreign land, yet the event is 
not held to suggest unfriendliness of any kind. In the 
case of Cuba, however, peculiar conditions made the 
stationing of a war-ship at Havana take on a special and 
unusual significance. That which did most to produce 
this unfortunate result was the prolonged delay in taking 
this action. Either President Cleveland or President 
McKinley, in the early days of his administration, might 
have sent a ship to Havana and kept one there continu- 
ously without awakening the resentment of the Spaniards, 
had the act been done promptly and quietly. As it was, 
newspaper clamour was aroused by the delay, the American 
papers most hostile to Spain being most noisy in their 
demands for the presence of a ship at Havana. What 
should have been merely a perfunctory and conventional 
precaution was made to take on the proportions and char- 
acter of an act of hostility and defiance. The diplomats 
were involved. Spain protested. The President hesitated. 
The newspapers shrieked. And so, when popular pres- 
sure and the real vital necessities of the case compelled 
the President to act, the sending of the ship was hailed by 
American jingoes and most Spaniards as an actually un- 
friendly act. The very precautions taken to divest it of this 
air only strengthened the popular conviction. The Spanish 
government was consulted and gave its formal acquies- 
cence to an act which perhaps never before in the history 
of nations had been made the subject of diplomatic nego- 
tiations. The correspondence between the State Depart- 
ment and the Spanish minister was made public to show 
how thoroughly friendly was the episode, and arrange- 
ments were made to have a crack Spanish cruiser, the 
" Vizcaya," visit New York as an offset to the American 
ship at Havana. 

The ship finally selected to undertake the mission was 
the second class battle-ship " Maine." Built in 1895, this 



Blue Jackets of '98 45 

ship was one of the most modern and ef&cient vessels in 
the navy at the time of her assignment to this service. 
She was 324 feet long, of 6650 tons displacement, with a 
trial speed of 17.45 knots and armoured with twelve inches 
of steel on the hull, and eight inches on the turrets. In 
each turret were two ten-inch rifles and in addition she 
had six six-inch rifles, seven six-pounders and eight one- 
pounders. She carried a crew of 26 officers, commissioned 
and warranted, and 330 men. For some weeks before her 
actual despatch to Havana the " Maine " had been stationed 
at Key West, her commander, Captain Sigsbee, being in 
constant cable communication with Consul-General Lee and 
under orders to proceed immediately to Havana if sum- 
moned by that official. It was well known at Key West 
and at Washington that the situation at the Cuban capital 
was grave and that at any moment some outbreak of mob 
violence might put the lives of the many Americans in 
jeopardy. Day after day Captain Sigsbee and General Lee 
exchanged cable messages on the most trivial topics, the 
purpose being to keep the cable constantly tested for in- 
terruptions. The understanding between the two officers 
was that on the receipt of the message " two dollars " Cap- 
tain Sigsbee should have his ship ready to sail within two 
hours, or on the receipt of another pre-concerted despatch. 
In his own story of the events leading up to the loss of 
his ship Captain Sigsbee says that this prehminary message 
did in fact come one night and that, after ordering all 
hands to report aboard at the sound of a gun, he went ashore 
with a number of his officers to attend a dance, that all suspi- 
cion of the possible movement of the night be averted. The 
second message did not come, however, and the destiny of 
the " Maine " worked itself out in a different way. Not until 
late m January when the battle-ship was at sea with the 
squadron of Admiral Sicard, did the order to go to Havana 
come, and then it came from Washington. On the 25th 
of that month the ship steamed into the harbour of the 
Cuban capital. Even more than the ordinary ceremony 



46 Blue Jackets of '98 

of courtesy was observed. The officers were clad in semi- 
dress uniforms and the crew in blue. A local pilot took 
the vessel to the buoy selected by the harbour master, and 
as soon as she was moored a Spanish lieutenant arrived to 
make the customary visit of ceremony. From him Captain 
Sigsbee satisfied himself that a salute fired to the Spanish 
flag would be returned, and accordingly salutes both to the 
flag and to Admiral Manterola were fired and speedily ac- 
knowledged. The next day Captain Sigsbee, accompanied 
by General Lee, paid his visit of ceremony to the Governor- 
General. It is worthy of record now that the American 
officer has said : " All visits were made without friction 
and with courtesy on both sides, and apparently with all 
the freedom of conversation and action usually observed." 
Even in the demeanour of the people on shore Captain Sigs- 
bee noticed nothing out of the way. "I thought the 
people stolid and sullen, so far as I could judge from an 
occasional glance. I noted carefully the bearing of the 
various groups of Spanish soldiers I passed. They saluted 
me, as a rule, but with such an appearance of apathy that 
the salute really went for nothing. They made no 
demonstration against me, however, not even by look." 

It was hardly to be expected, however, that there should 
not be some resentment in the Spanish mind against the 
naval representatives of a nation which was notoriously in 
sympathy with the efforts of the insurgents to win their 
freedom, and that some expression of this resentment 
should not occasionally break forth. Captain Sigsbee's 
own story of the events of his stay inspires rather wonder 
that the Spanish temperament, always impetuous and 
passionate, did not result in more open insults to the 
Americans during the short time that was to elapse before 
the destruction of the ship. He relates that no Spanish 
officers visited the ship except on calls of ceremony ; that 
the bumboat men in the harbour did not seem to wish the 
custom of the " Maine's " sailors ; that at a bull-fight he " de- 
tected glances at himself (me) that were far from friendly," 



Blue Jackets of '98 47 

and that from passing ferries in the harbour derisive shouts 
and whistles were sometimes raised at sight of the " Maine." 
These are but trifles, less important by far than the dis- 
courtesy with which a mayor of New York treated Cap- 
tain Eulate, of the "Vizcaya," when that officer made his 
visit of ceremony. ISTor was the circular thrust into the 
hands of Captain Sigsbee one day, a translation of which 
follows, much more significant. 



SPANIARDS 1 

XONG LIVE SPAIN WITH HONOUR ! 

What are you doing that you allow yourselves to be 
insulted in this way ? Do you not see what they have 
done to us in withdrawing our brave and beloved 
Weyler, who at this very time would have finished 
with this unworthy, rebellious rabble who are tramp- 
ling on our flag and on our honour ? 

Autonomy is imposed on us to cast us aside and 
give places of honour and authority to those who in- 
itiated this rebellion, these low-bred autonomists, 
ungrateful sons of our beloved country ! 

And, finally, these Yankee pigs who meddle in our 
affairs, humiliating us to the last degree, and, for a 
still greater taunt, order to us a man-of-war of their 
rotten squadron, after insulting us in their newspapers 
with articles sent from our own home I 

Spaniards ! the moment of action has arrived. Do 
not go to sleep. Let us teach these vile traitors that 
we have not yet lost our pride, and that we know how 
to protest with the energy befitting a nation worthy 
and strong, as our Spain is, and always will be ! 

Death to the Americans ! Death to autonomy ! 

Long live Spain ! Long live Weyler I 



Notwithstanding the comparative courtesy with which 
they were treated and the efforts made to preserve at least 
an appearance of amity with the Spanish authorities and 



48 Blue Jackets of '98 

people, the Americans understood that they were in what 
was practically a hostile port. On the " Maine " most of the 
precautions against attack which would have been taken 
in time of war were observed. To patrol the harbour, or to 
use search-lights would be to give offence, but the less 
obvious precautions were taken. An extra watch was 
kept on deck at night. Sentries were posted at every 
point of vantage on the ship and the most minute reports 
were made to the commander. Ammunition was kept 
ready for the rapid-fire guns and an extra supply of shells 
for the six-inch guns, while double steam was kept up in 
order that the turrets might be at all times movable. 
Though visitors to the ship were encouraged without 
reference to their nationality, a careful eye was kept on 
each, and particular attention was given to such as brought 
parcels aboard, lest dynamite or an infernal machine might 
be left in some vital part of the ship. The court of inquiry 
which examined into the cause of the explosion found, as 
we shall see later, that every imaginable precaution had 
been taken to guard against treachery. 

It was the night of February 15th. The harbour of 
Havana, always beautiful despite the miasmatic ooze with 
which it is bottomed, was never more enchanting to the 
senses. The soft tropic air just stirring with the westerly 
trade wind barely ruffled the surface of the water in which 
were reflected the brilliant stars of the southern heavens. 
An arc of shining lights against a dark background told 
where the city with its thronged caf^s and its starving 
reconceutrados lay. The harbour was dotted with ships. 
The " Maine" at her moorings had swung around broadside 
to the city — " in the position in which she would have 
been sprung to open her batteries on the shore fortifica- 
tions," is the significant way Sigsbee afterwards described 
it. A little distance astern was an American liner, the 
" City of Washington," while to the starboard were the two 
Spanish men-of-war " Alfonzo XII " and " Legazpi. " On the 



I 



Blue Jackets of '98 49 

decks of all the ships men were sitting and the quays of 
the city were thronged with people seeking the open air. 
Captain Sigsbee was sitting in his cabin writing, as he tells 
us, to his wife, apologising for having carried a letter of 
hers in his pocket for a year — how curiously do some of 
the little things of life jostle the great events that 
determine the course of history and make or unmake 
nations ! As he was putting the letter into its envelope 
there came a terrifying explosion and about the ship all 
was darkness. To him " it was a bursting, rending, crash- 
ing sound or roar of immense volume, largely metallic in 
character. It was followed by a succession of heavy, 
ominous, metallic sounds probably caused by the over- 
turning of the central superstructure and by falling debris. 
There was a trembling and a lurching motion of the vessel 
and a list to port, and a movement of subsidence. The 
electric lights, of which there were eight in the cabin 
where I was sitting, went out. Then there was intense 
blackness and smoke." 

Eushing through the darkness to reach the deck the 
captain encountered a man. In the impenetrable gloom 
he could not see whom he had met, but it proved to 
be his orderly, Wilham Anthony, who reported the ship 
blown up and sinking. In the contemporaneous accounts 
of the disaster Anthony was described as having given a 
formal salute, come to attention, and said, " Sir, I have to 
report the ship blown up and sinking." Amplified with 
much picturesque detail, this story went the rounds of the 
newspaper press, made Anthony a hero of melodrama, and 
might have passed into history had not Captain Sigsbee 
himself demohshed it with the remark that if a salute 
had been made it could not have been seen in the intense 
blackness of that compartment. But the captain goes on 
to say that no salute nor any melodrama was needed to 
add to the heroism of this private of marines who kept 
his head and did his duty with calmness and efficiency. 
It was at nine-forty P. M. the explosion occurred. Writ- 

4 



5o Blue Jackets of '98 

ing long after the fact, and with the full testimony taken 
by the board of inquiry available, we know now much 
that to Captain Sigsbee when he reached the flame-lighted 
deck was unknown and problematical. Despite the smoke 
which hung over all the ship like a pall he could see that 
the forward part of the " Maine " was shattered to pieces, 
that flames were leaping up amidships and that the wreck 
was sinking. He found about him most of his officers, 
though cries of agony from the water and from the fast 
sinking berth-deck gave melancholy certainty that among 
the crew great loss of life must have occurred. He has 
recorded that his first order was to post sentries about 
the wreck to guard against attack, for he instantly be- 
lieved what in due course of time was proved, that the 
" Maine " had been blown up from outside, and he 
ascribed it to an enemy. It was but a few moments 
before discipline and the habit of command and obedience 
asserted themselves among the survivors. The magazines 
were flooded lest any remaining explosives should be 
discharfjed. Boats were lowered to search for survivors 
in the water, in which task they were aided by boats 
from the Spanish man-of-war and the American liner. 
Slowly to the captain on the still tenable quarter-deck 
came reports showing the terrible extent of the disaster. 
Officers reported the machinery wrecked, the bow under 
water, the fire gaining on the after magazines and the 
great body of the crew lost — nobody knew how many 
until that dreadful night was far spent. The ship settled 
slowly until the deck on which Sigsbee and the executive 
officer, Lieutenant Wainwright, stood was level with the 
water. Then, as the fire still threatened the magazines 
all stepped into a boat, the captain being last to leave, 
and were rowed away to the " City of Washington " whence 
Captain Sigsbee sent the despatch to the Secretary of the 
Navy which heads this chapter. There too he received 
the report of the first muster which showed that only 
eighty-four or eighty-five survivors could be found, and 



Blue Jackets of '98 51 

thither General Lee hurried when news of the disaster 
reached him. Not until the hospitals had time to tell 
their stories of painful recoveries and pitiful deaths was 
the full measure of the disaster taken. In all on that 
fatal night 254 men were killed outright, while thirteen 
others died long after in hospital. In this one dis- 
aster — or as it may fairly be said, by this one crime — 
more than seventeen times as many men were kiUed as 
fell in the United States navy during the whole course 
of the war. 

The official inquiry mto the causes of the explosion, 
which was begun shortly after the disaster, not only 
sifted thoroughly all obtainable facts bearing on the de- 
struction of the " Maine " and resulted in a verdict which 
accorded with the first instinct of the people, but it 
brought out from survivors and eye-witnesses of the 
disaster picturesque and graphic accounts of the occur- 
rences of that dreadful night. Some of the testimony in 
this hearing may be quoted in part, showing as it does 
how instantaneous and complete was the calamity, and 
how the discipline among both officers and men asserted 
itself even before the extent of the ruin could be imagined. 
Peihaps most interesting of all the testimony given was 
that of Lieutenant John Hood, of the " Maine," who was on 
deck at the time of the explosion. In part it follows : 

" I was sitting on the port side of the deck, with my feet on 
the rail, and I both heard and felt — felt more than I heard — 
a big explosion, that sounded and felt like an underwater 
explosion. I was under the impression that it came from for- 
ward, starboard, at the time. I instantly turned my head, 
and the instant I turned my head there was a second explosion. 
I saw the Avhole starboard side of the deck, and everything 
above it as far aft as the after-end of the superstructure, spring 
up in the air, with all kinds of objects in it — a regular crater- 
like performance, with flames and everything else coming up, 
I immediately sprang myself behind the edge of the super- 
structure, as there were a number of objects flying in my 



52 Blue Jackets of '98 

direction, for shelter. I ran very quickly aft, as fast as I 
could, along the after-end of the superstructure, and climbed 
up on a kind of step. I went under the barge, and by the 
time I went up on the superstructure this explosion had passed. 
The objects had stopped flying around. Then I saw on the 
starboard side there was an immense mass of foaming water 
and wreckage and groaning men out there. It was scattered 
around in a circle, I should say about a hundred yards in 
diameter, off on the starboard side. I immediately proceeded 
to lower the gig, with the help of another man. After I got 
that in the water several officers jumped in it, and one or two 
men. In the meantime somebody else was lowering the other 
boat on the port side. I heard some groans forward, and ran 
forward on the quarter-deck down the poop-ladder, and I im- 
mediately brought up on an immense pile of wreckage. I saw 
one man there, who had been thrown from somewhere, pinned 
down by a ventilator." 

The Court. "May I interrupt Mr. Hood a moment? He 
said several officers jumped into the gig. He does not say for 
what purpose or what they did. That might leave a bad im- 
pression unless he states what the object was." 

Answer. " They jumped into the gig, commanded to pick 
up these wounded men whom we heard out in the water. The 
orders had been given by the captain and the executive officer 
to lower the boats as soon as they came on deck. I spoke of 
lowering the gig because I was on the deck before they got up 
there, and began to lower it anyway, to pick up these men. 
As I was saying a minute ago, I found this one man lying 
there on the quarter-deck in this wreckage, pinned down by 
a ventilator. With Mr. Blandin's help Ave got him up just in 
time before the water rose over him. The captain and the 
executive officer ordered the magazines to be closed [flooded]. 
We all saw at once that it would be no use flooding the maga- 
zines. We saw that the magazines were flooding themselves. 
Then the captain said he wanted the fire put out that was 
starting up in the wreckage. I made ray way forward through 
the wreck and debris, up to the middle superstructure, to see 
if anything could bo done toward putting out this fire. When 
I got there I found nothing could be done, because the whole 
thing was gone. 



Blue Jackets of '98 53 

" When I climbed up on this wreck on the superstructure I 
saw similar piles of wreckage on the port side which I had not 
seen before, and I saw some men struggling in that, in the 
water; but there were half a dozen boats there, I suppose, 
picking them up and hauling them out; and after pulling 
down some burning swings and things that were starting to 
burn aft, to stop any fire from catching aft, I came aft again 
out of the wreckage. There was no living thing up there at 
that time. Shortly after that we all left the ship. There 
were two distinct explosions, — big ones, — and they were 
followed by a number of smaller explosions, which I took at 
once to be what they were, I suppose — explosions of separate 
charges of the blown-up magazine. The instant this first ex- 
plosion occurred I knew the ship was gone completely, and 
the second explosion only assisted her to go a little quicker. 
She began to go down instantly. The interval between the 
two was so short that I only had time to turn my head and 
see the second. She sank on the forward end — went down 
like a shot. In the short time that I took to run the length 
of that short superstructure aft, the deck canted down, showing 
that her bow had gone at once. 

" At the same time the ship heeled over considerably to port, 
I should say about ten degrees the highest amount, and then 
the stern began to sink very rapidly, too; so rapidly that by 
the time I got that gig lowered, with the assistance of another 
man or two, the upper quarter-deck was under water, and the 
stern was sinking so quickly that when I began to pick this 
man up, whom I spoke of on the quarter-deck, the deck was 
still out of Avater. Before I got this ventilator off him — it 
did n't take very long, as Mr. Blandin assisted to move that 
to get him up — the water was over my knees, and just catch- 
ing this fellow's head, the stern was sinking that quickly. 

Two officers only went down with the " Maine," for the 
explosion occurring directly under and in the forward 
part of the ship left the officers' quarters and their stations 
on the quarter-deck almost intact. Lieutenant Friend W. 
Jenkins, unhurt by the first explosion, was rushing for- 
ward to his post of duty when the second eruption of 
steel and giant explosives occurred, and in it he met his 



54 Blue Jackets of '98 

death. Assistant Engineer D. R Merritt was sitting in 
the junior officers' quarters in the steerage with Naval 
Cadet D. F. Boyd when the infernal roar broke upon 
them. The steerage, being forward of the ward-room, or 
officers' mesS; was nearer the seat of the explosion and 
suffered more accordingly. Cadet Boyd, in his testi- 
mony, tells the story of Merritt's death: 

" Assistant Engineer D. E.. Merritt and I were sitting in 
the steerage when I heard a dull report, followed by the crash- 
ing of splinters and falling of the electric light fixtures over- 
head. The lights were extinguished at the first report. I 
■was struck by a small splinter and dazed for a moment. I 
grasped Mr. Merritt by the arm, exclaiming : ' Out of this ! 
Up on deck ! ' Together we groped our way out of the steer- 
age, and along the bulkhead in the after torpedo room, where 
we met a cloud of steam and tremendous rush of water. The 
force of the water separated us, and as I was lifted off my feet 
I caught a steam-heater pipe, and reached for the steerage 
ladder. It was gone. I worked my way along the steam- 
pipe until I reached the port side of the ship. Water was 
rushing through the air-ports, and as I reached the side, I 
heard some one cry : ' Grod help me ! God help me ! ' I think 
it must have been Merritt. At that moment I found the two 
torpedoes that were triced up under the deck-beams, and, twin- 
ing my legs around them, I worked my way inboard. The 
water was then at a level of about one foot from the deck- 
beams. At that moment some burning cellulose flared up, 
and I was able to reach the hatch-coaming and work my way 
up on deck, I rushed on the poop, and there found Cap- 
tain Sigsbee, Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, Lieutenants 
, Holman and Hood, and Naval Cadet Cluverius. The remain- 
ing boats were away, picking up these men in the water. 
Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright and I then went on the 
quarter-deck awning and on the middle superstructure to help 
out any wounded." 

About the death of Lieutenant Jenkins there has been 
some mystery, cleared up only in part by the testimony 



Blue Jackets of '98 55 

at the inquiry. At the moment of the explosion he was 
sitting with three other officers in the ward-room, far 
from the actual seat of the explosion. His companions 
were saved, but of him, or of his body, nothing has been 
seen since. It has been made apparent, however, that in 
following the path of duty he met death. The coloured 
waiter of the officers' mess, who was in the pantry ad- 
joining the mess-room when the shock occurred, tells of 
the last seen of Lieutenant Jenkins in homely but graphic 
phrases : 

"I met Mr. Jenkins in the mess-room, and by that time 
the water was up to my waist, and the water was running aft. 
It was all dark in there, and he hollered to me, and he says : 
' Which way 1 ' I don't know what he meant by that. I says : 
• I don't know which way.' He hollered again : ' Which way ? ' 
I says, 'I don't know, sir, which way.' And he hollered the 
last time ; he says : ' Which way 1 ' I says : ' I don't know, 
sir.' Then I was groping my way, and the water was up to 
my breast. Mr. Jenkins started forward, and then the whole 
compartment lit right up. That whole compartment where 
the torpedoes were lit right up, and I seen Mr. Jenkins then 
throw up both hands and fall, right by the steerage pantry. 
Then I groped my way aft, and got to the captain's ladder — 
the ladder coming out of the ward-room — just as you come 
I out of the ward-room to go up in the cabin. When I got 
i there the ladder was carried away, and somehow or other the 
manrope kept fast upon the deck, but the ladder got adrift 
from it down below in the water. By that time the water was 
right up even with my chin. Then I commenced to get 
scared, and in fooling around it happened that a rope touched 
my arm, and I commenced to climb overhand and got on 
deck." 

Immediately above the magazine which was exploded 
nearly three hundred men swung sleeping in their ham- 
mocks. More than two hundred and fifty of these were 
slain instantly or drowned by the rapid sinking of the 
ship. Some were blown to atoms as they slept, never 



56 Blue Jackets of '98 

recognising the abrupt transition from life to death. 
Some were so stunned that after regaining consciousness 
in the hospital at Key West they had no recollection of 
the disaster, and thought themselves still on board the 
good ship then deep in the foul ooze of Havana harbour. 
Those immediately above the roaring crater were oblit- 
erated. Captain Sigsbee relates that on the roof of the 
berth-deck there was the impression of two human bodies 
ground to powder against it by the force of the blast. 
The report of the court of inquiry is full of the narra- 
tives of those who escaped with their full faculties un- 
dimmed, but to most of the men the shock came so 
suddenly and out of such a peaceful environment, that 
the memory of a roar and the sense of finding themselves 
strugfrlincr in the water were all that remained. A fire- 
man, William Gartrell, told a story of escape that seems 
almost miraculous. He was, at the moment of the 
disaster, in the steam steering-room, two decks below the 
officer's mess-room. That is as if, taking the gun-deck of 
the ship as the first floor of a building, he was three 
stories under ground. To get as far up as the officers' 
mess-room, or the steerage, whence as we have seen 
officers and men escaped only with the greatest difficulty 
owing to the inrushing water, " he had to run forward 
about twenty feet, spring across to a ladder, climb up two 
flights of ladders, and pass through another doorway " — 
thus Captain Sigsbee describes his path to life and goes 
on to say of it that it " was a narrow and difficult route 
under the best of conditions." But Fireman Gartrell 
followed it to safety and thus tells the story of his flight. 

" I could see tlirough the door, sir. It was a kind of a blue 
flame, and it came all at once. The two of us jumped up, and 
I went on the port side up the engine-room ladder, and Frank 
Gardiner he went up the starboard side — at least, he did n't 
go up, because he hollered to me. He struck the door right 
there where the partition separates the two doors, and he 
must have struck his head. He hollered to me ; he says : ' 



Blue Jackets of '98 57 

Jesus, Billy, I am gone.' I didn't stop then, because the 
water was up to my knees. I made a break as quick as I 
could up the ladder, and when I got up the ladder into the 
steerage-room the ladder was gone. Everything was dark. I 
couldn't see nothing; everything was pitch-dark, and I gave 
up, or I started to give up. There was a coloured fellow with 
me ; I did n't know his name until afterward. His name was 
Harris. We got hold of each other. I says, ' Let 's give up ; 
there is no hope.' I started in to say a prayer the best I knew 
how, and I heard a voice. It must have been an officer; it 
could n't have been a man's voice, because he says, ' There is 
hope, men.' I knew from that that he was an officer. After 
that I seen a little light. It looked like an awful distance from 
me, but I made for that light, and when I got there it seemed 
like I could see the heavens. I got jammed in the ladder. My 
head was right up against the deck. I seen the ladder, and 
I caught hold of Harris, and the two of us hugged each 
other. . . . The ladder was hung crossways on top. There 
was n't no ladder that we could walk up. The ladder was up 
above us. ... I don't know whether I got out first, or this 
coloured fellow, but when I did get out I tried to say a prayer. 
I looked where I was, and I saw the heavens and every- 
thing, and I tried to say a prayer or something, and I fainted 
away. I felt some one picking me up, and they thro wed me 
overboard." 

From the principal sleeping place of the crew on the 
berth-deck forward only two men escaped, for it was 
directly above the magazine that was exploded by the 
external shock — whatever that may have been. That 
any should have come alive from that spot is no whit 
short of miraculous, for the deck above and below them 
was rent as by a volcanic shock, great masses of steel 
were lifted high in air and turned jagged edges on every 
side to tear the flesh of men thrown against them. One 
of the men who came still living through that fiery 
furnace explained his escape with the remark : " I think I 
must be an armour-piercing projectile." The other, Charles 
Bergman, boatswain's mate, gave to the court of inquiry 



58 Blue Jackets of '98 

a somewhat incoherent but still interesting account of 
his experience. He was sleeping in his hammock, he 
said, when he heard a terrible crash. 

"Something fell, and then after that I got thrown some- 
where in a hot place. Wherever that was I don't know. I 
got burned on my legs and arms, and got my mouth full of 
ashes and one thing and another. Then the next tiling I was 
in the water — away under the water somewhere, with a lot 
of wreckage on top of me that was sinking me down. After 
I got clear of that I started to come up to the surface of the 
water again, and I got afoul of some other wreckage. I got 
my head jammed in, and I couldn't get loose, so I let myself 
go down. Then it carried me down farther. I suppose when 
it touched the bottom somewhere it sort of opened out a bit, 
and I got my head out and started for the surface of the water 
again. I hit a lot of other stuff with my head, and then I got 
my head above the water. I got picked up by a Spanish boat, 
one of these shore boats, I think." 

The testimony of officers and passengers on merchant 
ships lying in the harbour also throws some light on the 
appearance of the ship at the moment of the explosion. 
The captain of a British bark, lying from a quarter to a 
half a mile away, said that he was writing in his cabin at 
the moment, and the shock was so great that he thought 
his ship had come into collision. The transoms of his 
cabin doors were knocked out of place, and the concussion 
affected his head painfully. That was with the first 
shock. Eushing on deck, he arrived just in time to see 
the second explosion. " The d(5bris ascended," he said, 
" one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty feet up 
in the air. It seemed to go comparatively straight until 
it reached its highest point of ascent ; then it divided and 
passed off in a kind of rolls or clouds. Then I saw a 
series of lights flying from it again. Some of them were 
lights, — incandescent lights. . . . The colour of the smoke 
I should say was a very dark slate-colour. There were 
fifteen to twenty of those lights that looked like incan- 



Blue Jackets of '98 59 

descent lights. The smoke did not seem to be black, as 
you would imagine from an explosion like that. It seemed 
to be more a slate-colour. Quantities of paper and small 
fragments fell over our ship, and for some time after." 

The American steamship " City of Washington " was 
lying at anchor about a quarter of a mile from the 
" Maine," and at the moment of the explosion several of 
her passengers were sitting on deck enjoying the tropical 
night. One of these, Mr. Sigmund Eothschild, delivered 
very important testimony at the inquiry. In the brief 
excerpt here printed, his insistence upon the resemblance 
of the sound of the first explosion to that of a shot is 
very noticeable : 

" I had brought my chair just about in this condition [indi- 
cating], and had not sat down, when I heard a shot, the noise 
of a shot. I looked around, and I saw the bow of the ' Maine' 
rise a little, go a little out of the water. It could n't have been 
more than a few seconds after that noise, that shot, that there 
came in the centre of the ship a terrible mass of fire and ex- 
plosion, and everything went over our heads, a black mass. 
We could not tell wliat it was. It was all black. Then we 
heard a noise of falling material on the place where we had 
been, right near the smoking-room. One of the -life-boats, 
which was hanging, had a piece go through it, and made a big 
hole in it. After we saw that mass go up, the whole boat 
['Maine '] lifted out, I should judge, about two feet. As she 
lifted out, the bow went right ■ down. . . . We stood spell- 
bound, and cried to the captain [of the ' City of Washington ']. 
The captain gave orders to lower the boats, and two of the 
boats, which were partly lowered, were foimd broken tlirough 
with big holes. Some iron pieces had fallen through them. 
Naturally, that made a delay, and they had to run for the 
other boats, or else we would have been a few minutes sooner 
in the water. Then the stern stood out like this, in this direc- 
tion [indicating], and there was a cry from the people : ' Help ! ' 
and ' Lord God, help us ! ' and ' Help ! Help ! ' The noise of the 
cry from the mass of human voices in the boat ['Maine '] did 
not last but a minute or two. When the ship was going down, 



6o Blue Jackets of '98 

there was the cry of a mass of people, but that was a murmur. 
That was not so loud as the single voices which were in the 
water. That did not last but a minute, and by that time we 
saw somebody on the deck in the stern of the ship, and it took 
about a few minutes when the boats commenced to bring in 
the officers." 

When day dawned after that night so full of horror and 
of death, the Americans on shore and on the ships could see 
only a shapeless mass of twisted and blackened steel where 
twenty-four hours earlier had been one of the proudest of 
the United States battle-ships. A cloud of smoke hung 
over the wreck, for the cellulose with which the sides were 
packed, and the wood in such portions of the cabin as 
were still above water, were slowly burning. All that 
was recognisable as a part of a ship was the after military 
mast, which, with its fighting-top and the national flag 
floating at half-mast, protruded above the scene of disaster. 
Boats crowded the harbour. Sightseers were out in swarms, 
patrol boats from the Spanish ships guarded the wreck, 
and the surviving American sailors were out in craft of 
all kinds on the solemn duty of recovering the dead as 
they slowly came to the surface. During the day, the 
United States despatch boat " Fern," and the lighthouse 
tender " Mangrove," came into the harbour from Key West, 
bringing supplies and surgical aid. It is worth noting, in 
passing, that while Captain Sigsbee urged a suspension of 
judgment on the part of the people as to the cause of the 
explosion, he was swift to form his own conclusions. He 
asked that lighthouse tenders, rather than a man-of-war, 
be sent him, because he believed that the " Maine " had 
been deliberately blown up, and he did not wish the nation 
to risk losing another ship in the same way on the eve of 
a war that had now become inevitable. 

Events now proceeded rapidly toward the final submis- 
sion of the issues between the two peoples to the arbitra- 
ment of the sword. Investigations into the causes of the 
explosion of the " Maine " were set on foot by Spain and 



Blue Jackets of '98 61 

the United States both. The Spaniards were promptest 
with their inquiry, beginning it within an hour after the 
disaster ; but as it proceeded it was apparent that it was 
undertaken less to find the real cause of the explosion 
than to clear the Spaniards of any complicity in it. In 
default of proof of incompetence or negligence on the part 
of the officers of the wrecked ship, the responsibility for 
the disaster rested with the Spaniards, for among all civil- 
ised people a ship in a foreign port is supposed to be enti- 
tled to police protection by the local authorities. The 
" Maine " lay at a buoy selected for her by the Havana har- 
bour master. The port was, technically at least, a friendly 
one. If the discipline and system aboard were such as to 
make it impossible that she had been destroyed by the acci- 
dental explosion of one of her own magazines, the responsi- 
bility for the disaster — which under such circumstances 
would be a crime — would necessarily rest with the Span- 
iards. This responsibility would be all the heavier for the 
fact that the city and port were in fact under military rule. 
For months no explosives of anything like the power 
necessary to set off the magazines of an armoured battle- 
ship had been in the possession of, or obtainable by, any 
private person in the city. Some years earlier, in the port 
of New York, an adventurous swimmer, to advertise a 
species of aquatic suit he had invented, swam out at night 
and affixed a dummy torpedo to the hull of a British 
man-of-war lying at anchor. Such an exploit might have 
been possible at Havana at other times, though the sus- 
picion with which the officers and men of the " Maine " 
regarded their surroundings and their hosts made it impos- 
sible at this moment. But the theory that the act was 
one of private malice only is shaken by the fact that mar- 
tial law strictly prohibited to any private citizen the pos- 
session of explosives. 

The feeling of resentment against the Spanish which 
naturally grew out of this calamity was not a little 
increased by the attitude and utterance of the people of 



62 Blue Jackets of '98 

Havana, including many of the high officers in the Spanish 
army. It is proper to say here that the Spanish navy 
officers, hving up to the traditions of courtesy which seem 
to characterise that branch of the armed service of every 
nation, did not offend in this regard, but, on the contrary, 
were punctilious in their avoidance of anything which 
might seem like gloating over the misfortune of the 
Americans, or criticism of the methods of discipline on 
the " Maine." But the very night of the wreck, while our 
men were still fightmg for Hfe in the engulfing waters, the 
cafds of Havana were crowded with Spanish army offi- 
cers drinking deep draughts of champagne to the downfall 
of the Yankees. When the cruiser " Vizcaya " reached 
Havana shortly afterwards, her captain called on Captain 
Sigsbee and showed something more than official and per- 
functory sorrow for the calamity which had befallen the 
American sailor, but the cry from the docks as the Spanish 
cruiser entered the harbour was, " Down with the Ameri- 
cans ! " and the sunken " Maine " was contrasted with the 
trim Spanish ship, as if the difference between the two 
nations was thereby typified. 

Calmly however, while the work of recovering and 
burying the dead was in progress the United States 
proceeded with the task of inquiring into the causes of 
the disaster. A court of inquiry composed of Captain 
(afterwards Admiral) William T. Sampson, Captain French 
E. Chadwick, Lieutenant Commander William P. Potter, 
and Lieutenant Commander Adolph Marix, judge-advo- 
cate, was appointed and convened at Havana in the cabin 
of the " Mangrove " on the 21st of February. Divers were 
then at work on the " Maine," and had been for some time 
gathering evidence for the court and striving to recover 
the bodies of the dead. In this work in and about the 
wreck the Americans were systematically hampered by 
the Spanish authorities, who at one time went so far as to 
attempt to prescribe to Captain Sigsbee the times and 
manner in which he should visit the wreck of his own 



Blue Jackets of '98 67, 

ship. This, and the persistence with which the Spaniards, 
by innuendo or direct charge, advanced the theory that 
the ship had been blown up through the fault of her own 
ofiScers, added to the tension between the representatives 
of the two countries. 

Into the details of the evidence submitted to the court 
of inquiry it will not be necessary to go. That portion of 
it other than the accounts of eye-witnesses to the tragedy, 
some of which we have quoted, was of a scientific and 
technical character intended to determine whether the 
ship had been blown up from without or by an internal 
explosion. It is obvious that had the latter been the case, 
the keel and bottom would have been bent out and down- 
ward. Upon the divers who examined the wreck deter- 
mination of this all-important problem rested, and in 
recognition of its importance several navy officers, though 
untaught in the art of diving, volunteered to don the sub- 
marine armour and go down into the mud and darkness to 
study the question for themselves. Permission was, how- 
ever, refused them, and rehance was placed upon the re- 
ports of the professional divers, some of whom were 
enlisted men in the navy. The manner in which evi- 
dence was deduced from their reports was interesting. 
Serving on the " Fern " at the time was a young navy offi- 
cer. Ensign W. V. N. Powelson. His training had been 
that of a scientific naval constructor, and his life had been 
given to the study of the structure of ships. With a set 
of detailed drawings of the " Maine " before him, he would 
have the divers measure pieces of the frame which were 
affected by the explosion. Comparison of these measure- 
ments with the drawings would show exactly the place in 
the ship at which the plate belonged, though when found 
it might have been blown many yards from its proper 
position. After painstaking work in the collation and 
comparison of evidence occupying one month, the court 
presented its report, which was in effect that the bottom 
of the ship had been forced up some 35 feet in a way that 



64 Blue Jackets of '98 

could only have been possible by the employment exter- 
nally of some powerful explosive. It declared that there 
were two explosions with an appreciable space of time 
between them and distinctly different in character. 

" The first explosion was more in the nature of a report 
like that of a gun, while the second was more open, pro- 
longed, and of greater volume. This second explosion 
was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial ex- 
plosion of one or more of the forward magazines of the 
" Maine.' " The court went on to declare that the condition 
of the bottom of the ship as disclosed by the divers " could 
have been produced only by the explosion of a mine at 
about frame 18 and somewhat on the port side of the 
ship." It further declared that " the loss of the ' Maine ' 
was not in any respect due to fault or neglect on the 
part of any of the officers or members of the crew of 
said vessel," but that " the ' Maine ' was destroyed by the 
explosion of a submarine mine which caused the partial 
explosion of two or more of her forward magazines." 

The report of the Spanish board of inquiry ascribed an 
internal cause to the explosion, and inferentially accused 
the American officers of faulty discipline and incorrect 
methods. But this document, though published widely 
in the United States, did not shake the public conviction 
that the act was that of a Spaniard, though there was no 
inclination to charge the Spanish authorities with com- 
plicity in the execrable crime. 

Great as was the wrath and hot the hatred bred of the 
destruction of the " Maine," it was in no sense the cause of 
the war which speedily followed. It is not easy to say 
whether it hastened or delayed the inevitable conflict. 
The slow deliberation of the court of inquiry, and the fact 
that all felt that a declaration of war before the findings 
of that court were complete would be something in the 
nature of " snap judgment," deferred for a month acts 
which probably would have been more hastily taken 
otherwise. Public sentiment had become pretty gen- 



Blue Jackets of '98 65 

erally fixed in the opinion that the inhuman conditions 
prevailing in Cuba could only be remedied by the inter- 
vention of the United States, and political conditions in 
Spain were such that such intervention would have led 
infalhbly to war. There were, it is true, people and pub- 
licists in the United States who were so strongly of the 
opinion that the " Maine " and the " Maine " alone brought 
on hostilities that they even went the length of accusing 
the Cuban patriots of committing the crime in order to 
inflame Americans against Spain. This unjust and in- 
credible suspicion, however, was held only among those 
known as " the peace at any price men," and it was 
scarcely the most discreditable opinion enunciated by 
them during the general public discussion that preceded 
the war. 

It is probable that history in coming ages will concede 
what the public men who urged on the war claimed, that 
it was a struggle entered upon for the most unselfish pur- 
poses ; that it was a war for humanity, a war undertaken 
to free a neighbouring people from a rule which was offen- 
sive to every civilised instinct ; a war from which could 
come no profit, and which would necessarily be costly, both 
in blood and treasure. The unexpected and possibly un- 
desirable fruits of the victory which the diplomats and 
politicians held for the nation at the end of hostilities may 
obscure but do not disprove the entire unselfishness with 
which the nation entered upon the struggle. It was not a 
war of revenge, any more than it was intended to be a war 
of conquest. Though the newspapers harped continually 
upon the fate of the " Maine," and the impression was created 
that the battle signal in the American navy was, " Eemem- 
ber the ' Maine,' " the thought of revenge was far distant 
from the minds of American commanders. No United 
States vessel went into action flying that signal. It was 
hoisted but once, without authority, by an enlisted man of 
the coast signal service, and he was promptly reprimanded 
for it. As Captain Sigsbee well said, " I should like to 

5 



66 Blue Jackets of '98 

make the point . . . that this great and free country, with 
its education, good intention, and universal moral influ- 
ence, may go to war to punish but not to revenge. Im- 
properly applied, the motto, 'Eemeniber the "Maine,"' 
savours too much of revenge, too much of evil for evil." 



CHAPTER IV 

At the National Capital — The Course of the Cuban 
Question in Congress — Its Treatment by President 
Cleveland — It Confronts President McKinley — The 
Mission of General Stewart L. Woodford — Fair 
Promises of the Spanish Ministry — The Failure of 
Autonomy — The De Lome Letter and its Result — 
Preparations for War — Congress Votes a $50,000,000 
Extraordinary Credit for Purposes of National De- 
fence — The Report of the " Maine " Court of Inquiry. 

WHILE the court of inquiry was holding its sessions 
at Havana and Key West, the tide of events at 
Washington was setting slowly but irresistibly toward 
war. In both Houses of Congress, even before the destruc- 
tion of the battle-ship, the war party was strong. The 
feeling that upon the nation rested a solemn duty to in- 
terfere in behalf of suffering humanity at its very doors 
was too forceful for party ties, and Eepublicans vied with 
Democrats in urging upon the administration a vigorous 
and immediate policy of intervention. The student of 
contemporaneous history as set forth in the newspapers 
of the day will discern a seeming party division ; but it 
was more apparent than real. The Executive, being 
charged with the heavy responsibility of determining upon 
war or peace, naturally and properly proceeded with the 
utmost deliberation, as though desirous of exhausting 
the last peaceful remedy before accepting the final arbitra- 
ment of the sword. As the President was a Eepublican, 
the great majority of the Senators and Piepresentatives of 
that party were in loyalty bound to uphold his policy and 
await his pleasure. It appeared then, that the Democrats 
were urging on the war and the EepubHcans holding back ; 



68 Blue Jackets of '98 

but when the President gave the signal, both parties were 
as one in their response. It was a war in which political 
differences were forgotten and sectional antagonisms 
obliterated. 

The date of the beginning of the active agitation which 
finally resulted in war may be set at December, 1896, 
when President Cleveland in his last message to Congress 
reviewed at some length the situation in Cuba growing 
out of the insurrection, recapitulated the various proposi- 
sions that had been made for securing to the Cubans 
relief from their intolerable ills, and referred, though 
without approval, to the demand for armed intervention. 
He went on to inform Congress that the Executive had 
suggested to Spain a plan for home rule in Cuba, and had 
offered to guarantee its execution if accepted This guar- 
antee was regarded as essential, since the perfidy of Spain 
in failing to fulfil the reforms by the promise of which it 
had quelled the last prior revolution made it unlikely 
that the insurgents would again trust to Spanish good 
faith. Though the message was addressed to Congress, 
one phrase in it was evidently intended as a hint to Spain. 
" It cannot be reasonably assumed," said the President, 
" that the hitherto expectant attitude of the United States 
will be indefinitely maintained. ... By the course of events 
we may be driven into such an unusual and unprecedented 
condition as will fix a limit to our patient waiting for 
Spain to win the contest either alone, and in her own 
way, or by our friendly co-operation." And, continuing, 
he said that a situation might be presented "in which 
our obligations to the sovereignty of Spam will be super- 
seded by higher obligations which we can hardly hesitate 
to recognise and discharge." 

Spain was not deaf to the hint of the President, but 
the threat aroused her antagonism and increased her stub- 
bornness rather than stimulating her government to seek 
an honourable and practicable way out of the hopeless sit- 
uation in which the nation was placed. The Prime Miu- 



Blue Jackets of '98 69 

ister, Canovas, responded at once with an interview which 
sounded the note of defiance. " No concession of any 
kind," said he, " will be made until the insurrection in 
Cuba is put under control. Spain is strong enough to 
carry on the campaign in Cuba and the Philippine Islands 
until peace is restored, no matter how long the struggle 
may last." 

And so the Cleveland administration went out of office 
leaving the Cuban trouble as a legacy to its successor. 
Meanwhile the agitation of the question grew in volume 
throughout the nation. A great section of the American 
press, comprising the newspapers of the largest circulation, 
if not of the greatest influence, made the cause of the 
Cubans its own. Havana was filled with American cor- 
respondents who telegraphed to their papers graphic 
descriptions of the cruelty of the Spanish soldiery and 
the wanton destruction of property to the permanent im- 
poverishment of the island. Some of these correspondents 
joined the insurgent forces and made the American people 
familiar with the character of such patriot leaders as 
Gomez, Garcia, and Maceo. Others fell foul of Spanish 
authority in Havana, and were cast into Morro castle, 
whence they were released only after long diplomatic 
negotiations. No campaign for the Presidency was ever 
fought by American newspapers with more persistence 
than the fight for recognition of the Cuban repubUc. 

In official circles at Washington the incoming of a new 
administration gave brief pause to discussion of Cuba. 
Among the practical politicians, the distribution of post- 
offices and consulships then took first place. But the 
administration undertook immediately the work of secur- 
ing the release of all Americans in Cuban jails, and pressed 
it with such zeal that by the end of April all were free. 
The Senate, on the 20th of May, passed a joint resolution 
recognising the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents, a 
measure which had it been given effect would have done 
away with the friction resulting from filibustering expedi- 



JO Blue Jackets of '98 \ 

tions. It was, however, left to die in the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the House. A day or two later, however, 
the Cuban question appeared again in Congress, being 
brought up by a special message from the White House. 
The President said that from special reports obtained from 
the American consuls in different parts of the island, it 
was learned that many American citizens were suffering 
as the result of the reconcentration policy of the Spanish 
military authorities. He asked that an appropriation of 
$50,000 be made for their relief, which was accordingly 
done. The discovery that, in order to check the rising 
ambition for liberty in Cuba, Spain was starving not only 
her own people, but our citizens as well, did not tend to 
allay the growing abhorrence of Spanish methods in the 
United States. 

At this juncture, General Stewart L. Woodford was ap- 
pointed United States minister to Spain, and given in- 
structions to pursue a most diplomatic and amicable 
course, keeping ever in view the end of restoring peace and 
settled conditions in Cuba, but exhausting every resource 
of diplomacy in the endeavour to accomplish it by peaceful 
methods. For a time it seemed that fate smiled on the 
purpose of the mission. Before General Woodford reached 
his post, an assassin struck down the Prime Minister, 
Senor Canovas, a man of the Bismarckian type, a man of 
blood and iron. To him succeeded Sagasta, and the liberal 
party, which was believed to be more ready to pursue a 
conciliatory policy toward the Cubans, came into office. 
The change in the attitude of the Spanish government 
was immediate. General Woodford presented the demands ^ 
of the United States to the new ministry, receiving instead ll 
of the cold rebuff with which Canovas had met all repre- 
sentations from this government, an assurance that Spain 
would consider and act upon them. The essential part of 
Mmister Woodford's instructions were to demand the re- 
call of General Weyler and the abandonment of the policy 
of reconcentration. He was also directed to inform the 



Blue Jackets of '98 71 

Spanish government that the war should have been ended 
long before, and to ask that a date be set prior to Decem- 
ber, 1897, when it would be stopped. The representations 
of the United States envoy were met with diplomacy more 
characteristic of Spain than the direct, if brusque and 
haughty, methods of Canovas. The policy of procrastina- 
tion and evasion was at once brought into play. Weyler 
was indeed recalled, returning to his country, there to 
become a popular hero and a menace to the ministry that 
recalled him, but, despite the most plausible promises, the 
system of reconcentration was not abandoned, and the 
work of starving Cuba into subjection continued. To the 
demand that a date be set for the close of the war, Spain 
replied that such action would be impossible ; and, as a 
return concession for the recall of Weyler, time was asked 
to put into operation in the island a new system of 
autonomy. It is enough to say of this project that it 
failed wholly of fruition. The Cubans had gone too far 
on the path to complete freedom to be coaxed back into 
allegiance to Spain by any device of home rule, however 
alluring, and the system of autonomous government for 
the island proffered by the Sagasta ministry was on its 
face hollow and unsatisfactory. In the early days of the 
war, much was made by the peace party in the United 
States of the apparent concessions wrung from Spain by 
Minister Woodford, and the assertion was generally made 
that a continuance of diplomatic negotiations would have 
secured for Cuba all that was won by the barbaric and 
expensive method of war ; but the facts cannot be said to 
bear out the argument. The Woodford mission was in all 
essentials a failure. The one thing accomplished was the 
recall of General Weyler, and his successor. General Blanco, 
varied little from his methods, though he succeeded in 
inspiring less antagonism in pursuing them. The hand of 
iron still held the Cubans in a grip no less remorseless 
because the glove of velvet had been donned. 

In Congress and by the people at large the slow progress 



72 Blue Jackets of '98 

of General Woodford's diplomacy was regarded with general 
impatience. Day after day the news from Cuba was of 
women and children slowly starving to death under the 
merciless operation of the reconcentration system. A 
plague, like that which appears in India at the time of 
famines, broke out among the unhappy islanders, and the 
scenes described by travellers and correspondents shocked 
the sense of humanity of our whole people. Our navy was 
kept busy at heavy expense in defeating the efforts of 
Americans to land arms and munitions of war for the use 
of the insurgents, and the courts sentenced to imprison- 
ment two ship captains found guilty of commanding such 
expeditions. This use of the new navy bitterly offended 
the nation, which saw the ships built to carry to all lands 
the emblem of liberty and popular government made the 
effective aids to the maintenance of as corrupt and bar- 
baric a despotism as the world has ever seen, while the 
sentence to the penitentiary of men convicted of aiding a 
neighbouring people in a struggle for hberty, however much 
in accord with the strict letter of the law it may have been, 
caused a cry of protest, indignation, and reproach to arise 
from every part of the republic. And so when Congress 
met in December ready to receive the President's message, 
the whole country looked with chief interest for that part 
of it which should treat of the Cuban question and the 
attitude of the new administration toward the patriots who 
were trying to do for Cuba what Washington and his men 
did for the colonies of North America. 

There was universal disappointment when it appeared 
that the whole sum and substance of the advice of the 
Chief Executive was, " Wait." The message was one of 
information rather than of suggestion. The intolerable 
situation in Cuba was described in detail, and with caustic 
comments upon the Weyler administration. But there 
was no suggestion of immediate action by the United 
States, but rather a plea for delay. The autonomy plan 
which few, either in the United States or Cuba, had taken 




I'RKSIDKX r McRlNM.F.V 



i 



Blue Jackets of '98 "j-^^ 

seriously, seemed to have impressed Mr. McKinley favour- 
ably, and he apparently expected a great change for the 
better under General Blanco. Only in so far as it set forth 
unmistakably the President's conviction that the United 
States possessed the right to intervene in Cuba when the 
proper time should arrive, did the message satisfy the 
American people. But as it did not declare that time ar- 
rived, it was disappointing on this side of the water, while 
in Spain the very enunciation of the right of intervention 
at any time added to the hostility felt for the United 
States. The President himself was speedily undeceived 
as to the condition of the people of Cuba, for on Christmas 
Eve, he issued an appeal to the country for contributions 
in aid of the starving Cubans, — unhappy reconcentrados 
who were starving as fast under the " humane " Blanco as 
under the cruel Weyler. 

The first month of the new year saw little official action 
in any branch of the United States government bearing 
upon the fast growing quarrel with Spain. Between the 
people of both countries the antagonism was fast becoming 
more bitter under the influences of the causes which I 
have detailed in an earlier chapter, but the President was 
still fighting for delay and the House of Eepresentatives, 
under the masterful domination of the speaker, Mr. 
Thomas B. Eeed, systematically held without action all 
resolutions sent thither by the more radical Senate. To- 
ward the end of January, the executive took the significant 
step of sending to Key West and the Dry Tortugas, within 
six hours steaming of Havana, the ships of the North 
Atlantic squadron, — so plain a menace that many high 
authorities have declared it equivalent to a declaration of 
war. 

February had hardly come in when an event occurred 
that ruffled the calm that seemed to be settling over of- 
ficial circles at Washington, and gave the diplomats of the 
world something to talk about. The very day when Presi- 
dent McKinley was penning his appeal to the American 



74 Blue Jackets of '98 

people for aid for the suffering Cubans, the Spanish min- 
ister at Washington, Senor Dupuy De Lome, was writing 
a letter to a Spanish journalist in which he described the 
President of the United States as a " low politician who 
wishes to leave a door open for himself, and to stand well 
with the jingoes of his party." The President was further 
accused of catering to " the rabble." This letter was stolen 
by an emissary of the Cuban Junta in New York, and 
given to the American press. 

Now the people of these United States are not always 
observant of the proprieties in speaking of their Presidents, 
and it is entirely probable that in more than one news- 
paper which printed with condemnatory headlines the De 
Lome letter, there may have been editorial comments on the 
President quite as disrespectful as those which the Spanish 
envoy permitted himself. Just about that time a great 
section of the American press was berating Mr. McKinley 
very vigorously for what seemed to be his lethargy in 
taking up the Cuban question. He was accused of being 
dominated by the financial interest of the country, and of 
being more alive to the sound of the Wall Street stock 
ticker than to the bitter cry of starving Cuba. But while 
Americans said these things of their President, and read 
them in their own journals with entire complacency, they 
experienced quite another sensation when they discovered 
a minister from Spain putting forth so very unfavourable 
an estimate of the qualities of the nation's chief magis- 
trate. The outcry against De Lome was immediate and 
noisy, and that hapless individual, quick to recognise the 
extent of his offence, forestalled the penalty which he 
knew would be inflicted, by cabling his resignation to 
Madrid before Minister Woodford could deliver the Presi- 
dent's request for his recall. This was regarded by the 
Spaniards as a diplomatic triumph on his part, and as 
Spain refused to apologise for his letter on the ground that 
it was purely a private communication, the affair ended 
without any formal reparation having been made for the 



Blue Jackets of '98 75 

affront. De Lome was neither recalled, ordered out of the 
country by our government, nor was apology made for his 
letter. On February 15th, the day of the explosion of the 
" Maine," the appointment of Seuor Luis Polo y Bernabe as 
minister to succeed De Lome was announced by the 
Spanish ministry. 

Naturally this incident did not tend to allay the grow- 
ing aversion with which the American people regarded the 
Spaniards, and the agitation for swift action in Cuba's 
behalf was greatly aided by some frank and illuminative 
passages in this same letter which showed that the 
promises of autonomy so ghbly made to Minister Wood- 
ford were meant only to deceive and to gain time. It 
was remembered too that the employment of the best ships 
of the United States navy to check filibustering, that so 
irritated our people, had been conducted practically under 
the directions of this envoy who was thus convicted of 
insulting and deceiving our government. But the De Lome 
incident was swept out of the mind of the people while 
it was still fresh in their memory by news of the awful 
and murderous destruction of the " Maine." 

Strangely enough the assassination of this noble ship 
produced a calm rather than a storm in the National Legis- 
lature. A distinguished United States Senator, Mr. Henry 
Cabot Lodge, who was himself foremost in the fight for 
Free Cuba, has well \vi-itten : 

" Scarcely a word was said in either House or Senate, and 
for forty days the American people and the American Congress 
waited in silence for the verdict of the board of naval officers 
■who had been appointed to report on the destruction of the 
'Maine.' To those who understood the American people, this 
grim silence, this stern self-control, were more threatening than 
any words of public sorrow or anger could possibly have been." 

This reticence of Congress, this unwillingness to appear 
to prejudge in any way the report of the court of inquiry 
justifies the assertion that the disaster to the " Maine " de- 



76 Blue Jackets of '98 

layed rather than hastened war. One single instance 
gives striking illustration of the care which was taken 
to avoid anythmg which might seem like acting under 
the influence of the natural wrath and indignation which 
the destruction of the war-ship aroused. The very day 
before news of the disaster arrived, Congress had called 
for information as to the state of affairs in Cuba, having 
particular reference to the condition of the reconcentrados 
and other peaceful victims of a cruel, cruel war. The 
President had this information at hand, it having been 
prepared by the American consuls in Cuba in response to 
instructions from the state department. It told a sad story 
of suffering, spoliation, and starvation, but the President 
withheld it from Congress until the first hot fire of wrath 
over the destruction of the " Maine " had been given time 
to cool. 

In the midst of this silence on the immediate matter of 
the disaster, however. Congress took definite action in 
preparation for the war which all but the most short- 
sighted could see now was sure to come. On the 9th of 
March both Houses, without a dissenting vote, appropri- 
ated as an emergency fund to be placed at the disposal 
of the President, S50,000,000. 

Thus provided with needed funds, the executive de- 
partments began the work of preparing for war. It was 
evident from the first that the brunt of the conflict would 
fall upon the United States navy. For Spain to invade 
the United States with any considerable army was obvi- 
ously impossible, and equally so was any invasion of the 
Iberian peninsula by the American forces. Whatever 
land fighting there was to be, would occur in Cuba and 
Porto Rico, and it was not to be expected that any very 
great army would be necessary for the establishment of 
American supremacy in those islands. Indeed the com- 
manding general of the army estimated that 90,000 
men would suffice. But the vast coast line of the United 
States, dotted with rich and populous cities, offered a rich 



i 



Blue Jackets of '98 77 

and tempting field for Spanish naval operations, and it 
was of prime importance that the navy should be suffi- 
ciently reinforced to be equal to any emergency that mio-ht 
arise. Accordingly, experienced officers were sent abroad 
to purchase such war-ships as might be found in the 
market and to secure additional supplies of munitions of 
war. It was necessary that this work should be done 
with the utmost expedition, for immediately upon the 
formal declaration of war it would become the duty 
of all neutral nations to prevent by all methods in 
their power the sale of war material to either of the 
beUigerents. 

There is a notable lesson for the future in the very 
slender success which our representatives abroad had in 
their efforts to purchase ships. They had practically un- 
hmited means and more than a month in which to con- 
duct negotiations, yet they secured only one ship which 
was a really considerable addition to our navy. This was 
the cruiser " Amazonas," built in England for Brazil, a pro- 
tected cruiser, with a disj^lacement of 3,600 tons and a 
speed of twenty knots. In her armament this wms a 
notable vessel, for she mounted Armstrong guns which 
possess a greater muzzle velocity and a greater striking 
energy than ours of the same class, — the six-inch Arm- 
strong being, in fact, equal in efficiency to our eight-inch 
rifles. The ship was also provided with smokeless powder, 
something that the American navy was without and the lack 
of which seriously affected the efficiency of our forces by 
land and sea. The " Amazonas " on being put into commis- 
sion under the Stars and Stripes was renamed the " New 
Orleans." With her was bought a sister ship, the " Abrou- 
ail," but this vessel, which was renamed the " Albany," was 
caught unfinished by the declaration of war, and pinned up 
in a British ship-yard during the continuance of the conflict. 
A very good torpedo boat destroyer — a class of vessel in 
which the United States navy is exceedingly deficient — 
was trapped in the same way. We secured, however, a 



78 Blue Jackets of ^98 

little sLxty-foot torpedo boat, and an 1,800 ton gun-boat 
built in England for Portugal, which we renamed the 
" Topeka." From Brazil was also purchased the " Nicthe- 
roy," an American merchant ship, bought by the Brazilians 
years ago and remodelled for naval purposes. She was 
hardly a valuable addition to the American navy. 

This virtual failure to materially strengthen the navy 
by purchase abroad, though money was plenty, time 
ample, and all the rest of the world at peace with no 
immediate need for men-of-war, should not be forgotten 
by the people of the United States. Had our quarrel 
been with a well-equipped nation, and one disinclined to 
delay the beginning of hostilities until we had ransacked 
the ship-yards of Europe, even this slender measure of 
re-enforcement would have been lacking. 

At home the purchase of vessels proceeded with more 
satisfactory results. In the great passenger ships of the 
American line the navy department had ready to its 
hand four swift liners easily convertible into cruisers. 
This luie enjoys from the United States government a 
large and most remunerative contract for the carriage of 
the trans-Atlantic mails, in consideration of which its 
ships are to be held subject to the government's right of 
charter in time of war. Two of the vessels, the " St. 
Paul " and " St. Louis " were built in American ship- 
yards and specially designed for conversion into cruisers. 
All four vessels were chartered, at an average cost of more 
than $2,000 a day apiece, and hurriedly remodelled. The 
British-built ships were renamed " Yale " and " Harvard," 
and were speedily presented with colours and machine- 
guns by the delighted students of those colleges. The 
best of the coast-wise steamships of other lines were also 
bought by the government and converted into cruisers, 
transports, or hospital ships, while a great number of slim 
and speedy yachts were bought for torpedo boats. In all, 
more than 50 vessels were thus purchased, ranging from 
the great 16,000 ton Atlantic liners down to trim and 



Blue Jackets of '98 79 

pigmy yachts hardly big enough to carry a one-pouuder 
rapid-fire gun. 

While the navy department was thus busy, the war 
department was not idle. The sites for camps had to be 
examined with reference to their hygienic condition, their 
propinquity to strategic points, and their railroad facilities. 
Contracts with railroads for the carriage of troops and 
munitions of war were to be prepared, and preliminary 
arrangements with the great purveyors of food products 
to be made for army rations. While Congress seemed to 
be hesitating, and the people were getting impatient with 
the prolonged delays of diplomacy in the face of certain 
war, the days seemed to those charged with the duty of 
preparation to fly all too fast. That the nation was not pre- 
pared was matter of current notoriety. In the United States 
the government is too constantly under the search-light 
of the press for the nation ever to be deceived, as were 
the French in 1870 with the famous report that the army 
was ready " to the last button on the last gaiter." We 
knew we were short of ammunition, of artillery and rifles, 
and of men, but in spirit the people were ready. For the 
military capacity of Spain there was a general contempt, 
which the subsequent events showed to be not unjustified. 

Towards the end of March the war party in Congress 
began to show renewed activity. On the 17th of that 
month the speech of Senator Proctor, recounting what he 
had seen in Cuba, was made in the Senate, and in both 
Houses of Congress at about the same time the members 
of a commission sent to the devastated island by the 
proprietor of the " New York Journal," described the scenes 
of starvation and horror there. Senator Proctor's speech 
was particularly effective, as he had been at an earlier 
period Secretary of War, and had not prior to the time of 
his address been prominently identified with the pro- 
1 Cuban party. His impassioned appeal for action made 
the pressure of Congress on the President more forceful 



8o Blue Jackets of '98 

than ever. On the 28th, the report of the " Maine " Court 
of Inquiry came in, accompanied by a message from the 
President still pleading for delay. A day earlier he had 
submitted to Spain a proposition by the terms of which 
the United States would undertake to conduct negotia- 
tions with the insurgents for peace, and a reconciliation 
with the mother country, Spain meanwhile declaring an 
armistice to continue until October 1st. It was also 
requested that the reconcentrados be permitted to return 
to their farms, while the United States would look after 
their immediate wants. The proposition met with cold 
rejection from Spain, — most happily ; for it is apparent 
now that, had the President succeeded in that or any of 
his well meant but unwise efforts to avert war, the suffer- 
ings of the Cubans would have been indefinitely prolonged 
and the war only deferred, not avoided. But the " Maine " 
report put an end to Congressional patience. A majority 
of the Senate had been for months openly at odds with 
the President on account of his dilatory policy, but with- 
out the concurrence of the House could not resort to 
compulsion. The parliamentary usage in the House is 
such that the speaker can absolutely dictate what business 
shall be done, and almost what matters shaU be spoken 
of. Speaker Keed was avowedly opposed to any action 
on the Cuban question. Even to the day of the declara- 
tion of war, he was at least a passive opponent of the 
pro-Cuban party, while in the earlier days of the discus- 
sion his power was sufficient to block all that the Senate 
wished done. Party discipline for a lung time kept even 
those Eepublicans who believed m the justice of the Cuban 
cause docile under the speaker's masterful domination, 
but after the report on the " Maine " there were threats of a 
revolt which he could not ignore. The country had 
forced Congress into line, and the representatives saw 
clearly that they must compel the speaker to cease ob- 
struction, or Eepublican candidates before the people at 
the next election would encounter public disapproval and 



Blue Jackets of 98 81 

defeat. Speaker Keed saw that the moment for his capit- 
ulation had come, and the President recognised that with- 
out the power of the speaker to defend him he would be 
at the mercy of a Congress which had long been hungry 
for more drastic measures. Accordingly he prepared a 
messao-e in which he virtually turned the determination 
of the whole policy of the government toward Spain 
over to Congress. But though news of the immmence of 
this message was conveyed to the capital, the document 
itself was held until the American consuls could be with- 
drawn from Cuba, lest its publication should provoke the 
Spaniards there to riot and perhaps to murder. It was 
the 11th of April when the message finally reached 
Congress. Pending its transmission, the ambassadors of 
Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, the Kussian 
charge d' affairs, and the Austrian minister waited upon 
the President and presented him a joint note appealing 
" to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the Presi- 
dent and the American people in their existing differences 
with Spain," and expressing a hope that further negotia- 
tions will lead to an agreement, which, while securing the 
maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees 
for ]the re-estabhshment of order in Cuba." There was 
some criticism among public men of the action of the 
President in receiving the diplomats, as it seemed to give 
an inferential acquiescence to the theory that our national 
quarrel was fit subject for the interference of European 
governments. But the President's reply, prepared care- 
fully in advance, was so worded as to avoid this construc- 
tion, making it clear that the United States regarded the 
communication as one in the interests of humanity only, 
and expressing confidence that " equal appreciation would 
(will) be .shown for its own earnest and unselfish en- 
deavours to fulfil a duty to humanity by ending a sit- 
uation, the indefinite prolongation of which has become 
insufferable." 

At noon on the 11th of April, the long expected mes- 

6 



82 Blue Jackets of 98 

sage on the condition of affairs in Cuba was sent to 
Consrress. The galleries in both chambers were crowded 
and every Eepresentative and Senator who was able to be 
out was in his seat. From Maine to Alaska, the nation 
was on the alert for what was expected to be a historic 
document, the iirst formal step toward the entrance of 
the United States upon its first war with a nation of con- 
tinental Europe, — a war that would be epoch-making in 
all history for the lofty purposes for which it had been 
undertaken. 

The message was long, with an infinity of detail and 
without effort at oratorical style. After rehearsing the 
history of Spanish rule in Cuba, and describing the con- 
ditions which the United States had at last determined 
to correct, the President went on to enumerate the reasons 
which justified the intervention of the United States. 
These were fourfold: 

First. Humanity, or the duty of checking the wanton 
sacrifice of human life in Cuba. 

Second. The obligation of the United States to protect 
the lives and interests of its citizens resident in Cuba, 
or the property on that island owned by citizens and 
residents of the United States. 

Third. The necessity of putting an end to the damage 
to American commerce caused by the existing state of 
disorder and war. 

Fourth. The wisdom of terminating a situation which 
was a constant menace to our national peace, and which 
involved the nation in heavy expense in its effort to 
preserve the laws of neutrality. 

In the presence of these considerations, therefore, the 
President declared that the time for intervention had at 
last come. He declined to recommend the recognition 
of the Cubans as belligerents, and made an elaborate ar- 
gument against the recognition of the Cuban EepubHc, 
but asked of Congress authority to take such steps as 
seemed to him wisest to the end of restoring a stable 



Blue Jackets of '98 83 

government in Cuba, and insuring peace and protection 
to its people and to our own citizens there resident. 
And he asked that he be empowered to employ the army 
and navy of the United States in giving effect to his plan. 
The well-disciplined administration majority in the 
House passed within twenty-four hours, and almost without 
debate, the resolution which the President had asked ; but 
in the Senate there was more delay. There the President's 
unwillingness to accord recognition to the Cuban Eepublic 
caused much dissatisfaction and an acrimonious debate, 
at the end of which a resolution was adopted which, 
besides conferring upon the executive the authority re- 
quested, declared the Island of Cuba free, recognised the 
Eepublic, and demanded the withdrawal of Spain's troops 
and the relinquishment of Spanish authority. The House 
then passed this resolution, with the proviso for the recog- 
nition of the Eepublic stricken out. That necessitated 
sending the resolution to a conference committee, whence 
it emerged in the following form, and was adopted on the 
19th of April by both Houses : 

" Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of 
the people of Cuba, demanding that the government of Spain 
rehnquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, 
and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban 
waters, and directing the President of the United States to 
use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these 
resolutions into effect. 

" Whereas, The abhorrent conditions which have existed 
for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our 
own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the 
United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilisation, 
culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United 
States battle-ship, with 266 of its officers and crew, while 
on a friendly visit in the harbour of Havana, and cannot longer 
be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the 
United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, 
upon which the action of Congress was invited ; therefore be 
it resolved, 



84 Blue Jackets of '98 

" First — That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of 
right ought to be, free and independent. 

" Second — That it is the duty of the United States to de- 
mand, and the government of the United States does hereby 
demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its 
authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw 
its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. 

" Third — That the President of the United States be, and 
he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land 
and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the act- 
ual service of the United States the militia of the several 
States to such an extent as may be necessary to carry these re- 
solutions into effect. 

" Fourth — That the United States hereby disclaims any dis- 
position or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or 
control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and 
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the 
government and control of the island to its people." 

The Cuban question was thus rapidly passing into the 
Spanish war. At home and abroad recognition of this 
fact was almost universal. Friends of peace and devotees 
of the stock market continued despairingly their efforts to 
avert the conflict, but it was apparent to the most san- 
guine that all hope of a peaceful adjustment was ended. 
Political conditions in both Spain and the United States 
forced the unwilling executives into war. The activity of 
the Democrats in this country in urging on the war, and 
the evident determination of the people that humane con- 
ditions should be restored in Cuba, even though by force 
of arms, caused some of the strongest influences about the 
President to be exerted in favour of immediate hostilities. 
In Spain the ministry saw that to yield to the demands of 
the United States would be to invite overthrow, even if it 
did not give supporters of Don Carlos, a pretender to the 
throne, a chance to embark upon a successful revolution. 
The signature by the President of the resolutions the day 
following their passage put an end to all doubt, and in- 



Blue Jackets of '98 85 

stantly upon this action an ultimatum was sent to Minis- 
ter Woodford at Madrid for presentation to the Spanish 
government. In this document the substance of the con- 
gressional resolutions was restated, and the demand made 
that Spain at once relinquish its authority in Cuba and 
withdraw its land and naval forces thence. Three days 
were given for an answer to this demand, and a copy of 
the document was given to the Spanish minister at 
Washington. 

To the ultimatum of the United States, no answer was 
ever returned other than the very insufficient ones offered 
by the guns of Montojo and Cervera at Manila and San- 
tiago. One of those diplomatic " triumphs " so dear to the 
hearts of the Spaniards was accomplished by the ministry 
at Madrid. Swift upon the passage of the resolutions by 
Congress, the watchful Spanish minister at Washington 
cabled the news to his government. Before Minister 
Woodford had an opportunity to present the ultimatum 
cabled him from Washington, he received from Pio GuUon, 
the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, his passports, 
with a note informing him that diplomatic relations be- 
tween the two nations must be considered at an end, be- 
cause Congress had passed a resolution which " denies the 
legitimate sovereignty of Spain and threatens immediate 
armed intervention in Cuba, — which is equivalent to a 
declaration of war." This was on the 21st of April. The 
day before at Washington Minister Polo had been notified 
by a messenger from the State Department of the charac- 
ter of the resolutions passed by Congress, and of the nature 
of the instructions sent to Minister Woodford. He at 
once responded by a demand for his passports, saying that 
" the resolution is of such a character that my per- 
manence in Washington becomes impossible." That 
very night he took a train for Canada, while Minister 
Woodford, no less prompt in abandoning a hostile coun- 
try, took train from Madrid to the French frontier. 

The Spaniards, like all Latin peoples, are more fond of 



86 Blue Jackets of '98 

the picturesque and romantic than we, and attach vastly 
more importance to the trivialities of etiquette than do 
any Anglo-Saxon people. To them the fact that Minis- 
ter Woodford had never been able to present the ultima- 
tum of the United States was a matter of prime impor- 
tance. Taken in connection with the Spanish minister's 
voluntary departure from the United States, while the 
American minister was ordered out of Madrid, it took al- 
most the proportions of a great victory, and when to these 
two incidents was added the further diplomatic triumph 
won by Dupuy De Lome in resigning before the Presi- 
dent of the United States could ask for his recall, the sum 
was as inspiring as a successful war. The contrast between 
the Spanish and the American character is strikingly shown 
by the difference in the treatment of the departing minis- 
ters. Senor Polo left Washington unattended, except by a 
crowd of newspaper reporters. General Woodford was 
escorted to the railway station at Madrid by the mayor 
of the city, who treated him with the gravest courtesy 
.until the train started, then turned and led the assem- 
bled crowd in a cheer for Spain. But Minister Polo 
reached the Canadian frontier without insult or assault, 
while the train of the American envoy was stoned at 
Valladolid. 

So ended the political and diplomatic preliminaries to 
the war. It is true that the formal declaration of war by 
the United States Congress was not made until the 25th 
of April, but the 19th may be taken as the date of the ac- 
tual beginning of hostilities. It was so regarded by Spain, 
for it was tlie act of that day that impelled the Spanish 
ministry to send Minister Woodford his passports and to 
withdraw Minister Polo from Washington. Indeed the 
United States navy committed the first overt act of war 
without awaiting the formal declaration by Congress, for 
four days prior to the declaration of war the blockade of 
Cuba was begun, and the first capture on the high seas 
effected. 



Blue Jackets of '98 87 

Before closing the account of the political events lead- 
ing up to the war, some account of the manner in which 
the statesmen of Spain met the fateful issue is necessary. 
Looking back upon the ease with which the United States 
won the victory in the conliict, and remembering that even 
before the issue was joined cool observers in either country 
must have been able to discern the great disparity of force 
between the two, one thinks that there must have been 
great trepidation among responsible leaders in Spain as to 
the outcome of the conflict. It is just to say, however, 
that if any doubt existed among the ministry or the lead- 
ers of the Opposition of the perfect ability of Spain to 
meet and honourably resist her giant adversary it was man- 
fully suppressed. The Spaniards bore themselves as a 
brave, if not a prudent people. Madrid met the news of 
the outbreak of hostilities with enthusiasm. The Queen 
Eegent, accompanied by the boy King, Alfonzo XIII, being 
then but fourteen years old, went to the Senate chamber, 
cheered as they passed along the streets of Old Madrid by 
an enthusiastic throng. The boy wore full military uni- 
form, the regalia of the Cadets with the insignia of the 
Golden Fleece. As they entered the great hall, the as- 
sembled multitude broke into frantic cheering. Probably 
no man there was ignorant, if he but stopped to think, of 
the immense superiority of the antagonist that Spain was 
about to meet, but there was no sign of trepidation. Na- 
tions are always self-confident, — happily so, else the best 
fights that ever have been fought for human liberty would 
have been left untried. Nor is any nation often doubtful 
of the entire justice of the cause it defends, nor harassed 
by any doubt that the divine favour is especially bestowed 
upon it. So the Queen Eegent, standing at the threshold 
of a war destined to deprive her country of its most cher- 
ished colonial possessions, announced to the Cortes the " in- 
domitable purpose which inspires my government to defend 
our rights," and professed confidence that the support of 
Heaven would be given to so just a cause. Three days 



88 Blue Jackets of 98 

later war was an accomplished fact, and with a final appeal 
to the Great Powers of Europe for sympathy and aid in this 
struggle against aggressive democracy, Spain entered upon 
a confiict from which she was destined to retreat crippled 
financially, bleeding from a score of deadly wounds, and 
stripped of her most precious colonial possessions in two 
hemispheres, — possessions won for her by the two great 
explorers who, though neither of them was a Spaniard, 
under the patronage of Spain's greatest monarchs, Ferdi- 
nand and Isabella, and the Emperor Charles V, made the 
name of Spain glorious, — the lands won by Christopher 
Columbus in the Atlantic and Ferdinand Magellan in the 
Pacific. 



CHAPTEK V 

The Navies of Spain and the United States — The 
Gloomy Estimates of the Experts — Ship Hunting in 
Europe — Why a Navy cannot be Extemporised — 
Yachts and Auxiliary Vessels — The Blockade of Cuba 

— Lieutenant Rowan's Expedition — The First Capture 

— Hot Work at Matanzas — The Attack on Cardenas — 
Death of Bagley — The Fight at Cienfuegos. 

AMONG the people of the United States the navy- 
has always been held in high favour. Perhaps 
this sentiment had its origin in the War of 1812, when 
the frigates commanded by Hull, Bainbridge, and Porter 
won stirring victories on the sea, and in some degree 
obliterated the memory of the shameful disasters to the 
American arms on shore. Or perhaps the ancient aver- 
sion of the fathers of the repubhc to a standing army has 
concentrated upon the navy all the popular affection that 
in other nations is divided between the two branches of 
the armed service. At any rate the American people 
have always shown to the navy a favour denied to the 
army, and if they have not been as liberal in their appro- 
priations to its support as navy officers might wish, they 
were not, in the decade preceding the Spanish-American 
war, at any rate niggardly. For this reason, when the 
war with Spain was fairly upon us, the naval prepara- 
tions of the United States may be said to have been 
adequate. 

Some slight outhne and comparison of the respective 
strength on the water of the combatants will be useful 
here, thoucch to so into detail would be of little service to 
the civilian reader. So many factors go to make up the 
sum of a warship's efficiency that a comparison perfectly 



90 Blue Jackets of '98 

lucid to a naval expert is only confusing to the lands- 
man. The number of guns, the weight of the broadside, 
the proportion of rapid-firing rifles, the torpe.do equip- 
ment, the weight of armour or other protection, the speed 
of the ship, the character of the powder, and a host of 
other considerations combine in a technical estimate of 
a warship's power. Such an estimate may well be 
omitted here. 

The sea power of Spain at the breaking out of the war 
may be broadly indicated by the following facts : In 
battle-ships Spain was decidedly ill-equipped, but two 
vessels of her navy coming in this class. One was of 
antiquated type, the other, the " Pelayo," was a modern 
steel battle-ship of 9900 tons, with a strong armament. 
In first-class cruisers Spain was strong. Of these she had 
seven, ranging in size from the " Emperador Carlos V " 
of 9235 tons to the " Cristobal Colon " of 6840 tons. The 
11-inch Hontoria rifles, which formed the main batteries 
of these ships, are regarded by navy officers as ex- 
ceptionally efficient ordnance. Of second-class cruisers 
Spain had eight, and of smaller cruisers and gunboats 
some thirty or more, a few of them being wooden and 
antiquated. In torpedo boats and torpedo destroyers 
Spain was vastly superior to the United States, and at 
the opening of the waa- this fact created something like 
a panic among Americans. The efficiency of the torpedo 
boat, having never been subjected to the actual test of 
war, was universally overrated, and most dolorous pre- 
dictions of the disaster which awaited our ships in the 
encounter with the waspish pygmies were common in the 
American newspapers. Of torpedo-boat destroyers Spain 
had six, ranging from 220 to 255 feet, and from 380 to 
400 tons displacement. These were really formidable 
vessels, uniting the qualities of a torpedo boat with those 
of a gunboat, and useful therefore on the blockade and 
on service requiring a greater coal capacity than any 



Blue Jackets of '98 91 

torpedo boat possesses. The United States was wholly 
without any of this class of vessels. Of torpedo boats 
proper, Spain had ten of the first class, six of the second 
class, and seven of a mongrel type, but thoroughly service- 
able. It may be pertinent to note at this juncture that 
throughout the war not one United States ship was 
destroyed, touched, or even seriously menaced by a 
torpedo. 

Let us consider now, in equally general terms, the navy 
of the United States at the outbreak of the war. The 
report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1897 showed that 
the United States had in effective condition four battle- 
ships of the first class, two of the second class (one of 
these was the ill-fated " Maine "), two armoured cruisers, 
sixteen cruisers, fifteen gunboats, six double-turreted moni- 
tors, one ram, one dynamite gunboat, one despatch boat, and 
five torpedo boats. There were at the time of the secre- 
tary's report under construction five battle-ships of the 
first class, sixteen torpedo boats, and one submarine boat. 
None of these was completed in time to be of service 
during the war. In connection with the effective strength 
of the navy should be considered the so-called auxiliary 
fleet, or merchant ships under subsidy and liable to naval 
service. In all, twenty of these were borne on the navy 
rolls. The great number of swift yachts owned by citi- 
zens of the United States and readily convertible into 
torpedo or patrol boats was also an element in the naval 
supremacy of the United States. 

Apparently, therefore, the navy of the United States 
was vastly more powerful than that of Spain. But to 
skilled students of naval affairs the disparity of the two 
adversaries did not appear so great. Captain Alfred T. 
Mahan, admittedly the greatest living expert on " Sea 
Power," refers to the comparative strength of the com- 
batants in an article written after the war had demon- 
strated the superiority in fact of the United States navy, 
thus: 



92 Blue Jackets of ^98 

" The force of the Spanish navy — on paper, as the expres- 
sion goes — was so nearly equal to our own that it was well 
within the limits of possibility that an unlucky incident, the 
loss for example of a battle-ship, might make the Spaniard 
decisively superior in nominal, or even in actual, available 
force. An excellent authority told the writer that he consid- 
ered the loss of the ' Maine ' had changed the balance ; that is, 
that, whereas with the 'Maine' our fleet had been slightly 
superior, so, after her destruction, the advantage, still nominal, 
was rather the other way." 

Captain Mahan charitably refrains from making public 
the name of the " excellent authority " whose estimate of 
the nominal strength of the United States navy proved 
so sadly at fault when its actual power came to be ex- 
erted. He was not alone, however, in his error. The 
English reviews printed many articles signed by men of 
supposed authoritative position among naval experts, 
depicting the struggle that was to come between the 
navies of the United States and Spain as a very close 
one, and in many cases giving all the elements of superi- 
ority to Spain. Our ships were described as imseaworthy, 
and our sailors, because of the admixture of nationalities 
which the whole people of the United States represent, 
were expected to lack that sense of national pride and 
patriotism which would enable them to stand fire. If 
the masses in the United States were a little bra^crart and 
flamboyant in their certainty of American superiority, the 
expert proved that the academic estimate is not the one 
necessarily correct. 

Moreover, the outcome of a naval war is not wholly 
dependent upon the comparative numbers of vessels in the 
hostile navies, for brilliant strategy may enable the weaker 
power to still outnumber the enemy in some decisive battle, 
or to reduce to impotence the fleet of its adversary by 
menacing manoeuvres without offering battle at all. In 
the accounts of the great naval battles of the war, I wiU 
contrast more fully the comparative strength of the two 



Blue Jackets of '98 93 

adversaries. It is proper to note here two elements of 
strength for Spain, and of weakness for the United States. 
The proximity of Cuba to the United States made it 
certain that the theatre of war would be on our coast. 
This being the case, it was highly advantageous for Spain 
that her colonial possessions in the West Indies supplied 
her with coaling stations and bases of supplies. If the 
United States had been compelled to press an offensive 
war on the coast of Spain, our commanders would have 
been handicapped from the very first by the lack of such 
facihties. The efficiency of a modern man-of-war is abso- 
lutely limited by its coal capacity. A battle-ship sent 
from our coast to Spain would exhaust two-thirds of its 
coal supply in crossing the Atlantic, Until that was 
made good, its condition would be most perilous, and as 
the tendency of modern custom is to declare coal contra- 
band of war, the bunkers of a United States ship in war- 
time could not be replenished in any foreign port, except 
under such limitations as would prohibit further offensive 
operations. The difficult and perilous device of coaling at 
sea from colliers sent from home ports would have to be 
relied upon, and would offer to an alert enemy most prom- 
ising opportunities for an eff'ective attack. Again, our long 
coast-line, plentifully dotted with flourishing cities, was 
difficult to guard, and tempting to the audacious and dar- 
ing naval commander, while Spain's coast is almost desti- 
tute of large cities. Our exposed coast cities, though 
never in fact attacked, or even menaced, still compelled 
the employment of a certain number of vessels as scouts 
and for harbour defence, reducing the force available for 
active operations against the enemy. Such a coast-line as 
ours adds immensely to the eff'ectiveness for an enemy of 
what the naval authorities call a " fleet in being." That 
IS, a fleet, organised and in commission, and which may at 
any moment strike at any one of a number of points. 
Such a fleet the Spaniards maintained at Cadiz through 
the greater part of the war, and because of it our govern- 



94 Blue Jackets of '98 

ment was at all times apprehensive of an attack on some 
one of our northern coast cities. Doubtless had the 
Spanish character been more adventurous, our coastwise 
towns would not have got off scot free as they did. Effi- 
cient as were our scouts, and alert as our intelligence 
department was, it is certain a seaman of the Paul Jones 
type, with a swift cruiser and a roving commission, would 
have found somewhere between Portland, Maine, and the 
Gulf of Mexico a spot to strike and flee from before a 
superior enemy could be called to give him battle. But 
Spain had no Paul Jones. J 

On the afternoon of the 21st of April, the harbour of 
Key West off the southwestern point of the Florida penin- 
sula was full of ships of war. There lay the North Atlan- 
tic squadron, under command of Eear Admiral William T. 
Sampson, who was appointed to this all-important com- 
mand upon completing his duty as President of the" Maine" 
court of inquiry. In his fleet were the " New York," which 
flew the admiral's flag, the battle-ships " Iowa " and " Indi- 
aria," the double-turreted monitors "Puritan," "Terror," 
" Miantonomah," and " Amphitrite," the cruisers " Marble- 
head," "Montgomery," "Detroit," and "Cincinnati," the gun- 
boats " Helena," " Castine," " Newport," " Nashville," and 
"Machias," the torpedo boats " Foote " and "Porter," and a 
number of colliers, despatch boats, supply boats, and other 
plebeians of a naval column. The little town, deadly dull 
usually and given over to Cuban cigar-makers and the 
native " conchs " who lead an amphibious life, had enjoyed 
three months of such life as it had not seen since the ■ 
days of the civil war. Its streets were crowded with i' 
officers, seamen, and alert newspaper correspondents. . 
These enforced visitors found less pleasure in the situa- • 
tion than did the natives, for Key West is, at the best, 
a dreary stopping-place for men accustomed to the activi- 
ties of the great world, and for weeks, from the officers 
and followers of the fleet, fervent prayers had daily 



Blue Jackets of '98 95 

arisen for action. No community in the whole land 
watched more impatiently the slow progress of Con- 
gress, and the suspense was increased by the difficulty with 
which full and prompt information of what was doing at 
the capitol was received. The Northern papers were two 
days old by the time they reached the sandbar on which 
some two thousand navy officers and men, with an army of 
civilians, were marooned, and the meagre details which the 
managing editors at home telegraphed for the guidance of 
the correspondents with the fleet only whetted the appe- 
tite for more. Nevertheless, it was from one of these cor- 
respondents that the admiral commanding first learned of 
the action of Congress, and that his fleet was to be ordered 
at once to begin the blockade of Cuba. Swiftly following the 
despatch to the correspondent came a long communication 
from the Secretary of the Navy, Hon. John D. Long, to Ad- 
miral Sampson, containing an order to sail, and with it the 
full text of the President's proclamation of blockade. Then 
there was stir in Key West. All officers and men were 
recalled to the ships, and the wharves were crowded with 
supplies bought by the ward-room stewards in anticipation 
of a long tour of sea service. The newspaper boats, of 
which there were a dozen or more, were darting nervously 
about the harbour, visiting one ship after another in search 
of elusive news. When night fell, the masts of the vessels 
glowed with winking parti-coloured eyes, that silently, but 
with infinite meaning, transmitted messages from one com- 
mander to the other. The great battle-ships lying farthest 
out toward the mouth of the harbour swept sea and land 
with the long, bright beams of their search-lights, vigilant 
ever lest some hostile torpedo boat should slip in to the 
destruction of some American vessel. At daylight, the 
smoke began rising, first in faint wreaths, and then in roll- 
ing clouds, from the stacks of the vessels, and the sun was 
not yet risen when a line of bright-coloured flags flying from 
the signal mast of the flagship told the watchers on shore 
that some order was being delivered. The signal was 



g6 Blue Jackets of '98 

answered instantly by the piping of the boatswain whistles 
on all the ships, and the clanking of heavy chains as the 
anchors were dragged up from their sandy beds. Soon the 
whole fleet was under way, in two parallel columns, and 
moving out to sea in perfect silence. Not a gunshot 
signalised this first movement of an American fleet against 
a European foe, no bugle-call noted the opening act of an 
epoch-making war. Not even a cheer told the men on 
ship and shore that a new page in history was being turned 
by a people long renowned for the victories of peace rather 
than those of deadly conflict. The scene was wholly peace- 
ful. The yachts employed by the newspapers as despatch 
boats gave even a festal air to the squadron, while a number 
of fishing smacks and merchantmen plied, as in ordinary 
days, about the harbour. 

For some of the merchantmen, however, the ordinary 
days were past and the era of war-time disaster at hand. 
The fleet had hardly left Key West below the horizon 
when a wreath of smoke on the sky-line showed a steamer 
approaching. She was watched, as everything afloat is 
watched from a man-of-war, but little heed was given to 
her, nor would have been, perhaps, except for the mistaken 
courtesy of her captain. 

" I saw that fine fleet of American warships," he said 
afterwards, gloomily recounting his tale to the newspaper 
correspondents, " and said I to the mate : * Pedro, get the 
colours, and we will salute those beautiful ships.' " So, in 
the innocence of his heart, and wholly ignorant of the fact 
that his country was at war with the United States, Captain 
Lazaraga, of the steamer " Buena Ventura," bound from Pas- 
cagoula, Mississippi, to Bilboa, Spain, with a cargo of lumber, 
ran up his best Spanish flag and dipped it thrice in seamanly 
courtesy to the fleet he so much admired. The answer 
was hardly what he expected, nor can it be termed chival- 
ric. None of the warships dipped its colours, but to the 
foretop of the leadmg one ran up a number of little balls 
of bunting, breaking out into some kind of a signal which 



Blue Jackets of '98 97 

Captain Lazaraga could not understand. Immediately he 
saw one of the American vessels, which he afterwards 
learned to be the " Nashville," turn aside from the column 
and steam towards him. Soon she fired a blank cartridge 
towards the " Buena Ventura." 

" A curious way of saluting, those Yankees have," said 
the captain, and kept his ship on a course. Then came 
another shot, this time sending a shell screaming before 
the bows of his ship. At this juncture he concluded to 
stop and see what the affair meant, and his vessel was 
presently boarded by an ensign and a prize crew, from 
whom he learned of the war, and that his ship, in pursu- 
ance of a barbaric custom still in vogue on the high seas 
though abandoned on land, was a prize to the American 
navy. The ship was sent into Key West, where she was 
received with great enthusiasm, and the newspapers of 
the nation, just then being in hysterical mood, made as 
great ado over taking this hapless merchantman as if some 
deed of unparalleled valour had been done. 

From time immemorial it has been the usage of nations 
to hold private property at sea in the ship of an enemy fit 
subject for capture, and navy officers have been enriched 
by the prize-money thus obtained. Yet civilised nations 
respect private property of an enemy on shore, and an 
army traversing an enemy's country will even punctiliously 
pay for supplies taken from the inhabitants for its support. 
Why this distinction should be drawn cannot be satisfac- 
torily explained. As the better natures of men have been 
developed, — and there is no doubt that man grows better 
as the world becomes more civilised, — effort has been 
made to do away with this practice of capture at sea. 
Though the poverty of Spain's merchant marine resulted 
in making the prizes of the American navy very few and 
of very little value, there was evident among the American 
people a feeling of aversion to the whole system of marine 
spoliation. Had an American army invaded Spain, our 
soldiers would not have looted the houses and shops and 



98 Blue Jackets of 98 

divided the booty. Why, then, asked our people, should 
a Spanish property afloat be less sacred than that ashore ? 
Could the salt water wash out the stain of the theft ? 
This sentiment was so very general among the people that 
it is probable the movement to exempt private property, 
not contraband of war, from capture at sea will receive a 
great impetus as a result of the Spanish war. 

The duty upon which Admiral Sampson's squadron was 
now despatched by the President to undertake was the 
most arduous and the least stimulating that ever falls to 
the lot of a navy officer. To maintain a blockade is to be 
a sentry with a beat at sea, and with no relief. Steaming 
slowly up and down, near enough to a shore to be in dan- 
ger should a sudden hurricane burst upon the sea, but 
unable ever to land ; close enough to the enemy to be 
in constant danger from torpedoes or other methods of 
stealthy attack, but without hope of a fair battle, ship to 
ship and man to man, the blockaders suffer stupid monot- 
ony without relief from constant apprehension of disaster, 
and have all the routiae and work of warfare without 
hope of glory. In this service, so thankless yet all-impor- 
tant, the United States navy has made a record that chal- 
lenges the admiration of the world. During the long 
years of the war between the States the navy kept the 
ports of the Confederacy locked like a bank's vaults. 
Bound in that circle of steel and iron, the South was fairly 
starved into subjection. Europe said it could not be done. 
The best naval authorities of the Old World scoffed at the 
idea of making an effective blockade of a coast more than 
two thousand miles long and full of practicable harbours. 
Nevertheless it was done, and though Europe, angered by 
interrupted trade, watched vigilantly for even a day's 
break in the blockade, such as would permit it to be de- 
clared ineffective, the break never came. In the war with 
Spain the problem before the navy was almost as great, 
though as no nation showed any great desire to have the 
Cuban ports reopened the diplomatic difficulties were less 



Blue Jackets of '98 99 

grave. The island has a coast-line of two thousand miles, 
but the harbours are comparatively few, and the dense 
undergrowth that made an impassable wall along the water 
front made the use by blockade runners, of any except the 
improved and recognised inlets, impossable. But the task 
of the navy was not to be confined to the maintenance of 
a blockade. A landing place for the American army that 
was to invade Cuba had to be prepared, and the Spanish 
fleet was to be found and destroyed. For many weeks, 
however, owing to the slow preparation of the army and 
the dilatory poKcy of the administration, the blockade 
alone engaged the attention of Admiral Sampson. All 
blockades are monotonous — this one was deadly dull. 
The prizes were few and of little value. The most notable 
one of these was the steamship " Panama," of Barcelona, 
a large steamer mounting two 14-pound guns and one 
machine gun. This vessel fell a prey to the " Manorove," 
a httle lighthouse tender, hastily fitted up for blockading 
duty, and far inferior to the " Panama " in armament, in 
the size of the crew, and in tonnage. So small was the 
" Mangrove's " crew that a prize-crew had to be borrowed 
from the " Indiana," which lay in the offing, to take the prize 
into port, while the boarding officer had to borrow a re- 
volver to overawe the captives. Beyond doubt, had the 
"Panama" shown fight she might have beaten off the 
audacious pygmy that made her heave to ; but the fleet of 
huge ships of war in the distance gave to the mandate of 
the " Mangrove's " captain an authority that under other 
circumstances the Spaniard might have been more willing 
to disregard. Another prize of considerable value, taken by 
the torpedo boat " Terror," was the " Bolivar," with about 
,000 in silver aboard. 



While the blockading fleet was steaming up and down 
before Havana in plain sight of the lights of the town by 
night, and the steeples and chinmeys by day, the people of 
the city were being urged by General Blanco to hold 



loo Blue Jackets of '98 

themselves loyal to Spain, and to resist the invaders to the 
death. Havana was full of Cuban sympathisers, but as 
the official class, with whom all authority rested, were 
strongly pro-Spanish, the patriots dared not express them- 
selves. Not until after the war was over, and the gallant 
Cuban General Gomez entered Havana with the American 
troops, did the feeling of Cuban patriotism break out in 
wild enthusiasm. Until American authority was there 
established, an expression of sympathy for the insurgents 
was likely to land the citizen in Morro, if indeed it did not 
end in his lying dead by the sea-wall as the firing squad 
marched away. So when war was declared. General 
Blanco met with what was, ostensibly at least, a hearty 
response to his appeals to the loyalty of the citizens. The 
town was decked with the Spanish colours, and a great body 
of citizens marched in procession to the Army headquar- 
ters, where their spokesmen pledged to General Blanco 
their lives and fortunes in defence of the Spanish crown. 
The general responded in a speech of characteristic Span- 
ish quality. He described in terrifying phrase the bar- 
barity of the foe, and called upon them to save all that 
they held dear — their lives, their property, and the honour 
of their women — by repelHng the invaders, who were 
even then at the very walls of Morro. As for himself, he 
swore that death only could put an end to the stubborn 
resistance he intended to offer. Unhappily for General 
Blanco the war was ended, and Spain expelled from Cuba 
without his ever seeing the American lines, or having 
any opportunity to perform any of the deeds of valour he 
promised the citizens of Havana. 

While the American fleet was standing guard at the : 
doorway to the Cuban capital and the military authorities 
in that city were fighting the war with volleys of eloquence, 
an officer of the United States army was prowling through 
Cuba, gathering topographical information for the expected 
army of invasion, and making arrangements with the 
Cuban insurgents for co-operation. The officer was Lieu- 



Blue Jackets of '98 loi 

tenant Andrew S. Eowan, who had entered Cuba the day 
of the declaration of war. Avoiding all the frequented 
lines of travel, he had crossed in an open boat from 
Jamaica, guided by a boatman who was half fisherman, 
half smuggler, and all outlaw. Eludmg the Spanish 
patrols, who would have promptly hanged him as a spy 
had they caught him, Eowan made his way to a camp 
of insurgents, by whom he was taken through the forests 
to General Garcia at Bayamo. He was the first official 
visitor from the United States to the camps of the patriots, 
and his arrival awakened the wildest enthusiasm. Through 
the Junta — or Cuban revolutionary committee — in New 
York, leaders like Garcia and Gomez had been kept in- 
formed of the generous interest which the people of the 
United States took in the Cuban struggle for hberty, and 
of the efforts making in Congress to aid them in their 
aspirations. This young officer, a soldier every inch, 
brought to the veterans of the revolution the first assur- 
ance that the long fight was won — for all knew that the 
aid of the great republic meant victory, certain and in- 
evitable. They did not know, nor did Eowan, that when 
the visitor entered their camp, war was already existing, 
and the Americans had begun making captures ; but the 
visitor was able to assure them that when he left Wasli- 
ington the breach between the two countries was certain, 
and the formal beginning of hostilities only a matter of 
days. And if the coming of Eowan was an encourage- 
ment to the revolutionists, the circumstances in which he 
found them offered justification for his mission and all 
that lay behind it. They occupied the ancient city of 
Bayamo, a place of 30,000 inhabitants. On every side 
were the smouldering ruins of forts, whence the Spaniards 
had but recently been driven. Through the gates of the 
city poured in a returning throng of its inhabitants, who 
had been driven from home by the barbarities of Spanish 
occupation, but for whom the victorious patriots had 
opened a way again to their homes and firesides. The 



I02 Blue Jackets of '98 

scene gave the lie to all the Spanish assertions of the col- 
lapse of the revolution, and offered to the messenger from 
the United States a picture of patriotism triumphant, of a 
great victory in a good fight for liberty. All day Eowan 
spent with Garcia, of whose high qualities as man and 
soldier he, like all who met that life-long champion of 
Cuban liberty, speaks in terms of admiration. Plans 
were interchanged, maps for the guidance of an invading 
army prepared, and the military situation carefully can- 
vassed. Doubtless the stories Eowan brought of the 
doings of the world beyond the blockaded coasts w^ere of 
surpassing interest to the general so long condemned to 
life in the Cuban thickets, but Garcia was a soldier, and 
in deadly earnest. He wasted no time, and gave his 
guest but a brief resting-space. " At five o'clock," says 
Eowan, " lie said he had his despatches ready, and asked if 
I could start North at once, as he wished to get his replies 
to the United States government as soon as possible. He 
detailed General Callazo, Colonel Hernandez, and Dr. Dietas 
an expert on the diseases of that section, to accompany 
me." The four started after nightfall, and threading the 
woods with the greatest care, travelled through jungles 
and across rivers and swamps for two days, when they 
reached a large town in ruins, but surrounded by fortifica- 
tions which were held by about 500 Cubans. This was 
Vittoria de las Tunas. Pressing on again through the 
dense forest, and at one time scaling a lofty peak whence 
they enjoyed a view of the ocean, which for them meant 
safety, they came at last to the coast. There they found 
a flourishing salt works, conducted for the Cuban army 
and manned by men under arrest for some breach of army 
discipline. A little boat, not big enough for the whole 
party, but the best obtainable, was here put at Lieutenant 
Eowan's service, and with sails made of hammocks, and 
a mere makeshift for a mast, they put to sea — Dr. Dietas : 
having been sent back for lack of room. In the distance, 
soon after setting sail, Eowan discerned the fleet of 



Blue Jackets of '98 103 

Admiral Sampson, then on its way to Porto Eico, for it 
was then the 5th of May. But without halting the fleet, 
the party continued its course for the coast of the United 
States, and, having by good fortune overhauled a spong- 
ing schooner, its crew of negroes were with some diffi- 
culty, and after many threats, persuaded to take them to 
Nassau. To reach home from that point was easy. In 
:the course of this perilous expedition. Lieutenant Eowan 
ihad crossed Cuba from south to north. He had discovered 
ithat a province which the Spaniards claimed to control 
was, in fact, in the hands of the revolutionists ; he had 
fseen for himself that the Cuban army was organised, 
[disciplined, ready to fight, and confident ; he had found 
jthe territory laid waste and depopulated, giving only too 
Istriking evidence of the fact that the war was making of 
Cuba a desert. All this he had done at the hourly risk 
of his life, at the peril indeed of a death commonly held 
to be ignommious, for in military law he was a spy, and 
would have been hanged within a few hours of his cap- 
ture. Yet, for all his bravery, he holds no unique posi- 
ttion among his fellows. The annals of the United States 
army are full of such deeds of courage as his exploit. 

And now to return to the blockade. When the navy 
bad fairly set itself to the task assigned it, the conviction 
became general that very insufficient tools had been fur- 
lished for a very hard job. Monitors with a speed of ten 
knots are not the most efficient engines with which to 
3lose a number of ports against merchantmen that make 
ifteen knots under easy steam ; and torpedo boats that 
3arry coal enough for perhaps three days' steaming are 
p-pt to be a source of embarrassment on a blockade where 
I coal capacity sufficient for a month's stay outside the 
blockaded port is a great desideratum. Nevertheless, the 
blockade was made effective, though no doubt that was 
largely due to the comparatively small temptation which 
Juban commerce offered to those who otherwise might go 



I04 Blue Jackets of '98 

in for the exciting and profitable sport of blockade nm- 
nin<7. Not only was every considerable mercliautman 
that came within suspicious distance of Havana or ad- 
jacent ports captured or warned off, but wretched little 
fishing smacks and boats with garden stuff for the be- 
leaguered town were sternly sent about their business, 
while a Yankee tug once fiercely tried to bring to the 
British man-o"f-war " Talbot " with a blank cartridge. Offi- 
cers and correspondents with the fleet report that so 
accustomed had the islanders and the Spaniards them- 
selves become to the murderous system of warfare which 
had been practised under Weyler that the prisoners 
taken by the navy could hardly comprehend their 
cTood fortune in not being at once shot, and the amaze- 
ment of a Spanish officer who was captured as he was 
CToing off on a leave of absence to be married, when he 
was released on parole, was picturesque and almost laugh- 
able in its eff"usiveness. But the occasional captures were 
not of sufficient importance to relieve the tedium of the 
blockade, and once or twice the sight of a warship on the 
horizon was hailed with enthusiasm by officers and men 
as seeming to promise a fight. But it always turned out 
to be the ship of a friendly nation — once an Italian, 
whose nationality was not made out until she began to 
salute the admiral's flag, and again the British ship " Tal- 
bot." The latter vessel, an armoured cruiser of 5600 tons, 
was twice zealously pursued as a possible enemy, once by 
the gunboat "Nashville," 1371 tons, and once by the 
" Scorpion," a converted yacht. 

Once in awhile two or three of the ships would run a 
little bit inshore and throw a few shells at some earth- 
work over which the Spanish flag was flying. As a rule 
little damage was done on either side, for the Spanish 
were not good marksmen, and while the shooting of the 
Blue Jackets was true, it was shown early in the war, and 
not disproved during its continuance, that earthworks 
cannot be reduced nor silenced for long by fire from ships. 



'-V 










'^ " - 1 ' 




I'.ATTI.KSHT? "IOWA" IN DRY-DOCR. 



Blue Jackets of '98 105 

But at home in the cities the news of these inconclusive 
affrays was eagerly read and commented upon as if a 
I battle had indeed been fought. The newspapers of New 
York gave almost as much space to the first event of this 
sort, the bombardment of Matanzas, as in 1861 they did 
' to the battle of Bull Run. Yet it was an affair only 
I worthy of a place in history, because it was the first 
attack with really modern naval weapons upon a fort. 
! The attacking vessels were the " New York," " Puritan," 
i and the " Cincinnati." The batteries were uncompleted 
earthworks, and it was to prevent their completion, and 
perhaps to afford his men a little relief from the boredom 
' of the blockade, that Admiral Sampson concluded to throw 
a few tons of iron and explosives at them. The " New 
York" opened fire at about 4000 yards, and the officers 
[Watching from the bridge saw the yellow dust fly. But 
I from the ports of the ship, from every turret, sponson, 
and shield in which there was a gun in action the yellow 
powder smoke flew too, and it was very quickly evident 
to those who sighted the guns and who watched the 
effect of the shots, that the great weakness of the United 
States Navy in the war was going to be the lack of smoke- 
less powder. The whole ship was wreathed in hot, stifling 
smoke. It choked and scorched the lungs of the gun- 
ners, and it hid the enemy from their sight. Though the 
batteries were worked with furious speed, much of the 
shooting was necessarily at random, for through the smoke 
was no vision possible, and there was no waiting for it 
to clear away before the next shot was fired. The officers 
in charge of the turret guns would run from the turret to 
a point on deck where the vapour was less dense, and 
there getting their bearings would rush back to train their 
.guns. The firing continued for twenty minutes, and at 
'the end the batteries, though silenced, were still effective. 
One shot from the big 12-inch gun of the "Puritan" 
was seen to strike immediately under one of the Spanish 
cannon, which rose in the air out of the cloud that at- 



io6 Blue Jackets of '98 

tended the exploding shell, but the rest of the projectiles, 
so far as could be seen, stirred up the dust and frightened 
the defenders, but did no damage that a gang of men 
with spades and wheelbarrows could not repair in an 
afternoon. 

When the news of this bombardment reached the 
United States it was hailed as a great victory. When 
the American ships stopped firing and drew off, the Span- 
iards on their part claimed a great victory, and celebrated 
it with oratory and fireworks. " Our loss, one mule," was 
the Spanish bulletin cabled to Madrid. It was in fact 
httle more than half an hour's target practice. Not one 
of the ships engaged was hit. 

There were several incidents of this sort, all largely 
celebrated in the American newspapers, but none of 
which had other than a passing and merely journalistic 
interest. On the 29th of April the batteries at Cienfuegos, 
on the southern coast of the island, were engaged by the 
" Marblehead," and the day after, the forts at Cabanas 
near Havana were attacked and materially injured by the 
cruiser "New York." It was good target practice for 
the Yankee gunners, and perhaps it played its part in the 
great denouement that came at Santiago on July 3d, but 
for the immediate moment it was a prodigious use of 
powder and shot for a pygmy result. 

As the days wore on and the purpose of the United 
States developed, the tedium of the blockade was relieved 
by opportunities for service of a more dashing character 
— service for employment in which the officers of the 
squadron vied eagerly with each other, and in which a 
few found both glory and death. 

On the northern coast of Cuba, some seventy-five miles 
from Havana, lies the little town of Cardenas. It pos- 
sesses a picturesque and difficult harbour, and was well 
fortified by tlie Spaniards in the days preceding the 
declaration of war. Within the harbour, protected partly 
by the batteries but more by the fact that the channels 



Blue Jackets of '98 107 

were too shallow to permit the entrance of the larger 
United States cruisers, were a number of Spanish gun- 
boats of light draught, which every now and then would 
run out, inspect the blockading fleet, and then dash back 
into their safe retreat. There was little harm in this, as 
none of the enemy's ships was big enough to menace 
even the smallest ship the Americans had on that part of 
the blockade, but there was an air of defiance, of bravado, 
about the Spanish procedure which irritated the men on 
the blockading squadron, and it was determined to teach 
them a lesson. The process of education proved expensive. 
The next time the Spaniards came out the torpedo boat 
" Foote " made a dash at them. The guns she mounted 
were of course no match for those on the enemy, but the 
American sailors had already become contemptuous of 
Spanish markmanship, and it was thought that the 
' Foote " could get within torpedo range, let slip her pro- 
jectile, and get away unscathed. The attack was hardly 
begun, however, before it was found that these Spaniards 
had learned to shoot, and the " Foote " withdrew, for the 
game was not worth risking a torpedo boat for. On the 
11th of May, the gunboat "Wilmington" joined the ves- 
sels on this part of the blockade. As her draught was 
light enough to permit her to enter the bay it was deter- 
mined to explore the entrance, and if possible inflict some 
damage on the enemy. All buoys had been removed 
from the harbour, and it was believed that the channel 
had been mined, but with the help of a Cuban pilot, the 
" Wilmington," torpedo boat " Winslow," and the auxiliary 
tug " Hudson," picked their way in toward the city, which 
was soon in plain sight, its red roofs, white walls, and 
green trees presenting a beautiful prospect. At the 
wharves could be seen two large, square-rigged vessels, 
and a trim white steamer, which the men on the three 
war vessels already looked upon as prizes. Nothing 
could be seen of the gunboats, which had evidently found 
some hiding-place close to the shore. To lure them from 



io8 Blue Jackets of '98 

their retreat the little " Winslow," armed only with one- 
pounders, steamed gallantly in towards the wharves. 
The bay was perfectly clear, and the water calm. In 
the city there seemed to be no sign of excitement, and 
the stillness of a summer's day hung over land and sea, 
over nature and the homes of men alike. Suddenly the 
peace was broken. From behmd the corner of a wharf, 
where no battery appeared nor any menace of danger, 
came a flash and sharp report, and a shell whizzed past 
the " Winslow." Hastily her helm was put hard down, 
but before she could turn shots came from three or four 
other places, with increasing precision. No smoke be- 
trayed the position of the batteries, and the noise made 
by the shells, no less than the obvious precision of the 
arms employed, showed that the enemy was equipped 
with the most modern ordnance. The Americans an- 
swered swiftly and vigorously, even the little " Winslow " 
banging away with her one-pounders. But about the 
ships of war hung dense clouds of yellow smoke, obscur- 
ing their aim, and making it impossible for them to 
discern each other's signals, while the Spanish use of 
smokeless powder concealed the location of their batteries 
and made the task of the navy gunners doubly hard. It 
was soon demonstrated that the attack proceeded from 
the Spanish gunboats, which were shielded behind solid 
wharves, and therefore made almost impregnable. From 
their retreat they directed their fire almost exclusively 
against the " Winslow." She was nearest in shore, more 
vulnerable than the "Wilmington" and more valuable 
than the " Hudson." The Spaniards determined to make 
the best of their opportunity. One of their first shots 
struck and partly disabled her, but she fought on in the 
midst of a rain of shot and shell, until at last, with her 
steering gear cut and nearly unmanageable, her commander, 
Lieutenant J. B. Bernadou, determined to take her out of 
action. The " Hudson " coming near at this moment, he 
informed her commander of his purpose. 



Blue Jackets of '98 109 

" Do you need any help ? " shouted the commander of the 
tug, seeing the battered state of the torpedo boat. 

" No, only plenty of room to work in," responded the 
commander of the " Winslow." " We are crippled, and 
she does not mind her helm well." 

The " Hudson " then drew off and returned to her en- 
gagement with the enemy, but in a few moments saw that 
the " Winslow " was drifting helplessly toward the shore, 
while a signal man was vigorously wigwagging some 
message to the flagship. Again the " Hudson " ran down 
upon the torpedo boat, and this time a heavy line was 
thrown across to her. At the first cast it fell short. A 
brisk breeze had by now sprung up, and the drift of the 
disabled vessel toward the shore grew more rapid, while as 
she drifted the accuracy of the enemy's aim improved until 
she was in a position fairly murderous. Again the rope 
was thrown. A shot knocked a great splinter of steel from 
the deck, which buried itself in Bernadou's groin, inflicting 
a painful and dangerous wound ; but wrapping a towel 
about it to stanch the blood, the plucky officer ran aft to 
get the hand-steering gear to work, as by this time the 
steam gear had been hopelessly wrecked. Before the 
necessary changes could be made the hand gear too was 
shot away, and the last vestige of hope for saving the craft 
under her own gear was destroyed. Meanwhile the 
"Hudson" drew near again. On her rail was perched an 
officer swinging the line he was about to throw. Amid- 
ships on the " Winslow " were a group of men in charge 
of Ensign Bagley, a boyish young officer just out of the 
naval academy. 

" Hurry up," cried Bagley, laughingly ; " it 's getting too 
hot for comfort here." 

The words had scarcely left his mouth when with a 
deafening crack a shell exploded just above his head. In- 
stantly the group of men that a moment before had stood 
there, alert, cool, expectant, inspirited by the calm and 
cheerful demeanour of the boy who commanded them, van- 



I lo Blue Jackets of '98 

ished. Five were instantly killed. One, sorely mutilated, ! 
was blown almost overboard, and died as his comrades i) 
were drawing him back. Ensign Bagley was struck in the 
head by a bit of the shell and instantly killed — the first 
officer to fall in the war. 

Meanwhile the Spaniards were not slackening their fire 
in any degree. Though the full measure of the destruction 
done by their shells on the torpedo boat could not be dis- 
cerned from their position, they could see through their , 
glasses that the " Winslow " was disabled, that the " Hud- I 
son " was handicapped by having to care for her, and that 
their range was accurate. Accordingly they redoubled 
their efforts. It was said after the battle that certain 
buoys in the harbour which our men took to mark the 
course of the channel were in fact planted by the Spaniards 
to indicate the range, and that this accounts for a precision 
of aim, which was equalled by their artillery or naval 
gunners in no other battle of the war. 

The hawser being at last made fast, the " Hudson " ] 
started out of the harbour, towing the sorely shattered tor- 
pedo boat with her freight of dead and wounded. From 
the town flames and smoke were beginning to rise, and 
weeks after deserters from the Spanish army coming off 
to the ships reported that had the attack been kept up a 
few minutes longer, town, gunboats, and shipping must have 
surrendered. A story told by Lieutenant Ernest Mead, 
the navigating officer of the " Hudson," shows something : 
of the spirit of the men that manned the " Winslow " that 
May morning : 

"While securing the 'Winslow ' the second time, an incident 
occurred which forces itself through the crush of sad memories 
and causes a smile. One of the ' Winslow's ' crew was con- 
spicuous for his quickness, knowledge, and adaptabihty. He 
knew where everything was, and how to do everything, and 
he was usually there to do it. But, from the time the first line 
was made fast until we were miles out of range of the shore, 
his sole idea was to get another shot at the Spaniards. The 



Blue Jackets of '98 11 1 

minute he could drop the work before him he would jump to a 
gun, throw in a shell, elevate the gun as far as it would go, and 
let drive, caring nothing of where the shot landed so long as 
it went in the direction of the shore." 

It seemed as though the death of Ensign Worth Bagley 
brought home to the people of the United States for the 
first time the conviction that it was a real war upon which 
the nation had entered, and that war meant death, and 
sorrowing homes, and desolated hearts. To his widowed 
mother in her North Carolina home came the expressions 
of regret and sympathy from a whole nation. The neigh- 
bours and boyhood friends of the dead lad paid to his body 
the honour of a hero's funeral, and a noble monument marks 
his resting-place. And even before the final ratification 
of the treaty of peace put a definite end to the war, the 
Congress of the United States, without dissenting voice, 
adopted a resolution creating five additional cadetships at 
the national naval academy in order that one might be 
given to the younger brother of the brave officer slain at 
Cardenas. Eepublics are not wholly ungrateful, nor surely 
could any nation not wholly lost to a sense of admiration 
for patriotism fail to reward with honour the sacrifice of a 
mother who meets the loss of her first son in warring for 
his country by consecrating her second to the very service 
in which the elder met his untimely though heroic death. 

While the guns were roaring at Cardenas, American sea- 
men and Spanish soldiery were engaged in hot conflict on 
the other side of the island of Cuba. On that southern 
coast one port only, that of Cienfuegos, was blockaded. In 
its configuration this harbour was not unlike the one where 
Bagley went to his death. The town, completely hidden 
from the sea by high hills, lay back some distance from 
the ocean, and was reached by a chaimel full of tortuous 
turnings. Its importance from a military standpoint arose 
from the fact that two cables had their ground connection 



1 12 Blue Jackets of '98 

there — one extending to Santiago de Cuba and another to 
Batanabo. It was determined to cut these cables, and the 
task fell upon the men of the blockading squadron, then 
composed of the " Marblehead," the " Nashville," and the 
revenue cutter " Windom." The work of cutting cables in 
order to isolate General Blanco from the world had been 
actively pressed on the northern side of the islands, and it 
was believed that by severing the lines at Cienfuegos he 
would be shut off from all outside communication. This 
proved to be an erroneous expectation, for never during 
the war was the Spanish general in Havana without full 
and speedy communication with his home government. 
In view of the complete information which our govern- 
ment had of the location of these cables and the facilities 
which we possessed for cutting them, it seems inexplicable 
that Blanco should have retained this privilege unless for 
some reason it was the policy of our government to leave 
him in communication with Madrid. At the final sur- 
render the terms were made by stipulation with the Madrid 
ministry, and it seems probable that had the commanding 
general at Santiago been left to act upon his own respon- 
sibility, his defence might have been more stubborn and 
protracted. As we shall see, the order which sent Cervera 
to his destruction came from the Spanish capital, and was 
insisted upon despite the admiral's protest. In fact, there- 
fore, it was a fortunate thing that all communication 
between the generals in Cuba and the governing authorities 
in Spain was not interrupted ; but whether its continuance 
was due to prevision on the part of our government or a 
mere failure to find and cut the cables cannot as yet be 
determined. 

To the men on the ships steaming up and down before 
Cienfuegos none of these considerations was of any im- 
portance whatever. They were ordered to find and cut the 
cables leading into that city, and they set about doing it. 
The point of attack was clearly indicated by the little 
house on the beach to which the cables led. To make the 



Blue Jackets of '98 1 13 

attack effective it had to be made from small boats, as on 
that coast the water shoals very gradually, and the large 
vessels could not approach the shore. Accordingly, early 
in the morning of May 11th, just as the ships at Cardenas 
were getting ready to enter the harbour, the three vessels 
outside Cienfuegos steamed as near to the shore as their 
draft would permit and let slip their launches and boats. 
Two steam launches, two smaller ones, and half a dozen 
boats were quickly crowded with men, who swarmed down 
the sides of the men-of-war, eager for action. On the 
launches were machine guns, the row-boats being unarmed. 
The plan was for the men in the small boats to go as near 
inshore as might be necessary to pick up the cables. 
They were to do no fighting, but give their attention 
wholly to the work in hand. If there should be an at- 
tack from the shore, the launches with their machine guns 
were to protect the workers and drive away their assail- 
ants. It was quite evident at the very outset that the 
Spaniards were entirely alive to the importance of their 
cables and intended to fight stubbornly for their defence. 
As the vessels came nearer the shore rifle pits could 
be made out, and bodies of infantry and cavalry could be 
seen forming about the cable-house. 

In command of the expedition was Lieutenant C. M. 
Winslow, a son of the man who sunk the " Alabama," with 
Lieutenant E. A. Anderson as second. The men were all 
volunteers, but not all of the volunteers, for when the 
word of the expedition was passed along the decks of the 
ships every man offered to go, and the process of selecting 
the fortunate ones almost bred a riot. 

As the boats drew off from the ships the latter opened 
a heavy fire with shell upon the line of bushes along the 
shore in which the enemy were thought to be concealed. 
There was silence for a time on shore, save for the burst- 
ing of our own shells, for the Spaniards fled from the 
heavy fire without response ; but when the line of boats 
came within two hundred feet or so of the sand, the ships 

8 



1 14 Blue Jackets of '98 

were obliged to cease firing. Then the enemy crept back 
to his line of low earthworks concealed in the bushes, and 
presently opened fire with rifles and machine guns. The 
position of the Americans was a most desperate one. 
Each boat, crowded with men, lying on a tranquil sea only 
a few hundred feet from a sheltered and unseen enemy, 
was an easy target. The row-boats were within ninety 
feet of the shore, within point-blank range of over a thou- 
sand Spaniards armed with modern weapons. About the 
little craft the water was lashed into fury by a storm of 
bullets, the jets springing up on every side as they do 
when some summer hail-storm pelts the surface of a quiet 
lake. Winslow stood quietly in his boat, a conspicuous 
target, urging on his men. Their task was one that re- 
quired deliberation and care. The cable had first to be 
found, as it lay on the bottom, with grappling irons, then 
hauled across a boat, and a section, usually about the 
width of the boat, chopped out of it with axes and chisels. 
The men engaged in this task had to suffer the fire of the 
enemy without responding. For them was all the peril 
of battle, without any of the stimulus and excitement 
which the act of fighting brings. They were as helpless 
as a pigeon before the gun of a noted trap-shooter. Out 
a hundred feet or so beyond them the launches were 
fighting manfully, with their one-pounders and rapid fire 
guns, to drive the Spaniards away ; but the latter had the 
advantage of cover and of numbers and stuck to their 
work. The ships in the distance joined in the affray, 
taking such positions and choosing such targets as enabled 
them to fire without endangering their own men. A light- 
house on the shore was filled with Spaniards, who were 
firing from its windows. "Cut it down," said Captain 
McCalla to the gunners of the " Marblehead," and soon 
down it came in ruins. The cable-house collapsed when 
a shell from the " Nashville " exploded in it. A block-house 
near by tumbled to pieces under the hot fire. How many 
of the Spaniards fell is not known now, perhaps it never 



jpW^ay^ig ■. ^^^ 







J 

''K 


4 
« 


%i " 


iii''-' 


%;-; 


^ 


11 ■''•'' 


,'*'■ 


«E>l: 


-^' 


P-T* 







Blue Jackets of '98 115 

will be, for Spain will not take pains to publish the records 
of a war in which she won no glory. But hot as was the 
fire from the sea, that from the land never slackened. 
The bullets still sung in the air above the busy workers 
at the cables, and splashed in the water in seemingly un- 
diminished numbers ; but the sailors noticed that the 
enemy seemed to be getting the range. The thud of the 
striking bullet and the groan of the stricken man began 
to be heard too often. Lieutenant Winslow was hit in 
the hand, but tied up his wound and went on with his 
work. Men were seen to topple over in the boats. Eight 
were seriously wounded, one of them dying on the way to 
the ship. One brave fellow sitting at his oar attracted 
the attention of a neighbour by his singular silence. Be- 
neath him was discovered a great pool of blood, and he 
was found to have borne a grave wound silently lest com- 
plaint might interrupt the progress of the work. Two 
hours and a half this fierce fire was endured, and then, 
two cables being cut, the signal was given from the flag- 
ship to withdraw. One man killed, two wounded seri- 
ously, one of whom died, and six slightly wounded was 
the official report. A curious hurt was sustained by 
Captain Maynard of the " Nashville," who was struck on 
the chest by a bullet which had already passed through 
the shoulder of an ensign. 

Trivial affairs, of course, as viewed in the great theatre 
of war, were these two battles of the 11th of May, 1898, 
but to the men engaged in them, to those who imperilled 
their lives and perhaps lost them, to those who as a result 
of their service to their country and to humanity through 
her met cruel wounds, these battles were as great as any 
Waterloo. If too the loss was light, so was it throughout 
the war to the Americans. One shell at Cardenas slew, 
on the little torpedo boat " Winslow," one third of the men 
killed afloat in the whole war. More fell there than died 
with Dewey at Manila and Schley at Santiago combined. 



1 1 6 Blue Jackets of '98 

In the two fights of the 11th of May, there fell more men 
than were lost elsewhere by the navy during the whole 
war; more navy men than fell either afloat or ashore, 
savincr only the six marines who died at Guantanamo. 
As Bagley was the first, so he remained the last com- 
missioned navy officer to die in battle during the war for 
the freedom of Cuba ; and so, if the importance of battles 
be, like most other things, relative, we mvist concede 
something more than mere passing importance to the 
good fights well fought by the United States navy at 
Cardenas and Cienfuegos on the same day. 



CHAPTER VI 

Spain's Possessions in Asia — Unexpected Scene of Amer- 
ican Naval Activity — The Philippine Islands and 
their People — Rendezvous of the Asiatic Squadron 
AT Hong Kong — Commodore George Dewey — The De- 
parture for the Philippines — The Spanish Fleet at 
Manila — The Battle and Complete Victory of the 
Americans — No Men Lost — Dewey Made an Admiral 
— Aguinaldo and the Insurgents — Trouble with Ger- 
many — A Vigorous Message — The Friendliness of 
England. 

DURING the lagging days of debate and diplomacy 
that preceded the declaration of war, there was 
of course eager discussion among the people of the prob- 
able strategy of the impending conflict and of the point 
at which the first blow would be struck. All agreed that 
Havana would be the first objective. That taken, some 
thought that in the event of continued resistance by the 
enemy our fleets might even be ordered to the coast of 
Spain. Hardly anywhere was there the shghtest idea 
that the first crushing blow of the war would be delivered 
in Asiatic waters, where the flag of the United States 
was seldom seen, and where Spain had a populous and 
rich colony, then almost an unknown land to Enghsh- 
speaking peoples. When the news came that Admiral 
Dewey had run into the harbour of Manila, May 1st, and 
destroyed a Spanish fleet, the nation was first dumb with 
astonishment, and then hilarious with joy. Little was 
known about Manila or the Phihppine Islands and less 
about Dewey, but a decisive victory won within ten days 
of the declaration of war, and in an unexpected quarter. 



ii8 Blue Jackets of '98 

stirred the nation as it was perhaps not stirred again dur- 
ing the course of the war. 

The Philippine Islands were won for Spain by the 
famous explorer Magellan under the patronage of the 
great Emperor Charles V in 1521, in the course of a 
voyage which ended in the circumnavigation of the earth. 
The colony had suffered more than three hundred years 
of Spanish domination, and showed all the signs of 
arrested development, and even decay, that characterise 
Spanish provinces wherever they may be placed. The 
usual rebellion had been in progress there for years, 
fought on the part of the insurgents as they fought in 
Cuba, with raids, skirmishes, and the avoidance of battles, 
and on the part of the Spaniards with wholesale execu- 
tions, torture, and barbarity. In the Philippine Archi- 
pelago are 1400 islands, most of them wholly uncivilised 
and never brought under the control of any government. 
In all some eight million people, mostly savages, some 
having a rudimentary civilisation, were ruled by the Span- 
iards, who applied to them the methods which had driven 
Cubans to beggary first, and then to desperation. The 
" carpet-bag official " was there in all his inefficiency and 
rapacity. The collection of taxes was farmed out, with 
the result that the maximum amount was exacted from 
the people and the minimum paid in to the government. 
There was absolutely no pretence at applying the revenues 
to pubhc improvements. Such things were unknown. 
Bridges once burned were not rebuilt, roads were mere 
trails, most of the towns were mere aggregations of huts 
with unpaved streets and only a big church to suggest 
the presence of any European authority. Out of the 
presence and the power of the church sprang many of 
the evils of which the Filipinos justly complained. The 
priests were in effect part — and a very powerful part — 
of the government. The Archbishop of Manila exerted 
more authority than the Governor-General. This would 
have been less hurtful had the tone of the church been 



Blue Jackets of '98 119 

as high, and its influence exerted as positively for good 
as is usual in civilised countries. But, far away from the 
central authorities, the church functionaries in the Philip- 
pines too generally forgot the duties imposed upon them 
by their priestly functions. They were often immoral, 
rapacious, cruel, and dishonest. The misdeeds of the friars, 
who were scattered all through the islands, formed one of 
the chief counts in the revolutionists' indictment of Spain. 

At the moment of the declaration of war with the 
United States no revolution was in active progress in the 
Philippines. In December, 1897, Spain had applied to 
the insurgents there the methods which had proved suc- 
cessful under Campos in Cuba in 1869, and had effected 
a compromise by promising reforms and paying a large 
sum of money to the insurgent leaders, chief among whom 
was a young man. General Emilio Aguinaldo, in consider- 
ation of their leaving the islands. As usual, the promises 
of the Spaniards were not kept. The reforms were in- 
solently repudiated, and such of the revolutionary leaders 
as had trusted in Spanish honour and remained in the 
islands were cruelly put to death. Aguinaldo and his 
colleagues, who had gone to Hong Kong, noted these 
infamies from afar, and, having at their command the 
very considerable sum which Spain had paid them, began 
preparations for a new revolt. 

In Hons Kong at this same moment was a man des- 
tined to do more toward freeing the Filipinos from the 
domination of Spain than could any junta of revolution- 
ists. This was Commodore George Dewey, U. S. K, 
who had with him a fleet, not of prodigious strength it 
is true, but which exceeded in power anything the United 
■States had ever before had in those far away waters. 
I Not by accident was Dewey there, nor was it by accident 
' that he was so " well heeled," as the fighting phrase goes. 
In war, the unexpected ought not to be permitted to 
happen, and nothing occurred in those far-away Pacific 
■waters which was unexpected to the authorities at Wash- 



I20 Blue Jackets of '98 

ington, however surprising it may have been to the people 
of the United States. The selection of Commodore Dewey 
to command the Asiatic squadron, which was made in 
January, was in no sense an accident. If the people 
overlooked the fact that Spain had a fleet and colonies 
in Asiatic waters, the Navy Department did not, and a 
man of proved gallantry and skill in battle was chosen 
to direct the United States forces there. Dewey had 
graduated in two good schools — at Annapolis in 1854, 
and under Farragut on the Mississippi Eiver in 1862. 
A veteran and a fighter, he was selected for the Asiatic 
squadron as soon as the probability of war was unmistak- 
able, and it is said that he was bitterly disappointed at 
the choice, expecting that all the sea fighting would be 
done on the Atlantic. The Navy Department, however, 
thought otherwise, and begun hurrying ships to the 
Asiatic station weeks before the rupture between the 
nations became imminent. By the eighteenth of April 
Commodore Dewey had his full squadron assembled in 
the British port of Hong Kong. These six fighting-ships 
comprised the fleet : 

" Olympia " : protected cruiser ; armament, four 8-in., ten 
5-in., twenty-four rapid fire ; complement, 466. " Balti- 
more " : protected cruiser ; armament, four 8-in., six 6-in., 
ten rapid fire ; complement, 395. " Boston " : partly pro- 
tected cruiser ; armament, two 8-in., six 6-in., ten rapid 
fire; complement, 272. "Ealeigh": protected cruiser; 
armament, one 6-in., ten 5-in., fourteen rapid fire ; com- 
plement, 200. " Concord " : gunboat ; armament, six 6-in., 
nine rapid fire; complement, 150. "Petrel": gunboat; 
armament, four 6-in., seven rapid fire; complement, 100. 
" McCulloch " : revenue cutter ; armament, four 4-in. ; 
complement, 1.30. 

Several colliers, purchased with their cargoes at Hong 
Kong before the declaration of war shut off this method 
of securing supplies, completed the fleet. Warned day by 
day by cable from Washington of the progress of the 




ADMIRAL GKUKGt JJKWKV. 



Blue Jackets of '98 121 

quarrel, Dewey put his ships in war paint, sent ashore 
all movables, instructed his officers in his plans, and was 
ready to strike when the word should come. The first 
official warnins; came from the authorities of Hong Koncr 
War had been declared, and Great Britain had issued its 
proclamation of neutrality. Even without orders from 
Washington, that fixed the only course that Commodore 
Dewey could take. Under the law of nations he was 
compelled to leave Hong Kong within twenty-four hours. 
Whither should he go ? The nearest United States 
port was San Francisco, seven thousand miles away. To 
enter another foreign port meant another brief resting 
space of twenty-four hours, and then a polite request to 
leave. And coal? That prime essential of a modern 
ship was construed as contraband of war, and accordingly 
no neutral power would permit him to take in any of 
its harbours more than a sufficient supply to carry his 
ships back to the United States by the most direct route. 
Evidently one course only was open to the American fleet 
— the orders from Washington could be of only one tenor. 
A Spanish harbour somewhere in Asiatic waters must be 
captured and made a naval base. First, however, it was 
necessary to heed the British note of warning and leave 
Hong Kong. Accordingly, anchors were hove up and the 
fleet, with flags flying and bands playing, steamed out to 
sea. The British residents of the city made no secret of 
their sympathy with the Americans thus going out to 
early battle, but crowded the quays and shipping, cheer- 
ing and saluting as the warships passed. 

This first voyage of the fleet was hut short. Mirs Bay, 
a Chinese harbour only a few miles to the northward had 
been selected as the anchorage where orders from home 
would be awaited, and the " McCuUoch " was left behind to 
fetch them when they should arrive. The delay was but 
short, for the next day the revenue cutter steamed up 
to the new rendezvous bearing this message, dated Wash- 
ington, April 24th : 



122 Blue Jackets of '98 

^^ Dewey ^ Asiatic Squadron: 

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. 
Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at 
once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture 
vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavours. Long." 

For this, Admiral Dewey had been waiting and planning 
ever since his arrival on the station in January, and there 
was now no delay. A short conference with the captains 
on board the flagships filled out the evening, and shortly 
after midnight the fleet sailed on its errand of battle. 
Prows were turned south towards the Philippine Islands, 
lying 620 miles away. Speedy ships were in the squadron, 
but so too were slow ones, and the latter — the " Petrel " 
with a speed of barely seven knots holding the unenviable 
distinction — fixed the speed of all. Three days passed 
before the line of the coast — the Island of Luzon — was 
made out. Then Subig Bay, where it was reported the 
enemy might be found, was carefully reconnoitred, but 
without success. The fishermen plying their calling about 
the harbour's mouth had seen no Spanish fleet, and in none 
of the nooks or corners of the bay was there so much as a 
gunboat. So on to Manila thirty miles away. It was 
clear that the Spaniard had taken refuge there, preferring 
to fight with the aid of shore batteries. 

What was this enemy for whom Dewey sought ? In 
naval strength unequal to him,- it was true, but not so 
much so as to make the issue of the battle a foregone 
certainty. The Spanish ships were comparatively anti- 
quated, but they were not, as a London weekly insisted, 
wooden. Their guns were as good as those earned by 
the American ships. They outnumbered the Ameri- 
cans materially — to Dewey's six fighting-ships Admiral 
Montojo had ten, and two torpedo boats besides. The 
" Olympia " outclassed anything the Spaniards had, but in 
skilled hands the numbers of the enemy might be ex- 
pected to more than make up for this. In batteries the 



Blue Jackets of '98 123 

Americans had the advantage, but not overwhelmingly. 
To their 57 big guns, the Spaniards had 52 ; and 
to their 74 rapid-fire and machine guns, the enemy had 
70. These figures eliminate the " McCulloch," which did 
not go into action, and the Spanish torpedo boats, which 
were sunk before their guns would bear. But the Ameri- 
can big guns were heavier, for the Spaniards had nothing 
but 6.2-inch cannon to Dewey's 10-inch. 

When the battle was fought the first hour showed 
the immense superiority of the Americans in everything 
that goes to win victory ; but as Commodore Dewey led 
his fleet along the coast of Luzon toward the harbour 
where he knew the enemy lay in waiting, he had noth- 
ing to expect but a desperate battle with a fleet not 
greatly his inferior. It must be remembered that the 
Spanish ships were anchored in a harbour protected by 
shore batteries. To get at them the Americans had to 
pass down a channel guarded on either side by powerful 
forts armed with modern rifles. The harbour to be trav- 
ersed before reaching the enemy was sixteen miles long, 
and it was only to be expected that it was plentifully be- 
sprinkled with mines. With these facts before him, and 
with the reasonable expectation that the Spanish fleet 
would receive his attack at a point where the fire of the forts 
would be effective. Commodore Dewey could only antici- 
pate a hard fight, with a result subject to the fortunes of 
war. The measure of a commander's gallantry is fixed 
by the probable perils he braves, not by the result of the 
combat. 

One seems to read in Dewey's first decision the effects 
of his training under the great Admiral Farragut. His 
fleet arrived off the mouth of Manila Bay at night. There 
was no stop to reconnoitre, no suggestion of " bottling up " 
the enemy after the Santiago fashion, no waiting until day- 
light might make it easier to run the gantlet of mines 
and batteries, no delay of any kind, but a quiet and im- 
mediate attack on the enemy. Only a brief wait for the 



124 Blue Jackets of '98 

moon to set, and then on, in single file, the " Olympia " 
leading, the " McCuUoch " brmging up the rear, with all 
lights out except one lantern at the stern of each ship for 
the next to steer by. Seemingly the Spaniards had no 
idea that an enemy was at their door. The great light 
that marked the entrance to the harbour gleamed as though 
to welcome the grim procession of ghostly gray ships 
stealing unaware upon their prey. The forts were as 
silent as though all defenders were dead. To the men on 
the ships it seemed that their progress was attended with 
the tumult of a thousand railroad trains. They walked 
with muffled tread and spoke in whispers lest Spaniards 
miles away might hear them, and marvelled that the rush 
of the vessels through the water ■ and the white foam 
breaking away from the cleaving prows did not attract the 
attention of the enemy. Yet there came no sound of can- 
non, nor did any mine rend the plates of any stout ship. 
The last ship of the column, the " McCuUoch," gave the 
first alarm. From its smoke-stack, when coal was flung 
on the furnaces below, there flared up a red flame lighting 
up the waters and the rigging of the ships ahead. AU 
turned expectantly toward the batteries in anticipation of 
a shot, but no sound came. Again the unlucky beacon 
flared, and again, and after the third illumination the 
darkness to starboard was pierced by the flash of a gun on 
a rock called El Fraile. The shell went wild and the " Con- 
cord " responded with the fierce bellow of a 6-inch gun. 
There was no longer any attempt at secrecy, and cannon 
roared from the "Boston," the "McCuUoch," and the 
" Concord," the big ships at the head of the line passing 
on in silent dignity. The shot from El Eraile had done 
much more good than harm. It gave to the commodore, 
who with a Filipino insurgent by his side stood on the 
bridge of the " Olympia " piloting in the fleet, a clear idea 
of how the shore lay. That battery once passed, all the de- 
fences of the harbour's mouth were left behind, and there 
was nothing more to apprehend until the city, with its 



Blue Jackets of '98 125 

forts at Cavite, was reached, — nothing, that is, except 
mines, against which no skill could avail and which might 
therefore be ignored. " Perhaps they '11 make it all the 
hotter for us when they do begin," said Dewey, commenting 
on the quiescence of the Spaniards. So the ships steamed 
sullenly on up the bay, the tension measurably lessened 
by the little spurt of fire, but with every man alert for the 
next development of the morning — for by this time the 
sudden dawn of the tropics was breaking. 

Nothing but the undeniable facts of the case could 
make credible the amazing inefficiency which characterised 
the Spaniards, not only at Manila but at other points 
attacked by American fleets. Thus early in Dewey's 
advance on Manila the defenders had sacrificed one ad- 
vantage without effort to make use of it. The mouth of 
the bay which the Americans entered without resistance 
was well fortified. A strait about five miles wide is 
broken by the islands Corregidor, Caballo, and El Fraile — 
■ all fortified, and armed with Krupp guns. On the main- 
land Limbones and San Jos^ points on either hand bear 
more forts and more steel rifled cannon. Nevertheless, all 
were passed within easy range and with only an ineffective 
fire from one battery. If there were contact mines in the 
channel, they failed to explode. If there were electric 
mines, the officers intrusted with their discharge failed to 
wake up. In the hands of a power of ordinary military 
attainments the defence of the entrance of Manila Bay 
would have cost the invader a ship or two. 

The swift coming of day discovered to the eager gazers 
from the American ships not only the old town of Manila 
with its clustering low roofs and towering cathedral, but 
a sight which they had come all this way to see — the 
Spanish fleet — ten great ships with military tops showmg 
across a low neck of land — lying at anchor under the 
batteries at Cavite, a suburb of the city where the navy 
yard, arsenal, and other military and naval establishments 
were placed. There was silence on the ships as the stir- 



126 Blue Jackets of '98 

ring spectacle was presented, and the men, many of whom 
had slept on the run in from the harbour's mouth, crowded 
to the points of vantage to gaze on it. With a glass, the 
roofs and quays of the city could be seen to be crowded 
with spectators; so it was evident that the short engage- 
ment with the battery at El Fraile had alarmed the city. 
As the men gazed, others passed up and down the decks 
of the men-of-war, distributing cups of hot coffee and 
biscuit by orders of the commodore, who had no intention 
of having his sailors go into action hungry. The plan of 
the battle had been worked out already, and only a few 
signals from the flagship were necessary to place the fleet 
in the formation agreed on. As the signals fluttered from 
the gaff, black balls mounted to every peak on all the 
vessels, and breaking out displayed the great battle-flags. 
At that the enemy growled out a word of warning with 
the 9-inch guns of Fort Lunetta, and the attacking column 
moved suddenly on to closer quarters. " Hold your fire," 
was the word passed on from the flagship, and save for 
two shots from the " Concord " no answer was made to the 
forts. Onward toward the Spanish fleet, which was main- 
taining a like silence, the fleet sped. A sudden muffled 
roar and a great volume of mud and water springing into 
the air right before the flagship told that the dreaded 
mines were near, and in an instant another exploded. 
Neither did any hurt, and with the explosion of the two 
the Spanish resources of that sort seemed to be exhausted. 
By this time the fleet was approaching the enemy nearly. 
On the bridge of the " Olympia " stood Commodore Dewey, 
Captain Gridley and Flag-Captain Lambert at his side. 
Though the Spanish ships now joined the forts in pouring a 
fire on the advancing foe, there was still no response. Just 
as the sun rose, red and glaring with midsummer heat, 
the commodore turned to the oflficer at his side and said, 
quietly, " You may fire now, Gridley, when ready." Gridley 
was ready, and almost on the instant an 8-inch shell hurtled 
out through the yellow smoke toward the enemy, now 



Blue Jackets of '98 127 

about 4500 yards away. Presently a signal from the flag- 
ship conveyed to all the vessels a like permission, and the 
whole fleet was soon enfjased. 

On the flagship, before opening action, Dewey had 
assembled his men and given them this final word : " Keep 
perfectly cool, and pay attention to nothing but orders." 
This was the watchword throughout the American fleet 
that morning, and, as the result, the fire was deliberate 
and deadly. The column — " Olympia," " Baltimore," 
"Ealeigh," "Petrel," "Concord," and "Boston," in the 
order named — steamed along parallel to the Spanish 
ships, working every gun that- could be brought to bear, 
and receiving the fire of ships and forts in return. The 
fire of the enemy was, as Dewey put it in his report, 
" vigorous, but generally ineffective." It was a succession 
of brilliant misses, of shots that came so near hitting that 
it was a constant marvel that the American ships were 
escaping destruction. One shell struck the bridge grat- 
ings of the "Olympia ; " one narrowly missed the com- 
modore himself. The fire became so hot that Captain 
Gridley, who stood exposed by the commodore's side, was 
directed to go into the conning tower in order that both 
might not be killed or disabled at once. On the " Boston," 
a shell burst in a stateroom setting it afire. Through 
both sides of the " Baltimore's " unarmoured hull a shell 
sped, happily hitting no one in its course. A 6-inch gun 
was disabled, and a box of ammunition was exploded on 
the same ship. Down past the Spanish line the squadron 
moved, the port side of every ship a mass of flame and 
smoke, then circling around in a grand sweep — that made 
the Spaniards think for a moment they were pulling out 
of action — the column returned again on its course, and 
the men of the starboard batteries had a chance to try 
their skill while their fellows rested. Each turn brought 
them nearer the enemy ; each broadside found the Ameri- 
can gunnery improving. Five times the circuit was 
made, and then a signal fluttered from the yard of the 



128 Blue Jackets of '98 

" Olympia," and the fleet turned away to the other side 
of the harbour, where the "McCuUoch" and the colliers had 
been lying. The Spaniards raised a resounding cheer at 
the sight of what they supposed to be a retreat, and a 
telegram was instantly sent off, that the enemy had been 
compelled to haul off for repairs. On the American ships, 
where the purpose of the order was not understood, there 
was much grumbling. "Breakfast," growled one of the 
gunners, who had been told that was the purpose of the 

intermission ; " who the wants any breakfast ? Why 

can't we finish off the Dons, now we Ve got them going ? " 
Breakfast, however, was not the object of the delay. A 
misinterpreted signal had caused the commodore to be- 
lieve that ammunition for the 5-inch guns was running 
short, and as the smoke made it difficult, if not impossible 
to ask each ship-captain by signal how much he had, it 
was determined to haul off and redistribute the ammuni- 
tion if it was required. In the end, however, no necessity 
was found for this, and as there was time then for break- 
fast, the meal was served. 

In the portion of the engagement prior to the inter- 
mission, the " first round," it might be called, the Spaniards 
had suffered heavily. The American fire had been both 
rapid and accurate. With the glasses, the shots could be 
seen striking the thin iron hulls of the Spanish ships, and 
by the time the third circuit had been made three were 
in flames. Stung into fury by the losses inflicted on his 
squadron. Admiral Montojo, just as the Americans were 
turning to begin their third circuit, slipped the cables of 
his flagship, and under full steam darted out as if with 
the intention of ramming the " Olympia," or at any rate 
coming to close quarters. The dash was magnificent, but 
it was futile. As the " Reina Cristina " swung away from 
her fellows, the fire of the whole American fleet was con- 
centrated upon her. As she clung stubbornly to her 
course, the storm of projectiles swept down upon her, 
pierced her hull like paper, swept her decks, and, bursting, 



Blue Jackets of '98 129 

spread death and fire of every side. Her bridge was shot 
away, her engines wounded. Superhuman gallantry could 
bear the punishment no longer, and, responding with 
difficulty to her helm, she turned to seek her former 
position. Just as her stern was presented to the Ameri- 
can fire, an 8-inch gun on the " Olympia " was trained 
upon her, and its projectile sped forth on a murderous 
errand. It struck the Spaniard full in the stern, tore its 
way forward, killing men, shattering guns, exploding 
ammunition, piercing partitions and tearing up decks, 
until it exploded in her after-boiler. The wound was 
mortal. With flames leaping from her hatches, and the 
shrill screams of agonised men rising above the thunder 
of the battle, the " Eeina Cristina " staggered back. One 
hundred and fifty of her men lay dead, and nearly a hun- 
dred wounded, — most of them sacrificed in Montojo's 
gallant effort to rush the American flagship. Another 
heavy loss fell upon the Spaniards while this act in the 
drama of battle was progressing. Thinking, no doubt, that 
the attention of the " Olympia," would be wholly centred 
upon the " Cristina," the two Spanish torpedo boats slipped 
out, and made a run for the American fleet. One headed 
for the supply -ships, but was caught by the " Petrel," which 
first drove her ashore, and then pounded her with rapid- 
fire guns until' she blew up. The other, advancing on the 
" Olympia," was struck amidships by a shell, broke in 
two, and disappeared like a broken bottle. So at Manila, 
as later at Santiago, it was demonstrated that torpedo 
boats are not the dangerous engines of war that had been 
thought, — at least not when they are in Spanish hands. 

Three hours' intermission was taken by the American 
sailors after that first round. A leisurely breakfast, a 
critical examination of all guns and machinery that had 
been under strain, and the work of preparing an ample 
supply of fresh ammunition occupied the time. Then 
out fluttered the signals again, the crews went to their 
q^uarters, the great screws began to revolve, and once more 

9 



130 Blue Jackets of '98 

the fighting ships bore down upon the unhappy enemy. 
This was to be the wind-up. Before those ships returned 
again to their anchorage it was the intention of the quiet 
little man on the " Olympia's " bridge to comply literally 
with the orders he had received from the Secretary of the 
Navy and destroy or capture the Spanish fleet. He 
took up the task just where he had left it, and in the 
same manner. Again the fleet revolved in a great circle 
of smoke and fire, though at closer range than before. 
The Spaniards, whose hopes had been roused by the stop- 
page of the action, were demoralised by its renewal. Their 
fire was wild, their resistance half-hearted. The " Eeina 
Cristina" — no longer the flagship, for Montojo had trans- 
ferred his flag to the " Isla de Cuba" — was blown up by 
the shells of the " Baltimore." After her, speedily fol- 
lowed the " Don Juan de Austria," her coup de grace being 
administered by the " Kaleigh." The little " Petrel " ran 
into the shoal water and set fire to the " El Correo," the 
" Marques del Duero," the " Don Juan de Austria," " Isla 
de Luzon," " Isla de Cuba," and " General Lezo," all of 
which had been disabled by the fire of the fleet, and most 
of which had been run ashore after surrendering. Admiral 
Montojo with great gallantry fought his second flagship 
until her guns were silenced and the flames were making 
her decks untenable. Then he abandoned her to her fate 
and escaped to the city, whence, it is said, a great con- 
course of people had come out that morning to see the 
" pigs of Yankees " annihilated. Finally, the " Don An- 
tonio de Ulloa," the last ship left fighting, sunk with her 
flag still nailed to her mast, and a well-placed shot entered 
the magazine at Cavite, ending the resistance of the shore 
batteries. Then the signal was flung out from the flag- 
ship " The enemy has surrendered," the hot, weary, and 
smoke-begrimed men swarmed cheering out of turrets 
and up from the bowels of the ships, the flagship's band 
broke out with the " Star Spangled Banner," and the 
victory of Manila, the first victory in the war with Spain, 



Blue Jackets of '9S 131 

was won. And at how light a cost ! The story told by- 
Mr. E. W. Harden, who was on the " Olympia " and wit- 
nessed that he tells of, recounts perhaps the most remark- 
able occurrence in naval warfare up to that time ; it was 
repeated at Santiago : — 

" As each captain came over the ' Olynipia's ' side, he replied 
to the eager query ' How many killed ? ' in a manner that 
indicated a very much mixed state of mind. Mingled with 
satisfaction at having lost no man, was an evident desire to 
have it understood that the lack of loss was no proof of an 
absence of danger. 

"'Only eight wounded,' replied Captain Dyer of the 
' Baltimore ' — ' none seriously. But six shells struck us, 
and two burst inboard without hurting any one.' 

" ' Not a dashed one ! ' was the rollicking way the next 
captain reported, 

" 'None killed and none wounded,' was the apologetic reply 
of the next one ; ' but I don't yet know how it happened. I 
suppose you fellows were all cut up ! ' 

" 'My ship wasn't hit at all,' was the next report, made 
with a sort of defiant air, as if the speaker would like to hear 
it insinuated that he had had any part in keeping his men in a 
safe place. 

" AVhen the ' Boston's ' captain came alongside it was feared 
that he for certain would have a serious list of casualties, for 
it was known that his ship had been on fire. And when he 
announced neither killed nor wounded, the news quickly spread 
through the flagship, and the men cheered vociferously." 

The description of the course followed by one shot 
which struck the " Baltimore " makes this complete im- 
munity of our men seem miraculous. This was a 60- 
pound armour-piercing projectile, fired from a land battery. 
It struck the ship about two feet above the upper deck 
between two guns which were being served ; pierced two 
plates of steel one quarter of an inch thick each ; then 
ploughed through the wooden deck, striking and breaking 
a heavy beam by which it was turned upwards ; passed 



132 Blue Jackets of ^98 

through a steel hatch-combing; disabled a 6-iiich gun; 
hurtled around the semicircular shield which surrounded 
the gun, missing the men at it ; reversed its course 
and travelled back to a point almost opposite that at 
which it had entered the ship, and thus passed out. It 
had passed between men standing crowded at their 
quarters and had touched none, but it exploded some 
loose ammunition by which eight were wounded. 

For the Spaniards there was no such immunity as 
attended the Americans. No miracles interposed between 
them and the American shells, perhaps because the latter 
were more skilfully directed. The exact losses in Admiral 
Montojo's squadron are not known. His ten ships and 
two torpedo boats were totally destroyed, and the report 
of General Augustin, the Governor-General, put the number 
of killed and wounded at about 618, though there is reason 
to believe it was nearer a thousand. The ships lost and 
their armament are summed up in the following table : 



Rsina Criatina . . . 
CastUla 

Don Antonio de Illloa 
Don Juan de Austria 
Isla de Luzon . . . 
Isla de Cuba . . . 

Velasco 

Marques del Duero . 
General Lezo . . . 
Argos 



Description. 



Steel cruiser. 
Wooden cruiser. 

Iron cruiser. 

Iron cruiser. 

Steel protected cruiser. 

Steel protected cruiser. 

Iron cruiser. 

Gunboat. 

Gunboat. 

Gunboat. 



Six 6.2-in., two2.7, 13 R. F. 
Four 5.9, two 4.7, two 3.4, 
two 2.9, 12 R. F. 

Four 4.7, 5 R. F. 
Four 4.7, two 2.7, 21 R. F. 

Six 4.7, 8 R. F. 

Six 4.7, 8 R. F. 
Three 6-in., two 2.7, 2 R. F. 
One 6.2, two 4.7, 1 R. F. 

One 3 5, 1 R. F. 



352 

349 
159 
179 
156 
156 
147 
96 
115 

87 

1796 



The official report of the battle by the Spanish admiral 
gives a graphic picture of the accuracy and effect of the 
American fire. After describing the fleets and the cir- 
cumstances under which the battle opened, he says : 



" Tho Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon ua 
nimiberless projectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the 
line devoted themselves almost entirely to fight the ' Cristina. ' 



Blue Jackets of '98 133 

my flagship. A short time after the action commenced one 
shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action all those 
who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of tho 
forward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge. 
In the meantime another shell exploded in the orlop, setting 
fire to the crew's bags, which they were fortunately able to 
control. The enemy shortened the distance between us, and 
rectifying his aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire 
projectiles. 

"At half-past seven one shell destroyed completely the 
steering-gear, another exploded on the poop, and put out of 
action nine men. Another destroyed the mizzen-mast head, 
bringing down the flag and my ensign. A fresh shell exploded 
in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, destroy- 
ing the wounded who were being treated there. Another 
exploded in the ammunition-room astern, filling the quarters 
with smoke and preventing the working of the hand steering- 
gear. As it was impossible to control the fire, I had to 
flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to 
explode. 

" Amidships, several shells of smaller calibre went through 
the smoke-stack, and one of the large ones penetrated the fire- 
room, putting out of action one master-gunner and twelve men 
serving the guns. Another rendered useless the starboard 
bow gun. "While the fire astern increased, fire was started 
forward by another shell which went through the hull and 
exploded on the deck. 

" The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing 
until there were only one gunner and one seaman remaining 
unhurt for firing them. 

" The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little 
squadron, the lack of all classes of the personnel, especially 
master-gunners, and seamen-gunners, the inaptitude of some 
of the provisional machinists, the scarcity of rapid-fire cannon, 
the strong crews of the enemy, and the unprotected charac- 
ter of the greater part of our vessels, all contributed to 
make more decided the sacrifice Avhich we made for our 
country. 

" Our casualties, including those of the arsenal, amounted to 
three hundred and eighteen men killed and wounded." 



134 Blue Jackets of '98 

Ordinarily after so signal a victory as this, a com- 
mander might reasonably expect relief from responsibil- 
ity and a respite from perplexing problems. Commodore 
Dewey's situation was not so comfortable. He held Ma- 
nila at the mercy of his guns, but to bombard it would be to 
kill scores of innocent people, many citizens of friendly 
nations. If he compelled the city to surrender by a threat 
of bombardment, he had no troops with which to hold it. 
If he drove out the Spanish troops, he had no means of 
preserving order and protecting property. All this doubt- 
less occurred to him as he watched the final scenes iu the 
annihilation of the enemy's fleet, and soon thereafter it was 
formally presented for his consideration by the British 
consul, who came off in a boat to ask that the city should 
not be bombarded. After consideration the commodore 
contented himself with sending word to the Captain-Gen- 
eral that the town would not be harmed unless the fleet 
was fired upon. This convention was scrupulously ad- 
hered to, and the fleet lay long in the harbour, with the 
Spanish flag floating in plam view and in easy range over 
the city. Cavite, however, with its arsenal and forts, was 
surrendered on the 2d of May, under threat of bombard- 
ment. The same day the cable connecting Manila with 
Hong Kong was cut, though Admiral Dewey offered to 
spare it and permit the Spaniards to use it in communi- 
cating with Spain if they would allow him to use it in 
communicating with Washington. This offer Augustin 
refused, happily for Dewey, perhaps, for he was thereby 
freed in great measure from the control of a Board of 
Strategy at Washington and of an Administration which 
was rather a clog than a spur to the operations of the 
army and navy on the Atlantic coast. As a result of the 
destruction of the cable, the people of the United States 
received their first news of the victory from Madrid, in- 
complete and garbled of course, as coming through Span- 
ish sources. 

Dewey was not in haste to send word of his achieve- 



Blue Jackets of '98 135 

ment, but waited until everything that could be done at 
that moment was completed. Monday morning the httle 
" Petrel " ran in near Cavite, and Captain Lambert went 
ashore to receive the formal surrender of the fort, which 
had hauled down its flag the day before. There was some 
Spanish quibbling, and an effort made to disprove that the 
fla<T had ever been struck, but Lambert was equal to the 
occasion. Before leaving his ship he had directed that 
unless he returned in an hour the works should be bom- 
barded. Forty-five minutes had been consumed in argu- 
ment when the captain pulled out his watch. " Unless 
you surrender unconditionally so soon that I can get back 
to my ship in fifteen minutes," he said, " the ' Petrel ' will 
open fire on your works." Then there was a speedy sur- 
render, and priests and nuns came humbly to beg the Am- 
erican commander to restrain his men from murdering all 
the wounded in the hospitals — something which they had 
been assured was the invariable practice of the barbarous 
"Yanquis." The next day the "Ealeigh" and "Balti- 
more " went down to the mouth of the bay and, after a brief 
attack, captured the forts on Corregidor and Sangley Point. 
The guns in these v/orks were destroyed by wrapping 
them with guncotton and exploding it with electricity. 
It is interesting to learn that when the officer in command 
at Corregidor went to the " Ptaleigh " to surrender himself he 
was greatly alarmed to find the ship drifting in the main 
channel, or Boca Grande, and demanded that he be put 
ashore. Asked for an explanation, he said that the chan- 
nel was full of contact mines, and that, while the Ameri- 
cans might brave death if they so desired, it was not fair to 
expose a prisoner to almost certain destruction. It was 
through that channel that the American fleet had entered 
the harbour. 

With all the harbour defences in his command, Dewey 
now sent off to Hong Kong the " McCuUoch " bearing his 
first despatches to Washington, four days after his victory. 
Thus it was one week after the first rumours from Madrid 



136 Blue Jackets of '98 

before the American people received definite information 
in these reports 

" Manila, May 1. — Squadron arrived at Manila at day- 
break this morning. Immediately engaged the enemy and 
destroyed the following Spanish vessels : ' Reina Cristina, ' 
'Castilla,' 'Don Antonio de Ulloa,' ' Isla de Luzon/ ' Isla 
de Cuba,' 'General Lezo,' ' Marques de Duero, ' ' Cano,' * Vel- 
asquo, ' 'Isla de Mindanao,' a transport and water battery at 
Cavite. The squadron is uninjured and only a few men are 
slightly Avounded. Only means of telegraphing is to American 
consul at Hong Kong. I shall communicate with him. 

"Dewey." 

"Manila, May 4. — I have taken possession of the naval 
station at Cavite, Philippine Islands, and destroyed the forti- 
fications. Have destroyed fortifications at bay entrance, Cor- 
regidor Island, paroling the garrison. I control the bay 
completely and can take the city at any time. Tlie squadron 
is in excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss not fully 
known, but is very heavy. One hundred and fifty killed, 
including captain, on ' Reina Cristina ' alone. I am assisting 
in protecting Spanish sick and wounded. Two hundred and 
fifty sick and wounded in hospital within our lines. Much ex- 
citement in Manila. Will protect foreign residents. 

"Dewey." 

To these despatches the immediate response of the Sec- 
retary of the Navy was a message of congratulation in the 
name of the President and the people of the United States I 
and the information that the President had appointed the 
victorious admiral-commodore a rear admiral. The morn- 
ing after the " McCulloch " brought that despatch to i 
Manila Bay, watchful eyes on many ships turned to the ' 
flagship to see what flag would be run up to the mainmast. 
It was the blue flag as of yore, but instead of one star 
there were two, and the guns of the squadron roared out a 
salute to the new admiral. 

Manila, wdiich now lay at the mercy of the American 



Blue Jackets of '98 137 

fleet, is a city of some 250,000 people, chiefly of course 
natives, although Chinese and Spaniards are there by the 
thousands, with a few Americans and Englishmen and a 
large body of half-breeds. It was at this time fortified 
heavily on its landward side, as the insurgents were active 
and tlireatened to capture the town now that the fleet was 
gone and the harbour defences were falling into the hands 
of the Americans. The presence of the insurgents was at 
once an advantage and an embarrassment to the Americans. 
They were in a sense our allies, as we had a common foe — 
the Spaniard ; and accordingly a certain degree of counte- 
nance was given to their most capable leader, Aguinaldo, 
whom Dewey gave passage down from Hong Kong on the 
second trip of the " McCulloch." He was received on the 
flagship with the utmost courtesy and admitted in no 
small degree to the admiral's counsels. Setting up head- 
quarters in Cavite immediately on his arrival, Aguinaldo 
began recruiting for the insurgent army and was provided 
with a certain amount of arms and ammunition from the 
captured stores by the order of the admiral. But with 
increasing power the insurgent leader became more self- 
assertive and his relations with the Americans became 
strained. It would have been unwise to permit his fol- 
lowers to capture the city, even had they the power, for 
as yet the admiral had no hint as to the purposes of his 
own government in dealing with the Philippines. He 
could not look on and see the insurgents establish a gov- 
ernment de facto which the Washington government might 
have to overthrow. The question of the attitude of other 
powers was also pressing. Shortly after the battle, Eng- 
lish, French, and German warships came flocking into 
the bay. The two latter nations had throughout the war 
manifested a guarded and restrained unfriendliness for the 
United States, and there was every reason to apprehend 
that unless order was maintained in Manila they would 
land forces to protect the interests of their citizens resi- 
dent there. Forces so landed are slow to retire — wit- 



138 Blue Jackets of '98 

ness the British in Egypt. Therefore it was Admiral 
Dewey's study to see to it that nothing should happen in 
the city which would justify European intervention. Bad 
as the Spaniards were, they had an organised government, 
and might be expected to maintain order better than the 
half-disciplined hordes of Aguinaldo. Accordingly, before 
very many days the Americans were put in the attitude 
of protecting their enemies the Spanish against their alUes 
the Filipinos. The intricacies of policy do not appeal to 
the half-savage mind, and this attitude was not unnatu- 
rally the cause of some bitterness in the insurgent camps. 
The foreign ships, particularly those of Germany, were a 
source of constant worry to the admiral. It is the custom 
of nations to permit the warships of a friendly power to 
enter and move about a blockaded harbour as they will, 
and equally it is the custom of navy officers who are cogni- 
sant of the etiquette of their profession to receive this 
concession as a privilege rather than a right, and to exer- 
cise it in a way that will harass the blockading fleet as 
little as possible. The Germans in Philippine water 
seemed to study methods of annoying the Americans. 
Their ships were constantly entering and leaving Manila 
Bay, at all hours and on the most frivolous pretexts. 
Their launches more than once ran about the harbour 
after nightfall in a way that justified the apprehension 
of the American lookouts that they might be Spanish 
torpedo boats. A shot at one of the intruders might have 
created the gravest international complications. The Ger- 
man navy officers, even after the defeat of Moutojo, made 
of the Spanish officers their chosen companions. They 
were continually going ashore, fraternising with the enemy 
in the Manila caf^s and giving every possible indication 
that their sympathies were strongly pro-Spanish. If they 
did not actually betray the confidence reposed in them by 
using their opportunities for observation of the American 
fleet to give information to the Spaniards, they were at 
least exceedingly indiscreet, for lights that looked like 



Blue Jackets of '98 139 

signals, and errands which seemed undertaken in Spain's 
behalf were frequent. More than once the feeling between 
the Americans and the Germans seemed to be leading 
inevitably to an armed conflict, for Admiral Dewey would 
not sacrifice a single right nor abate in any degree the 
rightful dignity of the commander of a United States 
squadron in possession of the bay of Manila. One of 
these instances was that of the German ship " Princess 
Wilhelmina," the captain of which prohibited the insur- 
gents from undertaking a certain expedition they had 
planned. Dewey sent a ship to the spot, and the expedi- 
tion was carried out under the protection of its guns. Mr. 
J. L. Stickney, a correspondent who was with the admiral 
on the flagship, tells a story which he declares he obtained 
from a " perfectly authentic source." The admiral learned 
that one of the German vessels had landed provisions in 
Manila, thereby violating neutrality. He summoned the 
flag lieutenant of the " Olympia " to his cabin. 

" Oh, Brumby," said he, when the officer appeared, " I 
wish you to take the barge and go over to the German 
flagship. Give Admiral von Diederich my compliments, 
and say that I wish to call his attention to the fact that 
the vessels of his squadron have shown an extraordinary 
disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse, and 
that finally one of them has committed a gross breach of 
neutrality in landing provisions in Manila, a port which I 
am blockading." 

The lieutenant saluted and turned to go. The admiral 
called him back, his voice, which had thus far been quiet 
and gently modulated, rising with an intonation of wrath. 

" And, Brumby," continued he, " tell Admiral von Diede- 
rich that if he wants a fight he can have it right now." 

The message had its effect, and thenceforward the annoy- 
ance from the Germans was materially lessened, although 
in some degree it continued until the end of the war, when 
the German Emperor himself, seeing the danger and the 
folly of pursuing a course which was creating hostility to 



140 Blue Jackets of '98 

Germany all over the United States, intervened and ordered 
the German ships away from Manila, intrusting the pro- 
tection of the German citizens there to the United States 
authorities, — a sort of belated diplomacy adopted vs^hen it 
was found that the methods of the mailed fist could not be 
safely employed. 

In contrast to the attitude of the German officers was 
that of the English. Great Britain had in Manila Bay a 
squadron quite equal to that of Germany, — the latter 
being rather superior to that of the United States. The 
British officers lost no opportunity to show their friend- 
ship for the Americans, and it is reported that, when on 
one occasion the German admiral, planning a stroke, asked 
Captain Chichester, the British commander, what the Eng- 
lish would do in case the Germans should protest against 
an American bombardment of Manila, the messenger 
received the answer : " Say to Admiral von Diederich that 
he will have to call on Admiral Dewey to find out what 
the British ships will do in such an event. Admiral 
Dewey is the only man authorised to answer this question." 

Perhaps there is exaggeration or incorrectness of detail 
in these stories and in others like them that were current 
in war-times. It is undeniable, however, that the hostility 
of the Germans and the friendliness of the English were 
generally recognised in the fleets, and the international 
imbroglio finally took the significant form of sailors' fights 
in Hong Kong, in which Yankee and British Blue Jackets 
fought shoulder to shoulder against the seamen of the 
Kaiser. 



CHAPTEE VII 

Spain's Cape Verde Fleet — The Coasts of the United 
States Menaced — How the Naval Force of the 
United States in the Atlantic was Employed — The 
Search for Cervera — Bombardment of San Juan de 
Porto Rico — Entrapped in Santiago de Cuba — The 
Sampson-Schley Controversy — The Voyage of the 
" Oregon " — The Blockade op Cervera. 

WHEN war was declared, Spain had at the Cape Verde 
Islands a very considerable fleet. To these islands, 
as a sort of outpost, the Spanish Minister of Marine had 
begun sending men-of-war when the despatch of our North 
Atlantic squadron to the Dry Tortugas and Key West 
seemed to suggest a threat. By the middle of April, the 
Spanish fleet under Admiral Cervera numbered four fine 
large vessels and three torpedo-boat destroyers. The most 
powerful ship of the squadron was the " Cristobal Colon," a 
battle-ship of the second class, mounting two 10-inch 
guns, ten 6-inch, and six 4.7-inch. That is to say, this 
was her main battery as set forth in the naval reports, 
but the Spaniards, with characteristic improvidence, had 
failed to mount the two 10-inch rifles. As a ship, she 
was a magnificent structure, " perliaps the finest of her 
class afloat," writes Captain Chadwick of the " New York," 
with whose opinion many of the first naval experts of 
Europe agreed. The three cruisers in Cervera's fleet were 
sister-ships : the " Almirante Oquendo," the " Infanta Maria 
Teresa," and the "Vizcaya." They were of 7000 tons 
displacement each, with a 12-inch armour belt and 3- 
inch protective deck, and mounted two 11-inch rifles, 
ten 5.5-inch, and the usual secondary battery of small 



142 Blue Jackets of '98 

calibres and machine guns. What appeared to give these 
ships a notable advantage was their estimated speed of 
twenty knots an hour. When the day of battle came, 
however, this speed was found to be as non-existent as the 
big guns on the " Oquendo." With this fleet Admiral Cer- 
vera had further three torpedo-boat destroyers, or large 
torpedo boats, the " Furor," " Terror," and " Pluton." Of 
this class of ships the " United States " was wholly desti- 
tute. Built in British ship-yards, of the most approved 
modern patterns, having a speed of thirty knots an hour, 
and adding to the terrifying torpedo armament a very 
respectable battery of rapid-fire and machine guns, these 
were really formidable vessels. They had in combination 
the sinister qualities of the serpent, which can deliver a 
fatal stroke and slip noiselessly away, and of the snarling 
panther, which if cornered can fight viciously for its life. 
Much was feared from them by the navy officers of the 
United States ; much was hoped of them by Spain. They 
accomplished nothing. 

For some days after the declaration of war, this fleet 
clung to the protection of the harbour of St. Vincent in 
the Cape Verde Islands. Portugal, which exercised sover- 
eignty over those islands, was ostensibly a neutral power^ 
and the duty rested with it to order Cervera away withii 
twenty-four hours of the declaration of war. But 
fact the sympathies of the Portuguese government were 
strongly with their Spanish neighbours, and they stretchec 
the code of neutrality to the utmost in giving Cervera 
sanctuary. The Spaniards were in no hurry to read 
Cuban waters. Cervera, an old and able sailor, knew th€ 
faults of the ships under his command if the Ministry o! 
Marine did not. In a Spanish magazine the story is tolc 
that a year before the war a visitor to Admiral Cervera 
said to him of this very squadron : 

" You appear to be indicated, by professional opinion, foi 
the command of the squadron in case war is declared." 

" In that case," replied Cervera, somewhat ruefully, ' 



Blue Jackets of '98 143 

shall accept ; knowing, however, that I am going to a 
Trafalgar." 

" And how could that disaster be avoided ? " inquired 
the visitor, with natural anxiety. 

" By allowing me to spend beforehand fifty thousand 
tons of coal in evolutions, and ten thousand projectiles in 
target practice. Otherwise we shall go to a Trafalgar. 
Eemember what I say." 

But the Spanish national character was not favourable 
to such wise preparation as the admiral wished. With 
fatuous self-confidence the responsible authorities, as well 
as the people, thought the navy invincible, and looked 
with contempt upon the ships and men under the stars 
and stripes. A former minister of marine, two weeks 
before the war, expressed through a Madrid newspaper 
these views as to the probable outcome of the contest 
upon the sea: 

" We shall conquer on the sea, and I am now going to give 
you my reasons. The first of these is the remarkable disci- 
pHne that prevails on our warships; and the second, as soon 
as fire is opened, the crews of the American ships will com- 
mence to desert, since we all know that among them are people 
of all nationalities. Ship against ship, therefore, a failure is 
not to be feared. I believe that the squadron detained at Cape 
de Verde, and particularly the destroyers, should have, and 
could have, continued the voyage to Cuba, since they have 
nothing to fear from the American fleet." 

The marked divergence of opinion between the politi- 
cians and people of Spain and the trained officers of the 
Spanish navy was not without a parallel on this side of 
the water. While our Navy Department and the officers 
of our ships showed calm confidence of their ability to 
cope with Cervera's advancing fleet, the people of some 
of our sea-coast towns manifested something like a panic. 
Delegations from nearly all the seaport cities descended 
upon Washington, headed by their Congressmen, to demand 



144 Blue Jackets of '98 

additional protection. Each wanted batteries and a coast- 
defence vessel. Had the authorities given heed to the 
apprehensive appeals of Boards of Trade, Chambers of 
Commerce, Aldermen and Mayors, the United States navy 
would have been split up into small flotillas and scattered 
along the coast from Eastport to Jupiter Inlet, while the 
army would have been converted into a number of small 
garrisons for harbour defence. Eich citizens of Boston 
packed up their silver and valuable papers and sent them 
off to inland safe deposits. Summer cottages along the 
shore were a drug in the market, and the summer colo- 
nists, with remarkable unanimity, developed a liking for 
mountain air. That in modern warfare unfortified towns 
are never bombarded did not seem to reassure the timid 
ones, and the absurdity of fearing that a warship would 
let fly a $2000 projectile at a peaceful $500 cottage did 
not appeal to their sense of humour. 

Nevertheless, there was some slight foundation for the 
popular apprehension of danger from the enemy's fleet. 
When that squadron left St. Vincent on April 29th, being 
hastened in its departure by a pointed communication 
from the United States minister to Portugal that neutral 
customs were being strained to the breaking-point, it dis- 
appeared absolutely from view. The Navy Department 
had apparently made no arrangements for tracing its wake, 
and the last definite news for many days was that a news- 
paper boat had followed it for some hours, and left it still 
headed westward. Of course, the supposition was that it 
was making the best of its way to AVest Indian waters, 
and it was estimated that it should arrive there about the 
9th of May. 

The distribution of the American fleets in the Atlantic 
at this moment is a matter of much interest as indicative 
of the measures of reconnoissance and defence adopted 
by the naval authorities when the coast was actually men- 
aced by a powerful fleet. At the probable seapoint of 
battle, with Cape Haitien as a base of information, was 



Blue Jackets of '98 145 

Admiral Sampson, with the battleship " Iowa," the moni- 
tors "Terror" and " Amphitrite," the unarmoured cruisers 
" Detroit " and " Montgomery," the torpedo boat " Porter," 
the collier " Niagara," and the armoured cruiser " New 
York" as flagship. It was a slow-moving squadron, for 
the monitors, though good in battle, are but sluggish 
steamers and had to be towed by some of the larger 
ships. 

The part of the squadron left on the blockade was put 
under command of Commodore Watson, who, with the 
two monitors, " Puritan " and " Miantonomah," lay off tlie 
entrance to Havana with a fleet of gunboats and auxiliaries 
reaching out to the east and west. Cruising about Mar- 
tinique and Guadaloupe were the swift converted liners 
" Harvard " and " St. Louis," while the " Yale " was sent 
to scout the seas about Porto Eico. 

Meanwhile the coast of New England and the Middle 
States was left with so scant a guard that in some degree 
the panic of the townsmen was justified. At anchor in 
Hampton Roads lay what was known as the Flying Squad- 
ron, organized early in the war for the protection of the 
coast, and put under command of Commodore Winfield 
Scott Schley. In this squadron were the " Brooklyn," 
" Texas," " Massachusetts," " Minneapolis," and " Colum- 
bia," — two battle-ships, two armoured, and one unarmoured 
cruiser. Circling about, far off the coast, were the auxil- 
iary " St. Paul," and a horde of converted yachts, whose 
duty it was to scour the sea in search for the enemy, and, 
discovering him, to make all speed for the nearest tele- 
graph point and summon the Flying Squadron to the rescue. 
Rumours of an enemy these scouts found in plenty, and 
day after day the newspapers reported mysterious ships 
seen off divers vulnerable points on the northeastern coast ; 
but while nobody knew where Cervera was, the Navy De- 
partment soon became convinced that he was not in 
Northern waters, and despatched the Flying Squadron to 
the Gulf, — an action that raised a bitter outcry on the 

10 



146 Blue Jackets of '98 

North Atlantic coast, where the " Columbia " alone, of 
the formidable ships, was left. 

When the first week in May passed and the enemy- 
failed to appear at any of the points where arrangements 
had been made to give him a warm welcome, there was a 
sense of growing anxiety at Washington. A fleet of four 
great ships and three torpedo boats seemed too big to dis- 
appear so completely when the ocean was covered with 
scouts on the outlook for it. Had Cervera outwitted us, 
and was he engaged in some secret adventure of sinister 
purpose ? The newspapers were filled with speculations, 
and the opinion of every naval expert was eagerly sought. 
Paimours of the most terrifying nature were abroad. Cer- 
vera had been sighted off Nova Scotia, and was about to 
desolate the New England coast. He had gone to the far 
southwest to intercept and destroy the gallant battleship 
" Oregon," then making a race from San Francisco to Key 
West, of which we shall have more to say. One day 
there came explicit news that the enemy had returned to 
Cadiz, and Ambassador Hay, at Paris, cabled home that 
he had positive private information that the big ironclads 
were lying in the harbour of Cadiz in plain sight for all 
to see. This was so definite, so official, that authorities 
and people rested content with the theory that " Cervera 
had turned tail and sneaked home again," until it was 
emphatically disproved. 

It was the hard-working squadron in the Gulf that 
finally determined the facts. Admiral Sampson, with the 
fleet above enumerated, and without more definite knowl- 
edge concerning the location of the elusive Spaniards 
than had the rest of the world, appeared before San Juan, 
Porto Rico, on the 12th of May. He had expected to 
find the Spaniards there when he began his voyage, but 
the information he received at Cape Haitien, where de- 
spatches from Washington were received, left little promise 
of that. Nevertheless, he concluded to go ahead and 
make an attack on the defences of the port, in the ex- 



i 

I 




B0M15ARDMENT OF SAN JUAN, PUKKTU KICO, MAY I ^, iSgS. 



j^ 



Blue Jackets of '98 147 

pectation of uncovering the Spanish fleet if it was indeed 
within. The topography of the harbour and town is like 
that of most of the Spanish cities in the West Indies. 
The town lies at the head of a long, narrow bay, which is 
defended at its entrance by batteries on the high hills, 
including, of course, the inevitable Morro. The interior of 
the harbour cannot be examined with passing the defences 
at its mouth, so that the question of the presence of the 
fleet there could only be determined by an attack. The 
action, though the most considerable one yet fought in 
West Indian waters, was of slight importance. The 
admiral, transferring his flag to the battle-ship " Iowa," 
led the " New York," " Amphitrite," and " Terror " thrice 
into the harbour, and out by the westward channel, pound- 
ing away with their heavy guns as they passed the three 
batteries. It was early dawn when the attack began, and 
as the ships crept in toward the glimmering lights of the 
city, which were beginning to pale in the face of advanc- 
ing day, every man who had a port to look out of gazed 
eagerly about the harbour for the enemy's fleet which they 
hoped to find. It was not there. The scene was one of 
perfect peace. The light was burning in the lighthouse, 
as though the people had no fear of guiding a foe to their 
homes. In the forts on the hills even the sentries seemed 
to be sleeping, for from them came no sign of life until 
the ships opened fire with their great guns. Morro Castle 
stood, dark and gloomy, on the crest of a sixty-foot bluff. 
Behind it lay the town ; opposite, the battery on Cabras 
Island. From the " Iowa " a 6-inch gun broke the 
silence, and the projectile crashed against the worn 
masonry of Morro. Slowly the ships steamed in proces- 
sion, firing broadsides, and receiving doggedly the return 
of the forts, which did not seem to wake to the situation 
until at least four broadsides had been discharged. The 
" Detroit," within easy range of Morro, fairly pelted that 
ancient stronghold with projectiles from her rapid-fire 
. guns, driving the defenders to the bomb-proofs, and 



148 Blue Jackets of '98 

enveloping the castle in a cloud of flying fragments of 
masonry. Though wholly uuarmoured, she went boldly 
within rifle range, and when the larger ships, completing 
their first turn, seemed to be steaming out of the harbour 
again, the Spanish gunners turned their attention exclu- 
sively to her. There was a good chance for disaster to 
the " Detroit," for she was vulnerable not only to the pro- 
jectiles of the modern rifles, but to the old smooth-bores, 
of which the Spaniards were employing several. But she 
stuck to her position, and when the hail of missiles about 
her seemed fiercest, her commander, Captain Dayton, as 
though anxious to do a little shooting himself, pulled a 
revolver from his belt, and, standing on the bridge under 
that fierce fire, shot calmly at a sardine-can his servant 
had thrown overboard. The witnesses of this bit of by- 
play report that his nerve was good, and that he liit the 
target five times before it sunk. 

The " Montgomery," an unprotected cruiser with a main 
battery of ten 5-inch guns, had been ordered before the 
beginning of the action to take Fort Canuelo under its 
especial charge and silence it if it opened fire. This task 
the cruiser accomplished with ease, although the battery 
against which it was pitted was well placed, heavily armed, 
and should have been able to drive an unarmoured ship 
away. But the marksmanship of the Spaniards was 
wretched, and their eagerness to seek cover in face of a 
lively and well-directed fire, even though little execution 
was done, was most unsoldierly. All the factors in the 
engagement except skill and discipline favoured them. 
Their batteries, besides possessing the advantage that land 
batteries invariably enjoy over ships, were on such high 
ground that their gunners were favoured by a plunging 
fire, while on the ships the guns had to be pointed at 
such an unusual elevation that the aim of the gunners 
was materially injured, and the structure of the vessels 
racked. The practice of our men with the larger guns 
was especially bad, doubtless for this reason, but the 



Blue Jackets of '98 149 

vigour and skill with which the secondary batteries were 
worked proved enough to quiet the enemy. Two only of 
our ships were struck, one shell bursting on the deck of 
the " New York," killing one seaman and wounding three 
others. Three men on the " Iowa " were wounded. With 
that the casualties on the attacking fleet ended, though 
the battle was hotly fought at close range for more than 
three hours. But on the other hand the enemy escaped 
as lightly. His forts were not materially injured, and it 
is not probable — though exact data are not obtainable — 
that his troops suffered seriously. The engagement simply 
added one more bit of evidence to the already complete 
proof that ships cannot reduce earthworks. When the 
enemy seemed silenced a brief intermission in the Ameri- 
can fire would result in the Spaniards returning to the 
guns they had abandoned, and taking up the fight again. 
It is true that Admiral Sampson might have passed the 
forts — indeed he did so repeatedly in the course of his 
manoeuvring. He might indeed have taken the city, for 
it lay open to his guns and at the mercy of a landing 
party. But the capture of small towns was not what that 
fleet was in the West Indies for. It was hot on the trail 
of Cervera, and finding that he was not at Port San Juan, 
the admiral pulled down his battle-flags, left the enemy 
to repair damages, and set sail again. On the way the 
torpedo boat "Porter" was sent into Cape Haitien for 
despatches. 

The "Porter" came back at the top of her speed with 
signals flying to show that she brought important infor- 
mation. When she entered Cape Haitien her people, like 
all on the American fleet, supposed that the report of 
Ambassador Hay that Cervera had returned to Spain was 
correct, but at the United States consulate the landing 
officer found an accumulation of despatches for the ad- 
miral that told most significant tidings. Cervera was in 
American waters. The American consul at Curagoa cabled 
that the Spaniards were there, short of coal and provisions ; 



150 Blue Jackets of '98 

a later despatch reported they had left that point for an 
unknown destination. From Secretary Long were a 
number of cables. One reported the Spanish fleet as 
off Martinique, the torpedo-boat destroyer " Terror" being 
left at Fort de France on that island. This despatch was 
definite enough to remove all further doubt, and the ad- 
miral promptly sent a despatch, ordering the " Yale " and 
"St. Paul" to cruise in the triangular passage between 
Jamaica, Haiti, and Cuba ; the " Harvard " to guard the 
Mona passage and the north side of Porto Eico ; while the 
" St. Louis " was sent to cut cables at Santiago and neigh- 
bouring points on the south side of Cuba. Admiral Samp- 
son was convinced in his own mind, by a certam instinct, 
that Cervera would make for Santiago, and he so warned 
the captain of the "Harvard" in a despatch. To the 
commodore commanding at Key West, he sent a cable 
directing that all ships on the south side of Cuba be 
warned that the enemy might appear there at any mo- 
ment. This prevision is a striking illustration of the way 
in which a trained mind, proceeding from fragmentary and 
insufficient information, will reach a correct conclusion. 
As for the squadron under his own immediate command, 
Admiral Sampson made all possible haste to take it back 
to Key West, proceeding in advance of it himself in the 
swift " New York." Arriving there, he found the Flying 
Squadron under Commodore Schley already in port, and 
the whole fleet tremulous with the knowledge that the 
enemy was in our waters and the decisive conflict could 
not long be delayed. There was a fluttering of telegrams 
to and from Washington, and a vast deal of wigwagging 
from ship to ship, while at night the electric lights blinked 
their party-coloured eyes from the foremast of the flagship, 
and the typevn-iter in the admiral's cabin below ticked 
away restlessly. When it was all done Schley was in 
possession of orders to take his squadron at once by way 
of the Yucatan channel to the southern coast of Cuba, 
pick up the " Iowa " and " Marblehead " at Cienf uegos, and 



Blue Jackets of ^98 151 

find the enemy if possible. The three ships with which 
Schley started, the " Brooklyn," " Massachusetts," and 
" Texas," were passing out of Key West harbour when the 
last of the slow-going fleet which Sampson had had at 
San Juan entered. " I congratulate you in advance," the 
admiral signalled to the outgoing ships. " I believe you 
are going to meet and defeat the Spaniards." 

Through the sapphire seas of that tropic region the 
great warships ploughed heavily, making their relentless 
way to the port where all expected to find the enemy 
with whom the fight was to be fought to the death. At 
the western end of Cuba two fellow-cruisers, the " Cin- 
cinnati " and " Vesuvius," were sighted. They were going 
back to Key West for coal, and had seen nothing of 
Cervera. The " Marblehead " and " Nashville " also came 
up, and were equally ignorant of the enemy's where- 
abouts. Cienfuegos was reached on the 21st. It is one 
of the blind harbours of which the West Indies are full. 
Were the Spaniards inside ? That question was destined 
to worry Commodore Schley for some days to come. It 
was at night that he reached the port, and early the next 
morning every man on the fleet who had a glass or whose 
eyes were sharp was studying the entrance to the harbour 
in search of signs of the enemy's presence. Nothing 
could be seen. Grim batteries guarded the narrow en- 
; trance to the bay, and high hills cut off all vision. But 
i the night before the commodore had heard guns which 
he thought to be fired in welcome to the Spanish fleet. 
He saw, furthermore, heavy smoke rising from the inner 
harbour as though a fleet were at anchor there with fires 
up. Impressed with the belief that ■ the enemy was 
' within, he determined to blockade the port for a time, 
, sending the fleet " Scorpion " on to Santiago to learn what 
the big ship scouting in that neighbourhood might have 
discovered. That day the " Iowa," with " Fighting Bob " 
Evans on the bridge, came up to join the blockaders, and 
on the next day the converted yacht " Hawk," the gun- 



152 Blue Jackets of '98 

boat " Castine," and the collier " Merrimac " arrived. Up 
to this time Schley was confident that he had the enemy 
trapped, though it is said that a majority of his officers 
disagreed with him. Certainly little had been done in 
the two days to settle the point. No boat, not even a 
launch, had tried to force the harbour on a voyage of 
discovery, nor had any officer been put ashore to spy 
out the land, as we shall find Lieutenant Blue doing at 
Santiago. 

But the " Hawk " brought news which destroyed 
Schley's confidence in his present position, and made him 
fear for the safety of the " Scorpion." It reported that 
the " Minneapolis " had seen the Spanish fleet enter 
Santiago harbour on the 19th, and had hastened to Hayti 
to cable the news to Washington, whence it had been 
telegraphed to Key West, arriving there just after Schley 
had sailed. Shortly after the arrival of this intelligence 
the British ship " Adula " came to the mouth of Cien- 
fuegos harbour, for the avowed purpose of taking away 
British refugees. Her captain told the commodore 
that Cervera had left Santiago ; he had heard it authori- 
tatively at Jamaica. This left the American commander 
undecided again. The report coming by the " Hawk " 
might be both correct and incorrect. The " Minneapolis " 
might have seen the Spaniards enter Santiago harbour, 
but they might have come out and reached Cienfuegos 
later. Accordingly a despatch was sent off to the admiral 
in which the commodore, after relating all these things, 
said, " I shall therefore remain off this port." 

Admiral Sampson at Key West was as firmly con- 
vinced that Cervera was at Santiago as Schley was that 
he had him cooped up in Cienfuegos, and out of this 
deJay at the mouth of the latter harbour grew a contro- 
versy among zealous partisans of the two officers which 
has not been pleasant reading for admirers of the navy. 

The next day, the 24th, the « Marblehead," "Eagle," 
and " Vixen " joined Schley. The commander of the 




AI)Mlk\l, W 11.1,1 \\l IHO.MAS SA.MI'M)N. 



Blue Jackets of '98 153 

former, Captain McCalla, had been long on the Cuban 
blockade and had made the most of his opportunities. 
Ever since the squadron had been off the port, three fires 
had burned on a certain hill by night, and three horses 
were seen tethered below by day. 

" There is a band of insurgents there," said McCalla, 
and he went ashore to see them. They told him posi- 
tively that Cervera was not in the harbour, and with this 
final and convincing bit of evidence Schley ordered the 
squadron to get under way and proceed to Santiago. It 
was a run of four hundred miles, and the fleet was within 
sight of Morro Castle, that guarded the entrance to the 
harbour, by five o'clock on the afternoon of the 26th, 
finding there the " St. Paul," the " Minneapolis," and the 
" Yale." The former of these vessels reported the capture 
of a British colher under the very guns of the Spanish 
batteries. She was freighted with coal for Cervera, and 
her presence at Santiago should have dispelled the last 
doubt in the commodore's mind as to where his prey was 
to be found. Seemingly, however, he did not grasp the 
situation, for that night without making any effort to 
reconnoitre the harbour, or seek further for the enemy he 
displayed the signal : 

" Destination Key West as soon as collier is ready, via 
south side Cuba and Yucatan channel. Speed nine 
knots." 

This order, coming when most of the men on the ships 
were expecting a signal to prepare for a dash at the enemy 
early the following morning, caused astonishment and 
something like consternation in the fleet. The more out- 
spoken captains condemned it bitterly. A correspondent 
reports that, soon after the signal had been displayed, 
"Fighting Bob" Evans shouted from the deck of the 
" Iowa " to Captain Philip of the Texas : 

" Say, Jack, what do you think of it ? " 

" Beats me." was the response ; " what do you think 
of it?" 



154 Blue Jackets of '98 

" Damned if I know," answered Evans, whose reputa- 
tion for profanity was quite as well won as his reputation 
for gallantry. " But I know one thing — I 'm the most 
disgusted man afloat." 

The order was unquestionably a grave error. Out of 
it sprang that controversy which raged for a long time in 
the halls of Congress and in the public prints. The 
friends of Commodore Schley insisted that the plan of 
returning to Key West to coal was but the fulfilment 
of orders given by Admiral Sampson. The partisans of 
the latter officer charged Schley with having, through 
stupidity or a lack of dash, narrowly escaped giving 
Cervera an opportunity to get out to sea and ravage our 
northern coasts. After the battle of Santiago, in which 
Schley bore the most active part, the question of the 
rewards to be given the victorious commanders came up 
in Congress, and there the contest raged fiercely. Ad- 
miral Sampson, in recommending promotions, declined to 
recommend Schley, pronouncing his conduct " repre- 
hensible." There were stinging innuendos, hints of coward- 
ice, of suppressed despatches, of orders the dates of which 
were changed after the sequel had proved them to have 
been unwise, and all the other scandalous charges that 
zealous politicians trying to build up one man at the 
expense of another know so well how to array. The 
essence of the controversy does not appear to be matter 
worthy the dignity of history, and the manner of it re- 
flected little credit on the friends of the two chief figures 
whether in Congress or in the navy. As we shall see, the 
search for Cervera was entirely successful and his destruc- 
tion complete. The remark of Commodore Schley, when, 
the last Spanish ship being then blazing on the beach, 
some one raised the question of to whom the honour 
of the victory belonged, " There is glory enough in it 
for all of us," was manly and honourable. It is a pity 
that all discussion of the affair might not have been con- 
ducted in this spirit, for it is in this way that history 



^ ^ 




.J» " # 



'''$ 

^-/e*,^ 





Blue Jackets of '98 155 

will view it after the petty dissensions and jealousies of 
men great enough to win an epoch-making battle have 
been forgotten. 

It is enough to say here that the order to return to Key 
West was never carried out. Before the collier could be 
put into condition to make the return voyage, more definite 
orders arrived from Washington directing the commodore 
to maintain the blockade at all hazards. 

Let us return briefly to Admiral Sampson, whom we 
left at Key West when Schley's squadron steamed away 
for the south side of Cuba. The admiral left the rendez- 
vous with the purpose of cruising in the seas that Cervera 
might fairly be expected to pass through. At Key West 
he gathered up one or two of the blockading vessels and 
started for St. Nicholas channel with a fleet that included, 
besides the flagship " New York," the battle-ship " Indiana," 
the monitors " Puritan " and " Miantonomah," the cruisers 
" New Orleans," " Detroit," and " Montgomery," and several 
torpedo boats and auxiliaries. On the 27th the dynamite 
cruiser " Vesuvius," the cruiser " Cincinnati," and the 
monitor " Amphitrite " joined his fleet. St. Nicholas 
channel extends along the northern coast of Cuba. Samp- 
son was therefore within comparatively easy communica- 
tion with Washington, torpedo boats plying constantly 
between the fleet and the nearest cable station, or even 
running back to Key West on occasion. At the moment 
of beginning this cruise the admiral was without definite 
information that the enemy had taken refuge in Santiago, 
and he chose his cruising-ground, therefore, so as to be 
able to intercept Cervera should he make for Havana from 
the east, without going so far as to be unable to return 
and check the enemy should the Spanish fleet come around 
the western end of Cuba and seek to make Havana from 
that direction. Holding thus the key to Havana, he cruised 
up and down the channel, alert for the appearance of the 
enemy. 



156 Blue Jackets of ^98 

The Spaniards, however, did not put in an appearance ; 
but the admiral's days were plentifully filled with the 
despatches that poured in upon him from Washington and 
from Schley. As the conviction grew stronger both at the 
Navy Department and in the mind of the admiral that the 
Spaniards were in Santiago, the successive despatches from 
Schley reporting his continued presence at Cienfuegos, or 
his purpose of going to Mole St. Nicholas or even Key 
West to coal, created the most lively apprehension that the 
enemy would escape. Communication with Schley either 
from the fleet or from Washington was difficult. By the 
time an order was despatched a message would come from 
the commodore indicating such a change in the situation 
that the order evidently stood in need of correction. On 
the 28 th, apparently doubtmg that Schley's representations 
of the necessity for coaling certain of his ships and the 
impossibility of accomplishing it in the heavy swell of 
the open sea were well founded. Admiral Sampson sent 
the " New Orleans " to Santiago with the collier " Stirling," 
with instructions to Schley to sink the latter vessel in the 
channel, and by that means to " bottle up " the enemy. 
Under no considerations was Schley to leave the mouth of 
the harbour. Thereupon Sampson himself returned to Key 
West, that he might be in more immediate communication 
with the Navy Department. There on the 29th he re- 
ceived a despatch from Santiago reporting that smootlier 
weather had enabled the sailors to coal the " Marblehead " 
and " Texas." This was a relief to the admiral, who 
straightway wired back congratulations on the achieve- 
ment, and reiterated his instructions to hold the position 
at all hazards. Meanwhile the admiral had been seeking 
from Washington permission to go himself to Santiago, 
and, succeeding, started with the " Oregon," the " May- 
flower," the " Porter " and the flagship. On the way the 
" St. Paul " was met and from Captain Sigsbee was ob- 
tained a copy of a despatch he was carrying to Mole St. 
Nicolas to be cabled to Long. It was this : 



Blue Jackets of '98 157 

" [Dated] 7 p. m. May 29th. 
" Enemy in port. Kecognised ' Cristobal Colon ' and * In- 
fanta Maria Teresa ' and two torpedo boats moored inside 
Morro, behind point. Doubtless the others are here. We are 
short of coal. Using every effort to get coal in. Have about 
3,000 tons of coal in collier, but not easy to get on board here. 
If no engagement next two or three days, Sampson's squadron 
could relieve this one to coal at Gonaives or vicinity of Fort au 
Prince. 'Brooklyn,' 'Iowa,' 'Massachusetts,' 'Texas,' 
* Marblehead, ' 'Vixen,' and collier compose squadron here. 

"Schley." 

The presence of one of the ships with Sampson requires 
some explanation. In March the battle-ship " Oregon" lay 
at anchor in the harbour of San Francisco, where she had 
been built. She is a sea-going battle-ship of 10,228 tons, 
with an estimated speed of fifteen knots, a main battery 
of four 13-inch and eight 8-inch rifles, and a full comple- 
ment of those swift and furious distributors of death known 
as the secondary battery. To the authorities at Washing- 
ton the absence of this magnificent ship from the probable 
theatre of war on the Atlantic coast was a situation not 
to be risked. It was then thought that the balance of 
strength between the Spanish and United States fleets was 
so delicate that the presence or absence of one ship might 
change it, and it was determined to bring the " Oregon " on 
the long journey around Cape Horn. We shall see that 
her presence off Santiago did materially affect the strength 
of the American fleet, though, as the day went, she might 
perhaps have been spared. 

On the 19th of March the " Oregon " left San Fran- 
cisco. War was not yet declared, but everybody under- 
stood the purpose for which the gallant battle-ship turned 
her stern to the coast which she had not left since the 
day of her launching, and sped off to the southward. 
For her officers and crew, though the diplomats might 
cry, " Peace ! Peace ! " there was no peace. Every pre- 
caution that would have been observed in time of war was 



158 Blue Jackets of '98 

taken. The first port reached was Callao, a run of 4000 
miles in 16 days. It was a Spanish-American town, full 
of people who spoke the language of Spain, and were more 
in touch with the habits and customs of the nation whose 
yoke their fathers threw off than they were with the free 
institutions of the United States. Captain Charles E. 
Clark, commanding the " Oregon," with the memory of 
the " Maine " fresh, neglected no precaution he would have 
taken in an avowedly hostile port. The bunkers had to 
be filled afresh, but every lump of coal passed under the 
scrutiny of a cadet engineer, lest some infernal machine 
should find its way into the furnaces. About the ship all 
night steam launches filled with armed men kept watchful 
patrol, and doubled watches on every part of the ship stood 
guard, ready to shoot at the slightest sign of danger. 
Swiftly on the completion of the task the anchors were 
raised, and the ship began again her race against time. 
One after another the states of western South America 
were left behind as the restless screws churned mile after 
mile of the blue waters of the Pacific into a narrow path- 
way of foam. After leaving Montevideo there was a brief 
period of excitement and perhaps anxiety, springing from 
the fact that a Spanish torpedo boat was reported to have 
lately left that harbour to seek for the American vessel. It 
was apprehended that the enemy might lie in wait behind 
one of the capes that extend into the Straits of Magellan, 
and dash out upon the ship as she was passing through 
those narrow waters ; but no sign of the enemy appeared, 
and the great battle-ship turned northward with half its 
journey done and no enemy sighted. But on April 17th 
at Punta Arenas the tars of the battle-ship turned out on 
the decks and turrets to cheer as they saw the stars and 
stripes flying over a trig little gunboat. It was the " Mar- 
ietta," and she brought to Captain Clark the story of the 
rapid drift of political events toward war. The narrative 
only increased the anxiety of all to reach the battle-ground 



before all should be over. It was not a matter of fearing 



M 




"RACIN(; IKiMI, ' — THE HATTLESHIP " OREGON " ON HER WAY 
FROM SAN FRANCISCO TO KEY WEST, 



1 



Blue Jackets of 98 159 

an attack of the enemy, but rather dread lest the enemy- 
should have been defeated without the " Oregon " sharing 
in the work. So after coaling again, with all hands 
working day and night, the ship dashed out to sea. Eio 
Janeiro was entered and left behind. There the news of 
the declaration of war and Dewey's deeds was received. 
Bahia, reached on the 8th of May, had despatches from 
Washington for the ship. The Navy Department sent 
word of the disappearance of Cervera's fleet and the general 
apprehension lest it might have sailed south to cut off the 
" Oregon." Now indeed the " Oregon " was entering the 
zone of danger. At muster that day Captain Clark ad- 
dressed the crew, telling them of the power of the enemy 
that they might at any moment encounter, and saying : 
" In time of war it is our duty to avoid so superior a force, 
but if we do meet them we shall impair their fighting 
efficiency." Then the ship was stripped, her dull war- 
paint put on, and so out again into the pathless ocean 
ready to do battle not only with wind and wave, but with 
any steel-clad fighting-machine that might carry the 
Spanish flag. In company with the " Oregon " now sailed 
the " Buffalo," which, as the " Nictheroy," had been pur- 
chased from Brazil. But through the perilous waters of 
the West Indies the two ships steamed without sighting 
the enemy, and on the 24th Captain Clark communicated 
with Washington from Jupiter Inlet. " If you have re- 
pairs to be made," telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy, 
" go to Norfolk ; otherwise report to Admiral Sampson at 
Key West." The " Oregon " went to Key West. After a 
voyage of 14,700 miles at the top of her speed she had ar- 
rived in perfect condition, without a rivet sprung or a tube 
leaking. 

Now that ships have become floating machine-shops, 
great iron tanks full of delicately adjusted and compli- 
cated machinery, such an exploit as this is as notable as 
a victory. What men-of-war have gained in destructive 
efficiency and in invulnerability to an enemy's shot, they 



i6o Blue Jackets of '98 

have lost in what may be colloquially called staying 
capacity at sea. The days when a ship could put out for j 
a three years' cruise, often being out of port for many 
months, are ended forever, A battle-ship's ability to keep ; 
the sea is limited above all things by her coal capacity,] 
so that visits to port at least once in three weeks are] 
essential. But more than this, it is very unusual for a. 
modern warship to be able to make a cruise at all pro- 
tracted, even under easy steam, without disarranging herj 
machinery to a degree that makes a visit to some navy- 
yard a necessity. The United States navy has recognised ! 
this fact, and has sought to counteract it by building a j 
floating machine-shop, the " Vulcan," which carries all j 
possible appliances for making repairs at sea, so that a' 
blockade or a cruise need not be interrupted. 

The voyage of the " Oregon " was, therefore, an excep- 
tional exploit, an achievement that reflected upon its' 
builders and on the engineering staff which had charge 
of her machinery the credit that in a hot battle falls to] 
the share of the line officers. She was built at the Union 
Iron Works of San Francisco, a ship-yard which has 
turned out several vessels of the new navy. Her chief] 
engineer was Eobert W. Milligan. No doubt the exploit! 
of carrying the " Oregon " a distance equivalent to half! 
the distance around the earth at the equator had much to! 
do with the passage by Congress, in March of 1898, of a] 
long contested measure by which the engineering force] 
of the navy was given just equivalent rank with the line,] 
and equal opportunities for promotion. It is no deroga-j 
tion to the man behind the gun, whose praises have been] 
widely sung, to say that the man who guards the valves] 
and bearings deep in the bowels of the ship, not knowing] 
how the battle is going above, and without hope of escape] 
in case of disaster, is an equally important and equally] 
admirable figure in modern naval warfare. 

All suspense being now over, the little sijuadron went 
gaily on, and the next morning found Schley's fleet clus- 



Blue Jackets of '98 161 

tered about the mouth of Santiago harbour. The admiral 
at once took command of the entire fleet, and the Flying 
Squadron, as an independent command, went out of 
existence. Commodore Schley reported that on the 28th 
he had taken his whole squadron far enough into the 
harbour to discover the entire fleet of Cervera lying at 
anchor, with the great " Colon," like a huge mastiif, lying 
farthest to fore and guarding the entrance. Two days later 
the Americans opened fire on the harbour defences, but 
at such long range that no material effect was produced. 
With this, active efforts against the enemy ended until 
Admiral Sampson arrived. It was June first that the 
admiral appeared, and the American fleet settled down 
to watch the mouth of that narrow harbour as a cat 
watches a hole whence a mouse is expected to pop out 
at any moment. Eanged about, ready to pounce upon 
their prey, were these ships of the United States navy : 
Battleships : " Massachusetts," " Texas," " Oregon," " Iowa." 
Armoured cruisers : " New York," " Brooklyn." Cruisers : 
" New Orleans," " Marblehead." Auxiliaries : " Gloucester," 
" Vixen," " Mayflower," " Harvard." Gunboat : " Castine." 
Torpedo boat : " Porter." 



11 



CHAPTER VITI 

Santiago de Cuba — The Plan to bottle up Cervera — 
The Volunteers — Preparations for the Sacrifice — 
The Stations of the Men — Under Fire — The Steer- 
ing Gear Disabled — The Torpedoes Shot away — 
Sinking of the " Merrimac " — Surrender of Hobson and 
his Men — Admiral Cervera's Courtesy — In Morro 
Castle — The Bombardment. 



THE town of Santiago de Cuba is the second in size 
of the Cuban towns, having a few more than 70,000 
people. It is an historic spot, outdating any settlement on 
the continent, for it was founded in 1514, while that 
great mainland of North America whence now came 
swarming these ships and sailors for Santiago's overthrow 
was still a wilderness, inhabited only by the warring red 
men. Before the war it was a thriving place, the centre 
of the mining industry of Cuba and the place of invest- 
ment of considerable American capital. Its harbour is 
of the characteristic Cuban type. A narrow channel 
gives entrance to a bay six miles long and about two 
broad. At the harbour's mouth steep hills come down 
to the water's edge on either side. One is crested with 
Morro Castle, a picturesque, venerable, and wholly obso- 
lete fortress of masonry. On the other side were some 
earthworks at the entrance, and the Estrella and Cata- 
lina batteries farther in. How efficiently these batteries 
were armed and manned could not be told from the fleet, 
but Commodore Schley's reconnoissance had discovered 
the presence of modern rifles, while the narrowness of 
the channel and the elevation of the batteries made any 
effort to run in apparently very hazardous. 

In a general way the topography of Santiago Bay was 
familiar to Admiral Sampson before he left Key West. 



Blue Jackets of '98 163 

At that time his presumption was that the American 
objective, that is, point of main attack, in Cuba would be 
Havana, and he desired to have all the American battle- 
ships and armoured cruisers off that city to aid in the 
assault upon it. Accordingly, his one study was to dis- 
cover some method of freeing the fleet from the duty 
of blockading Cervera, for he did not believe that the 
Spaniards would come out and offer battle while a supe- 
rior force lay off the bay. For the Americans to dash in 
after the fashion of Dewey does not seem to have been 
considered. The force within was vastly greater than 
that Dewey had to encounter, the harbour was more 
difficult and better defended. It occurred to the admiral 
that a ship might be sunk in the channel in such a way 
as to bar all egress, and that with the enemy thus bottled 
up most of the vessels of the blockading squadron could 
be spared to join in any movement against Havana. This 
project was broached to a young officer. Lieutenant 
Hobson, before leaving Key West. 

Lieutenant Hobson was known at this time in the navy 
as a hard student and a man of scientific tastes and 
attainments. He had graduated at the head of his class 
in the naval academy, and after two years' service as mid- 
shipman on the cruiser " Chicago," was sent to Europe to 
study methods of planning and constructing warships. 
When the war broke out he was an assistant naval con- 
structor, with the rank of lieutenant, and was ordered to 
the " New York " to study and report on the character- 
istics of the various ships of the North Atlantic squadron 
and the class of service for which each was best fitted. 
Because of his technical attainments Hobson was desired 
by the admiral to prepare a plan for sinking the collier 
" Merrimac " in the channel. The plan once adopted, the 
young officer eagerly asked the assignment to carry it out. 
At first the admiral hesitated. The captain of the 
" Merrimac " had a presumptive right to command his 
vessel in any service to which he was assigned, and 



164 Blue Jackets of '98 

Captain Miller strenuously insisted on this right, but in 
the end the admiral concluded that Hobson, as the origi- 
nator and author of the plan, would necessarily go to see 
to its accomplishment, and that Captain Miller would be 
in effect a supernumerary. As the enterprise was extra- 
hazardous, permission for the captain to go was refused. 

The plan was simple enough ; the execution of it simply 
implied that nine men could be found willing to take a 
ship into point-blank range of the Spanish batteries and 
over the Spanish mines, anchor her deliberately across the 
channel, explode torpedoes under her hull, and escape by 
means of a small boat through the Spanish zone of fire 
and past the enemy's picket-boats. It was easy to find 
the nine men, for there were more than 3000 in the 
squadron, and upon call, all volunteered. Officers and 
men pressed about Hobson when the news of the adven- 
ture became general, and begged to be chosen. In the end 
these seven were chosen : Eandolph Clausen, Osborn War- 
ren Deignan, Daniel Montague, Francis Kelly, George 
Charette, George F. Phillips, and Mullen. 

The ship was hurriedly prepared for the sacrifice, by 
being stripped of everything valuable. Torpedoes were 
fastened to the starboard side and connected with electric 
wires to the deck. The plan was to enter the channel at 
full speed, and at a concerted signal the men in the engine 
room, Phillips and Kelly, were to shut off the engines, 
open the water connections, and lay up on deck. At a 
prearranged point in the channel the ship was to be laid 
athwart the channel and the heavy anchor at the bow let 
go. Elaborate arrangements were made to bring the strain 
on this gradually. At the moment it was to be let fall, 
the ship would be moving at an estimated speed of six 
knots an hour, and the momentum of so heavy a mass of 
iron moving through the water would cause the anchor to 
drag, even if the chain did not part. Accordingly a series 
of hemp stops, or short ropes, were attached to the chain 
at different points and then to cleats on the ship, so that 



^ ^mm^WSi 



liHMfe;% lIB t pWKtl i 




RESPONSE TO THE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS TO' ACCOMPANY HOHSON 



ON THE "mERRIMAC." 



Blue Jackets of '98 165 

before the full strain fell on the chain it would come upon 
them one by one. They would resist briefly, then snap, 
and after the last stop had given way an eight-inch cable 
would take up the burden, holding it until it in turn parted. 
By this time it was thought the ship's speed would be so 
much reduced by these successive checks that the chain 
cable might be expected to hold. While the vessel was 
slowly swinging across the channel, the men were to touch 
off the torpedoes, each man being given an end of an electric 
wire for that purpose. When she was seen to be sinking, 
all were to leap overboard and clamber into a boat towing 
at the stern. They were then to make for the shadow of 
the shore under Morro Castle, where a launch under com- 
mand of Ensign Powell was to be prepared to pick them 
up. It was a desperate undertaking, but one such as at 
all times in the history of the American navy our Blue 
Jackets have been eager to engage in. The rivalry of 
ofhcers and men for a share m this exploit was so lively 
that the admiral and Hobson were subjected to much 
embarrassment by the pressure for place. Admiral Samp- 
son, with whom the plan originated, was more hopeful of 
its execution without loss of life than were most of the 
officers on the fleet. To a correspondent who asked if it 
was not sending men to certain death, he responded : " Well, 
I don't know. You see it will be pretty hard to hit eight 
men on a big ship like that." As for the men, they did 
not seem to consider whether there was a chance of escape 
or not. All they wanted was a chance to join in the ■ 
attempt. The night before the harbour was entered, the 
volunteers were summoned to the admiral's cabin for final 
muster. In a few words the admiral expressed his sense 
of their bravery and devotion in undertaking so perilous 
an adventure, but he had hardly stopped speaking when 
the spokesman of the men answered : " And we want to 
thank you, sir, for giving us the privilege of going when 
so many good men volunteered." 

On the morning of the 2d of June the ship was ready 



1 66 Blue Jackets of '98 

for the sacrifice and was under way, just about to make the 
turn into the harbour, when a torpedo boat came flying 
from the flagship with instructions to return to the fleet. 
The disappointment was a bitter one, for until the admiral 
could be seen Hobson could not tell whether the whole 
plan might not have been abandoned. To add to the sus- 
pense, the "New York" went flying off at daybreak in 
pursuit of a suspicious vessel seen in the offing, and did 
not return for some hours. On her return, eager inquiries 
were made of the admiral. The undertaking was to be 
postponed only, not abandoned. 

About midnight, as the moon was setting, the " Merrimac " 
was again under way. On the bridge were Hobson and 
Deignan, in the engine-room were Phillips and Kelly. 
Murphy was on the forecastle, with instructions to let go 
the anchor and instantly to fire torpedo number one. A 
new man this Murphy, taking the place of Mullen, who 
had broken down with overwork and nervous strain. His 
was the post of the greatest danger on the ship — if there 
were one spot more dangerous than another where all stood 
in continual peril of their lives. Slipping the anchor, he 
would be in peril from the snapping stops, and the rushing 
cable. Touching off" torpedo number one, which would be 
immediately under his post, he would be in danger of being 
blown overboard or even of receiving a wound. All these 
things were explained to him, but he showed no trepida- 
tion. " It shall be done, sir," was his only response. All 
on deck were to lie on their faces near the rail. A halliard 
tied to the wrist of each and running to the bridge where 
Hobson stood was to be the means of making signals. 
Three decided pulls meant that the torpedoes were to be 
discharged. For the men below, the signal on the engine- 
room telegraph to stop served also as a signal to throw 
open the water-valves and come on deck. Uniforms were 
simple — underwear, cartridge belts, and revolvers. 

The last launch left the ship for the fleet, carrying in it 
Ensign Powell, who was to stand on and off the harbour's 



Blue Jackets of '98 167 

mouth looking for survivors after the deed was done. The 
moon was high and bright, and in its clear light the con- 
tour of the shore and the forts that were to be braved were 
clearly outlined. It was evident enough that the Spaniards 
would have no excuse for being surprised, as the great 
black ship, 400 feet long, was a conspicuous object on the 
silvery water. The range line that marked the entrance 
for the channel was reached. The ship swung round and 
pointed fair and straight down the watery lane it was to 
follow to its death. Charette ran down below to tell the 
two in the engine-room that the die was cast and to repeat 
their instructions by way of precaution. Straight down 
the appointed course sped the heavy collier. One thousand 
yards from Morro, and no shot yet. Hobson began to 
wonder at this ominous silence, which was more trying to 
the nerves than the clamour of great guns and small that 
he had expected. Five hundred yards. Ah, there goes the 
first shot ; but it came from the surface of the water, not 
from the forts, and was quickly followed by another and 
another. Nothing could be seen except the flash of the 
gun, but its position showed that it must be a rapid-fire gun 
on a small picket-boat. The artillerist seemed to be a poor 
marksman. No sound of striking shot was heard, though 
he was near enough to hull the ship at every discharge. 
His projectiles all seemed to pass astern. Suddenly Hobson 
solved the mystery. The Spaniard, with admirable judg- 
ment, knowing that the small calibre of his cannon would 
make no impression on the ship, was shooting at the ex- 
posed rudder and steering-gear. Success in hitting that 
target meant failure for Hobson. Now, however, began 
the roar and crash of great guns from the land batteries. 

" Steady, men, never mind the batteries." The men were 
steady. None moved, and the helmsman stood to his 
wheel as though rooted there. From both sides of the 
narrow strait came now the din of guns, the leaping jets 
of flame, and the singing shells. Machine guns and 
Mauser rifles swept the decks. The hull of the ship 



1 68 Blue Jackets of '98 

quivered under repeated blows. For that part, Hobson 
now cared little. He was near the point at which the 
" Merrimac " was to be scuttled, and every hole below or near 
the water-mark made his task easier. Something struck 
the bridge and carried part of it away ; but the engine tele- 
graph was still there, and through it the signal went to 
the two brave men down below — " Stop." 

Immediately the screw stopped turning and a shiver 
through the ship told that the sea-connections were 
opened and the vessel was beginning to fill. 

" Lay down to the torpedoes," was the word now passed 
along, and the men crawled along the deck, each to his 
appointed station. Then came the discovery of a loss 
that made all this careful planning, all this heroism fruit- 
less. " Starboard " was the word to the wheelman. Deig- 
nan swung his wheel obediently, but the ship hung. 
"Starboard! I say, starboard ! " "The "helm's a-starboard, 
sir." The slow response of the " Merrimac " to the helm 
was suspicious. Now came the moment to swing into the 
final position. " Hard a-port," cried Hobson. The answer 
came calmly, " Hard a-port, sir." The ship made no re- 
sponse. " Hard a-port, I say ! " A little excitement now 
in the lieutenant's tone, as surely was excusable. The 
well-trained man-of-war's man answered in conventional 
phrase, " The helm is hard a-port, sir, and lashed." He 
knew what was the trouble, but he volunteered no re- 
mark. Hobson was quick to grasp the situation. The 
steering gear had been shot away, — afterwards the Spanish 
lieutenant who commanded the guard boat at the entrance 
to the harbour claimed credit for this, — and at the critical 
moment the " Merrimac " was unmanageable. 

The one chance now was that tlie ship's headway and 
the tide might be used to swing the vessel into position 
in connection with the anchors. It was desirable, above all 
things, to get the bow grounded first ; that done, there was 
still hope of swinging athwart the channel. All men were 
now at their posts, Hobson alone on the bridge, Deignan 



Blue Jackets of '98 169 

having left the useless wheel for his torpedo. Murphy on 
the forecastle felt a warning pull on his line, then three 
steady pulls, and seizing his axe he cut the cable, and the 
bow anchor fell with a crash. Turning swiftly, he picked 
up two electric wires. Their ends were brought into con- 
tract, the spark flashed down to the torpedo, and with a 
crash the bow torpedo exploded. All was going well. 

Now for the rest of the torpedoes. Three pulls on the 
ropes for two and three. No answer. The signal was 
repeated without success. Crossing the bridge, the lieu- 
tenant shouted at the top of his voice, " Fire aU torpedoes," 
but the infernal din of the cannonnade and the bursting 
shells drowned his cry. In a moment, Charette came run- 
ning through the storm. " Torpedoes 2 and 3 will not 
fire, sir ; a shot struck the firing battery and the cells are 
scattered all over the deck." Then off went Number 5, 
followed in a few moments by the report that 4, 6, and 7 
were destroyed by the enemy's fire. The situation was 
thus desperate. Slow sinking and no steering gear made 
the project of controlling the vessel's position almost hope- 
less. Perhaps careful management of the stern anchor 
might help to gain the day. Hobson left the bridge, and 
went to the deck, determined to superintend in person this 
last manoeuvre. As he reached the rendezvous amidships 
where the men were to gather after the duty assigned to 
each should have been done, he found all there. Then the 
stern anchor had already been let fall and nothing remained 
but to trust to chance. The lieutenant was somewhat 
chagrined ; but presumed Montague, the sailor in charge 
of the anchor, had f<jllowed instruction. Long after he 
learned that a shell from the batteries had burst just 
above Montague's head and, sparing him, had cut the 
lashings and let the anchor fall. 

Huddled together under the bulwarks, with the shells 
whizzing and bursting above them, the men now waited for 
the ship to settle to her last berth. Dense smoke hung over 
all the deck, and the clamour of the shells made conversa- 



170 Blue Jackets of 'gS 

tion in any ordinary tone of voice impossible. Suddenly 
out of the mirk appeared a strange figure creeping on all 
fours toward the rendezvous. " An enemy," was Hobson's 
first thought, and drawing a revolver he covered the ad- 
vancing man. From the belt of Charette too flashed a 
pistol. Luckily neither man fired, for as the crawling form 
came closer it was made out to be that of Kelly, who had 
been stunned and thrown violently against the mainmast 
by a shell that broke immediately above him. Curiously 
enough, the shock destroyed his memory, and recollecting 
only that he belonged in the engine-room, he started 
down the hatch, being recalled to his senses by the sight 
of water pouring in below in a heavy stream. 

All this time the ship was settling but slowly, and as 
it lay beneath the Estrella batteries at point-blank range, 
it seemed that nothing but a miracle was saving the little 
crew from death. The Spaniards had, of course, no knowl- 
edge of the helplessness of the craft they were firing 
upon, and they wasted enough ammunition on the riddled 
" Merrimac " to sink a battleship. At last a torpedo went 
off with a stunning shock, and the ship began to settle 
more rapidly, though even then to Hobson's impatience 
it seemed super naturally buoyant. It is curious, as one 
reads the story of this adventure, to contrast the slowness 
with which the " Merrimac " sank, despite the efforts of 
friends on board and foes ashore, with the suddenness 
with which some great Atlantic liner, like the " Bour- 
gogne" in 1898 for example, goes to the bottom despite 
every effort made to keep her afloat. 

There remained nothing to be done except to consider 
the possibilities of escape. Some of the men suggested 
leaping overboard at once and attempting to get away by 
swimming, but the commander pointed out that the 
moon was near setting, and that with it down escape 
would be easier in the darkness ; so all lay still on the 
gradually falling deck, the vessel trembling under the 
repeated strokes of missiles that found their mark. It 



Blue Jackets of '98 171 

is inexplicable that none were hit, for from Mauser rifles 
to six-inch cannon, every variety of shore and naval gun 
was levelled on the ship, and torpedoes were fired from 
the " Pluton " and the " Keina Mercedes." At last came 
a significant lurch. " She will turn over on us," cried one 
of the men. 

" No," answered Hobson ; " she will right herself in 
sinking, and this will be the last spot to go under." So it 
proved. Bending down her bow like some great animal 
lowering its head in token of defeat, the " Merrimac " sank, 
lifting her stern high in air. But let Lieutenant Hobson 
himself tell the story of that supreme moment : 

" A great rush of water came up the gangway, seething and 
gurghng out of the deck. The mass was whirHng from right 
to left ' against the sun ; ' it seized us and threw us against 
the bulwarks, then over the rail. Two were swept forward as 
if by a momentary recession, and one was carried down into a 
coal-bunker, — luckless Kelly. In a moment, however, with 
increased force, the water shot him up out of the same hole 
and swept him among us. The bulwarks disappeared. A 
sweeping vortex whirled above. We charged about with 
casks, cans, and spars, the incomplete stripping having left 
quantities on the deck. The life-preservers stood us in good 
stead, preventing chests from being crushed, as well as buoy- 
ing us on the surface; for spars came end on like battering- 
rams, and the sharp corners of tin cans struck us heavily. 

" The experience of being swept over the side was rather 
odd. The water lifted and threw me against the bulwarks, the 
rail striking my waist ; the upper part of the body was bent 
out, the lower part and the legs being driven heavily against 
what seemed to be the plating underneath, which, singularly 
enough, appeared to open. A foot-ball instinct came promptly, 
and I drew up my knees ; but it seemed too late, and apparently 
they were being driven through the steel plate, a phenomenon 
that struck me as being most singular ; yet there it was, and I 
wondered what the sensation would be like in having the legs 
carried out on one side of the rail, and the body on the other, 
concluding that some embarrassment must be expected in 



172 Blue Jackets of '98 

swimming without legs. The situation was apparently relieved 
by the rail going down. Afterward Charette asked: 'Did 
those oil-cans that were left just forward of us trouble you also 
as we were swept out 1 ' Perhaps cans, and not steel plates, 
separated before my knee-caps. 

" When we looked for the life-boat we found that it had been 
carried away. The catamaran was the largest piece of floating 
debris ; we assembled about it. The line suspending it from 
the cargo boom held and anchored us to the ship, though 
barely long enough to reach the surface, causing the raft to turn 
over and set us scrambling as the line came taut. 

" The firing had ceased. It was evident the enemy had not 
seen us in the general mass of moving objects; but soon the 
tide began to set these away, and we were being left alone with 
the catamaran. The men were directed to cling close in, bodies 
below and only heads out, close under the edges, and were 
directed not to speak above a whisper, for the destroyer was 
near at hand, and pulling boats passed near. We mustered; 
all were present, and direction was given to remain as we were 
till further orders, for I was sure that in due time after day- 
light a responsible officer would come out to reconnoitre. It 
was evident that we could not swim against the tide to reach 
the entrance. Moreover, the shores were lined with troops, 
and the small boats were looking for victims that might escape 
from the vessel. The only chance lay in remaining undis- 
covered until the coming of the reconnoitring boat, to which, 
perhaps, we might surrender without being fired on. 

" The moon was now low. The shadow of Socapa fell 
over us, and soon it was dark. The sunken vessel was bub- 
bling up its last lingering breath. The boats looking for 
refugees pulled closer, peering with lanterns, and again the 
discipline of tlie men was put to severe test, for time and 
again it seemed that the boats would come up, and the impulse 
to swim away was strong. A suggestion was made to cut tlie 
line and let the catamaran drift away. This was also emphati- 
cally forbidden, for Ave should thus miss the reconnoitring 
boat and certainly fall into less responsible hands. Here, as 
before, the men strictly obeyed orders, though the impulse for 
safety was strong to the contrary, and sauve qui peut would 
have been justifiable, if it is ever justifiable. 



Blue Jackets of '98 173 

" The air was chilly and the water positively cold. In less 
than five minutes our teeth were chattering; so loud, indeed, 
did they chatter that it seemed the destroyer or the boats 
would hear. It was in marked contrast with the parched lips 
of a few minutes before. In spite of their efforts, two of the 
men soon began to cough, and it seemed that we should surely 
be discovered. 1 worked my legs and body under the raft for 
exercise, but, in spite of all, the shivers would come and the 
teeth would chatter." 

At daybreak the bugles sung from the Spanish forts, 
and soon the chilled and famished men clinging to the 
raft heard the sound of a steam launch coming toward 
the wreck. They were invisible from the launch, for by- 
orders they kept their heads below the rail, and were on 
the further side of the catamaran. Wlien the launch 
came near, Hobson hailed in a strong voice. 

" Is there an officer on that launch ? " he cried. After a 
moment of surprised silence the answer came in the 
affirmative. 

" An American officer wishes to surrender himself and 
his men," continued Hobson. At this a file of marines 
appeared on the bow of the launch with rifles as though 
about to fire, and all that had been said and written of 
Spanish cruelty flashed through Hobson's mind. But he 
was in the hands of a gallant and chivalric enemy. A quiet 
order was spoken in the launch, the riflemen disappeared, 
and soon the drenched Americans were being helped 
aboard, while in the midst of the Spanish conversation 
that went on among the captors, the prisoners could dis- 
tinguish now and again the word" valiente," and it needed 
no knowledge of foreign tongues to enable them to guess 
what that meant. 

The officer on board the launch proved to be Admiral 
Cervera himself. Without entering into conversation with 
the prisoners he directed that they should be put aboard 
the " Reina Eegente," where he left them. Here all were 
treated with that lack of personal animosity with which 



174 Blue Jackets of '98 

navy ofificers of all lands usually regard a foe. For Hob- 
son the executive officer laid out a full uniform, stimulants 
were offered to officer and men, and a good breakfast served. 
While Hobson ate, all the officers joined in the general 
conversation, all the details of his exploit being admiringly 
discussed. It is interesting to know that at this informal 
gathering, before a single battle had been fought, the 
Spanish officers expressed the conviction that Cuba was 
already lost and that Spain was fighting for honour only. 

Presently Hobson sent to Admiral Cervera the request 
that he might be allowed to send to Admiral Sampson a 
formal report, a copy of which he enclosed for the Spanish 
admiral's perusal. This request was naturally declined, 
but Cervera with generous courtesy sent off a flag of truce 
to the fleet with news of the safety of the captives. This 
was happy tidings to the men on the American ships, for 
Ensign Powell, after having gallantly braved the Spanish 
fire in his little launch through the whole night and until 
day-breaking made him an easy target for the gunners on 
shore, had returned to the flagship with the mournful 
tidings that not a man had appeared. Perhaps in later 
days, when Admiral Cervera was himself a prisoner to the 
American navy, remembrance of this kindly deed had 
much to do with the general sympathy and good feeling 
manifested for him by the whole American people. Lieu- 
tenant Hobson himself bears testimony to the uniform 
consideration shown him by the Spaniards. " There can 
be no question," he writes, " that the Spanish character is 
deeply sensible to a genuine sentiment. The history of 
warfare probably contains no instance of chivalry on the 
part of captors greater than that of those who fired on the 
" Merrimac," and I knew that harshness of treatment could 
have had its origin only in official consideration." And yet, 
as we contrast the treatment of these prisoners of war who 
had behind them the power of a great nation in arms with 
that meted out to wretched Cubans, non-combatants as 
well as soldiers, and with the cowardly execution of the 



Blue Jackets of '98 ^75 

crew of the " Virginius," we cannot ascribe the courtesy 
shown Hobson to Spanish character altogether. Eather it 
seems that Admiral Cervera was a man of chivalric in- 
stincts who had inspired his officers with like sentiments. 
In part, too, it must be ascribed to that greater mildness 
of personal temper always notable in the naval service, to 
which I have already referred. It would seem that the 
cosmopohtan training of the men who follow the sea 
teaches them all men are about of a kind whatever their 
nationality, and that a brave and honourable man is to be 
honoured and well treated whatever his flag or his condition. 
It is very noticeable that as soon as the American prisoners 
were transferred to the charge of the army their dis- 
comforts began. 

Immured in a cell of Morro Castle, whither they were 
taken from the " Reina Mercedes," the prisoners awaited 
a doubtful future. In the main they were treated well 
enough, though the Spanish sentries jeered the sailors with 
gestures suggestive of violent death. The Blue Jackets 
were not in any degree disturbed, however. " We would 
do it all over again to-morrow, sir," said Charette to Hobson 
when he met the latter in his cell one morning. From his 
window the lieutenant could look down into the channel 
where the " Merrimac " lay, and the sight was one of 
bitter disappointment, for instead of blocking the channel 
she had swung lengthwise in it and the gallant exploit was 
fruitless. From the Spanish officers who paid visits of 
ceremony he learned many curious incidents of the night. 
Many Spaniards had been wounded and a few killed, of 
course by their own guns firing across the strait, for the 
" Merrimac " carried not a single cannon. As a comple- 
ment to this illuminating episode in Spanish warfare, may 
be mentioned the fact that an American patrol boat picked 
up one of the torpedoes that had been fired at the " Mer- 
rimac," and discovered that the warhead, or explosive 
charge, had not been placed in it, and it was as harmless 
as a wooden projectile. The Spaniards on their part were 



176 Blue Jackets of '98 

very curious about American methods, and were par- 
ticularly puzzled by the number of foreign-born citizens in 
our navy. That by the alchemy of the Republic Swedes, 
Irishmen, Frenchmen, and Germans could be made into 
American citizens and fight valiantly and well for their 
adopted country, was to the Spaniards inexplicable. 

In Morro Castle Hobson had to undergo the bombard- 
ment which after some days was taken up by the fleet. 
The shells roared and crashed about the decrepit old fort, 
and brought down great masses of masonry amid blinding 
clouds of dust. Though the location of his cell was known 
to the fleet, and every effort was made to avoid striking it, 
many of the shells struck too near for comfort, and a great 
gash in the wall within two feet of the window tells to- 
day the story of his peril. Neither the lieutenant nor 
any of his companions suffered, however, and they re- 
mained snugly caged until the coming of the army in June 
led to their exchange. Of that more in due course. For 
the present we may leave the gallant eight closing in 
Spanish cells an exploit of which Commodore Schley 
said: 

' ' History does not record an act of finer heroism than that 
of the gallant men who are prisoners over there," pointing to 
Morro. " I watched the ' Merrimac ' as she made her way to 
the entrance of the harbour, and my heart sank as I saw the 
perfect hell of fire that fell on the devoted men. I did not 
think it was possible one of them could have gone through it 
alive. They went into the jaws of death. It was Balaclava 
over again without the means of defence which the Light 
Brigade had. Hobson led a forlorn hope without the power 
to cut his way out. But fortune once more favoured the brave, 
and I hope he will have the recognition and promotion he 
deserves. His name will live as long as the heroes of the 
world are remembered." 



CHAPTER IX 

The Army in the War — Prejudice against a Standing 
Army — Regulars and Militiamen — Character of the 
United States Soldier — The Calls for Volunteers — 
The Rough Riders — The " Sons of Somebody " — Mobili- 
sation of the Troops — The Fifth Corps at Tampa — 
The "Gussie" Expedition— Preparing for the Invasion 
OF Cuba — The Delays and the Start — Arrival at 
Santiago — Conference of Shafter, Sampson, and 
Garcia — The Landing. 

FROM the very earliest days of the Republic it has 
been the pride of its people that no great standing 
army has been necessary for the maintenance of its author- 
ity at home or its influence abroad. A determination to 
shun anything like militarism was impressed upon the 
people by Washington and Jefferson, and given renewed 
emphasis by observation of the lamentable results which 
the creation and maintenance of enormous armies have 
entailed upon the peoples of Europe. It is not to be 
denied that this instinctive dread of an army would be a 
source of peril to the nation, if the temper of our people, 
the nature of our interests, and our geographical situation 
did not all combine to make foreign wars very rare in our 
history and very improbable for our future. Once only in 
our national existence have we been embroiled with a foe- 
man at all our equal in resources, — in 1812 with Great 
Britain. The war with Mexico was a foregone conclusion, 
and that with Spain hardly less so, although the latter 
power was vastly our superior in the strength of its army. 
It had indeed in Cuba alone, when war broke out, a greater 
military force than our entire regular army, and it had 

12 



178 Blue Jackets of '98 

lost in Cuba during the time of the then existing revolu- 
tion an army four times the size of ours. For years all 
the military needs of this nation had been amply met by a 
regular army of about 28,000 men. The gradual disap- 
pearance and progressive civilisation of the Indians made 
the need for soldiery less apparent year by year, and an 
increasing tendency to employ the United States forces to 
preserve order in cases of strikes and other labour troubles 
alarmed thinking people, and stimulated political dema- 
gogues. It is probable that the sentiment, essentially a 
healthy one, against a great standing army was never 
more forceful in the United States than on the eve of the 
war with Spain. 

But the army we had, if small, was admirable. Its 
officers were as fine a body of educated soldiers as the 
world contained. Graduates, in the main, of the military 
academy at West Point, they had enjoyed a technical 
education such as no military nation of Europe can 
outdo for its young soldiers. A considerable number of 
the older officers had served through the desperate 
campaigns of the war between the States, and brought the 
experience of veterans to the guidance of their juniors, 
while still more had profited by service in Indian wars, 
which peculiarly fitted them for the bushwhacking 
tactics that might be expected in Cuba. The rank and 
file of the army fell in no degree short of the officers in 
fitness. The small size of the army and the relatively 
high pay have made it possible for the United States to 
pick and choose its soldiers to a degree unknown in 
England, where military service, as here, is voluntary. 
Man for man, no armed force of Europe could outdo ours 
in technical skill or discipline, and throughout the war 
the foreign attaches who followed our campaigns joined 
in encomiums upon the hard-marching, hard-fighting, 
uncomplaining American regular. 

About this little nucleus of profe=pional soldiers was to 
be built and moulded into military form and efficiency 



Blue Jackets of '98 179 

the volunteer army. For this the foundation was the 
organised militia of the States, numbering some 410,000. 
Militia regiments, by the terms of their organisation, are 
subject only to service when called upon by the governor 
of the State, commissioning them. To become a part of 
the army of the United States, they must volunteer 
in response to the summons of the President. Out of 
this situation there proceeded some confusion and not a 
little scandal in the opening days of the Spanish war. 
There was great disparity in efficiency between the 
militia organisations of different States and of different 
localities in the same States. In some of the poorer 
communities of the South and West the local militia was 
only partly uniformed and not all armed, while in some 
of the large and rich cities of the North, where dread of 
riot had made wealthy citizens liberal to the local regi- 
ments, the equipment was not only eff'ective but ornamen- 
tal. Fate brings its compensations, however. It was not 
from the action of any half-clad company of a backwoods 
cross-roads that the sign of unwillingness to serve the 
country at the front in war-time came, but from the rich- 
est regiment in the richest city of the Union. 

On the 23d of April, following swift upon the signing 
of the warlike resolutions of Congress, the President issued 
his proclamation calling for 125,000 volunteers. These 
were to be taken from the States and Territories in pro- 
portion to the population of each ; and although nothing 
in the proclamation or the law limited volunteers to the 
existing national guard or militia organisations, yet in 
practice this first body of soldiers was made up of men 
already enlisted in the militia. One month later a second 
call for 75,000 men was issued, and at this time room was 
found for specially organised regiments, distinct from the 
National Guard. By special authority of Congress the 
army was further increased by the enlistment of ten 
regiments of " immunes," or men, usually negroes, not 
liable to contract yellow fever; three special regiments 



i8o Blue Jackets of '98 

of cavalry, to be recruited among the cowboys and 
pioneers of the far West ; and a special engineering com- 
mand of 3550 men. The maximum strength of the regular 
army was also raised by congressional authority. The 
creation of this great body of volunteers gave opportunity 
for many striking displays of patriotism. As in fitting 
out the navy with auxiliary craft several private indi- 
viduals made free gifts of their large and costly steam 
yachts to the nation, so the army for the liberation of 
Cuba was made the beneficiary of many generous donors. 
Mr. John Jacob Astor was the most conspicuous of these, 
for he armed and organised a magnificent field battery 
and gave its services to the nation. No touch of self- 
seeking was in this gift, for he did not even ask the com- 
mand of the battery, but later accepted a staff appointment. 
Men of wealth and prominence enlisted in subordinate 
offices or even in the ranks. Mr. William J. Bryan, a 
recently defeated Democratic candidate for the Presidency, 
raised a company in his native town of Lincoln, Nebraska, 
and was elected the colonel of the Third Nebraska Hem- 
ment. The President, in appointing general officers for 
the army, took pains to select a few representatives of the 
Confederate veterans in the South. FitzHugh Lee was 
one of these, though his service as consul-general at 
Havana in the troublous days just preceding the war 
gave sufficient reason for his appointment to a major- 
generalship. General Joseph A. Wheeler, a veteran 
cavalryman of the Confederacy and a Democratic member 
of Congress, was also appointed major-general and put in 
command of a division of cavalry. The courage, physical 
endurance, and continued pertinacity of General Wheeler 
in the face of his apparent frailty — he weighed but ninety 
pounds — and his advanced years, for he had almost 
attained the Psalmist's limit of threescore years and ten, 
made him a popular hero. It was inevitable, perhaps, 
that with the vast number of military places to be filled 
and the pressure brought for appointment by politicians 




(IKNKkAl, .IoSI':i'H WHKELER. 



Blue Jackets of '98 181 

and other men of influence, there should have been grave 
errors of judgment committed. In providing for the 
necessary personnel for the commissary and quarter- 
master's departments, most unfortunate appointments were 
made. Day after day the newspapers recorded the 
appointment to offices, with the rank of major or higher, 
of young men without experience or capacity, who were 
the relatives of senators, cabinet officers, or other men in 
official station. The scandal of " The Sons of Somebody," 
as the newspaper phrase ran, grew with each day's 
reports. It became so notorious that an- ex-President 
of the United States whose son had received one of these 
appointments was constrained to say publicly that he had 
not asked the appointment, and, indeed, had urged his 
son not to take it. It is but just to say that the son 
became one of the most efficient officers of his army 
corps. 

A picturesque and, as the event proved, most service- 
able addition to the army was one of the special cavalry 
regiments organised at San Antonio, Texas, and soon 
known the land over as Roosevelt's Rough Riders. When 
the war began, Theodore Roosevelt, a New Yorker of 
means, an old-time ranchman, a keen hunter, a politician 
of no mean skill, and a nervous, restless, adventurous, and, 
above all, combative man of middle age, was Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy. He had sought this place expect- 
ing war with Spain, and had exerted himself to the utmost 
in preparing the navy for the conflict. As the time of 
active hostilities grew near, he looked eagerly about for 
some way in which to take the field; for to one of his 
temperament the routine of a bureau, however useful to 
the nation, would be intolerable when there was oppor- 
tunity to engage in real war. The act of Congress authoris- 
ing the enlistment of three regiments of cavalry opened 
the opportunity, and the colonelcy of a regiment forming at 
San Antonio, Texas, was presently given to an intimate 
friend of Mr. Roosevelt's, Dr. Wood, a regimental surgeon in 



1 82 Blue Jackets of '98 

the regular army. A most extraordinary military com- 
mand this soon became. Having a nucleus of cowboys and 
plainsmen, it was at once dubbed by the newspapers the 
" Eough Eiders," and began to gather recruits from the 
most diverse classes of society. Mr. Eoosevelt was him- 
self a picturesque character of many dissimilar interests, 
and former companions of his in very different walks of 
life flocked to his standard. He was a college-bred man, 
and into the ranks of the Eough Eiders came men who 
were still undergraduates, men famous on the athletic 
field or the football gridiron. He had lately been a police 
commissioner of New York, and members of the famous 
Broadway squad of giants volunteered to follow him to 
Cuba. The New York clubs gave some of their most 
gilded members, and young men went to San Antonio 
with their valets to become privates in the rough riding 
cavalry. From the West came men who had hunted the 
big game of the Eockies with Eoosevelt, or rode with him 
over his ranch in the Bad Lands. From the very first 
much was made of this regiment forming in the far South- 
west by the newspapers, and it had the advantage — for 
it is an advantage even to a fighting-machine — of wide 
advertising. A famous shooting sheriff of Arizona, and an 
actor well known in the theatres of the Northern cities ; 
several veteran Indian fighters and several Indians as 
well ; three former officers of the regular army ; four ex- 
clergymen of the Baptist and Methodist denominations ; a 
few professional gamblers ; an internal revenue agent from 
Tennessee, where gentlemen of his calling are at any time 
likely to be shot on sight, and a number of rich young 
men experienced in the pursuit of pleasure in many lands 
made up this extraordinary reginient. 

In the end the First United States Volunteer Cavalry 
proved to be something more than picturesque. Dis- 
mounted, with all their talent for rough riding unem- 
ployed, they fought the first fight in the invasion of Cuba, 
suffered bravely, and acquitted themselves well. Better 




Copyright, iS.)3, l>y C. (I. Kockwood. N. Y. 

HON. THKODOKK ROOSEVELT. 



Blue Jackets of '98 183 

armed than the majority of the volunteer regiments, and 
composed of men most of whom were inured to hardship 
and trained in the use of weapons, this command had 
most of the good qualities of a regiment of regulars. 
When it is remembered that many of the volunteers, even 
those who had been long in service in the national guard, 
had never fired a gun up to the time they were brought to 
the camps of concentration, it is easy to appreciate the 
immense value of a regiment of trained hunters and pistol- 
shooters such as this. It is worth noting, by the way, 
that though nominally a cavalry regiment, this command 
was never furnished with sabres, as it was thought the 
time employed in teaching the use of an unfamiliar arm 
would be wasted. It is not improbable that in future 
warfare this example will be widely followed. Colonel 
Mosby, the celebrated " rough rider " of the Confederacy, 
has left his opinion that the sabre is a handicap to the 
cavalryman when two or more pistols can be carried. 

The troops thus gathered from the great cities and from 
the farms, from workshops, counters, class-rooms, and fields, 
were gathered together as speedily as might be in great 
camps, for instruction, drill, and all the processes of mak- 
ing a soldier out of a raw recruit. These camps were 
scattered about the country, the largest beuig at Chicka- 
mauga, Tennessee, where some thirty-five years earlier the 
fathers of many of these men now going to fight shoulder 
to shoulder for the nation had met in deadly battle. But 
the most important of the great camps was at Tampa, a 
small settlement on the gulf coast of Florida, convenient 
to a harbour near the coast of Cuba. Here, by the end of 
May, were concentrated about 16,000 men, constituting 
the Fifth Corps, under command of Major-General Shafter. 
In the main this corps was composed of regulars, for it 
was intended for the first invasion of Cuba, and the most 
efficient troops were naturally selected for it. The great 
body of volunteers was scattered over the country at 



184 Blue Jackets of '98 

Chickamaiiga, Mobile, Fernandina, Jacksonville, Camp 
Black, on the wind-swept plains of Long Island, and 
other points of rendezvous, where officers of the regular 
army were diligently endeavouring to make the militiaman 
into a disciplined automaton. In all, before midsummer 
the army rose to a strength of 274,717 men, of whom 
58,688 were regulars. Up to the time of the cessation of 
hostilities in Cuba less than one-fifth of this army had 
seen active hostilities, and many regiments were mustered 
out without having left their camps of instruction. The 
actual fighting of the war, in the West Indies at least, was 
done mainly by the little regular army. 

The camp of the Fifth Corps at Tampa was unique in 
many respects among the military posts of history. The 
chief figure of the little town was a great winter-resort 
hotel, of those Brobdignagian proportions and that bar- 
baric splendour which characterise the resorts of Florida. 
Ordinarily it is closed at the season of the year correspond- 
ing to that which saw Tampa transformed suddenly into 
an armed camp, but in 1898 it was open in all its gor- 
geousness through the glaring summer days. Here con- 
gregated the vast array of begilded officers, the swarming 
correspondents, the observant foreign attaches, artists 
looking for material, sightseers and the vast army of 
womankind who flocked to the spot as soon as it appeared 
that the movement upon Cuba was not to be immediate. 
War was declared, and the guns of the navy were thunder- 
ing against the coast of Cuba; but at Tampa the cool 
drink on spacious porches, the dance in brightly lighted 
ballrooms to the strains of music from New York, and the 
quiet flirtation in shady walks were the most martial 
occupations of the officers. It was the " sound of revelry 
by night," like that which Byron describes as ushering in 
the battle of Waterloo. But in the midst of all the gaiety 
those whose duties were to prepare for the movement of 
the troops were busy, anxious, and alert. 

Indeed, General Shaf ter and his headquarters staff at 



Blue Jackets of '98 185 

Tampa had confronting them a problem which had never 
before been presented for solution in the army of the 
United States. For the first time in the history of the 
nation a foreign country was to be invaded in force. For 
the first time all the details of an expedition by sea had 
to be worked out with due regard to the possibility of 
interference by the enemy's navy, and the difficulties of 
subsisting in a hostile and already desolated lan.d. Dur- 
ing the war with Mexico a small military force was 
moved by sea against the enemy's coast, but neither then 
nor during the war with the Southern Confederacy was 
there any hostile navy to be reckoned with. And so, 
when the problem came to be solved in 1898, it was dis- 
covered that if all essential technical knowledge was at 
hand, which is by no means certain, the tools were surely 
lacking. Not in thirty years had a brigade of the United 
States army been moved in a body, and as for mobilising 
and transporting a whole army corps, that was a thing 
about which our officers might know from their researches 
in books, but only old fellows who had had general com- 
mand in the Civil War possessed any practical experience 
of it. The very earliest days of the war indicated what 
the later experience proved, that while the line of the 
army was efficient, while officers and men were good 
marchers and good fighters, in the staff departments, in 
the bureaus of commissary and of transportation, we were 
wofully deficient. Nor was this situation materially 
improved, as the young and inexperienced men, owing 
their appointments to political favour, began to appear at 
the various camps, and take up the tasks of feeding, hous- 
ing, and transporting the soldiers. 

It is related of the great Von Moltke, that during the 
years of peace which preceded the Franco-Prussian War, 
he laboured incessantly, preparing plans for the mobilisa- 
tion of the Prussian army on any frontier that might be 
menaced. Plans of the most elaborate detail were drawn 
up and corrected day by day. The location of every 



i86 Blue Jackets of '98 

Prussian regiment was noted, the distance and route to 
the place of rendezvous, the amount of rations necessary 
on the way, the time it would take to reach the point of 
mobilisation, and all the myriad particulars of vast im- 
portance in the aggregate, but each in itself seemingly 
insignificant, were connoted, and all emergencies prepared 
for. The story goes, and it is true in substance if not in 
detail, that, war being declared at midnight, an aide was 
sent to Von Moltke's quarters to inform him of the fact. 
The general was in bed. He listened to the officer's 
tidings in silence. " Very well," said he tranquilly, when 
the situation was explained. " Look in the third pigeon- 
hole of the left-hand side of my desk," and therewith 
returned to his slumbers. This done, there were dis- 
covered in perfect form, and with the greatest amplitude 
of detail, the plans for mobilisation of the army on the 
French frontier, even to the orders to the various corps 
commanders, so that while Von Moltke slept the de- 
spatches went winging forth, and the troops began to move 
to the battle-ground. 

Nothing so systematic as this was perhaps possible in 
the United States, since detailed plans for the mobilisation 
of an army can hardly be prepared without knowledge of 
the size and disposition of the army, and our army was, 
in the main, created after the declaration of war was 
promulgated. Yet it is impossible to doubt that prudent 
forethought might have obviated many of the difficulties 
which arose at Tampa, and much of the resulting suffer- 
ing. The probability of war with Spain had been suffi- 
ciently great for a year before the actual event to justify 
the War Department, which is never overpressed with 
business, in preparing several alternative plans for the 
mobilisation of the array and the invasion of Cuba. In 
that event camps would not have been established in 
spots destitute of water and of shade, like Hempstead 
Plains, Long Island, nor in localities naturally unhealth- 
ful, like Chickamauga. And had the difficulty of embark- 



Blue Jackets of '98 187 

ing an expedition of 16,000 men been properly studied, it 
is not likely that the port chosen would have been one 
reached by only one line of single-track railroad, almost 
destitute of yard and shipping switching facilities, — a 
port where good drinking water was a marketable com- 
modity, and where the burning sun sapped men's vitality 
and quickly ruined supplies. The Secretary of War, Hon. 
Eussell A. Alger, himself said in June : " I do not be- 
lieve that there ever was a nation on earth that attempted 
to embark in a war of such magnitude, while so utterly 
unprovided with everything necessary for a campaign." 
The Secretary of War went on to extol his department 
and the army for the manner in which the initial dis- 
advantages had been met and overcome, and indeed 
notably good work was done in repairing the faults re- 
sulting from a notable failure to take precautions when 
time was plenty. We may note and condemn the obvious 
faults of the War Department without in any degree un- 
derestimating the worth of its many successes ; we may 
show the weakness of our army without forgetting the 
fact that, despite all weakness, it accomplished speedily 
and thoroughly the task set it. Criticism of the military 
methods of the United States in 1898 does not imply a 
quarrel with success, but rather an indication of the 
lessons that may be learned from the conduct of this war 
for the good of the nation should it ever unfortunately be 
forced into another. 

While the soldiers of the United States by the tens of 
thousands were sweltering under the burning sun of 
southern Florida, clad in uniforms designed for service on 
the wind-swept plains of Dakota, the military authorities 
concluded to send arms and munitions of war to the Cuban 
insurgents, — a body of patriots of whom much was 
hoped, but from whom little was realised during the 
progress of the war. It is true that at this moment our 
own army was so badly equipped as to be the scoff and 



1 88 Blue Jackets of '98 

jest of the foreign attaches at Tampa. There were regi- 
ments without uniforms and without arms, regiments in 
which seventy-five per cent had never fired a gun, and one 
hundred per cent had never shot at an enemy. There were 
volunteers and regulars going into service side by side, 
armed with entirely different types of rifles, so that there 
could be no interchange of ammunition. The great body 
of volunteers were equipped with rifles that were use- 
less within easy range of the Spanish Mausers. All 
this was known of all men; but the Cubans were in 
still worse condition, so, turning from the phght of our 
own people, we undertook to supply the needs of our 
allies. 

For this purpose a steamer was obtained — the " Gussie," 
perhaps the most antiquated vessel then on the Gulf of 
Mexico. She was a side-wheeler, hence an easy target 
with all her vital machinery exposed. Her speed was 
such as to make a monitor seem swift in comparison. 
This craft, being freighted with several thousand rifles, 
fifty mules, a number of horses, a quantity of ammunition, 
and other things useful to a people at war, took on 100 
men of the First United States Infantry under command 
of Captain Dorst, and three members of the insurgent 
commission, who were to aid in opening communication 
with the Cubans. Then she set forth to seek a landing- 
place on the enemy's coast, but not before all the corre- 
spondents had learned of her mission, and telegraphed 
about it to their papers, whence it speedily reached Gen- 
eral Blanco via Madrid. As the ship made first for 
Havana, before disembarking her cargo, and there steamed 
about in full view of the observers on shore, it was but 
natural that the Spaniards thereafter kept a sharp watch 
on her movements. Up and down the coast her progress 
was signalised by the quick flashes of the heliographs on 
the hills, and much of the way bodies of cavalry attended 
her down the beach. It was therefore not extraordinary 
that when, on the 12th of May, she cast anchor near 




i z 



Blue Jackets of '98 189 

Mariel aud prepared to lower boats, a considerable force 
of Spaniards appeared on the beach ready to oppose any 
landing. The two auxiliaries which accompanied the 
" Gussie " cracked away with their one-pounders at the 
troops on shore until they took to flight, but the expedi- 
tion moved on to another spot near the entrance of the 
harbour of Cabanas before landing. Here again failure 
attended its effort, for the utter lack of secrecy that had 
characterised the methods of the expedition from the 
very start had put the Spaniards all along the coast on 
their guard. Mr. Zogbaum, the well-known artist, had 
accompanied the expedition as a correspondent for " Har- 
per's Weekly," and tells of the scene as witnessed from the 
deck of the ship thus picturesquely : 

" It is Avell on in the afternoon as we near the entrance to 
Cabanas Bay, and it is decided to attempt a landing on 
Arbolitos, the point on the western side. Sounding con- 
stantly, the big red hulk of our ship creeps closer and closer 
in towards the reef. With a roar of chain and upward splash 
of spray the anchor takes the ground, and we swing slowly 
abreast the beach — in sea parlance, ' close enough to sby a 
biscuit on shore.' The gunboat, with gentle, easy dip and 
roll, lies just off our quarter ; a little further out to sea the 
graceful lines of a diminutive cruiser, the United States gun- 
boat ' Wasp, ' show up in a gray mass on the unbroken surface 
of the sea. Of course the ' Gussie ' is short-handed, — who ever 
knew of a hired transport that was n't ? — and it takes some 
time to lower the boats. Amid some confusion, for there 
seems to be no one aboard experienced in such matters to direct 
their movements, two of the boats are filled and manned by the 
soldiers, the boat first ' shoved off ' moving up the reef, as if 
seeking an opening, the second pulling direct for the shore. 
As it nears the reef the swell begins to lift it, sending it in 
quick-succeeding leaps rapidly forward, until in a burst and 
smotlier of foam it plunges right into the surf, almost disap- 
pearing from view. For a moment we on the ship hold our 
breath in anxious expectation ; then, as we see one blue-clad 
form after the other boldly plunge overboard and rush through 



I go Blue Jackets of '98 

the water, stumbling, falling full length, picking themselves 
up again, in eager emulation to reach the land, while others 
grab the gunwales of the boat on either side, and shoving it 
along between them, carry it bodily up on the strand, an 
enthusiastic shout bursts out, as cheer on cheer goes up for the 
first American soldiers to set foot on Cuban soil. 

" Meanwhile the first boat seems to be hard and fast on the 
reef, teetering up and down in the swell like the 'Gussie's' 
walking-beam ; but the fine athletic fellows are out of her in a 
jiffy, and soon, strung out in long skirmish-line on the beach 
alongside their comrades, move forward into the bush. The 
Cubans are quickly landed, and the task of setting the horses 
ashore begins. . . . On the hurricane-deck of the ship, lined 
up under cover of the hay-bales, the men who form the cover- 
ing party have been watching the proceedings with anxious 
interest. Suddenly some way up the beach, right on the 
edge of the brush, we see something moving. Two or three 
blue figures emerge partly, and are running forward, arms at a ' 
trail ; one drops on knee ; with quick, jerky movement up goes " 
rifle to shoulder, and we see the flash of the discharge, ' By 
God, they 're attacked ! ' speaks a voice at my side, and 
simultaneously the air about us is filled with a whirring, 
humming sound, followed by a distant pattering noise, like; 
fire-crackers on Independence day. Zip! hum! buzz! the; 
angry bullets come flying, and a thin blue haze floats over thel 
brush just beyond where one of the boats has been hauled up; 
on the shore. * Tenshun ! ' The hardy figures behind the \ 
hay-bales become rigid. * With magazines, load ! ' A mo- 
mentary rattling and clicking of steel on steel. ' Aim just 
the right of the boat on the shore ! Steady ! Fire ! ' and like 
the discharge of a single piece the volley hits back at the] 
attacking enemy. Again and again, quietly and as on drill,! 
the men respond to the orders. The fire on shore rolls here 
and there, now falling, now rising again, slacking finally to 
few scattering shots, then dying away. The enemy's attact 
is repulsed, and he has retired, leaving behind him the bodie| 
of an officer and two soldiers, victims of the first encounte^ 
between American and Spanish soldiers on Cuban shoresJ 
But, victorious as are our men for the time being, tlieir posi-j 
tion on shore is exceedingly precarious. Our morning's worl 



Blue Jackets of '98 191 

has shown us that the country is swarming with Spanish 
soldiery. Cabanas is not far distant, the enemy knows our 
force, and it will not be long before he can confront us in 
overwhelming numbers. We must try to make the woods too 
hot to hold him, and so word is sent to our friends of the 
gunboats with request to shell and drive him away, while 
dispositions are made to re-embark. 

" It is a pretty sight to witness as the two gunboats move 
slowly broadside to the beach. Their fire sweeps the entire 
length of the jungle, and the boom of the guns, the whir of 
the projectiles, and the sharp burst of the shells as they 
plunge in among the trees mingle in one continuous roar, and 
are added to by the rumi)le of the storm over the land yonder. 
Time presses, the afternoon is waning, the tide is falling, and 
the roar of the surf strikes heavier and heavier on tlie ear. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Dorst, the officer in command of the ex- 
pedition — his boat upset on landing, casting him and all its 
occupants into the sea — stands with the Cubans by the trees 
where the horses are. ^ 

" Word had been brought off to the ship that our allies, 
alarmed by the presence of the enemy, hesitated to carry out 
the mission for which they had been put ashore ; but now we 
see them saddling the horses, and soon they mount and ride off 
up the shore, picturesque figures in their wide-brimmed hats 
and loose cotton garments. Our men have gone forward into 
the bush again, ready to repel the enemy should he renew the 
attack ; but now the bugle sounds the recall, and we see them 
emerging from the trees and gathering in squads on the beach. 
It is going to be more difficult to re-embark even than it was 
to land. The boats have to be shoved out to the reef, Avhere 
the water deepens abruptly, and the surf is angry and growing 
more violent every moment as the swells run in from the open 
sea. The men wade into the water, pushing the boat before 
them, until the reef is reached, and scramble in ; some, up to 
their necks in tlie water, throw their rifles into the boat, and 
clinging to the gunwales as the light craft is driven out over 
the swells, are dragged in by their comrades. A boat from 
the 'Manning,' as close in to the reef as it can get, lies on its 
oars waiting to take Dorst off, and I own to a grateful feeling 
of relief when, after struggling neck-deep through the surf, I 



192 Blue Jackets of '98 

see him safe in the stern-sheets of the ' Manning's ' boat, the 
last to leave the shore." 

At Tampa, in the long dull days of preparation for the 
start, the air was full of rumours. No one knew where the 
American attack would be delivered, but the general 
opinion was that Havana would first be taken. That was 
the natural expectation, though we know now that from 
the first the authorities at Washington had decided against 
besieging the Cuban capital. Captain Sigsbee and General 
Lee, both of whom had exceptional opportunities to judge 
of the strength of the defences, have left on record the 
opinion that it could have been taken easily at the be- 
ginning of the war. Every day's delay, however, was 
diligently improved by the Spaniards in extending the 
fortifications, and as they undoubtedly expected the 
American attack would be delivered against that city, it 
was no doubt the part of military wisdom to strike some- 
where else. Where that would be was the subject of 
hourly conversation at Tampa ; and Porto Eico, Cienfuegos, 
Santiago, and Matanzas had each its partisans. The secret 
was, however, well kept until the last minute. Being 
destitute of facts on which to base criticism of the plan of 
campaign, the disapproval of the idlers at Tampa was 
therefore directed against the wearying delay which con- 
tinued day after day and week after week. For that 
criticism there was abundant justification. Swift action 
might have lodged an invading force in Cuba before 
Cervera's fleet could get across the Atlantic to menace it. 
That golden moment gone, it was still essential that 
action should be immediate in order that the campaign — 
which all knew would be short — might be ended before 
the Cuban rainy season with its attendant pestilence 
should set in. But the Spanish weakness for procrastina- 
tion seemed to have infected the War Department, and 
the orders to move were delayed time and again, until the 
nation began to growl ominously. Early in May the 



Blue Jackets of '98 193 

plan was for a reconnaissance in force to the southern 
coast of Cuba to establish communication with General 
Gomez. That was abandoned when the news of Cervera's 
departure from the Cape Verde Islands was received. 
Then a month of drill and monotony followed, the com- 
missary department meanwhile trying to catch up with 
the work before it. "Even as late as May 21st," writes 
General Shafter, " some of the regiments were without 
arms or uniforms." May 30th the moment for action 
seemed to have arrived. News came from Washington 
of the blockade of Cervera at Santiago, and the Fifth 
Corps was ordered to proceed to Santiago and assist in 
capturing the town and fleet. At the same time came 
word from General Nelson A. Miles, the major-general 
commanding the army, that he would take train for 
Tampa at once. 

Then began the work of preparing the expedition for 
its departure. The United States had never seen such 
a spectacle, nor had the officers of its army ever had such 
a problem to grapple with. The point of embarkation 
was Port Tampa, nineteen miles from the camp. A single- 
track railroad connected the two points, and at the port 
ran out on a long pier which extended into navigable 
water, so that the great transports could lie easily by its 
side. The first plan was to sail on the 8th of June 
with 10,000 men, and all were embarked, after heart-rend- 
ing confusion and delays, and some of the transports were 
well out to sea, when a telegram arrived from Washington 
ordering a halt. Somebody had seen some vessels out in 
the St. Nicholas channel which were suspected of being 
Spanish men-of-war, and the loaded transports were 
hurried back to the safe shelter of Port Tampa. We 
know now that no Spanish cruisers were at large at that 
moment, but the precaution was nevertheless a wise one. 
Even a single hostile torpedo boat might do dire damage 
in a fleet of crowded transports. Again on the 10th the 
fleet started only to turn around and steam ignominiously 

13 



194 Blue Jackets of '98 

back to its moorings, with all the good-byes to be said 
over again, the cheering and the patriotic airs with which 
the troops were bidden Godspeed by those left behind all 
expended untimely. These repeated delays could not but 
have a tendency to demoralise the men, and they cer- 
tainly put a heavy strain on the quartermaster's depart- 
ment. The troops were provided with rations for the 
voyage to the point of landing, which a few knew to be 
Santiago, but they were not fitted out for a week's stay 
in port and then a voyage on top of that. The single- 
track railroad which connected the long pier with civili- 
sation and markets was overtaxed by this new and unex- 
pected demand. In a sandy country hemmed in by salt 
water potable water was scarce and precious — two cents 
a gallon was the price the owner of the only considerable 
supply demanded for his fluid. Accordingly the water 
on the ships was stale, ill-smelling, and unhealthful. 
Colonel Astor offered to buy enough for all the ships at 
this price if it would be accepted ; but General Shafter, 
feeling doubtless that there was a limit to the amount 
of financial assistance that soldiers of the nation should 
accept from even the most patriotic millionaire, declined 
the offer. So drinking doubtful water, most scantily fed, 
cooped up on ships, with little shade and less room for 
exercise, the men waited most impatiently for the order 
which should really mean " Forward." 

It came June 14th. By this time the fleet and the 
army had grown in size. An army of 17,000 men was 
embarked on thirty-two troop ships, convoyed by four- 
teen men-of-war. The troop ships were great floating 
barracks with berths in tiers, built of pine, and men by 
day swarming over every part of the ship. At night — 
the hot calm nights of the tropics — all who could slept 
on deck, so that there was scarcely room for the seamen 
to pass amid the recumbent forms. Circling about the 
flotilla were swift torpedo boats and converted yachts, like 
cowboys riding about a herd keeping all in place, while 



Blue Jackets of '98 195 

the great battleship " Indiana " and the other heavier 
vessels of the convoy kept pace with the flotilla and 
watched cautiously for any sign of an enemy. The 
light-heartedness with which the American people had 
embarked on this war characterised their method of con- 
ducting some of the most vital movements in it. Thousfh 
within fiity miles of a hostile coast, this great flotilla of 
ships went steaming along night after night, with all 
lights burning, men singing lustily, and often a band play- 
ing to while away the time. True, the convoy was vastly 
superior to any Spanish naval force that could by any 
possibility be in those waters, but the opportunity for 
a dash by a torpedo boat or even an auxiliary fitted with 
rapid-fire guns was such as has seldom been offered a 
belligerent. Ordinarily the fleet was so extended that 
the vessels in the rear were lost to sight for hours at 
a time, while at one point the contour of the channel 
was such that the forty-eight large ships were crowded 
into a strait only seven miles across. But perfect weather 
and an absolute quiescence on the part of the Spaniards 
contributed to make the voyage absolutely uneventful 
It was another opportunity lost to the enemy, — another 
instance of such entire lack of audacity or even ordinary 
naval alertness on the part of the Spaniards as to make 
it clear that the United States, because of their easy 
victory over that power, must not feel themselves ready 
to grapple at a moment's notice with a really first-class 
military and naval nation. 

June 20th the great fleet arrived off Santiago, and the 
blue jackets of the blockading squadron climbed on the 
rails of the great steel ships and cheered for the coming 
army. Admiral Sampson made haste in his launch to 
call on General Sh after, and arrangements were at once 
made for a joint visit to the Cuban General Garcia, whose 
camp was not far away. Boats put ashore the admiral, 
the general, and a small army of newspaper corres- 
. pendents alert for this historic interview. A ride of two 



196 Blue Jackets of '98 

miles up the hills into the interior brought the party to 
the patriot camp. On either side ragged native soldiery 
lined the road, well armed, showing signs of discipline, and 
of course intensely interested in the arrival of the Ameri- 
cans who were to win for them the liberty for which they 
had so long and manfully striven against heavy odds. 
General Garcia himself was absent w^hen the camp was 
reached, and his of&cers vied with each other in their 
efforts to contribute to the comfort of the visiting officers 
until he could be summoned. They had little in their 
scanty commissary stores to offer, but all they had was 
pressed upon the visitors with almost pathetic insistence. 
Cocoanuts, limes, pineapples, mangoes, and coffee w^ere 
about the scope of the list of Cuban delicacies in Garcia's 
camp, and while the new arrivals were devouring these in 
a hut thatched with palm-trees and looking down to the 
sea, there was a stir without, and Garcia came. The 
Cuban general was straight and gaunt of frame, dark and 
grizzled of face, with white hair, a flashing eye, and, 
carved deep in his forehead, a bullet wound marking his 
effort to kill himself once when, a prisoner in Spanish 
hands, he sought rather certain death than the mercy 
of his captors. His dark face was set off by a heavy 
white moustache and imperial, giving him a pronounced 
resemblance, one of the spectators noted, to Caprivi, the 
German chancellor and successor to Bismarck. He wore 
a linen uniform and high military boots, with a slouch 
hat. However uncouth the exigencies of a starvehng 
commissary might make his troops appear, Garcia was 
always in dress the officer and the gentleman. It may 
be said that this scrupulous neatness in dress was a char- 
acteristic as well of most of the Cuban officers of elevated 
rank. Contrasted with the spare form of the Cuban 
leader was the ponderous Shaffer, a very leviathan of a 
man in the sober blue garb of a United States major- 
general. Admiral Sampson, in immaculate white duck, 
slight and turning gray, made the third in a trio of figures 



Blue Jackets of '98 197 

destined to become historic in the annals of the western 
hemisphere. Garcia had with him about 4000 Cuban 
soldiers, moderately well armed, but sadly destitute of 
rations and clothing. They had some cattle on the hoof, 
but in the main subsisted on fruits and roots. His pres- 
ence at that point was the first useful result of the mis- 
sion of Lieutenant Eowan, some account of which has been 
given in an earher chapter. He instantly put himself 
and his men at the disposal of the American commanders, 
saying that he regarded this moment as the culmination 
of his long struggle for liberty, and that he believed 
victory now assured. General Shafter replied that he 
was without authority to conclude any arrangement with 
the Cubans other than to accept their aid if freely offered, 
but he wished particularly the benefit of Garcia's superior 
knowledge of the topography of the country and the 
numbers and disposition of the Spanish forces. On these 
subjects the three commanders talked for some hours, the 
Cuban generals Eabi and Castillo being summoned to 
the conference, with the result that at the end a plan of 
campaign was determined upon and formulated in the 
following memorandum : 

"About 12,000 Spanish soldiers at Santiago and vicinity. 
Spaniards can concentrate at any moment about 4000 on the 
west. Proposal made of a feint of 3000 or 4000 men at some 
point west of Santiago de Cuba, and then land expedition at 
Daiquiri and march on Santiago, Plan proposed for General 
Castillo to have about 1000 men at Daiquiri, while navy bom- 
bards, and will capture escaping Spaniards. General Shafter 
then proposed a plan that on the morning of the 22d he would 
have the navy bombard Daiquiri, Aguadores, Siboney, and 
Cabanas, as a feint, and land whole expedition at Daiquiri. 
About 5000 Spanianls between city and Daiquiri. General 
Garcia says Daiquiri is the best base, and General Shafter 
accepts it. The following numbers of Spaniards were then 
, given by General Castillo : force at Daiquiri, near wharf, 300 
men; at Siboney, 600 men; Aguadores, 150 men; Jutici, 150 



198 Blue Jackets of '98 

men; Sardinero, 100 men. It was then decided that General 
Castillo will take on board the transports 500 men from Aser- 
raderos, to be landed at Tajababo and joined to his command 
now there and 500 strong ; with this 1000 men he will be at 
Daiquiri, and assist at landing on the morning of the 22d. 
General Rabi will, on 22d, make a demonstration at Cabanas 
(to the west) with 500 men, while navy shells. It was then 
decided by General Garcia to bring his men, about 3000 or 
4000 strong, from his camp near Palma to Aserraderos, and be 
ready to embark on the transports the morning of the 24th, and 
then be taken to Daiquiri, to join General Shafter. To-mor- 
row (the 21st) navy will make transfer of 500 men to Tajababo, 
under General Castillo; 500 men under General Kabi will 
make demonstration on Cabaiias on the morning of the 22d." 

The interview terminated, the guests, followed by the 
retinue of correspondents and foreign attaches who had 
been industriously taking notes and making snapshot 
photographs the while, started for the coast. Garcia 
mounted his horse, and rode along, while the ragged army 
was drawn up in double lines along the road to do the i 
new allies honour. Once back at the ships, immediate 
steps were taken to give the plan of campaign effect. ^ 
Two thousand rations were sent to the Cuban camp, and 
the next day 500 Cubans were carried by the navy to join ; 
the 500 under command of General Castillo at Tajababo. 
Then some of the transports steamed down towards 
Cabaiias, as if to threaten a landing there, while the navy 
made demonstrations at divers points along the shore in 
order to divert the attention of the Spaniards from the 
real landing-point, which was to be at Daiquiri. ThsDi 
there was rest of a sort on the crowded transports, ioi, 
every man knew that the next morning at six o'clock th(i 
work would begin of landing through the rolling surf or 
a beach probably lined with hostile sharpshooters. • | 



J 



CHAPTEE X 

The Landing at Daiquiri — Flight of the Enemy — Good 
Fortune attending the Invaders — Difficulty of land- 
ing Stores — The Advance into the Interior — Con- 
ference AT Siboney — March of the Rough Riders — 
Fight at Guasimas — Bravery and Heavy Loss of the 
Americans — The Regulars in Action — The Losses and 
the Value of the Victory. 

^"^HE merits of the campaign of Santiago, judged from 
the view-point of the military critic, will probably 
be long the subject of controversy. To begin with, there is 
at least a reasonable doubt whether or not the army should 
have been called upon at all. The town was of import- 
ance to the United States only because in its harbour lay 
the Spanish fleet. That fleet once destroyed, Santiago was 
of the very least value to us. As the effect of the tactics 
employed by our forces, the Spanish fleet was compelled 
to leave the harbour, and instantly fell into the clutches of 
Sampson and Schley, who suffered not one ship to escape. 
But this triumph, though won at slight expense to the 
navy, cost the army dear ; and the question arises why the 
army should have been called upon to perform a task 
which seems to have been naturally that of the navy. It 
is true that Cervera lay under protecting batteries, but so 
did Montojo at Manila. It is possible that the harbour 
was mined, but so was the harbour of Mobile on that hot 
afternoon of August when Farragut shouted, " Damn the 
I torpedoes ! Go ahead ! " Looking back upon the opera- 
tions about Santiago, and counting their cost, it seems that 
the part of common-sense would have been for the ships 
to go in after the enemy instead of waiting a month for 
the army to painfully force him out. However, the latter 



200 Blue Jackets of '98 

was the course determined upon at Washington, and the 
war was fought from Washington, — an innovation which 
a distinguished British admiral remarked is ominous for 
the future of naval tactics. 

The task that the strategists at Washington set for 
General Shafter and his army was to land near Santiago, 
secure, and intrench a position commanding the city, and 
finally take it by assault or siege. Already an American 
force was intrenched at Guantanamo Bay, where the 
marines from the squadron landed and established Camp 
McCalla. But this was too far from the objective point, 
and a nearer landing-place was sought. Daiquiri, twelve 
miles east of the entrance of Santiago Bay, was selected, 
chiefly because there was there a small pier, and roads ran 
thence through the dense thickets into the interior. 

June 22d, the morning of the landing, was clear and 
scorching hot. On every transport the men were up 
early, and eagerly scanning the mysterious shores that 
held for them all the possibilities of war. They saw a 
mountainous coast sloping abruptly to the beach, cut at 
two points down to the water-level by narrow slots, at the 
mouth of which little villages could be dimly made out, 
— villages for the most part of thatched huts scarcely 
distinguishable from the dense forest surrounding. A 
few red-tiled roofs peeped out from the trees, and clouds 
of smoke rising into the still hot air from each little set- 
tlement told that the Spaniards were burning their houses 
as they fled to the woods. Those woods were menacing. 
Thick and impenetrable, they afforded the best possible 
cover for sharpshooters, and the steep hills suggested 
many a point of vantage for a battery to contest the right 
to land, or to cut to pieces any marching column that 
should attempt one of the narrow roads leading off 
towards Santiago. One village was about five miles dis- 
tant from the group of transports. That was Siboney. 
Immediately in front of the anchored ships a little pier 
extended some 500 feet into the water. This was Dai- 




GENKRAI, WIl.I.IA.M R. SIIAKIF.R 



Blue Jackets of '98 201 

qiiiri, where a very considerable mining-industry had been 
conducted by Americans before the revolution ended 
peaceful industry in Cuba. 

Through the quiet air, quivering vv^ith heat, came the 
sound of distant cannonades, for the navy had been asked 
to attack fiercely several small harbours in the neighbour- 
hood, that the Spaniards might be kept busy and their 
attention diverted from the actual point of landing. 
But the men on the ships had little time to study the 
tropical landscape presented to their view, nor to speculate 
concerning the possibilities latent in the jungles along- 
shore, for the command soon came to pack and prepare to 
land. The smaller vessels of the navy ran close inshore 
and searched the bushes with insistent shells, while from 
the larger ships strings of boats, with a launch at the head 
of each to tow, could be seen making for the transports. 
The facilities for landing other than those supplied by the 
navy were exceedingly inadequate. General Shafter had 
ordered three tugs and two barges brought for this pur- 
pose, but only one tug and one barge arrived; but the 
friendly aid of the navy made good the lack. By and by 
the men on the crowded decks began to show themselves, 
girt about with rolls carrying their slender luggage — 
there was little enough of it, for they thought they under- 
stood the Cuban climate ; but four hours after the roads 
about Daiquiri were strewn with the little they did take, 
and the army went stripped to its shirt, trousers, and shoes. 
The Eighth Infantry was the first to land, and the First, 
General Shafter's old regiment, followed. Those still on 
the ships looked eagerly after the vanguard. All expected 
a fierce fight at the water's edge. From the " Seguranca," 
the headquarters ship, the correspondents and foreign at- 
taches who had not been permitted to land watched 
through their glasses for the volley which all felt sure 
awaited the first boat when it should reach the surf. 
" They are waiting to see the whites of their eyes," said 
some one, reminiscent of colonial tactics at Bunker HilL 



202 Blue Jackets of '98 

On the high ground commanding the beach was a Spanish 
block-house, so there could be no doubt that the ground was 
known to the enemy. But the boats drew up to the pier 
without a sound from the shore, and hung there bobbing up 
and down in the heavy surf, while the men clambered out 
and catching up their rifles made for the beach as fast as 
possible. Still no sign of an attack. Some blue-coated 
figures disappeared in the forest, and in a minute there 
resounded the crack of rifles. Was the expected battle 
open at last ? Apparently not, for immediately the Ameri- 
cans were seen clustering about the block-house, and pres- 
ently a small United States flag rose and fluttered above 
it, while all the whistles in the fleet shrieked shrilly, men 
cheered hoarsely, and the foreign attaches who had come 
across the Atlantic and the Pacific to see a real war settled 
disappointedly down to the conviction that the Spaniards 
would not fight at all. It is needless to say that this 
erroneous opinion was corrected at San Juan and El Caney 
a day later. 

It being apparent that no resistance was to be appre- 
hended at the moment, the work of landing proceeded 
apace. The spot was not the best imaginable. The pier 
at Daiquiri was so high above the water that the men liad 
to throw their rifles on it first, and then clamber up the 
piles from a boat which was bobbing up and down in a 
high rolling surf. The terrible execution which Spanish 
sharpshooters in the woods could have done during this 
deliberate operation shocks the imagination. At Siboney 
was no pier at all, and at neither landing-place was there 
any anchorage, so that the transports were compelled to 
steam up and down to prevent being blown out to sea or 
on shore. Fortune favoured the invaders here again, for 
though iu was the season of hurricanes and even a moder- 
ate storm would have cut the army in two, half being 
carried out to sea and the rest left to the mercy of a su- 
perior force of Spaniards on shore, the weather remained 
calm and the Spaniards were as quiet as the winds. It 



Blue Jackets of '98 203 

must be remembered, too, that the landing of the men and 
the horses was the easiest part of the undertaking. The 
former, with the quick adaptability of the American sol- 
dier, devised means for overcoming the difficulties of the 
situation, while the latter were landed by the simple pro- 
cess of being thrown overboard and compelled to swim 
for their lives. The mules, long trained to follow a mare 
hung with a bell, were guided in their swim by men who 
walked the beach ringing a dinner-bell with might and 
main, while the horses responded readily to the word of 
command. About twenty animals were lost in the process 
of landing, and two men who fell from the boats while 
trying to scale the pier were carried down by their heavy 
equipments and drowned. So light a loss in so large an 
expedition silences criticism of the plan. It was another 
of the many cases in our war with Spain in which good 
luck took the place of good management. 

The lack of facilities for quick and safe landing proved 
more serious, however, when the stores came to be put on 
shore. An army of 16,000 men on land with one day's 
rations in their packs and everything else — artillery, am- 
munition, rations, ambulances, medical stores, and the like 
— on thirty ships afloat without anchorage on an unpro- 
tected and dangerous coast in a season of high winds, is in 
a serious position. Freight cannot under the best circum- 
stances be landed from small boats with expedition, and 
many circumstances combined to make the landing of the 
stores unusually slow. To begin with, there was a great 
shortage of boats. One big scow towed from Tampa was 
the main reliance, and to it for awhile were added several 
old lighters which the chief quartermaster had found on 
the beach. But the management of these vessels was 
put in the hands of soldiers, landsmen all, with the result 
that the lighters were speedily stove against the pier or 
swamped in the surf. Then the small rowboats of the 
transports were employed to land tons of freight — nat- 
urally a slow and difficult task. It was not made easier 



204 Blue Jackets of '98 

by the captains of the transports, who, not being enlisted 
men but merely hired with their ships, conceived their 
first duty to be to the owners of their craft, and with an 
excess of caution lay from three to ten miles out at sea, 
often out of reach of any signal and never able to com- 
prehend the wigwagging of the navy code. This could 
have been remedied had General Shafter exerted the 
authority he undoubtedly possessed, and put every captain 
under military authority ; but he did not do it, and much 
of the time of the boats was spent in chasing steamers 
over miles of sea for another load of needed munitions. 
Another grave weakness, discovered of course when dis- 
covery cost most, was the fact that in loading the ships 
no effort had been made to put the things likely to be 
needed first where they could be most easily come at. 
Moreover, articles belonging to the same branch of the 
service, as for example medical stores, were scattered 
among twenty vessels, so that each would have to be ran- 
sacked to find a given thing. This led to the gravest 
results. When fever broke out in the trenches before 
Santiago, it was almost impossible to get medical stores. 
Cots for the sick, surgical instruments, medicines, and 
disinfectants were least obtainable when most wanted, and 
the frantic surgeons who rode through the woods to the 
shore to seek for themselves could not even get boats in 
which to go to the ships in search of what they needed. 
It is probable that, though there was never a sufficiency 
of medical stores on the field, large quantities were carried 
back to the United States in the returning transports, 
simply because they had not been found in season to be 
of use. Certainly an immense quantity of miscellaneous !| 
stores were thus sent back. As for the difficulty of keep- 
ing the army supplied with rations, General Shafter in hia i| 
report admits that " it was not until nearly two weeks 
after the army landed that it was possible to place on 
shore three days' supplies in excess of those required for 
daily consumption." 



Blue Jackets of '98 205 

The strategic plan of campaign is less open to criticism 
than the details of the arrangements for landing the army, 
nor, indeed, can an unprofessional student of military 
events presume so justly to comment upon it. The sub- 
stance of General Shafter's plan was to attack Santiago 
from the landward side. It has been urged since that a 
wiser strategy would have been to proceed down the rail- 
way which runs along the coast to Aguadores, and thence 
proceed westward along the coast, under cover of the guns 
of the fleet, to Morro at the mouth of Santiago Bay. At 
that point, without attempting to storm or reduce the 
castle, he could go inland to the shore of Estrella Bay, 
and seize the shore station from which the submarine 
mines were operated. With this once in the hands of 
friends, the fleet could enter the harbour and aid the army 
in fighting its way up to the city. This plan viewed 
superficially seems to be admirable. The aid of the fleet, 
which could concentrate upon any point in the front of 
the advancing army a fire of 100 projectiles a second, 
would have made resistance almost impossible ; the trans- 
ports could have kept pace with the troops, and the sup- 
plies would therefore have been at all times near at hand, 
and the proximity of the open sea might have averted 
those malarial diseases which, as we shall see later, almost 
destroyed the army in its pestilential trenches. Two objec- 
tions to the plan suggest themselves. Much of the railroad 
line to Aguadores passed over a long trestle which the 
Spaniards burned, and the other roads were even worse 
than the direct ones to Santiago which the troops followed. 
Furthermore — and this is General Shafter's own explana- 
tion of his plan — the orders to the army directed the 
capture of the Spanish forces. An advance by the coast 
would have left General Linares, who commanded in Santi- 
ago, ample opportunity to abandon the city and retreat 
into the interior with all his army, in case of serious 
reverses. Should he do so, the war would be prolonged 
for another year at least, for in the rainy season, tlien 



2o6 Blue Jackets of '98 

approaching, no American force could follow him. By 
attacking the city from its landward side, all opportunity 
for retreat was denied the enemy. It is true that the 
event showed the Spaniards not at all anxious to take to 
the forests and prolong the war. When opportunity came 
to surrender, not only the force caught in Santiago was 
dehvered up, but all the troops in that military district, 
thus indicating an entire willingness to submit to the 
inevitable after Spanish honour had been satisfied. How- 
ever, this dispositioa on the part of the enemy could not 
have been foreseen, and the wisdom of General Shafter's 
course depends upon the question whether the advantage 
derived from capturing the enemy was a fair set-off to the 
loss to his own campaign due to the selection of a difficult 
and miasmatic line of attack. 

The plan actually adopted by the general took the men 
into the interior as fast as they were landed. Cubans 
were employed as scouts, while back of them were small 
detachments of our own men deployed on either side of 
the road and keeping closely in touch all along the line. 
By night of the first day of the disembarkation, 6000 
men were ashore and trudging along the narrow road, 
walled in by almost impenetrable banks of foliage, in 
which poisonous, thorny, saw-edged, and matted greenery 
made the progress of the pickets slow and painful, and 
clattering land-crabs scuttled about, startling the soldiers 
with their hideous looks. The army was one of regular 
soldiers almost wholly; the Second Massachusetts, the 
Seventy-first New York, and the First Volunteer Cavalry 
or Eough Eiders, being the only volunteej organisations in 
the corps. The cavalry regiments fought on foot, for no 
horses had been brought except for pack trains. On the 
first two days, as the commands made their way from the 
landing-places at Siboney and Daiquiri to the villages of 
the same names a few miles in the interior, there was 
little resistance offered. Both towns had been held by 
the enemy, but from both they had discreetly retreated as 



Blue Jackets of '98 207 

news of the American advance preceded the column, and 
such of the houses as were not burned by the navy's 
shells or the torches of the fugitives served as quarters 
for men who had been crowded on stifling transports for 
a week, — a utihsation of doubtful value, as the huts 
harboured the germs of more than one epidemic disease. 

On the 23d the Cubans in advance of General Young's 
division, slipping through the jungle toward the threatened 
city, had come upon a body of Spaniards, clearly the rear- 
guard of the retreating army. Eifles had flashed, and 
bullets flew ; but neither party was eager for a fight, and 
the Spaniards continued their flight, while the scouts re- 
turned to Siboney to notify General Wheeler, who was 
in command there, as General Shafter was still aboard 
ship, that the enemy was in the front. There was a 
consultation that night between Wheeler, General Young, 
Colonel Wood, and General Castillo, whose Cubans brought 
the news. The latter described the country to his col- 
leagues. From Siboney two roads perforated the forest 
toward Santiago. One, a mere trail, useful for pack- 
horses, but impassable to anything on wheels, runs straight 
up over a high ridge to the north of the town and turns 
west to a point about four miles away, where it joins 
the other, a wagon-road which has reached the same spot 
by a more circuitous route around the base of the hills. 
The junction is called Guasimas. Colonel Wood was 
ordered to take his Rough Eiders over the hill. In 
General Shafter's original plan the Eough Eiders had 
no business to be there in the van at all ; but that restless 
body, instead of loafing about the beach on landing and 
letting others take the road ahead of them, had made a 
forced march at night and reported at the rendezvous at 
Siboney ahead of many commands which landed before 
them. While these eager volunteers were to scale the 
hills, the regulars, consisting of four troops each of the 
First and Tenth Cavalry, with four Hotchkiss guns were to 
take the wagon trail. Both parties started about sunrise. 



2o8 Blue Jackets of '98 

A Cuban guide led the way, and immediately behind him 
came Sergeant Hamilton Fish, of Captain Capron's troop, 
a young New Yorker of an historic and wealthy family, 
a mighty athlete in college, and a famous " man-about- 
town " since his graduation. Under him were four men, 
as scouts. Then followed Capron's troop, chosen for the 
difficult post of vanguard because of the experience and 
courage of their commander. Then a gap, after which 
came General Wood, Colonel Eoosevelt, aides, and two 
newspaper correspondents. Then the body of the Rough 
Riders in single file, for the trail was narrow and steep. 
Usually in the advance of a column through a hostile 
country, men are thrown out on either side as flankers, 
to see that none of the enemy are passed and left in the 
rear, but in this march this was impossible. The thickets 
on either side were too dense for men to make their way 
through. At one point a log spanned a stream, and over 
it the men filed one by one. The column advanced 
steadily without anything in the demeanour of officers or 
men to suggest that the first serious battle of the war was 
at hand. Tlie men talked of the novel country through 
which they were passing, and discussed its hunting possi- 
bilities until the word came from the head of the column 
to keep silence in the ranks. Then a halt and an order 
to fill magazines. That meant fight, but no excitement was 
manifested in the ranks. " The men," says Colonel Roose- 
velt, "were totally unconcerned. ... I could hear the 
group nearest me discussing in low murmurs, not the 
Spaniards, but the conduct of a certain cow-puncher in 
quitting work on a ranch and starting a saloon in a New 
Mexican town." Edward Marshall, a correspondent who 
was shot down early in the fight, writes : 

" These volunteers had been so long in preparation, so many 
weary days liad elapsed since they first buttoned tlieir uni- 
forms over hearts beating with tremendous primary patriotic en- 
thusiasm, that now they were taking things calmly, and talk- 
ing about dogs and the imperfections of army shoes. One 




(;KNKRAI, I.KOiVARI) WOOD. 



Blue Jackets of '98 209 

man persistently blew paste balls at his neighbours. (Two 
hours later I saw him lying livid and dead in the high grass. 
He had been hit by a diHerent kind of missile.) Spaniards 
and fighting seemed as far away to them as the cities of Asia 
Minor do to the school-boy studying geography, they had been 
carrying idle guns and ammunition so long. Indeed, it was 
hard for any of us to realise the actuality of the enemy. 

" ' ! Would n't a glass of cold beer taste good ? ' said 

one, whereupon others threw pebbles and sand at him for sug- 
gesting such an impossible ecstasy. There was much good- 
humour. " 

The halting-place was one of the few points on the 
trail at which the surrounding underbrush gave way so 
that a view of the neighbouring country could be had. 
On the right of the column the tropical foliage sprung up 
thick and impenetrable to a height of fifteen feet. On the 
left was a stout wire fence shutting off broad fields of high 
grass, into which here and there the jungle foliage cut in 
little islets and peninsulas of denser green. Wood and 
Capron dismounted here, and went cautiously down the 
trail ahead. The men in the ranlcs began to grow more 
serious, and those of Capron's troop brought their guns to 
a ready and knelt by the side of the fence, peering across 
the fields to the thickets beyond, as though suspecting 
danger. Presently the officers returned. Signs of the 
Spaniards were plentiful, a dead body being discovered in 
the road just ahead, presumably at the point of yesterday's 
skirmish with the Cubans. So the main force of the Rough 
Riders was deployed in line of battle to the left of the 
road where the open fields lay. Lieutenant-Colonel Roose- 
velt with three troops was ordered into the dense forest 
on the right. Capron continued down the trail. The 
men had hardly secured the positions to which they had 
been ordered when the storm burst with a rattle of 
Mauser rifles and a singing of bullets through the trees. 
" The noise of the Mauser bullet," writes Edward Marshall, 
who not only heard many but felt one, " is not impressive 

14 



2IO Blue Jackets of '98 

enough to be really terrifying until you have seen what it 
does when it strikes. It is a nasty, malicious little noise, 
like the soul of a very petty and mean person turned 
into sound." It was an irritating sound, however, and 
at it and the sight of leaves cut away about them by the 
flying bullets, some of the men began to swear. " Don't 
swear, men," growled out Wood ; " SHOOT ! " That raised 
a laugh, and restored self-possession to any who might 
have been about to lose it. The fire was a galling one, 
the more so because the absolute freedom of the Spanish 
powder from smoke made it impossible to tell whence 
came the stinging darts that struck men down. The 
high penetrating power of the Mauser bullets made them 
doubly deadly. They would cut through a palm-tree 
without losing anything of their murderous force, and 
many instances are recorded of two or more men struck 
down by the same vicious bolt. The attack fell first on 
Capron's men. Sergeant Fish fell at the first fire, shot 
through the heart. " It would be just my luck to get put 
out in the first fight and see nothing of the war," he had 
said at Tampa. Captain Capron, a gallant young soldier 
of a family of soldiers, found in that volley his death- 
warrant. Next day his father left for a brief time his 
battery before the Spanish lines, and came over to where 
the body of his son lay on the rank grass. He looked a 
moment on the still features, then stooped and kissed the 
icy face. " Well done, boy, well done ! " was all he said 
as he went back to the battle. 

The men in the road were being cut to pieces, and it was 
evident that the Spaniards knew the topography of the 
region perfectly, so accurate was their fire. Though not 
more than eighty yards away, they could not be seen by 
any of the Americans. The troops with Eoosevelt in the 
bushes were suffering less, partly because the men were 
more widely deployed and offered a less conspicuous target, 
partly because the foliage that made progress difficult also 
impeded the enemy's aim. What was going on in the 



J 

m 



Blue Jackets of '98 21 1 

other parts of the field they could only guess by the 
sounds. Once the hum of machine guns was heard. All 
supposed that the Hotchkiss cannon, of which Lieutenant 
Tih'any had charge, had been brought up and were open- 
ing on the Spaniards. " Poor fellows ! Now will they be 
good ! " were the cries arising from the American lines ; 
but it was not till night that they learned that it was 
the Spanish Gatlings opening on the men in the road the 
deadly fire that struck down Capron and Fish. For the 
men in the woods the advance was almost a matter of 
individual dh-ection. If one could keep in touch with the 
man to the right and the one to the left of him, it was 
the utmost possible ; farther down the line the palms, 
the softly waving vines, the gay flowers hid all in a vernal 
shield. The opportunity was tempting for skulking, but 
few yielded. In the main the line pressed on, men crawl- 
ing under boughs where the limbs hung low, dropping to 
the ground when the fire was heavy, and running eagerly 
forward when some open space invited a dash. The diffi- 
culty of the ground and the impossibility of maintaining 
communications with all parts of the army caused some 
costly confusion. At one point in the battle an officer 
came running, crying to the men to stop firing, that they 
were shooting down their own comrades. Of course they 
stopped, horror-struck at the thought ; but after the battle 
a Spanish captive taken on that part of the line com- 
mented on the curious custom of American soldiers of 
advancing without firing. At another moment a column 
of the enemy passed within easy range of the men with 
Eoosevelt, but it was so absolutely impossible to determine 
that they were not Cuban allies that the fire of the troop- 
ers was withheld. At last the men on the right broke 
from the thickets and came in view of the Spanish posi- 
tion. A ravine separated tlie enemy from the Eiders, and 
on a ridge beyond the Spanish lines were fixed in a sort 
of obtuse angle, the apex of which extended towards the 
gap which lay between Wood's lines and those of General 



212 Blue Jackets of '98 

Young. Here was a large red-tiled building, whicli seemed 
to harbour an enemy ; so with a cheer and a rush — the 
very sensation of being in the open where a rush was 
possible was invigorating — it was charged and taken. It 
was found deserted, but with great heaps of empty car- 
tridge shells, showing that earlier in the tight it had shel- 
tered a considerable and active body of the enemy. The 
battle was by this time approaching its end. 

Meanwhile the column of regulars under General Young 
had swung along down the wagon-road until they too 
encountered the enemy. That day the doubt whether the 
Spaniards would fight or whether they could shoot was 
effectually dispelled. The route was more open than that 
which the Eough Eiders had followed, and the enemy was 
discovered at a greater distance. A row of battered straw 
hats appearing over a stone wall a quarter of a mile away 
was the enemy's first appearance to General Young, and 
after examining the phenomenon a few moments he 
ordered up the Hotchkiss cannon, and sent word for the 
troops to follow in ten minutes. It was more like civilised 
fighting — if any fighting is truly civilised — on that front, 
and less like bushwhacking, than the tactics to which the 
Eiders were reduced. There was a pause after the guns 
came up, for General Young did not wish to go into action 
until the men with Wood and Eoosevelt on the other road 
should be engaged. But when the first cannon opened 
the response was so swift and accurate that one of the 
artillerymen fell where he stood beside his piece. The 
Spaniards evidently had the range of that position accu- 
rately. Then the First Cavalry rushed forward, and the 
fight began. 

It is probable that no troops in the world are superior 
to the American regulars in action. Our army is so small 
that recruiting officers are enabled to be exclusive, and the 
men enlisted are picked men of their class. As the term 
of enlistment is short, those who are not fit for a soldier's 
life or who have a distaste for it quickly drop out, and the 



Blue Jackets of '98 213 

American soldier who re-enlists is apt to do so for the 
love of a calling for which he has special aptitude. This 
campaign against Santiago was fought in the main by 
regulars, and this battle at La Guasimas was the first 
engagement of regular troops against a foreign foe since 
the war with Mexico. But these men, particularly those 
whose shoulder-straps or chevrons showed sign of long 
service, were veterans nevertheless. They had fought 
Indians on the arid plains of the Southwest and the bleak 
and wintry prairies of the North, and had seen serv'ice 
against bandits on the Mexican frontier. The business of 
war was no new thing to them, and they went about it in 
the unaccustomed surroundings of a tropical forest with 
professional calmness. They moved forward coolly, losing 
heavily, it is true, but driving the enemy from one posi- 
tion after another. After a few minutes the sound of 
guns on the left gave tidings that the volunteers were 
engaged as well, and now and then a shout and once a 
guidon waved from a tree told where the Rough Riders 
were pressing the foe. Finally a charge up a hill sent the 
Spaniards fleeing down the road to Santiago, the left of 
the Tenth Cavalry and the right of the First Volunteer 
Cavalry were joined, and thus the coloured regulars and 
the cow-punching, club-haunting volunteers in happy har- 
mony dashed madly off in fruitless pursuit. The field of 
La Guasimas was won, and to the phrase which gained 
currency in the Civil War, " The coloured troops fought 
nobly," was added a new one, — " Cowboys, dudes, and 
football players make good soldiers." 

Somebody has said of the campaign against Santiago 
that it was fought and won by the individual soldiers. 
The purport of the phrase is that the generals' plans had 
little to do with the victory. This may be, and doubtless 
is, an overstatement ; but the battle at Guasimas was, 
beyond doubt, one in which the devotion and intelligence 
of the private soldier were all important. The difficul- 
ties of the ground and the impossibility of detecting the 



2 14 Blue Jackets of '98 

Spanish positions because of the smokeless powder, threw 
upon the men who carried rifles the duty of winning the 
fight by sheer tenacity of purpose, advancing as seemed 
to them best, and trusting to break the Spanish lines when 
they were encountered. Because of the great part that in- 
dividual valour played on this field, the many illustrations 
of it told by eye-witnesses are as important as interesting. 

Captain Capron, being struck down early in the action 
with a wound he knew to be mortal, called to a man near 
bv '^<J give him the rifle that lay by the side of a dead 
soldier. Propped up against a tree, he continued firing 
with this weapon at the enemy until his strength gave 
out, and he fell forward to die. A very similar display 
of courage was made by Private Heffener, who fought 
leaning against a tree until he bled to death. Trooper 
Ptowland, a cowboy from New Mexico, was shot through 
the lungs early in the action. Saying nothing about it, he 
kept his place on the firing-line until Eoosevelt noticed 
the blood on his shirt and sent him to the hospital. Soon 
he reappeared. " I thought I sent you to the hospital," 
said the officer. " Yes, sir, you did, but I did n't see that 
they could do much for me there, so I came back," was 
the response ; and back he stayed until the fight ended. 
Then he went again to the hospital, where the doctors, to 
his intense disgust, decided that he must be sent back to 
the States. That night Rowland secured his rifle and 
pack, slipped out of the hospital, and made his way back 
to his command, where he stayed. Nobody talked again 
of sending him to the States. Edward IMarshall, the 
newspaper correspondent, struck down with a wound 
which the doctors pronounced mortal, employed the 
moments when he was not writhing in convulsions of 
agony in dictating the story of the battle to be sent to 
his paper. Wlien he was being carried in a canvas ham- 
mock to the hospital, he noticed that one of the bearers 
of his litter, Trumpeter Cassa, had suffered the loss of two 
fingers near the middle joints, and was grasping the rough 



Blue Jackets of '98 215 

canvas with the bloody stumps. In Marshall's story of 
his experiences is a dramatic description of a scene in the 
field hospital where sorely wounded men lay crowded 
together awaiting their turns under the surgeon's knife : 

" There is one incident of the day which shines out in my 
memory above all others now as I lie in a New York hospital 
writing. It occurred at the field hospital. About a dozen of 
us were lying there. A continual chorus of moans rose 
through the tree-branches overhead. The surgeons, with 
hands and bared arms dripping, and clothes literally saturated, 
with blood, were straining every nerve to prepare the wounded 
for the journey down to Siboney, Behind me lay Captain 
McClintock, with his lower leg-bones literally ground to 
powder. He bore his pain as gallantly as he had led his men, 
and that is saying much. I think Major Brodie was also there. 
It was a doleful group. Amputation and death stared its 
members in their gloomy faces. 

" Suddenly a voice started softly : 

' My country, 't is of thee, 
Sweet land of liberty, 
Of thee I sing.' 

Other voices took it up : 

* Land where my fathers died, 
Land of the Pilgrims' pride — ' 

" The quivering, quavering chorus, punctuated by groans 
and made spasmodic by pain, trembled up from that little 
group of wounded Americans in the midst of the Cuban soli- 
tude, — the pluckiest, most heartfelt song that human beings 
ever sang. 

" There was one voice that did not quite keep up with the 
others. It was so weak that I did not hear it until all the 
rest had finished with the line, 

'Let Freedom ring.' 

Then, halting, struggling, faint, it repeated slowly : 

* Land — of — the — Pilgrims' — pride, 
Let Freedom — ' 



2i6 Blue Jackets of '98 

" The last word was a woful cry. One more son had died 
as died the fathers." 

The battle of Guasimas ended thus in complete victory 
for the Americans. They had met the Spaniards on their 
own ground, had triumphed over ambushes and intrench- 
ments, had driven the enemy back, and had taken an 
advanced position on the road to the goal. They had 
proved that coloured regulars would fight with the dash 
and courage of Anglo-Saxons. They had shown that a 
volunteer regiment composed of such material as the 
Piough Riders would not only be brave, but would maintain 
discipline in battle. For all this they had paid dearly. 
Of the 964 men engaged, 16 were killed and 52 wounded, 
the Eough Eiders alone losing 8 killed and 34 wounded. 
How great was the enemy's loss cannot be told exactly. 
The official report made by the American commander 
put it at 45 killed, while the Spanish report was 9 killed 
and 27 wounded. Colonel Eoosevelt asserts that he saw 
eleven dead Spaniards on the field after the battle. 

Out of this affair — as unfortunately out of almost 
every battle during the war — sprung some controversy 
as to the tactics employed. General Shafter being on 
board the " Seguranca " when the news of the affray 
between the Cubans and the Spanish rear guard was 
brought to Siboney, General Wheeler ordered the advance 
that brought on the battle. In Shafter's plan the Eough 
Eiders were not assigned any such position in the van as 
fell to their lot that day, and there has been discussion as 
to the propriety of Wheeler's action in sending them for- 
ward. The military men will, no doubt, continue to de- 
bate the phases of this point of etiquette long after the 
mass of the people have settled down in the conviction that 1 
what the Eough Eiders did afforded ample justification 
for their employment, and that whatever variations in the 
original plan of advance may have been caused by General 
Wheeler's action, they were excused by the result. General i| 



Blue Jackets of '98 217 

Shafter himself, while saying that the battle was no part 
of his original plan, remarks : " The engagement, though 
unimportant, had an inspiring effect on the army, showing, 
as it did, that the Spanish troops could not stand against 
us. It proved to the men that they could whip the 
Spaniards if they could get at them." 



CHAPTEK XI 

San Juan, El C aney, and Aguadores — Waiting for Supplies 

— The Position at El Caney — General Lawton's Dispo- 
sitions — Effect of Mauser Bullets — Stories of the 
Battlefield — The Capture of El Caney — The Attack 
on San Juan — Plan of the Battle — The Slaughter in 
the Sunken Road — The Charge on the Hill — Exposed 
Position of the Americans — The Question of Retreat 

— The Scenes at Bloody Bend — The Demand for the 
Surrender op Santiago — News of Cervera's Defeat. 

NOW ensued days of preparation for the really decisive 
action of the campaign. The Spaniards had fled 
not only from La Guasimas, but from Sevilla, a little vil- 
lage a few miles farther up the road toward Santiago, and 
the country in the immediate front of the invading army 
was open to its advance. General Wheeler with his cav- 
alry division was ordered to a point a little beyond Sevilla, 
and directed to stop there, keeping his front well picketed 
and reconnoitring the country before him. Just beyond 
Sevilla on the crest of a ridge was the group of farm- 
houses known as San Juan, and here the enemy was 
evidently established in force. Farther to the right on 
the crest of another hill was the block-house of El Caney, 
a massive structure of stone defended by Spanish rifle- 
men. The main road from Siboney to Santiago split at a 
ford called El Poso, one fork branching off to El Caney, 
the other continuing directly on to San Juan. The sur- 
rounding country to within a few hundred yards of these 
posts was a typical Cuban jungle, the spaces between the 
great palms thickly matted with clinging thorny vines, i 
the saw-edged palmetto and the needle-pointed Spanish I 
bayonet. Immediately before the two forts extended a 



Blue Jackets of '98 219 

broad expanse of open hillside, plentifully obstructed by- 
fences of barbed wire, — a new defensive material which 
the Spaniards used freely in all their fortifications. Upon 
these open spaces, swept by the fire from the trenches at 
the crest, the roads debouched from the forests, a single 
opening to each as clearly defined as a door in a stone- 
wall. Of course the Spaniards had well noted the range 
to each of these openings, and any body of troops coming 
out in a dense column would have a murderous fire to 
encounter. On the 1st of July battles were fought at 
both San Juan and El Caney, besides a skirmish at 
Aguadores. The three, though simultaneous, were in fact 
distinct actions. 

The days from the 24th to the 30th of June were filled 
full by the work of landing supplies and getting what the 
soldiers called " the cracker line," by which rations were 
sent to the front, into good running order. This was 
vitally important, of course ; but the delay it caused was 
endured with the utmost impatience by the men in the 
front, who could see that the Spaniards were utilising it 
by strengthening their lines in every imaginable way. 
Why no artillery was sent to the front to interrupt the 
enemy's industry in building rifle-pits has never been 
satisfactorily explained. The heavy siege-guns brought 
from Tampa the commanding-general never had landed, 
seeming to consider them useless ; but he had four light 
batteries at the front which could have kept the Span- 
iards engaged during these days of waiting. However, 
the enemy peacefully dug his trenches and our men 
bloodily took them. 

On the 29th, the landing of supplies having proceeded 
far enough to make an advance practicable. General 
Sliafter, who had thus far remained at Siboney, rode for- 
ward as far as a high hill near El Poso to examine the 
country. Prior to this time the reports of reconnoitring 
officers had supplied him with knowledge of the topography 
of the country that was satisfactory, at least to him, 



2 20 Blue Jackets of '98 

though some vigorous criticism has been directed against 
his failure to examine more in detail himself. The gen- 
eral was physically handicapped by his great bulk, which 
in that torrid climate was a serious disability, and by an 
attack of gout which made every movement excruciating 
torture. His campaigning had to be done chiefly from a 
cot in the rear, or, in instances of unusual activity, from a 
buckboard. The climate by this time had begun to tell 
upon even the enlisted men, though they were young and 
picked for their robust physical health. The almost daily 
rains, the mists that rose from the water-logged soil, the 
bivouacs on sodden ground, the wretched and insufhcient 
food which drove the soldiers to the unhealthful tropical 
fruits, all combined to bring on the army those first signs 
of a breaking down that were so fearfully watched for at 
home and in the field. The experience of the Spaniard 
for years past had not been lost upon our people. They 
knew what campaigning in Cuba in the rainy season 
meant to troops from the temperate zone, and every day 
of delay before San Juan was discussed anxiously in a 
hundred thousand homes in the United States, while 
every morning's paper was scanned eagerly and laid by 
with relief if no report of the coming of the dreaded 
yellow fever appeared in the news from the front. 

On the afternoon of June 30th there came to the com- 
manding officers of the 12,000 men encamped along the 
sides of the road to San Juan, orders to move at four and 
take up positions in the woods before the enemy's lines, 
ready to attack at dawn. General Lawton was sent with 
his division to attack the Spaniards at El Caney, and by 
marching all night was ready to attack at six o'clock in 
the morning. With him was Capron's battery and Bates's 
brigade. As the fighting at this point began before that 
at San Juan, we may conveniently first consider it. 

. A stone fort on the crest of a steep hill was in the 
centre of the Spanish position, and from it the " flag of 
gore and gold " floated defiantly. On either side yellow 



Blue Jackets of '98 221 

lines of fresh earth told of trenches filled with riflemen 
whose bullets were deadly at two miles' distance. Beyond 
and north of the fort, and separated from it by another 
valley, was the village, built of stout stone and adobe 
houses, huddled together almost as if intended to take the 
form of a fortification. An old stone church with a high 
tower pierced for musketry stood in the town. The two 
valleys, that before and the one behind the fort, were 
mainly open fields of grass waist high, broken here and 
there by groves of cocoanut and mango trees. The 
stronghold was defended by about a thousand Spaniards ; 
estimates vary, and the stubbornness of the defence 
inclined the men who charged up and down those slopes 
that midsummer day in the tropics to set a much larger 
figure, but this seems to be approximately correct. 

Early in the morning of July 1st the guns of Capron's 
battery began to thunder against the antiquated stone 
fort that crowned the hill. Masonry is of Uttle use 
against modern artillery, and it might have been expected 
that the usefulness of that fort would have been terminated 
before the infantry was sent in to the attack. For some 
reason, however, the artillery proved ineffectual. There 
were but four guns, and these, says Captain Arthur Lee, 
the British military attach^, " were served with such 
deliberation, five and ten minutes elapsing between suc- 
cessive rounds, that it was of little material assistance to 
the infantry attack." When the fort was finally carried 
by assault, it was found to be shattered indeed, but still 
tenable. During the firing Lieutenant Hobson from his 
cell window in the prison of Santiago could see the fort 
clearly. " It was a fine sight," he writes, " to see the 
billows of smoke dart out of the hillock (where the bat- 
tery was stationed), and then, after an expected pause of 
five or six seconds, see the puff-balls of gas at the block- 
house ; then came another pause of ten or twelve seconds ; 
then the peal, followed shortly by a sharp, strong echo 
from the mountains behind." 



222 Blue Jackets of '98 

The plan of battle adopted by General Lawton, who 
commanded the American right which fronted El Caney, 
involved the almost complete surrounding of the enemy 
by the attacking lines. Chaffee's brigade enveloped the 
north and east sides, and Ludlow the south and west. 
At the first shot of Capron's battery the Spaniards, who 
prior to that signal had been coolly disporting themselves 
in front of their trenches as though ignorant of the presence 
of an enemy, plunged for the earthworks. In a few 
moments all that was to be seen of them was the row of 
big straw hats peering over the crest of the banked-up 
clay redoubts. But their alertness was made known by 
the stinging fire that came without sign of smoke from 
those sheltered lines. The Americans responded in kind, 
and for about three-quarters of an hour the battle took 
the form of a duel between infantry at about 600 yards. 
The assailants, however, were continually creeping for- 
ward, but every foot of advance was dearly paid for. The 
Spanish shooting was excellent. At one point on the 
American line eight sharpshooters crept forward to take 
position on a little knoll, and five were hit within five 
minutes. At another part of the field a hedge obstructed 
the advance of the Seventh Regiment. Seven men broke 
through it, and an immediate volley killed three and 
wounded all the rest. General Chaffee, who kept erect 
and on the firing-line, seemed to bear a charmed life. 
One bullet snipped a button from his coat, and another 
passed through the cloth under his shoulder-straps. The 
colonel of the Seventeenth Infantry was hit three times 
within a few seconds. Five men volunteered to take him 
to shelter, and before they had completed the task three 
were shot down. The troops advanced literally, as Napo- 
leon said an army moved, on their bellies. Worming their 
way slowly tlirough the high grass, running forward a few 
feet with trailing arms wliere the nature of the ground or 
a lull in the firing seemed to promise success, they fought 
for their ground, yard by yard, as stubbornly as ever a 




GF.XKKAL ADXA R. CHAFFKR. 



Blue Jackets of '98 223 

Yale football eleven struggled for an advance on the goal 
Hne of Princeton. The attitude of the men and the 
tremendous penetrating power of the Mauser bullets 
led to some curious and shocking wounds, for the conical 
steel-clad bullets entering at the top of the body, as the 
victim stooped over, would range the whole length of the 
man's trunk, often passing down the leg to some distance. 
Sometimes striking a bone, these vicious projectiles would 
double on their course, describing almost a circle within 
the body. It is worth noting, however, that the wounds 
inflicted by the Mausers, though seemingly more exten- 
sive than those caused by the larger-calibre and slower- 
speed bullets of earlier days, were less deadly. The 
channel was more cleanly cut, and the shock of the 
impact less. Men were sometimes seriously hit without 
knowing it until faint from loss of blood. Men shot in 
the stomach would complain that they had been kicked, 
perhaps by a comrade in the rank before them, and would 
be astonished to learn that a bullet had drilled them 
throufrh and through. The officers, debarred in the main 
by military custom from shielding themselves as did the 
men, suffered severely in this fight. The story of one 
young lieutenant's death, told by the friendly captain 
whom England sent to see if America had any new 
message of military value for the old world, is worth 
retelling : 

" Close in front of me a sHght and boyish lieutenant com- 
pelled my attention by his persistent and reckless gallantry. 
Whenever a man was hit he would dart to his assistance, 
regardless of the fire that this exposure inevitably drew. Sud- 
denly he sprang to his feet, gazing intently into the village ; but 
what he saw we never knew, for he was instantly shot through 
the heart and fell over backward, clutching at the air. I 
followed the men who carried him to the road and asked them 
his name. ' Second Lieutenant Wansboro, sir, of the Seventh 
Infantry, and you will never see his better. He fought like a 
little tiger.' A few convulsive gasps and the poor boy was 



224 Blue Jackets of '98 

dead; and as we laid him in a shady spot by the side of the 
road, the sergeant reverently drew a handkerchief over his face 
and said, ' Good-bye, lieutenant ; you were a brave little 
officer, and you died like a true soldier.' Who would wish a 
better end 1 '" 



Non-combatants on that hard-fought field have told 
graphic stories of the carnage and of the calm manner in 
which the men met wounds or death. It seemed that the 
same cry went up from each who felt the shock of a 
bullet. " I 've got it," most would cry, dropping heavily 
to earth or rolling over clutching the wounded part, 
though some struck in the head or other mortal spot 
would raise a pitiful cry to God. As the wave of battle 
swept on, the field behind presented an appearance never 
seen until this Cuban war, for the bodies, dead or still 
living, were mostly half-stripped and lay gleaming white 
against the green grass. This came from the distribution 
to each soldier of " first aid " bandages, with instruction 
how to use them while waiting for the surgeons or hospi- 
tal stewards to arrive. As a result, every wounded man 
who had sufficient vitality tore off that part of his slender 
raiment which covered his hurt and strove to stanch the 
blood. Captain Lee, whom I have already quoted, gives 
in his article in " Scribner's Magazine " a description of the 
field hospital at El Caney that is illuminating in the light 
it throws on the methods of hospital work and on the 
fierceness of the fire that day : 

" About noon I crossed over to their position, and on nearing 
the sunken road noticed that it was full of men lying down. 
I asked an officer of the regiment who was coming down the 
road if those were his reserves I saw, and his reply was some- 
what startling : ' No, sir, by God, they are casualties.' And 
indeed they were. On reaching the spot I found over a hun- 
dred killed and wounded laid out in as many yards of road, and 
so close were they that one could only pass by stepping over 
them. There was a strange silence among these men, not a 



Blue Jackets of '98 225 

whimper or a groan, but each lay quietly nursing his wound, 
with closed eyes and set teeth, only flinching when the erratic 
sleet of bullets clipped the leaves off the hedge close above 
their heads. Many looked up curiously at my strange uniform 
as I passed, and asked quickly and quietly, ' Are you a doctor, 
sir r I could but shake my head, and they would instantly 
relapse into their strained intent attitudes, whilst I felt sick 
at heart at the thought of my incompetence. Some of the 
slightly wounded were tending those who were badly hit, and 
nothing could have surpassed the unskilled tenderness of these 
men. I was astonished, too, at their thoughtful consideration. 
'Keep well down, sir,' several said, as I stopped to speak to 
them. ' Them Mausers is flying pretty low, and there 's 
plenty of us here already.' 

" But the worst feature of it all was the scarcity of doctors. 
Hour after hour these wounded men had lain in the scorching 
sun, unattended, and often bleeding to death. Their comrades 
had in many cases applied the first-aid dressings in rough and 
unskilled fashion, but so far as one could see there had been no 
medical assistance. The nearest dressing-station was three- 
quarters of a mile to the rear, and while the medical staff there 
was undoubtedly more than busy, it was chiefly with such cases 
as were slightly enough wounded to walk down for aid. 

" One man I noticed lying very quiet in a great pool of blood. 
A comrade with a shattered leg was fanning him with a hat and 
keeping the flies off his face. I sat down beside them, and 
seeing the man was shot through the stomach, knew there was 
nothing I could do beyond giving him a little water. I asked 
him how he felt, and he replied with difficulty, 'Oh, I 'm doing 
pretty well, sir.' His companion then said: 'Well, sir, if you 
can you might send a doctor along to see this man. He was 
one of the iirst hit, about eight this morning and no one has 
seen him yet.' The wounded man here broke in: ' That 's all 
right, Mick ; I guess the doctors have more than they can do 
looking after them as are badly hurt, and they will be along 
I soon.' I looked at my watch, and it was nearly one o'clock." 

But to return to the battle, — back again to the firing- 
line whence came those brave fellows whose patience in 
the hoispital so moved the representative of England. 

16 



226 Blue Jackets of '98 

All the morning the battle had raged. The Spaniards 
in the trenches with the regularity of automatons were 
rising up to deliver a volley and then sinking back to 
safety, leaving more of our brave fellows writhing on the 
ground. The situation was becoming intolerable, for the 
advance of our men, though steady, had been so slow that 
there was no prospect of forcing the Spaniards from 
their position unless more dashing tactics were adopted. 
At one o'clock came a disquieting order from Shafter. 
The troops before San Juan were finding hotter work 
than they had expected, and Lawton was directed to leave 
El Caney and make a junction with the forces of General 
Wheeler. That meant retreat. It meant an admission 
that American troops could not carry a stronghold manned 
by Spaniards. It was a thing not to be thought of. 
Lawton instantly gave Chaffee discretion to charge the 
fort in his front, something that Chaffee had been wait- 
ing for. The tidings quickly passed along the line and 
cheered all the men in their work. The artillery 
briskened up, and its shells tore great rents in the stone 
fort as Captain Haskell's battalion of the Twelfth Infan- 
try led the charge. It was not a spectacular charge. 
There were no long lines of cheering m^n in regular for- 
mation, with battle flags waving, as at Gettysburg for 
instance. Instead the spectator on the flank who from a 
position of comparative safety watched the advance saw a 
few men without formation advancing in groups slowly, 
while behind them some twenty paces followed a larger 
body of soldiers, who would run forward bent almost 
double for a few rods, then drop to the ground and crawl 
and wriggle on a bit, then rise and dash on again. A 
barbed-wire fence stopped the advance for a moment near 
the crest of the hill ; but this was speedily cut, and the 
assailants dashed through the breaches. Then the Span- 
iards could be seen rising on the high ground behind 
their trenches and turning in flight. The fort had long 
been silent and its flag had been shot away, but soon 



Blue Jackets of '98 227 

through glasses the men back on the firing-line could see 
a man in civilian garb entering the fort while the storm- 
ing-party danced and cheered from the top of the earth- 
works and from the outside of the stone citadel. The 
civilian who thus led the assailants w^as James Creelman, 
a correspondent for the " New York Journal." He found 
fort and trenches filled with dead and wounded Spaniards 
who made no effort at resistance. The scene spoke 
volumes for the courage of the defenders, for fort and 
trenches were literally paved with their bodies. None of 
the men who were engaged in the attack on the hill at 
El Caney ever afterwards expressed doubt whether the 
Spaniards would fight. 

But the jollification on top of the hill was cut short 
when the Spaniards recommenced without ceremony their 
exposition of the fact that valour and pertinacity in battle 
are not the exclusive possession of any one people. The 
elated victors suddenly discovered that the battle was not 
ended, and that they had captured for themselves a most 
exposed position, against which the enemy from other 
block-houses on his line and from the houses and church 
tower in the village were now directing a galling fire. 
The bullets spattered against the stone fort, and one slip- 
ping in through an embrasure wounded Creelman, who was 
within. There was no cover for the large party which 
had by this time gathered at the dearly won position, and 
the best they could do was to drop to earth and pump 
away with their repeating-rifies at the enemy in the streets 
of the town. But the first success had stimulated the 
other troops on the American line, and they began to 
stream across the hollow and up against the Spanish lines. 
Such was the enthusiasm and dash of the assault, tlvit the 
enemy fled from every block-house and streamed away 
through the city streets in full retreat, with the rifles of 
the Americans blazing down pitilessly from the captured 
heights. There was little attempt at pursuit, for no cavalry 
was at hand and the men were worn out with a long day 



2 28 Blue Jackets of '98 

of hard fighting. In all 158 prisoners were taken, each 
of whom made ready for instant slaughter, as had been 
the pleasing practice in the Cuban war before quixotic 
Americans introduced new customs. We had lost in this 
hot day's fight nearly 500 in killed and wounded out of 
3500 engaged. The enemy lost half of the thousand men 
in his trenches. It was a heavy price in human life to 
pay for one step on the way to Santiago. 

Meanwhile at San Juan had been raging a battle almost I 
as sanguinary and quite as fierce. "When Lawton's divi- 
sion had branched off to the north on its way to the hard- 
fought battle-field of El Caney, that part of the army J 
which was designed for the capture of San Juan went 
straight ahead down the worn and sunken road which led 
direct to the enemy's stronghold at Santiago. It was not 
a good road at the best, for on either side of it rose banks 
three or four feet high, as if it were a ditch — which indeed 
it further resembled, from the fact that the rains which 
had now set in had left two or three inches of water at 
the bottom which the tramping feet of thousands of men 
soon churned into mud. At points the road was forty I 
feet wide, but at others it was only ten ; and as the columns 
proceeding down it were continuous, the narrowest width 
fixed its total capacity. The troops marched in columns i 
of twos down either side of the river of mud, while up and 
down the middle galloped mounted aides carrying orders, > 
and now and then a pack train with ammunition, spatter- 
ing with mire the plodding men as they passed. In those 
patient, toiling columns were the dismounted cavalry regi- 
ments under Generals Sumner and Wood, including the 
Eough Riders, and six regiments of regular infantry under 
General Kent. Their task for the first day was to march 
to the edge of the woods fronting the Spanish position at 
San Juan. There they were to bivouac for the night, 
and in the morning attack, when they heard Lawton's 
guns at El Caney. It was expected, when the plan of 



Blue Jackets of '98 229 

battle was formulated, that the little stone fort on the hill 
would delay Lawton only briefly, and when he had run 
over El Caney the troops before San Juan were to swing 
in behind him, and completely invest the city on the 
north. But both at El Caney and at San Juan the enemy's 
stand was unexpectedly plucky, the headquarters plan 
was smashed, and, but that the soldiers and regimental 
commanders took authority into their own hands and 
adopted the t;^ctics that the situation on the field of battle 
dictated, the day might have been lost. The men who 
saved the day were ill fed, half clothed, left by the ineffi- 
ciency of their superiors without food to maintain their 
health or medicines to restore it when lost. The utterly 
insufficient methods of maintaining communication with 
the base of supplies at Daiquiri had resulted in the troops 
being kept on half rations during the days of the heaviest 
fighting, — a time when, if ever, a soldier should be supplied 
with everything needed to keep his physical strength at 
the highest point. The cheerfulness of the army under 
these circumstances was the mar\^el of the foreign attaches. 
The men accepted half rations or no rations at all, with 
only a little good-natured grumbling, and the loud cheers 
which greeted the arrival of a wagon train supposed to be 
rations changed but little in their note of enthusiasm 
when the load proved to be ammunition, or even, as in 
one case, an observation balloon, which in the end served 
only as a means of making the enemy's fire more accurate 
and murderous. 

San Juan was a typical Spanish stronghold. Along a 
ridge ran lines of earthworks connecting block-houses 
which stood on little peaks rising above the general crest 
of the hill. Before the trenches were entanglements of 
barbed wire to catch and hold an assailant while the 
deadly Mausers from the heights beyond did their work. 
For some hundreds of yards the ground sloped away in 
front, largely denuded of trees and brush but covered with 
grass waist deep. The road from Siboney debouched on 



230 Blue Jackets of '98 

this clearing at a point in full command of the Spanish 
guns. To either side of the road extended heavy thickets, 
through which shells and Mauser bullets could indeed 
make their way easily, but the passage for men was pain- 
ful and slow. 

The attacking force had spent the night in the vicinity 
of El Poso. From there to Santiago it was about three 
miles, and from the place of bivouac the soldiers could see 
the lights glittering in the streets of the city which was to 
be their goal. How heavy a toll of human life was to be 
exacted for passage over that short stretch of quiet country 
road ! Half-way to Santiago was San Juan. Dawn found 
the troops turning out, cooking a hasty and insufficient 
breakfast and preparing for the advance. Through the 
rising mist, ominous foreteller of malarial ills to come, 
they could look across to the enemy's works, see the 
Spanish flag floating proudly, and mark the morning smoke 
rising gently above the red roofs of San Juan. Wheeler's 
cavalry division — then in command of General Sumner, 
Wlieeler being ill — lay on the hill of El Poso about the 
guns of Grimes's battery. Kent's division had bivouacked 
near the road farther back. The task of the morning for 
these commands was to proceed down the road to a speci- 
fied point in the enemy's front, there deploy to right and 
left until Sumner's right should join Lawton's left — the 
latter officer being expected to have run over the little 
fort at El Caney by that time — and Kent's left touch 
the right of Duffield, who was expected to drive the Span- 
iards from a position they held at Aguadores. Thus com- 
pleted, the line was to sweep over San Juan and on to 
Santiago. The first and chief obstacle to the complete 
fulfilment of the plan was the stubbornness of the Spanish 
defence at El Caney, where Lawton was held until late in 
the afternoon instead of being ready to co-operate with 
Sumner and Kent by nine o'clock, as was hoped. A 
second obstacle was the failure of Duffield to carry his 
objective point at all. This did not, however, materially 



Blue Jackets of '98 231 

affect the final result, though, had the Spaniards been as 
aggressive as they were plucky in defence, they might 
have taken advantage of Duffield's failure to outflank our 
lines on the left with possibly disastrous results. 

Grimes opened fire at sunrise. A great cloud of smoke 
indicated his position with precision to the enemy, who 
responded at once with well-aimed shells. The effect 
showed the onlookers the unwisdom of stationing un- 
sheltered troops near a battery in action, for the enemy's 
fire fell heavily upon the Rough Riders and other cavalry 
commands on the hill. They speedily deserted that posi- 
tion and swung into the road, where already the men of 
Kent's command were trudging manfully along toward 
the front. The road was choked with marching men, 
among whose ranks the spiteful bullets were searching 
insistently for victims. At the head of the column the 
troops were deploying out into the fields and forest on 
either side of the road and forming the line of battle. 
General Shafter, far in the rear, had defined the night 
before the exact limit of the advance, and had directed 
that, that spot attained, the army should wait for further 
orders. The difficulty with this arrangement was that 
the spot indicated was exposed to the fire of the enemy, 
who had the range exactly, and the further orders never 
came. General Shafter says, however, that his plan of 
the night before was disarranged by the delay at the fort 
of El Caney, and that when it was found that Lawton 
would not be able to lead the attack on San Juan, 
Kent and Sumner were ordered to go on without waiting 
for him. " They understood," continues the general, " that 
they were to assail the Spanish block-houses and trenches 
as soon as they could get into position, for there was no 
longer any intention of waiting until Lawton should come 
up on the right." There seems to be some doubt whether 
Kent and Sumner did understand that they were to make 
an assault. At any rate, the misunderstanding was such 
that for a long time the troops were halted under a heavy 



232 Blue Jackets of '98 

fire from the enemy, many of them being m the crowded 
road where a bullet or a shell did double execution. 
From the long line of Spanish breastworks, from the 
block-houses on the hill, and from sharpshooters in the 
bushes and trees came a deadly fire. The rattle of 
machine guns rose above the din of battle, and their 
streaming bullets sped down the road, leaving rows of 
wounded and dead men behind. No wreath of smoke 
gave a hint of the position of any Spanish gun. A sharp- 
shooter might be perched in a tree within fifty yards of 
our lines, and if he kept his body hidden he could pick 
off our men in entire safety. It appeared that many of 
these sharpshooters had secured hiding-places in the rear 
of our troops, — a condition always galling and demoralis- 
ing to the men who suffer. This General Shafter doubts, 
saying that the long range of the Mausers gave the drop- 
ping and almost spent bullets the appearance of coming 
from the rear; but this explanation seems hardly plau- 
sible. There had been so little reconnoitring or skirmish- 
ing in the neighbourhood that it is entirely probable an 
army advancing by night down a single narrow road 
might have left hundreds of concealed sharpshooters on 
its flanks and rear. 

Under the most advantageous circumstances the ad- 
vance of a large body of troops along a narrow road is 
but slow. On this scorching July day, when the sun 
seemed as pitiless as the bullets, the advance seemed to 
be at a snail's pace. Well disciplined as the men were, 
the dropping of a man checked for a brief moment the 
advance of those behind him, and men were dropping 
fast. There was no stopping to care for the wounded. 
The utmost that could be done was to lay them to one 
side of the road, where they remained until the hospital 
stewards came along and painfully carried them to the 
shore of the little brook where the field hospital was 
established, — " Bloody Bend," the soldiers dubbed it. As 
the opening of the road into the fields before San Juan 



Blue Jackets of '98 233 

was approached, the men defiled through gaps in the 
fences into the woods on either side, where they spread out 
to right and left. They were invisible to the Spaniards 
there, but their position was well enough known, and the 
fire was pitiless. Every shot from an American rifle 
furnislied tlie enemy with a target, and many a man on 
the field cursed the lack of prevision in the department 
at Washington which had left to the soldiers of a nation 
boasting itself the most progressive, the old-fashioned 
and dangerous black powder, while antiquated Spain — 
" poor old Spain," this Spain which we described as old- 
fogy, " moss-backed," everything that expressed lack of 
progress and enterprise — had the best smokeless powder, 
the best rifles, and plenty of both. But we had some 
modern engines of war — or at least we flattered our- 
selves we had. With the Kough Pdders was an engine of 
destruction called the dynamite gun. Its name suggested 
terrifying possibilities, and its appearance, being unlike 
any form of artillery known to soldiers, stimulated the 
imagination of men. But its accomplishments were dis- 
appointing. In the hands of a body of picked men of 
unusual intelligence, enthusiasm, and energy, it still failed 
to perform any feats of carnage. It was too heavy to get 
into effective position, its range was limited, and from 
some fault in construction it was continually getting 
choked and put out of action. There was also a balloon 
that was expected to be of inestimable service in recon- 
noitring. This was not a wholly new idea, as balloons 
were often employed during the Franco-Prussian war; 
but it may be said that our use of the balloon with 
Shafter's army was entirely novel. For on this day of 
hard shooting and heavy loss, when our lines were within 
almost point-blank range of the enemy and enjoying only 
a little immunity from loss because the thickets hid 
them, the balloon was sent up some fifty yards imme- 
diately above a road packed with soldiers. Some of the 
enemy's marksmen intelligently reasoned that at the point 



234 Blue Jackets of '98 

where the controlling cord of the balloon touched the 
earth there must be men, so they fired there with results 
profitable to them and disastrous to us. Others let fly 
at the great ball of silk itself, and their bullets dropping 
to earth behind fell among our men far back on the road. 
As an invitation to effective musketry that balloon has 
not been equalled in military history, and an eye-witness 
avers that when it had at last been happily disabled by 
a shot, the oihcer descending it reported, as the sole 
fruit of his observations, that he had seen " men over on 
those hills firing upon our lines," — a fact already suffi- 
ciently established by the testimony of our dead and 
wounded. 

A fearful sight was that road after the tide of battle had 
swept on. Lined on either side with blankets, coats, 
ponchos, belts, food, and the various impedimenta which 
the men rushing into battle had thrown aside ; the soft 
soil trampled into mud and soaked at many a spot with a 
redder and warmer liquid than ever fell from the skies 
or gushed from the lush stems of tropical plants ; dotted 
all too often with dead men, — some, calm of face, lying on 
extended backs gazing up into the blue mystery of the 
heavens, others frightfully distorted as though death had 
come amidst excruciating pains ; here and there a dead 
horse, or, more pitiful still, a sorely wounded one with a 
look of dumb suffering and patient wonder in his eyes ; 
the bushes on the side scarred by flying bullets, and even 
the larger trees shot through and through, — all formed a 
picture which could never be forgotten by him who be- 
held it, a picture of war at its deadliest, a picture which 
showed how the fairest face of nature could be made 
frightful when man and his hatreds had their way with 
it. 

For hours the devoted soldiers stood in the road of 
death or lay firing ineffective volleys from the cover of the 
woods. No order to advance came. The sound of battle 
coming across the country from El Caney gave no indica- 



Blue Jackets of '98 235 

tion that Lawton had carried that point. The bullets cut 
savagely through the grass, and snipped the leaves from 
the trees and bushes as fast as though expert wielders of 
a sickle were there at work. Men whose duty compelled 
them to expose themselves erect to the enemy's lire were 
falling fast. Captain O'Neill — " Bucky," most picturesque 
of the Eough Eiders — received a bullet fair in the forehead 
just as he had boasted, " There is no Spanish bullet made 
that can kill me." It became plain to the rawest soldier 
in the ranks that to remain still under that fire meant ob- 
literation. To retreat was not to be thought. A trooper 
lying flat on his face in a row of his fellows put the feel- 
ings of all in a phrase when he grunted, " Boys, I have got 
to go one way or the other pretty damned quick." But 
there was only one way for American soldiers in the face 
of the enemy to go, and suddenly it appeared that all along 
the line this conclusion was reached at the same moment, 
and all sprung forward in a desperate charge. 

By whom the advance was ordered is a matter not 
made clear by either the official reports or the accounts of 
observers on the field. It was seemingly much such a 
spontaneous act of all on the line as was the capture of 
Lookout Mountain by Grant's troops, not only without, but 
in defiance of, the general's orders. Inspector-General 
Breckinridge in his report says only : " About one o'clock, 
after a delay of nearly two hours waiting for the troops to 
reach their positions, the whole force advanced, charged 
and carried the enemy's first line of intrenchments." 
General Wheeler in his report says : " It was evident that 
we were as much under fire in forming the line as we 
could be by an advance, and I therefore pressed the com- 
mand forward from the covering under which it was 
formed." General Kent, whose report gives the best of- 
ficial account of the action, describes the charge as simply 
part of the general forward movement ordered by him. 
Some correspondents were inclined to ascribe the assault 
as due to the sudden initiative of comparatively subordi- 



236 Blue Jackets of '98 

nate officers ; thus in the story as told by one appears 
this description of Colonel Eoosevelt's part : 

" Colonel Roosevelt, on horseback, broke from the woods 
behind the line of the Tenth, and finding its men lying in his 
way, shouted : ' If you don't wish to go forward, let my men 
pass, please.' Captain Bigelow and the other junior officers 
of the Tenth, with their negroes, instantly sprang into hue with 
the Rough Riders, and charged at the blue block-house on the 
right." 

Another saw, or thought he saw, General Hawkins wave 
his hand toward the breastworks, and set that tide of men 
in blue to rising slowly but irresistibly up the hill. The 
matter is immaterial. However the order came, the men 
were ready and eager for it, and the hills were won by 
the men who carried guns. The charge was not spec- 
tacular. The troops advanced by rushes, one platoon 
running a few yards forward, then falling on its face 
while at its right another platoon would rise, dash beyond 
it, and in turn sink to earth. The dismounted cavalry, 
Roosevelt's men and the Tenth, or coloured cavalry, who 
supported them on their left, went up almost as individu- 
als ; the colonels in the front, Roosevelt mounted and 
" yelling like an Indian," as one admirer telegraphed home, 
the men following, stooping low, sending a shot ahead 
when occasion offered, falling to earth when the enemy's 
fire grew too hot, and running when there seemed a chance 
to make a few yards. They fell fast indeed, and the slope 
behind them was dotted thickly with writhing men or 
bodies strangely silent, but the advance was uninterrupted. 
On the left could be seen General Hawkins going up at 
the head of his brigade of infantry, his erect stalwart 
figure and determined mien giving his white hair the lie. 
To his support went speedily the Third Brigade under Colo- 
nel Wikoff, wlio fell ere the crest was reached. Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Worth succeeded him in command, and 
quickly in death too. So also of Colonel Liscum, the third 



Blue Jackets of '98 237 

in command. The Spaniards were firing in volleys, and 
their machine guns were rolling with devilish zeal from 
every block-house. Now the point of interest is on the 
right, where the watchers can see that the Spanish fire from 
the San Juan fort, as one block-house was called, is slacken- 
ing. Through glasses the defenders can be seen strag- 
ghng out of the trenches there and running down the hill, 
and our men with a new burst of speed swarming around 
the ends and into trenches and house. It is the cavalry 
that has been victorious there, for first the yellow flag and 
then the bright-coloured guidons of the different troops can 
be seen fluttering on the hill. It can be seen, too, that the 
end is not yet reached. In the midst of the cheering the 
victors falter and seem to fall back, as though they had taken 
a position they were not strong enough to hold. But they 
quickly pulled themselves together and returned. Mean- 
while on the rest of the line the men were rapidly near- 
ing the crest. Here and there a bugle sung notes of 
encouragement and command. Officers moved along among 
the men, fairly pushing them forward. To the men left be- 
hind, that rising line seemed to be growing perilously thin 
as it neared the top. Sometimes it seemed about to disap- 
pear altogether, broken up into fragments as a great wave is 
shattered among rocks. It lagged, and the men who still 
struggled on could be seen to be sorely tired, while the 
little heaps of dead and wounded grew more numerous 
minute by minute. In the very front strode a young 
lieutenant of the Sixteenth Infantry, and by him, shoulder 
to shoulder, up the slope marched the standard-bearer of 
the regiment proudly bearing a great flag, while on the 
other side marched a private and a flute-player, the latter 
a boy of sixteen who looked years younger. Near the 
crest the private fell. Lieutenant Ord turned in answer 
to a faint cry from him. The wound was clearly mortal, 
and the officer was about to turn away, when the soldier 
said painfully : " I 'm done for. Lieutenant. But you had 
better take my steel nippers. There may be another wire 



238 Blue Jackets of '98 

fence beyond the hill, and I won't be there to cut it for | 
you." The little musician struggled on with his com- 
mander, marched by him until in the hour of victory a 
Spanish prisoner whom he was about to help shot the 
young officer dead. And still the boy sat by the body. 
" I was going back," said the little flute-player, when 
asked how he, so weak and so useless, had joined in that 
fierce charge. " I wanted to go back to the hospital and 
look after Colonel Egbert when he fell wounded, and I 
was doing no good at the front, for my flute is ruined with 
the mud and rain. But just as I started I heard Mr. Ord 
say, ' Now, all the boys who 's brave will follow me ; all 
the boys who 's brave, follow me ; ' and then he rushed 
ahead, and kept that up about half an hour, resting a 
little while and then rushing ahead. And every time he 
started up he would shout back, ' Now, all the boys who 's 
brave will follow me.' So all the boys followed him, and 
as I was lighter I got farther ahead than most." " Were n't 
you afraid, sonny ? " asked an officer. Stephen Bonsai tells 
the story. " I was very fearful, sir, but I was n't afraid." 
Soon the Americans were established along the crest 
which had formed the advanced line of the Spanish posi- 
tion. The enemy retired to a second line, and kept up a 
vicious fire while our men intrenched themselves as well 
as might be with their bayonets and hands while awaiting 
the arrival of intrenching tools from the rear. The glory 
of the day had been won by the regulars, the Rough 
Eiders alone of the volunteer organisations having any 
share in it. An unfortunate feature of the day's work 
was the action of the Seventy-first New York Volunteers, 
out of which a bitter controversy afterwards arose. It 
can best be described here in the words of General Kent's 
official report. After detailing the situation on the road 
near the ford, he says : 

"I hastened to tlie forks made by this road, and soon after 
the Seventy-first New York Regiment and Hawlcins's brigade 
came up. I turned them into the bypath indicated by Lieu- 



Blue Jackets of '98 239 

tenant-Colonel Derby, leading to the lower ford, sending word 
to General Hawkins of this movement. This would have 
speedily delivered them in their proper place on the left of 
their brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the first 
battalion of this regiment was thrown into confusion and 
recoiled in disorder on the troops in the rear. At this critical 
moment tlie officers of my staff practically formed a cordon be- 
hind the panic-stricken men, and urged them to again go for- 
ward. I finally ordered them to lie down in the thicket, and 
clear the way for others of their own regiment who were com- 
ing up behind. This many of them did, and the Second and 
Third battalions came forward in better order, and moved along 
tlie road toward the ford. One of my staff officers ran back, 
waving his hat to hurry forward the Third Brigade, who upon 
approaching the forks found the way blocked by men of the 
Seventy-first. There were other men of this regiment crouch- 
ing in the bushes, many of whom were encouraged by the 
advance of the approaching column to rise and go forward. . . . 
The head of Wikoflf's brigade reached the forks at 12.20 p. m., 
and hurried to the left, stepping over the prostrate forms of 
men of the Seventy-first." 

It was unfortunate for the good name of this regiment 
of volunteers — one of the " swell " regiments of New 
York City — that the first fire fell upon officers unused to 
war, and who seemed to be without the cool courage 
which would enable them to meet the situation. The 
men were demoralised by the failure of their leaders. 
Among them were many who keenly felt the disgrace 
which they saw coming upon their regiment, and who 
took their guns and fell in with other commands which 
were more fortunately led. But the defection of the 
Seventy-first as a body left the field of San Juan one 
which was won by regulars almost without aid. The 
Eough Eiders alone carried the standard of the volunteer 
army high and proudly. 

Mid-afternoon found our men in position all along the 
ridge. The enemy's retreat had been precipitate, but 
there was no effort at pursuit. General Wheeler reports 



240 Blue Jackets of '98 

of his men that after having carried the ridge " they were 
absolutely unable to proceed farther." Moreover, the 
question of holding the position won was one which took 
precedence over any possible pursuit. The enemy had 
only retired to another line nearer the city, and from 
thence continued the fire upon the unprotected captors 
of the hill. The victors had possession of long rows of 
rifle-pits, facing the wrong way, and several block-houses 
pierced for firing toward our own lines, but blank on the 
side of the enemy. The Spanish artillery quickly showed 
how little shelter the block-houses would offer, and sug- 
gested that the fight for possession might have been less 
bloody had the American troops been as well supplied 
with cannon. The men lay flat on the crest of the hill, 
panting with their exertion, and wondering what next. 
They could not rise to retreat ; it would have been mad- 
ness to go forward. A rush of Dillenback's battery to 
the crest of the hill gave promise of support, and the 
men cheered wildly, as the heavy guns came rumbling up 
the slope, the bright guidons flying, horses galloping, 
whips cracking, and all swung into position and let fly 
with a roar. But it was a brief diversion. In full view 
from the Spanish trenches the artillery men were easy 
targets for the Mausers, and they fell too fast for their 
fire to be effective. Limbering up again, the battery 
rushed back to the spot whence it had come. The Mauser 
rifle makes artillery useless at the old close range. It 
vras mid-afternoon, and since dawn the men had had 
nothing to eat, nor was there anything now available, for 
no rations had come from the rear, the mule trains being 
busy hurrying ammunition to the front. Later in the 
day General Wlieeler arrived among the rifle-pits which 
held the men of his cavalry division. He had risen from 
a bed of sickness to hasten to the sound of the firing, and 
now went up and down the lines speaking words of en- 
couragement to the men. It was on this day that the 
wiry veteran of the Civil War delighted his men by climb- 



Blue Jackets of '98 241 

ing a tree despite his sixty-odd years, and shouting from 
its top : " They 're running ! They 're running ! See the 
Yanks — no, no, I mean the Spaniards, run." When the 
guns were roaring, the memories of the days when he 
fought with Lee against the forces of the Union some- 
times confused the gallant defender of the Stars and 
Stripes in Cuba. 

General Shafter, too, was drawn from his cot by the 
news of the battle, and from the hill at El Poso sent 
orders to the front to intrench, and to the rear to hurry 
forward the intrenching tools. He expected the Span- 
iards would attack furiously in the morning, and every 
nerve was strained to prepare for them. The men who 
had fought all day worked in relays all night digging 
trenches. About midnight Bates's brigade, wliich had 
fought at El Caney, came up, after a hard march, and was 
sent in on Kent's extreme left. Lawton, after settling 
the affair at Caney, had started at once for the scene of 
battle in the centre, but encountering unexpected resist- 
ance, had retraced his steps, and come up from the rear. 
The march took him until noon of the 2d. General 
Shafter tells a story illustrative of the tireless patience 
of the soldiers who fought and marched on those two 
bloody days. A correspondent, as the Tenth Cavalry was 
coming into position on the 2d, noticed one of the ser- 
geants, a tall muscular black, carrying a little dog, the 
regimental mascot, in his arms. " Sergeant," he asked, 
" did n't you march all night before last ? " " Yes, sah." 
" And did n't you fight all day yesterday at El Caney ? " 
" 'Deed, I did." " Did n't you march all night last night 
too ? " " Yes, sah." " Then why are you carrying that 
dog ? " " Why, boss, the dawg 's tired." 

But while the men to whom the battle left strength 
and high spirits were working with pick and shovel, or 
dragging guns into new position, or bringing up more 
ammunition, or foraging for food, there were sorry sights 
in the hospitals, and in the spots where the dead were 

16 



242 Blue Jackets of '98 

brought for identification and burial. The day had been 
one of heavy losses. That ridge which now displayed the 
tattered flags of the victorious regiments had cost dear. 
Of the infantry, 12 officers and 77 men were killed, 82 
officers and 463 men were wounded. Of the cavalry, 6 
officers and 40 men were slain, and 223 men wounded. 

That night there was grave discussion among the 
American officers whether the position so gallantly won 
should not be abandoned. The heavy losses of the day 
were depressing ; the fact that between the heights and the 
town lay the very strongest point on the Spanish line of 
defence, the apparent activity of the enemy in preparing to 
attack in the morning, and the knowledge that not far away 
were 5000 Spaniards marching to reinforce Santiago, with 
only the Cubans to keep them out, all combined to make 
even the stoutest-hearted doubt whether the San Juan 
ridge could be held, or was worth the holding. It may 
be noted here that the Cubans failed to cut off the Span- 
ish reinforcements, as indeed throughout the operations 
before Santiago they failed signally to be of service to 
our forces. During the night following the action, General 
Duffield's failure to carry the Spanish works at Aguadores 
became known, and the officers recognised that the 
American army occupied the perilous position known in 
military technology as " resting its left flank in the air." 
But while these doubts and these problems harassed the 
minds of the general officers, the company officers and 
men were working sturdily at the trenches, and the morn- 
ing of the 2d found the troops on the ridge safely in- 
trenched. The east was just turning gray when the 
Spaniards opened a heavy fire on our works. Our men 
withheld their fire except when some especially rash 
Spaniard offered a target that could not be ignored. Not 
a cannon sounded from our lines. It was seen that there 
might be long work and hot work before the city nestling 
snugly in its nost of hills could be taken, and the word 
was passed to be saving of ammunition. On the night 



Blue Jackets of 98 243 

before, indeed, there had for a time been grave apprehen- 
sion lest ammunition might actually give out, and our sol- 
diers in this new war for liberty be left as defenceless on 
the crest of San Juan hill as were the patriots on Bunker 
Hill a century and a quarter ago. Frederick Eemiugton, 
the well-known war artist, tells of the enthusiasm with 
which a pack-train coming from the rear with ammuni- 
tion was hailed by men who were half starved and who 
knew well enough that a road crowded with ammunition 
trains would not get through any rations that night : 

" The wounded going to the rear, cheered the ammunition, 
and when it was unpacked at the front, the soldiers seized it 
like gold. They lifted a box in tlie air and dropped it on one 
corner, which smashed it open. 

" 'Now we can hold San Juan hill against them garlics — 
hey, son ! ' yelled a happy cavalryman to a doughboy. 

" 'You bet — until we starve to death.' 

'• ' Starve nothin' — we '11 eat them gun-teams.' " 

With cartridge belts filled anew, the defenders of the 
hill crouched all day in the trenches, watchful for an as- 
sault and keeping up just enough of a response to compel 
the enemy to be cautious. Far away on the southwest 
the deep thunder of the navy's guns could be heard. The 
fleet was engaging the Socapa battery. In the harbour 
the hapless Cervera was getting ready to make his dash 
the next day, and at the rear of our lines General Shafter 
was considering whether a retreat would be necessary. 
At half-past nine at night the Spaniards made a vigorous 
sortie, and drove our men for a few minutes from several 
points on the line. The positions were retaken, however, 
iand the Spaniards driven back with heavy loss. Shortly 
afterwards at El Poso a council of war was held to dis- 
cuss the wisdom of withdrawing to a more protected 
position. General Shafter had cabled to the United States 
that the enemy had been driven from his works, but that 
the American lines were so thin that he might be com- 



244 Blue Jackets of '98 

pelled to take a position farther to the rear. The situation 
was so abruptly changed the next day by the news of the 
destruction of Cervera that the general was bitterly con- 
demned for his despatch, and even for considering a 
retreat at all. The facts seem to show this criticism to 
be unjust. Many of the officers at the front, including 
General Wheeler, whose course throughout the campaign 
came in for the most generous laudation, are said to have 
advised retreat on the afternoon and night of the 1st. 
General Shafter himself, so far from being the originator 
of the plan to withdraw, opposed it. That his cable 
message was unwise is doubtless true, for it needlessly 
alarmed the officials at Washington, and would have 
greatly alarmed the people, and correspondingly have 
encouraged the Spaniards, had it been published by itself. 
Happily, however, when the newspapers secured the 
despatch, the news of Cervera's annihilation was made 
pubhc as well. It is enough to say of the controversy 
over the proposition for a withdrawal, that whatever 
may have been the individual opinions of the division 
commanders on the afternoon and night of July 1st 
and through the day of the 2d, when they came to ex- 
press themselves officially on the night of the 2d, each 
with one accord voted to stick to the trenches on the 
ridge. Perhaps the greeting of a .=oldier whom Shafter 
passed on his way to the conference, and whose bleeding 
wounds suggested the price paid for that ridge, even as his 
words indicated the pride of the men who took it in their 
achievement, may have had something to do with General 
Shafter's determination to stick. " They gave us a hell of 
a fight, General," said the poor fellow, in a weak voice, 
" but we drove them out." The general saluted and rode 
on, visibly affected, says one who rode by him. 

No battle-field of history, perhaps, has had its incidents, 
stirring, pathetic, or ridiculous, so fully commemorated in 
story as this of Santiago. In an age when all men write, 
and a multitude write well, it was the hunting-ground of 



Blue Jackets of '98 245 

an army of correspondents, magazinists, and novelists who 
dressed with more or less skill the incidents they saw and 
tiie anecdotes they heard. The horrors of the held hospital 
at Bloody Bend have been described by many skilled pens, 
until behind them the service of those who suffered there 
that human hberty might make a new and a giant stride 
seem almost hidden. There had been no expectation of 
such a great number of wounded as fell at Santiago, and 
the inevitable cruelties of a field hospital were multiplied 
threefold. For lack of ambulances, rough wagons, desti- 
tute of either springs or cushions, were employed in 
bringing the sufferers to the hospital. On the hard board 
floors of these jolting vehicles they slid helplessly about, 
often jolting down into one bleeding, suffering, screaming 
mass at the end. At the hospital where the Red Cross 
flag waved, often without proper respect from the enemy, 
the surgeons worked all night by fitful, spluttering lamps. 
The wounded came faster than the swiftest knives could 
work, and they lay in long rows waiting for attention. 
For those whom a glance showed to be beyond aid there 
was little care given, — brutal it seemed to pass them by 
with a hopeless gesture which too surely told the dying 
his hopeless state, — but mercy to those whom mercy might 
aid compelled it. There was dearth of anaesthetics, dearth 
even of surgical instruments. There was, as at Bingen- 
on-the-Rhine, 

". . . lack of woman's nursing, 
There was dearth of woman's tears." 

But there was courage amid all the suffering, manliness 
in the midst of death in its most cruel form. The lives 
that were yielded up in that hospital were lives mankind 
could ill afford to spare, for they were the lives of men 
who had been ready to die for their country. 

The next morning, July 3d, General Shafter sent by a 
flag of truce into the lines of the Spanish a demand for the 
surrender of Santiago. " I have the honour to inform, 



246 Blue Jackets of '98 

you," said the American commander in this communica- 
tion, " unless you surrender, I shall be compelled to shell 
Santiago de Cuba. Please instruct the citizens of all 
foreign countries, and all women and children, that they 
should leave the city before ten A. M. to-morrow." An 
audacious demand this, considering that it followed within 
a few hours a serious consideration on the part of the 
Americans whether they could hold the line they had 
won. Audacious too for the fact that, despite the threat 
of a bombardment, Shafter had really but few heavy siege- 
guns, and the bombardment by the navy had proved wholly 
ineffective. It is noticeable that in reporting the de- 
spatch of his demand for a surrender General Shafter says 
he informed all the division and brigade commanders of 
the fact. It may be presumed justly that the demand 
was made quite as much to restore the morale of the 
American troops as in any hope that it would be fruitful. 
But the flag of truce had been gone but two or three 
hours when along the lines passed suddenly a rumour 
that the Spanish fleet had gone to destruction, and Santi- 
ago's chief defence was demolished. The news came to 
General Shafter from Lawton's lines. He sent out at once 
this bulletin, — a phrase of which adds to the evidence 
that he felt need of cheering the men in the trenches in 
every possible way : 

" Lieutenant Allen, Second Cavalry, from our extreme right 
where he overlooked the bay, states that Admiral Cervera's 
fleet steamed out this morning and engaged our fleet. The 
French consul who came into our lines yesterday informed 
General Garcia that Admiral Cervera said yesterday that it 
was better to die fighting than to sink liis sliips. Rush this 
information all around our lines at the front." 

The mere news that the Spaniards had gone out to fight 
was hailed by our men as though it were the tidings of a 
victory, and when later in the evening the actual intel- 
ligence of Schley's glorious triumph aiTived, there was 



Blue Jackets of '98 247 

pandemonium on the lines. Men leaped to their feet and 
executed wild war-dances on the crest of the Spanish 
trenches in full view of the sulking Spaniards, for the 
truce was still on and no jealous sharpshooter could cut 
short the rejoicing of any. The bands played patriotic airs, 
and especially a music-hall ditty which had come to be 
almost the official air of the army in Cuba, — " There '11 
be a hot time in the old town to-night." Bonfires 
blazed, salutes were fired, — most of them without the 
connivance of the commanding officers, for there was still 
a likelihood that graver use might be found for all the 
available ammunition. Though the response of General 
Toral, who had succeeded linares in command of the 
Spanish forces, came in the midst of the rejoicing, and 
though it bore a refusal to surrender, it checked the 
celebration not a whit. The foreign consuls in the city 
asked that the armistice then in force should be continued 
longer than had been offered by General Shafter, in order 
that the women and children might be moved to places 
of safety. This was agreed upon, and a temporary peace 
settled down over the battle-scarred field. Both sides 
employed the lull in strengthening their works. General 
Shafter moved reinforcements to the front, put mortars 
and siege-guns in place, brought up reserve rations, and 
prepared for a long wait. From Washington came orders 
to consider no terms except unconditional surrender. 



CHAPTEK XII 

Rigidity of the Blockade — The Bombardments — The Ma- 
rines AT GUANTANAMO — CeRVERA's DaSH FOR LIBERTY — 

The Fleet Alert — Absence of the Flagship and the Ad- 
miral — The Controversy over the Honours — Destruc- 
tion OF THE "Infanta Maria Teresa" — Capture of 
Admiral Cervera — Gallant Fight of the " Gloucester " 

— The Annihilation of the Torpedo Destroyers — The 
"Almirante Oquendo " Beached — The End of the 
" Vizcaya " — Magnificent Work of the "Oregon" and 
"Texas" — The "Cristobal Colon's" Fight for Life 

— The End of the Spanish Squadron — Effects of 
American Gunnery — The Disposal of the Prisoners. 

OUTSIDE the entrance to the harbour of Santiago de 
Cuba the men on the great steel ships had been 
sweltering in enforced idleness, while their brethren of 
the army had been enjoying and enduring so much. Life 
on a battle-ship in the latitude of the south side of Cuba 
in the months of June and July is not like summer 
yachting. The great ships in their war-paint absorbed 
instead of radiating the heat, and the atmosphere in the 
crowded berth-deck and even in the compact little state- 
rooms of the officers was stifling. Happy were they who 
could get permission to sleep on the superstructure, where 
some air at least found passage. The daily routine for 
both officers and men was quite as arduous as if it were 
not wholly destitute of anything Like glory. Night and . 
day the mouth of the harbour had to be watched. From 
every ship a certain number of alert eyes were at all times ' 
riveted on that point. Columbus in those West Indian 
waters peered no more eagerly from the bow of his 
caravel for the first sight of land, than did fifty pairs of 
keen American eyes gaze toward that gap in the hilly 



Blue Jackets of '98 249 

coast of Cuba, looking for the first sight of the advancing 
vessel that should give signal for a battle by which all 
that Columbus did for Spain would be undone. 

The blockade established by Admiral Sampson was iron 
in its inflexibility. A 350-foot channel was to be watched, 
and he closed the doors on it effectually. " I . . . main- 
tained the blockade [at night] as follows," he says in his 
report : " to the battle-ships was assigned the duty, in turn, 
of hghtmg the channel. Moving up to the port at a dis- 
tance of one or two miles from the Morro, dependent 
upon the condition of the atmosphere, they threw a 
searchlight beam directly up the channel and held it 
there. This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel 
for half a mile inside of the entrance so brilliantly that 
the movement of small boats could be detected. Why the 
batteries never opened fire upon the searchlight ship was 
always a matter of surprise to me, but they never did." 

This, by the way, was also a matter of surprise to the 
foreign naval attaches upon our flagship. Captain Paget, 
the British attach^, standing once on the deck of the " New 
York " when this performance was going on, gazed on the 
broad shaft of light penetrating the enemy's harbour, and 
then on the battle-ship lying within easy range of the 

guns in Morro, and exclaimed fervently, " What d d 

impertinence ! " 

" Stationed close to the entrance of the port were three 
picket launches, and at a little distance farther out three small 
picket vessels, usually converted yachts, and, when they were 
available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrange- 
ment there was at least a certainty that nothing could get out 
(if the harbour undetected. After the arrival of the army, 
wlien the situation forced upon the Spanish admiral a decision, 
our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was 
reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battle-ship was 
placed alongside the searchlight sliip with her broadside trained 
upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship 
should appear." 



2 so Blue Jackets of ^98 

Early in the days of the blockade, before knowledge of 
Spanish marksmanship or experience with the unwilling- 
ness of the defenders of the fort to provoke a conflict had 
inspired contempt, Admiral Sampson ordered a bombard- 
ment in the expectation of so damaging the enemy's works 
that the ships might he well in shore without danger. It 
was this bombardment that Hobson watched from his cell, 
and in which he came near meeting his end from a shell 
that struck within a few feet of his window. June 6th 
was set for the attack, which began shortly before seven 
in the morning. The fleet attacked in two parallel 
columns, the works on the east side of the harbour's mouth 
being bombarded by the column under Admiral Samp- 
son, in which were the " New York," the " Iowa," the 
"Oregon," the "Yankee," and the "Dolphin," — two 
battle-ships, one armoured cruiser, one auxiliary, and one 
despatch boat. This squadron delivered its fire against 
Morro, the most imposing but not the most formidable 
of the harbour defences, the batteries at Estrella Point, 
and those on Gorda Point. Commodore Schley, in the 
" Brooklyn," led the second squadron, which included 
the " Massachusetts," the " Texas," the " Suwanee," and 
the "Vixen," — two battle-ships, one armoured cruiser, 
and two auxiliaries. Later in the engagement the " New 
Orleans," the British-built ship bought from Brazil, went 
into the action with her smokeless powder, to the envy of 
all the other ships, and the cruiser " Marblehead " was 
permitted a short taste of the pleasures of action. The 
morning was hot and wet, with frequent gusts of rain and 
wind, the showers sometimes falling so heavily that the 
ships were hid from the batteries and from each other. 
The ships steamed directly in toward the harbour, firing 
from their bow guns as they advanced, and turning to 
east and west as they came within a range of from 2000 
to 2500 yards, letting fly their broadsides as they made 
the turn. The fire was deliberate, the greatest attention 
being given to accuracy of aim. Indeed, the affair had 



Blue Jackets of '98 25 i 

its chief value, as appeared later, in being a sort of target 
practice under fire. The attack was kept up for about 
two hours and a half, the batteries of the enemy being 
silenced early in the action. But here, as so often in the 
war, our seamen discovered how empty a triumph it is to 
"silence" a battery. Looking eagerly from his cell in 
Morro, Lieutenant Hobson had an excellent opportunity 
to watch the effect of the American fire, and his story is 
very convincing on this point. After describing the 
terrifying eff'ect of the stroke of a 13-inch shell, — "it 
would raise a great yellow cloud of earth and debris, 
sending forked shafts of gas out and up for a hundred 
feet, while for many seconds afterward the fragments 
would continue to drop about Morro and in the water," 
— he writes : 

" The fire seemed to slacken for a moment ; then the enemy 
opened, and again the fire set in strong against the Socapa sea 
battery, and I came out, and climbed to the window once more, 
in time to see the crews of the enemy's guns leave them and 
run to a pit in the rear. Then I watched for the next lull. 
Sure enough, up they came again, and fired away. Then our 
guns reopened in full force, and again the crews retreated to 
the pit. 

" This occurred over and over ; and then I realised, even 
more than in the bombardment of San Juan, that sliips cannot 
destroy shore batteries without coming into machine-gun range. 
It is necessary actually to strike the gun itself in order to put 
it out of action. I saw some of our sliells literally bury guns 
with dirt and yet do virtually no injury. Our marksmanship 
was excellent, — splendid line shots, that tore up the shrubs 
and earth along the whole front of the battery, — but I did 
not see a single gun disabled, and every time we would slacken, 
the Spaniards would come up and fire away. I understood 
how they could thus make the vaunted ' last shot.' " 

In the main the bombardment was fruitless so far as 
any injury to the batteries was concerned. One or two 
heavy guns are said to have been destroyed, but most were 



252 Blue Jackets of '98 

simply dismounted and quickly replaced after the fleet 
withdrew. Lieutenant Staunton, assistant chief of staff 
on the flagship, notes that "a 12-inch shell from the 
' Texas ' exploded under a 6-inch gun in the Socapa 
battery, blew it into the air and capsized it, and, it is 
said, killed all of its crew. Two days afterward that 
gun was again remounted and ready again for service." 

The Spanish cruiser " Eeina Mercedes," which came 
gallantly to the strait at the harbour's mouth to aid in the 
defence, suffered more severely. A shell burst under her 
forward turret, and killed one officer. Captain Acosta — 
who had been particularly courteous to Hobson when that 
officer was a prisoner on the ship — and sixteen men, and 
wounded another officer and eleven sailors. Some of our 
shells fell in the streets of the city, but seem to have done 
no damage. Mr. Frederick W. Eamsden, the British con- 
sul in the city, who by the way made a noble record for 
self-sacrificing and arduous labours in the cause of humanity 
during the siege and died shortly after of exhaustion, says 
in his diary of that date : 

" Many shells fell in the bay about three-quarters of a mile 
distant from our office. ... I can't say how many shots have 
been fired, but firing was continuous from eight to half-past 
ten, and a lot of powder has been wasted. . . . The first lieu- 
tenant of the ' Reina Mercedes, ' Acosta, has been killed. A 
shell took ofi" his right leg, but he continued to give orders for 
the care of the other wounded until lie died. The ship . . . 
caught fire three times. . . . Emma wanted to know what the 
sound like a railway moving in the air was, and was consid- 
erably surprised to find it proceeded from the shells flying 
about." 

The ships drew off virtually unhurt by the Spanish 
response to their fire. On the 14th of June and for a day 
or two thereafter the attack was renewed in the same 
deliberate manner. To those on the vessels it was only 
a more exciting variety of target practice. The men in 



Blue Jackets of '98 253 

the forts have not recorded the emotions excited in their 
breasts by the storm of projectiles, grading from 13-inch 
shells downward, but Consul Eamsden in his diary 
describes the striking of one shell in the water which 
threw up a column of spray as high as the mast of a ship, 
and further notes the very disquieting fact that "any 
quantity of shells of all calibres are being picked up 
intact." He instances one 13-inch shell which he saw 
himself unexploded. But despite the noise and the 
prodigious expenditure of ammunition, the batteries that 
kept guard over Santiago were as strong after the several 
bombardments as they were before. 

The bombardments, however destitute of results, were 
an excellent expedient for keeping up the spirits of the 
men, and steadying nerves sorely strained by the ceaseless 
watchfulness and apprehension of the blockade. Though 
the inexplicable inertness of the Spaniards resulted in a 
month of absolute immunity from attack, the ships were 
at all times exposed to danger, and the nervous strain was 
almost as great as if a more active enemy had been con- 
fronted. Most of the time the ships were within easy 
rifle-range of the batteries, and while the armoured hulls 
were impervious to small projectiles, the upper works, 
where because of the heat many men slept, were vulner- 
able to :Mauser bullets. The men who operated the 
searchlights, too, were absolutely without protection from 
any form of firearm the Spaniards might see fit to employ 
against them. Night after night the most conspicuous 
thing on the coast was the great eye, gleaming white, and 
sending a long beam of fierce light straight into the 
harbour. Ko armour protected the dehcate apparatus of 
this beacon, nor the men who served it ; but not once did the 
Spaniards try with Mauser or with great guns to demolish 
it, though it was within easy range of either weapon. 
But the men in the tops of the searchlight ship did not 
know how long the gunners on shore would resist what 
must have been a temptation to any expert artillerist, and 



254 Blue Jackets of '98 

they expected a shot at any minute. Of course the small 
boats plying close in shore as pickets, particularly charged 
with watching out for torpedo attacks, kept their officers 
and crews under a continual strain. On them the Span- 
iards did indeed try their marksmanship, with negative 
results as a rule, but with a sufficient percentage of hits 
to keep the targets alert. The knowledge that in the 
harbour lurked the much dreaded torpedo boats was also 
a continual source of anxiety. Not only the danger to 
the picket boat should one slip out unperceived, but the 
certainty that any failure in watchfulness might result 
in the loss of a great battle-ship, kept the commanders 
of the scouts keyed up to the highest pitch. A torpedo 
boat at night is a phantom object, and many a phantom 
has been taken for a torpedo boat by even cool officers 
when charged with heavy responsibility. Men who are 
constantly looking for something are apt to find it, even 
if it is trouble ; and so now and then some officer, after 
peering anxiously through a pitchy-black night for hours 
at a time in expectation of a Spanish torpedo boat, would 
see one coming perfectly distinctly, and then all the small 
guns on that ship would roar, and the signal to look out 
for a torpedo attack would flash high up in the air, and 
all the other vessels would move anxiously and begin to 
spit fire and bellow noisily like a herd of elephants when 
a mouse runs across the floor. One night a railroad train 
running along the road bordering the sea caused the 
alarm, and the shot-riddled cars were shown next morning 
in Santiago in evidence of Yankee barbarity. Another 
night the b ack hollow of a cave, with the white breakers 
tumbling on the rocks at its entrance, suggested to a 
picket boat well in shore that a dark torpedo boat was 
coming out at full speed with a tremendous bone in her 
teeth. These things were humorous in the telling after- 
wards, but at the time they were deadly earnest, and the 
men who went through them found the blockade any- 
thing but unexciting. 



Blue Jackets of '98 255 

In the naval service of every nation is a body of 
amphibious soldiery who serve aboard ship — the marines 
described by Kipling as " soldier and sailor too/' and the 
butts of many a Blue Jacket's scoff and story. In the 
earlier days of naval warfare the chief duty of the marine 
was to act as a sort of ship's pohceman, keeping order 
aboard in time of peace and serving as a rifleman in 
battle. To some degree these functions are still filled 
by the marine corps ; but it has become more of a martial 
organisation than of old, serving at rapid fire-guns during 
battle, and always the first to be landed when a shore 
party is needed. For weeks a detachment of marines had 
been stewing in the hot confines of the transport "Pan- 
ther" at Key "West, awaiting the discovery of some point 
at which they could be of service. When the news that 
Cervera was cooped up at Santiago reached Sampson, they 
were hurriedly sent for, and had no sooner reached the 
fleet than a task was assigned them which tested all their 
quahties of individual bravery and discipline. 

Xot quite forty miles east of Santiago lies the bay of 
Guantanamo, with a small town of the same name at its 
upper end. It is an excellent harbour, then not at all 
formidably fortified, and offering a safe shelter for war- 
ships and an easy landing-place for troops if such were 
needed. In the early days of June Admiral Sampson 
thought that such a landing-place would be needed. He 
knew that the army was painfully and slowly mobilising 
at Tampa, and that a great fleet of transports was gather- 
inc,^ there to bring General Shafter's corps to the neighbour- 
hood of Santiago. It occurred to the admiral to prepare 
the way at Guantanamo. If the army did not like that 
landing-place, possession of the harbour would still be use- 
ful to the navy, for coaling and repairing. So the " Panther " 
had hardly reached the blockade with her 600 marines 
aboard before they were ordered to Guantanamo, where the 
cruiser " ]\Iarblehead " and the auxiliary " Yankee " had 
been preparing for their reception by diligently shelling the 



256 Blue Jackets of ^98 

earthworks the Spaniards had thrown up on the shore. 
It was impossible to tell how vigorous a resistance the 
enemy would offer to the landing-party ; so the " Oregon," 
the " Yankee," the " Yosemite " — with a crew of naval 
militiamen clear from Michigan — the " Scorpion," the 
" Dolphin," and the supply-ship " Supply " were sent along. 
They were not needed. The Spaniards made no resistance 
— indeed, throughout the war they never fought our troops 
at exactly the moment when resistance would have been 
most effective, namely, when we were landing from boats. 
With hardly a rifle-shot, and while the band played 
cheerily " There '11 be a hot time in the old town to- 
night," the marines landed, pitched their tents, and went 
into camp. It was as peaceful as a picnic. The Span- 
iards, when driven away by the fire from the " Marblehead " 
and the " Yankee," had left a flagstaff standing, and there 
the Stars and Stripes were run up, while the marines stood 
in line at a " present," and the ships in the bay fired a salute 
and cheered the colours. That was really the first land- 
ing of our troops on the south side of Cuba, for this was 
on the 10th of June, — twelve days before Shaffer began 
landing his troops. The camp was named Camp McCalla, 
in honour of the commander of the " Marblehead," and 
the men set to work making it tenable for a long stay by 
burning infected Cuban huts in the vicinity, landing pro- 
visions, and fixmg the camp kitchens. The spot seemed 
so peaceful that about evening many of the men, hot 
and wearied with a long day's work, stripped and went 
down to the beach to bathe. Wliile they were disporting 
themselves, a Cuban came running into camp closely pur- 
sued by Mauser bullets. From the brush on the hills 
sounded the crack of rifles, and the vicious whistle of the 
bullets rung in the air. Naked men caught up rifles and 
cartridge-belts, and ran to where the officers were form- 
mg the companies and sending company after company 
out to the firing-line. They were absolutely green men, 
most of these marines, and the attack was a complete 



Blue Jackets of '98 257 

surprise ; but they responded like veterans to the word of 
command, and poured their volleys into the bush with 
coolness and precision. The fighting was not long that 
afternoon, for the enemy soon drew off; but two of our 
men had fallen, — the first to lose their lives on Cuban 
soil, — James McColgan, and WiUiam Dunphy, privates 
both. At night the enemy returned to the attack, not 
charging or attempting to carry the American position in 
any way, but lurking in the bushes and potting away 
at the tents and the dark figures of our men outlined 
against the sky. All night this was kept up, effectually 
preventing the marines from getting any rest after their 
hard day's work. About midnight Surgeon John B. 
Gibbs was killed, the first United States officer killed in 
action in Cuba. 

The next morning Colonel Huntington concluded to 
move his camp to lower ground, where the men would 
not form such conspicuous targets. The task was a 
wearing one. Never had the tropic sun been hotter than 
it was while the marines were painfully carrying tents, 
boxes, and bedding down the blazing hillside, while the 
Spaniards in the bushes popped away with their Mausers. 
Crouching in the bushes, with palm-leaves tied about 
them and using smokeless powder, the assailants were 
literally invisible to the Americans. Though the ships 
joined with the men on shore in shelling the bushes, the 
aim was at random, and if it did any execution did not 
check the Spanish fire. Neither did two raidiug-parties 
sent out through the bush put an end to the persecution. 
It was like fighting a lot of gnats. All day of the llth 
and the 12th this fighting went on. At night the Span- 
ish fire slackened but little. Not even the American 
burial-parties were sacred to them, and their bullets 
poured quite as fiercely upon the men who drew up be- 
side the chaplain at the grave of the dead as upon those 
on the firing-line. The marines dug trenches and landed 
their three field-guns, but to little effect. The " Marble- 

17 



258 Blue Jackets of '98 

head" ransacked the bushes by night with searchlight 
and shell, but still the nagging stream of bullets flew from 
the thickets. Machine guns had as little effect. It be- 
gan to look as if the marines would have to learn to 
ignore Mauser bullets altogether or take to the ships 
again. 

However, a scouting-party learned that the Spaniards 
had a sort of base not far from the camp, where there 
was a reservoir of drinking-water, the only supply in the 
neighbourhood, and a heliograph for communication with 
the fort at Caimanera at the head of the bay. With a 
small company of Cubans, who fought bravely, a force 
of marines marched against this post, and destroyed it, 
burning the block-house, smashing the water-tank, and 
capturing the heliograph. Seventeen Spaniards and one 
officer were taken, and sent aboard the " Dolphin," which 
had followed the expedition along the coast. It was 
learned that the Spaniards had 2000 men in the vicinity, 
and people wondered why they had not swooped down on 
the 600 marines and gobbled them up. But, as General 
Garcia said in a conference on the " New York," " The 
Spaniards never attack. Eemernber that. The Spaniards 
never attack." How many they had lost in the four days 
of fighting was never known. The Cubans claim to have 
counted the bodies of fifty dead. 

This much having been accomplished towards making 
the camp at the mouth of Guantanamo Bay tenable, the 
navy concluded to finish the job by running up to Cai- 
manera at the head of the bay and smashing the Spanish 
forts there. The " Texas," " Marblehead," and " Suwanee " 
undertook this task, and after a three hours' bombardment 
silenced the fort in the traditional way. The garrison 
ran away promptly, some rushing down to a train for 
Santiago which was in full view of tlie ships, and at 
which the " Texas " sent a 6-inch shell as it pulled out. 
At the end the forts were still formidable had the gar- 
rison chosen to return to the defence, but apparently the 




I'.A'I'II.KSHIP " MASSAC HUSK/ITS. 



Blue Jackets of '98 259 

commander of that district was content to abandon the 
neighbourhood, for thereafter the navy used Guantanamo 
Bay without molestation and the marines' camp was not 
disturbed. It is interesting to note that in their way up 
the bay both the " Texas " and the " Marblehead " fouled 
contact mines with their propellers. Neither mine ex- 
ploded, though, when hauled on deck and dissected, each 
was seen to be powerful enough to sink any ship under 
which it should be discharged. 

On all the ships about Santiago harbour were now heard 
the two questions, " When will the army come ? " and 
" When will Cervera come out ? " All lingering doubt 
about Cervera's presence — though, indeed, there was 
little left — was ended by the daring reconnaissance 
around Santiago of Lieutenant Victor Blue, undertaken 
on the 13th of June. This young navy officer had already 
distinguished himself by slipping through the Spanish 
lines on a mission to General Gomez. In his second ex- 
pedition he crawled through dense thickets, infested with 
guerrillas, passed through the Spanish lines where if taken 
he would have been instantly hanged as a spy, found a 
spot on the crest of a hill whence he could look down 
on the harbour and count all the Spanish ships that were 
known to have sailed from Cape Verde, with the excep- 
tion of the torpedo destroyer " Terror," and then returned 
to the sea west of the city, having made a complete circuit 
of Santiago. The exploit was one of the most daring of 
the war. Its success makes all the more inexplicable the 
apparent lack of just such expeditions in front of the 
army before it advanced on Santiago. 

On the morning of the 20th fleet tugs came up to the 
blockade, bringing news of the presence of the army 
expedition in the offing, and a few minutes later the 
"Detroit," one of the convoying ships, came up with the 
same tidings. Admiral Sampson went down in a cruiser 



26o Blue Jackets of '98 

to meet the incoming armada, and the hills of Cuba re- 
sounded with the salutes of the warships to the general 
and the cheers exchanged by sailors and soldiers. It was 
a historic moment, this meeting of the two wings of the 
armed service of the United States on that distant foreign 
coast. It was the beginning of the end of Spanish mis- 
rule in Cuba ; that was patent to all beholders of the 
monster armament there gathered. Sampson in a launch 
went off to call on General Shafter, and shortly afterwards 
the headquarters ship, " Seguranca," came up to the 
blockade, and the admiral and the general made that visit 
to Garcia's camp which has been described already. There- 
after for a day or two the navy was employed in shelling 
the coast defences preparatory to the landing of the 
troops and in assisting the actual disembarkation. The 
one incident of interest in this extended bombardment was 
the explosion on the " Texas " of a 6-inch shell, one of the 
few hits scored by the Spaniards in the war and the 
cause of the death of the first man killed afloat in 
the Santiago campaign. The " Texas " was bombarding the 
enemy's works at Cabanas, and ten transports lay in the 
offing as though awaiting an opportunity to land their 
cargoes. So vigorous and well directed was the Spanish 
fire that the affair which was intended as a mere feint 
developed into a fierce duel between the ship and the 
artillerists on shore. The range was about 5000 yards, 
and while the aim of the navy gunners was good, their 
lack of explosive shells enabled the enemy to stick to his 
guns. At last a 6-inch shell struck the battle-ship on 
the port bow about five feet below the main deck. It 
pierced the steel plate, at that point about an inch and 
three quarters thick, and exploded in the forward com- 
partment, where fifteen men were standing at quarters. 
The steel-clad room was instantly filled with flying bits 
of iron. A great steel stanchion was cut in two, a 4-inch 
hawser and the oaken core on which it was wound were 
cut as with axes. The side of the ship opposite that by 



Blue Jackets of '98 261 

which the shell entered was bulged out three inches, and 
bolt-heads, gun-fittings, ribs, everything that came in the 
way of the storm of steel disappeared in general ruin. A 
man who was directly in the path of the missile was 
blown to atoms, and eight others were wounded ; but the 
wonder is that any in that pent-up room with bits of 
steel and iron flying Hke grape-shot escaped alive. It 
was natural that when the officers came to gaze upon the 
scene, the first opportunity any of them had had to view 
the effect of a big modern shell in a warship, they should 
remember that projectiles twice as large were fired from 
every battle-ship on that station. " Well, if that is the 
work of a 6-inch shell," said Captain Philip of the 
" Texas," " I wonder what a 13-inch would do ? " 

The drama which was being enacted around Santiago 
was now rapidly approaching its denouement. The men 
on the great gray ships that clung so closely to the nar- 
row entrance to the harbour knew that before many days 
the Spaniards must come out and fight, unless they in- 
tended to await the capture of the city by the American 
troops, and be compelled to blow up their vessels at their 
berths. But they did not know that during these very 
days the cable, which no American ship had been able to 
find and cut, was bringing from Madrid orders to Admiral 
Cervera to make the dash for freedom. Cervera had in- 
deed protested. None knew better than he how inade- 
quate were his ships to meet the storm of fire that lay in 
wait for them beyond the shelter of Morro. The days 
that he had lain quietly at anchor had been to him as the 
period in jail before the day of execution is to the con- 
victed criminal. He is said to have wept, when he en- 
.tered Santiago, knowing that his squadron would never 
escape ; and he received now, as July was ushered in, the 
orders of General Blanco to make the dash, with resigna- 
tion and without hope. 

s On paper the fleet which Admiral Cervera had under 
his command was a formidable one, but its actual strength 



262 Blue Jackets of '98 

was materially less than that with which it was credited 
in the naval manuals. Instead of the speed of from 18 
to 20 knots with which his ships were credited, they 
proved when put to the test, to be slower than our 16- 
knot cruisers. His flagship, "Cristobal Colon," was 
without the 11-inch guns for which she was fitted, but 
which the Spanish navy authorities, though war had been 
imminent for more than a year, had never had mounted. 
The discipline of the crews was of the most slovenly, and 
their marksmanship, as was proved later, was beneath 
contempt. It had never been the practice in the Spanish 
navy to buy powder and shot just to shoot away in target 
practice. Notwithstanding all weaknesses, however, the 
squadron was the strongest body of modern men-of-war 
that had up to that time been despatched from any 
European port on a mission of war. The flagship, the 
" Cristobal Colon," was an Itahan-built armoured cruiser. 
The armour belt on her hull was six inches thick, on her 
barbettes five inches. Her complement was 500 men; 
her armament, in the main battery, two 9.84-inch and ten 
5.9-inch rapid-fire rifles ; secondary battery, six 4.7-inch 
rifles, ten 6-pounder and ten 8-pounder rapid-fire, and two 
Maxim guns. The displacement of the "Colon" was 
6800 tons, or about that of the "Texas." The three 
cruisers that followed the flag of the "Colon" — the 
" Vizcaya," " Almirante Oquendo," and " Maria Teresa " — 
were sister ships, so alike in proportions and appearance 
that in Havana harbour Captain Eulate of the "Vizcaya" 
told Captain Sigsbee that his ship could only be distin- 
guished from the others by some trifling differences in the 
gilding on the stern, and the carving of the woodwork. 
The description of these magnificent ships was : displace- 
ment, 7000 tons ; length, 364 feet ; speed, 18.5 knots ; com- 
plement, 500 men. Guns: main battery, two ll-incl 
Hontoria, ten 5.5-inch Hontoria rapid-fire guns ; second- 
ary battery, eight 6-pounders, ten 1-pounder rapid-fire 
and several machine guns. Added to this squadron o 



Blue Jackets of '98 263 

fighting craft were two torpedo destroyers, " Furor " and 
" Pluton," sister ships, of 380 tons, manned by 67 men 
each, carrying two 14-pounders, two 6-pounders, two 
1.45-inch automatic guns, and two torpedo tubes each. 
All the Spanish ships had the usual complement of tor- 
pedo tubes. On paper — that phrase must constantly be 
returned to, for the estimated qualities of the Spanish 
ships differed so greatly from their actual accomplish- 
ments in battle — on paper there were in this squadron 
elements of actual superiority over their foes. It was 
equipped with smokeless powder, a great advantage. 
The Hontoria guns were regarded by naval experts, the 
world over, as better, weight for weight, than the American 
guns, being more rapid in action, and of greater muzzle 
velocity. In speed — again on paper — the Americans 
had only two ships equalling the Spanish vessels. On 
the day of battle one of these ships, the " New York," was 
absent from the blockade, and the other, the " Brooklyn," 
had one engine uncoupled and useless. What in more 
daring hands would have been a notable element of supe- 
riority in the Spanish fleet were the two torpedo-boat 
destroyers, splendid vessels of their class, and unmatched 
by anything in the United States navy. 

The American fleet that engaged Cervera on his ap- 
pearance at the harbour's mouth was notably superior in 
weight of metal, besides outnumbering the Spaniards. 
The " New York " may be left out of the calcalation, as 
she was absent from the blockade when Cervera made his 
dash, and came up only after the surrender. The fleet 
actually engaged was composed of three first-class battle- 
ships, one second-class battle-ship, one armoured cruiser, 
and a converted yacht. The descriptions of the ships 
engaged are as follows : 

Iowa, battle-ship, 11,340 tons; complement, 505 men. 
Armour : belt, 14 inches ; barbettes, 15 inches ; turrets, 15 
inches. Guns : main battery, four 12-inch, eight 8-inch, 
six 4-inch rapid-fire ; secondary, twenty 6-pounders, four 



264 Blue Jackets of '98 

l-pounders, four Colts. Two torpedo tubes. Speed, 17.1 
knots. Commander, Captain Robley D. Evans. 

Indiana, battle-ship, 10,288 tons; speed, 15.5 knots; 
complement, 473 men. Armour : belt, 8 inches ; deck, 2| 
inches ; barbettes, 17 inches ; turrets, 15 inches ; case- 
ments, 6 inches. Guns: main battery, four 13-inch, eight 
8-inch, four 6-inch slow-fire ; secondary rapid-fire battery, 
twenty 6-pounders, six l-pounders, four Catlings. Tor- 
pedo tubes, two. Commander, Captain Henry C. Taylor. 

Okegon, battle-ship, 10,288 tons ; speed, 16.8 knots ; 
complement, 473 men. Armour: belt, 18 inches ; deck, 2 1 
inches; barbettes, 17 inches; turrets, 16 inches; case- 
ments, 6 inches. Guns : main battery, four 13-inch, eight 
8-inch, four slow-fire 6-inch ; secondary rapid-fire battery, 
twenty 6-pounders, six l-pounders, four Catlings, and two 
field-guns. Torpedo tubes, three. Commander, Captain 
Charles E. Clark. 

Texas, second-class battle-ship : displacement, 6,315 
tons ; speed, 17.8 knots ; complement, 389 men. Armour : 
belt, 12 inches ; deck, 2 inches ; turrets, 12 inches. Guns: 
main battery, two 12 -inch, six 6 -inch slow-fire ; second- 
ary rapid-fire battery, six l-pounders, four 37-millimeter 
Hotchkiss, two Catlings. Torpedo tubes, two. Com- 
mander, Captain John Philip. 

Brooklyn, flagship of Commodore Schley : displace- 
ment, 9215 tons; speed, 21.9 knots; maximum coal-: 
supply, 1461 tons; complement, 516 men. Armour:' 
belt, 3 inches ; deck, 3 to 6 inches ; barbettes, 8 inches ; I 
turrets, 5| inches. Guns: main battery, eight 8-inch,' 
twelve 5 -inch ; secondary battery, twelve 6-pounders, four' 
l-pounders, four Colts, and two field-guns. Torpedo tubes, 
four. Commander, Captain F. A. Cook. 

The " Gloucester " and " Vixen," which completed the 
roster of the vessels available for meeting Cervera, were 
converted yachts. The former mounted four 6-pounders. 
Under the command of Captain Richard Wainwright, 
who had been with Sigsbee on that dreadful night when' 



Blue Jackets of '98 265 

the " Maine " was assassinated in the harbour of Havana, 
she did gallant service in the day of battle. 

To the layman the American squadron seems vastly 
superior, — an impression which is, of course, strengthened 
by the completeness of the victory it won. But just as 
the naval experts, even in our own service, at the begin- 
ning of the war thought the Spanish and United States 
navies very equally matched, so students who made their 
estimates of the comparative strength of the two squad- 
rons at Santiago from the data set down in the books 
were not inclined to attribute any overwhelming superior- 
ity to the Americans. Mr. H, W. Wilson, a well-known 
English authority on naval affairs, writing after the battle, 
declares that the Spaniards were not so very deficient in 
anything except the skill to fight their ships. He makes 
an interesting comparison of the number of shots each 
squadron could deliver in five minutes, which shows that 
if the Americans had more guns, the Spaniards, by virtue 
of having more of the rapid-firing type, could discharge 
more projectiles in a given time. The exact figures for 
the space of five minutes, leaving out of the question the 
very small guns of the secondary batteries, are : Ameri- 
cans, 290.5 shots, with a total weight of 39,400 pounds ; 
and Spaniards, 367.5 shots, with a weight of 31,200 pounds. 
Nor was the difference in the weight of metal hurled so 
great an advantage to the Americans as might appear, as 
it proceeded chiefly from their possession of more heavy 
guns, — the 12-inch and 13-inch calibres. As a matter of 
fact, only two shells from cannon of these great calibres 
hit their marks, so that the possession of these guns to 
the Americans was of but slender value. 

It is worth while to consider these comparisons before 
taking up the story of the battle, because they are the 
sort of estimates our officers had been making for days 
and weeks before the crucial time of battle came. With 
access to all the latest naval statistics they were able to 
figure out exactly — so far as calculations in which the 



266 Blue Jackets of '98 

comparative gallantry of men must remain an unknown 
factor can be exact — the chances of the battle that was 
coming. "When it was over, and won so completely and 
with so little loss, there was a tendency on the part of 
many to think it had been a most unequal atfair, after all. 
It was unequal only because the Yankee seamen had 
planned to fight it as if they were meeting an enemy act- 
ually their superior. It was easily won, not because of 
the heavier guns of our ships, but by the better shooting 
of our gunners. We suffered little, not because our armour 
was thickest, but because every man from captain to 
powder-boy gave force and effect to Farragut's maxim, 
" The best defence against an enemy's fire is the fire of 
your own guns." 

It was Sunday morning, July 3d, and on all the ships, 
as they floated heavily in their great half-circle, eight 
miles long, about the mouth of Santiago harbour, the men 
could be seen swarming out on the decks, clad in fresh, 
clean white clothes for general muster. The iron ring was 
not drawn as tightly as usual, for about nine o'clock the 
" New York " had hung out the signal " Disregard flagship's 
movements," and steamed off toward the east. She had 
gone to take Admiral Sampson to a conference with Gen- 
eral Shafter, for which the general, whose troops that morn- 
ing were just resting after the bloody assault on San Juan 
hill and El Caney, had long been asking. The absence 
of the " New York " made the blockading line west of the 
harbour ragged and weak. The little picket boat " Vixen " 
was there, and the " Brooklyn " lay to the southwe'^it of the 
harbour. The " Texas " was directly south, and the three 
big battle-ships, " Iowa," " Oregon," and " Indiana," made a 
curve from the " Texas " inshore east of the Morro, with 
the " Gloucester " farthest east and nearest inshore. It 
was, perhaps, the most ragged appearance the blockading 
line had presented since the cordon was drawn nearly five 
weeks before. None of the ships had full steam up, the 



Blue Jackets of '98 267 

" Iowa " and " Indiana " had both reported some trouble 
with their forward turrets, and the " Brooklyn's " forward 
engines were uncoupled. It is not probable that there 
was any conscious relaxation of watchfulness, but it is 
evident that conditions were about as favourable as they 
could be for an effort to break the blockade. Probably 
the general expectation was that when Cervera did make 
his dash he would make it at night, but he has himself 
said that the blockade seemed more impenetrable at night 
than by day. This morning saw the one ship which was 
supposed to be able to compete with the Spaniards in 
speed absent, and a broad gap in the blockading Kne. 
Cervera, under peremptory orders to sail, doubtless figured 
that he could leave the heavy battle-ships behind, and if 
the " Brooklyn," which alone was supposed to have a 
chance m a race, should pursue him, he could turn and 
overwhelm her with his superior force. 

All the nif^ht before the lookouts on the fleet had re- 
ported fires burning on the hills, and this morning Com- 
modore Schley, who had command in Admiral Sampson's 
absence, had signalled to the " Texas," " What is your 
theory about the burning of the block-houses on the hill 
last night?" The commodore sat on the deck of the 
" Brooklyn " awaiting an answer to his signal, and in- 
cidentally watching a cloud of smoke which was rising 
from the interior of the harbour behind the hills. It was a 
phenomenon to be watched, but it did not necessarily mean 
anything serious, for about that time in the morning a tug 
was apt to make a visit to the Estrella battery. There 
had been so many other hot and quiet Sundays that all 
hands concluded that another one was there, with attention 
to general muster the most serious business for the of- 
ficers, and the danger of being caught at inspection in a 
badly washed jumper the gravest peril to the Jackies. 
But nevertheless the smoke was watched, and presently, 
when the quartermaster on the forward bridge said quietly 
to the navigating officer, " That smoke 's moving, sir," that 



268 Blue Jackets of '98 

officer thought it worth while to take a peep himself. 
What he saw nearly made him drop the glass. The mo- 
ment for which the fleet had waited five weeks, the hour 
of trial for which some of those blue and white clad men 
had been educating themselves for a quarter of a century, 
was at hand. 

" After-bridge there," he bellowed through a megaphone, 
" tell the commodore the enemy is coming out." 

No need to repeat the message. It was heard all over 
the ship, and not only the commodore but the powder- 
boys were rushing for their stations. The cry rung out, 
" Clear ship for action," and the gongs and bugles which 
call to general quarters clanged and pealed on the quiet 
air. From the other ships, so lately peaceful in the Sab- 
bath calm, came echoes of the same martial sounds. The 
signal " The enemy is escaping " ran to the masthead of 
the " Brooklyn," the " Texas," and the " Iowa " at the same 
moment, for on all three ships keen eyes were fixed on 
that suspicious smoke. Apparently all the vessels on the 
blockade caught the alarm at the same time. Down came 
that signal from the flagship, and up went another, " Clear 
ship for action." Vain trouble ! On every ship the men 
were rushing to quarters, without waiting for the com- 
modore's commands. On every ship men were running to 
their places, dropping off the white clothes in which they 
had been prepared for general muster. Everything wooden 
was tumbling overboard all along the line, water-tiglit 
compartments were rumbling shut, battle-hatches were 
being lowered, hose was being coupled up and strung along 
the decks to fight fire, ammunition hoists were going, and 
— greatest of all miracles — while all this was accom- 
plished in the midst of deafening turmoil in less time 
than it takes to tell of it, at the sudden blast of a bugle 
the men stood silent at their posts — 500 and more men 
to a ship, and each one where he would be most needed 
in battle and each as silent as a mute. 

A huge black hull appeared thrust forth from beyond 



Blue Jackets of '98 269 

Estrella Point. It came out far enough to show a turret, 
and from the turret came a flash and then the boom of a 
heavy shot. Almost at the same moment a 6-pounder 
runcr out from the " Iowa." The battle was on, and 
" FiwhtinCT Bob " Evans had fired the first shot. 

There has been some discussion as to the commander 
to whom credit for the victory won at Santiago should be 
awarded. Zealous partisans of Admiral Sampson have 
contended that though he was absent at the moment of 
battle it was his plan that was followed in the combat, and 
that to him therefore attaches the glory. On the other 
hand, adherents of Commodore Schley have insisted that 
as the flag officer present at the battle he should reap all 
the honours. But at the risk of ignoring naval etiquette 
and of descending beneath the dignity of history, which 
should perhaps painstakingly judge the merits of this 
controversy and award the guerdon, I will express the 
opinion that to no flag officer, present or absent, does there 
attach any especial and peculiar glory except in the purely 
formal and perfunctory way that a superior is given credit 
for the work of his subordinates, even though he has not 
actively directed it. For the plan of battle that Admiral 
Sampson had decreed in the event of a dash by the enemy 
was simply for each ship to make for the harbour's mouth 
and engage the enemy as they came out. Surely that was 
a plan not requiring any notable tactical skill to devise, — 
a plan which left to the individual ship commanders the 
real responsibility for the outcome of the action. As for 
Commodore Schley, his greatest glory proceeded, not from 
any commands which he gave the fleet, but rather from 
the gallant way in which he rushed the " Brooklyn " to the 
front, although she alone was weaker than any two of the 
vessels coming out. It was a day when the fleet com- 
mander was effaced and the captains were in their glory. 
Even the signal that the enemy was coming out was made 
from at least two of the battle-ships as soon or sooner than 
from the flagship, and the commodore's signals to clear 



270 Blue Jackets of '98 

ship for action and to close in and attack the enemy were 
in both instances anticipated by every ship in the squad- 
ron. For these reasons the acrimonious controversy be- 
tween the friends of Schley and of Sampson which, as 
these pages are being written, is raging in the newspapers 
and in tiie halls of Congress with such fierceness that de- 
serving navy officers are being deprived of well-earned 
advancement because of it, will be ignored here. It will 
be forgotten while the victory off Santiago is still fresh 
in the memory of man. The officers and men will not 
be soon forgotten. As Schley well said, " There was glory 
enough for all." 

The first ship out was the " Maria Teresa." Behind her 
came the " Vizcaya," the " Cristobal Colon," and the " Almi- 
rante Oquendo." To meet them all the ships of the block- 
ading fleet were standing in toward the harbour, firing 
rapidly from every gun that could be brought to bear. 
According to the plan of the blockade, the American vessels 
were lying still and had to get under way, — a slow process 
for a 10,000-ton battle-ship when the enemy is forging past 
under full headway. Which way the Spaniards would 
turn when they passed beyond the shoals that extend for 
half a mile beyond the harbour's mouth, was the vital ques- 
tion then. If they turned eastward, they would have to 
run into the midst of the most formidable ships of the 
squadron. If they went directly west, they might outrun 
the battle-ships and escape. The " Brooklyn," which was 
fastest of the ships on the blockade, was also in the best 
position to head off the enemy should they take this 
course. She was no match for the number of the enemy's 
ships that would be in a position to engage her when she 
came up to them, but Schley showed no sign of hesitation. 
It was possible that his ship would be lost — he says that 
the contingency entered very clearly into his calculations 
— but in sinking the " Brooklyn " the Spaniards would be 
delayed long enough for the battle-ships to come up with 
them, and once in the clutch of these monsters there was 



Blue Jackets of '98 271 

no reason to fear their escape. The difficulty with the 
" Brooklyn's " manoeuvre was that, as it brought her up 
with the Spaniards on a parallel course and going in a 
directly opposite direction, she was compelled to make a 
complete circle in order to chase them. Had they pos- 
sessed the speed with which they were credited in the 
naval manuals, this would have put the " Brooklyn " out 
of the fight, for one of her engines was uncoupled and her 
speed was greatly reduced. As a matter of fact, however, 
the Spaniards fell so far behind their estimated speed that 
not only was the " Brooklyn " able to circle about and still 
overhaul the fleetest of them, but the " Texas," our slowest 
battle-ship, was able to hold its own in the race. 

The "Maria Teresa" rounded the shoals and turned 
west. That settled the first problem of the day so far as 
she was concerned. But was the whole Spanish fleet 
going to take the same course ? Might not Cervera, 
knowing that in a fleet action we were too strong for him, 
scatter his ships, in the hopes that the fortunes of war 
might enable one to defeat her adversary, or at least to 
slip away through the American lines ? That was the 
next anxiety, and professional students of the battle have 
since agreed that that was the best course the Spaniards 
could have pursued. The fortune that overcame Cervera 
that day, however, impelled him to take his whole line 
of ships to the west, and the situation for the Americans 
was cleared of all perplexities. " Close in and engage 
the enemy," was quite as explicit an order as any captain 
had need of that day. 

The little " Vixen," which lay near the " Brooklyn," let 
fly with her 6-pounders when she saw the huge bulk of 
the " Maria Teresa " turn towards her, and then prudently 
slipped away. But the rest of the American ships, with 
funnels belching black smoke, and turrets, hulls, and tops 
spurting out red flame and yellow smoke, came rushing 
down towards the enemy. Noble work was done by the 
men whose most important but not spectacular duty it is 



272 Blue Jackets of '98 

to feed the roaring fires that drive the great floating forts. 
In the engine-rooms and stoke-holes of those men-of-war 
that scorching July day, men worked naked in fiery heat. 
They could hear the thunder of the guns above them, and 
feel the ship tremble with the shock of her broadsides. 
How the battle was going they could not see. Deep in 
their fiery prison, far below the lapping waves that rushed 
along the armoured hull, they only knew that if disaster 
came they would suffer first and most cruelly. A success- 
ful torpedo stroke would mean death to them, every one. 
The clean blow of an enemy's ram would in all probability 
drown them like rats in a cage, even if it did not cause 
them to be parboiled by the explosion of their own boilers. 
A shot in the magazine would be their death-warrant. 
All the perils which menaced the men who were fighting 
so bravely at the guns on deck threatened the sooty 
sweating fellows who shovelled coal and fixed fires down 
in the hold, with the added certainty that for them escape 
was impossible, and the inspiration which comes from 
the very sight of battle was denied them. They did their 
duty nobly. If we had not the testimony of their com- 
manders to that effect, we still should know it, for they 
got out of every ship not only the fullest speed with which 
she was credited under the most favourable circumstances, 
but even more — notably in the cases of the " Texas " and 
" Oregon," which, despite bottoms fouled from long service 
in tropical waters, actually exceeded their highest recorded 
speed in the chase. On the " Oregon," wlien she was 
silently pursuing the " Colon " at the end of the battle, 
Lieutenant Milligan, who had gone down into the furnace- 
room to work by the side of the men on whom so much 
depended, came up to the captain to ask that a gun might 
be fired now and then. " My men were almost exhausted," 
said Milligan, " when the last 13-incli gun was fired, and 
the sound of it restored their energy; and they fell to work 
with new vigour. If you will fire a gun occasionally, it 
will keep their enthusiasm up." On most of the ships 



Blue Jackets of '98 273 

the great value of the work the men in engine and boiler 
rooms were doing was recognised by the captains' send- 
ing down every few minutes to them an account of how 
the fight progressed. Each report was received with 
cheers and redoubled activity. On the " Brooklyn," when 
the " Colon " was making her final race for life, Commo- 
dore Schley sent orderhes down to the stoke-holes and 
engine-rooms with this message : " Now, boys, it all de- 
pends on you. Everything is sunk except the ' Colon,' 
and she is trying to get away. We don't want her to, 
and everything depends on you." The " Colon " did not 
get away. 

As the enemy came rushing out of the harbour, the 
American vessels to the eastward steamed down as fast as 
possible, maintaining a fierce fire the while from everything 
that could be brought to bear. The batteries on shore 
turned loose at the Americans, but no attention was paid 
to them. Nearest the shore was the " Indiana," and she, 
too, was nearest the leading ship of the enemy at the 
moment of beginning the battle. The water about this 
battle-ship fairly boiled with the flood of projectiles that 
poured down from Morro and sped from the broadside with 
which the " Maria Teresa " opened. The " Indiana" scored 
more than one hit on the " Teresa," as that ship was mak- 
ing her turn to the west, and then gave her attention to 
the " Vizcaya." All the American ships were engaged by 
this time, and it was almost impossible, in the dense smoke 
and the storm of projectiles, to make out the success that 
attended the efforts of any single vessel; but Commander 
Eaton, who was watching the fight from the tug " Eeso- 
lute," says : "As the ' Vizcaya ' came out, I distinctly saw one 
of the ' Indiana's ' heavy shells strike her abaft the fun- 
nels, and the explosion of this shell was followed by a 
burst of flame, which for a time obscured the afterpart of 
the stricken ship." Straight toward the fleeing enemy 
steamed the " Iowa " and " Oregon," belching forth great 
clouds of smoke until they looked like huge yellow clouds 

18 



2 74 Blue Jackets of '98 

on the water. Then came the time when a cool head and 
a clear eye were necessary fur the captain of an American 
ship. As the battle-ships closed in on their prey, they 
overlapped each other, and careless use of the guns or a 
failure to make out accurately the target might have 
resulted in one of our ships firing into another. But so 
skilfully were our ships handled that at no time were they 
put in jeopardy from either the guns or the rams of each 
other, though at one time the " Oregon " was firing right 
across the decks of the " Texas." 

The hapless " Maria Teresa " was the first ship to leave 
the harbour, and her end was swift and frightful. Upon 
her for a time the fire of all the American squadron was 
concentrated. The shells from the great turret-guns for 
the most part went wild, but the 5-inch and G-iuch shells 
and the storm of smaller projectiles searched out every part 
of the doomed ship, spread death and ruin on every hand, 
and soon had her woodwork ablaze. Her gunners for a 
time stood manfully to their guns, and the scarlet flames 
jetted viciously from her sides like snakes' tongues. 
Little smoke hung about her, and she stood out bold and 
black against the green background of the hills, a perfect 
target. A shot from the " Brooklyn " cut her main water- 
pipe ; a shell, supposed to be from the " Oregon," entered 
her hull and exploded in the engine-room ; a 6-inch shell 
from the " Iowa " exploded in her forward turret, kilUng or 
wounding every man at tlie guns; while the tempest of 
smaller projectiles made the decks untenable, and by the 
din of their bursting silenced the officers' commands. 
Admiral Cervera himself was on this devoted ship. " He 
expected to lose most of his ships," said one of his officers 
afterwards, "but thought the 'Cristobal Colon' might 
escape. That is why he transferred his flag to the ' Maria 
Teresa,' that he might perish with the less fortunate." 
Anotlier officer who stood by the admiral's side that mur- 
derous morning, told an American journalist afterwards 
some stories of the effect of the American fire. Of a 



Blue Jackets of '98 275 

shell from the " Brooklyn " he said : " It struck us iu the 
bow, ploughing down amidships ; then it exploded. It 
tore down the bulkheads, destroyed stanchions, crippled two 
rapid-fire guns, and killed fifteen or twenty men." And 
of a shell from the " Iowa " he says : "It struck the 11-inch 
gun in the forward turret of the cruiser, cutting a furrow 
as clean as a knife out of the side of the gun. The shell 
exploded half-way in the turret, making the whole vessel 
stagger and shake in every plate. When the fumes and 
smoke had cleared away so that it was possible to enter 
the turret, other gunners were sent there. The survivors 
tumbled the bodies which filled the wrecked turret through 
the ammunition hoist to the lower deck. Even the 
machinery was clogged with corpses. . . . All our rapid- 
fire guns aloft soon became silent, because every gunner 
had been either killed or crippled at his post and lay on 
the deck where he fell. . . . There were so many wounded 
that the surgeons ceased trying to dress the wounds. 
Shells had exploded inside the ship, setting fire to the 
woodwork, and even the hospital was turned into a fur- 
nace. The first wounded who were sent there had to be 
abandoned by the surgeons, who fled for their lives from 
the intolerable heat." 

The " Teresa " had come within the zone of the Amer- 
ican fire at about 9.35 a. m. Within fifteen minutes smoke 
was rising from her ports and hatches, indicating that she 
had been set afire by the American shells. The shot 
from the " Brooklyn " that had cut her water-main made 
it impossible to extinguish the flames, and, the fire from 
the American ships growing more accurate and more 
deadly every minute, she was beached at 10.15 and her 
flag hauled down. On the " Texas " the men raised a 
shout of joy. " Don't cheer, men," said Captain Philip 
from the bridge ; " those poor fellows are dying." Admiral 
Cervera's own race for life and liberty lasted less than 
forty minutes. Clad in underclothes only, he tried to 
escape to the shore on a raft, directed by his son, but was 



276 Blue Jackets of '98 

captured and taken to the "Gloucester," where he was 
received with honours due his rank. His voyage away 
from Santiago covered exactly six miles and a half, and 
his brief experience with American gunnery cost nearly 
half his officers and crew. 

Behind the " Maria Teresa," at an interval of about 800 
yards, came the " Vizcaya," — that crack cruiser which 
had been sent to New York as an offset to the " Maine's " 
visit to Havana, and from the decks of which in the har- 
bour of the Cuban capital Spanish officers had looked 
down with idle curiosity and careless indifference upon 
the sunken wreck of that gallant battle-ship. We may 
well believe that when the prow of Captain Eulate's ship 
came ploughing out from the bay, Wainwright, late of the 
" Maine," on the little " Gloucester " aimed some shots at 
her with a special ill-will. But his particular game was 
of another sort, as we shall see, and the " Vizcaya " under 
gathered headway rushed on to the west, passing the 
heavier battle-ships "Iowa" and "Indiana," but receiv- 
ing terrible punishment from their guns. In a newspaper 
interview on his arrival as a prisoner in the United States, 
a lieutenant of the " Vizcaya " spoke of the murderous 
effect of the shells from the "Indiana." He thought 
them the 13-inch shells, but it is more probable that they 
were the 8-uich missiles. " They appeared to slide along 
the surface of the water and hunt for a seam in our 
armour," he said. " Three of these monster projectiles 
penetrated the hull of the ' Vizcaya,' and ex])loded there 
before we started for the shore. The carnage inside the 
ship was something horrible and beyond description. 
Fires were started up constantly. It seemed to me that 
the iron bulkheads were ablaze. Our organisation was 
perfect. We acted promptly, and mastered all small 
outbreaks of llame until the small ammunition magazine 
was exploded by a shell. From that moment the vessel 
became a furnace of fire. Wliile we were walking the 
deck headed shoreward, we could hear the roar of the 



Blue Jackets of '98 277 

flames under our feet above the voice of artillery. The 
' Vizcaya's ' hull bellowed like a blast furnace. Why, 
men sprang from the red-hot deck straight into the mouth 
of sharks." 

But the " Vizcaya " lasted longer than the " Almirante 
Oquendo," which followed her out of the harbour. While 
the former ship made her turn at the harbour's mouth 
and headed west on the coast, with the " Brooklyn," 
" Oregon," and " Texas " in full pursuit, the latter fell an 
immediate prey to the fire of the " Indiana " and " Iowa." 
Though accredited with speed equal to that of her sister 
ships, she lagged that day of all times, and received a 
fiercer baptism of fire than fell to the lot of any of her 
ill-fated comrades. She bore the punishment five minutes 
longer than the " Teresa ; " then, with flames pouring out 
of every opening in her hull, she made for the beach, 
hauhng down her flag in token of submission, while men 
were dropping from her red-hot decks to the water. 
Two great Spanish war-vessels were thus destroyed in the 
first three-quarters of an hour, and the American fleet, 
as though hungry for more victims, was concentrating its 
fire now on the two that were left. From the conning- 
tower of the " Iowa," " Fighting Bob " Evans passed the 
word through the speaking-tubes to the men in the 
bowels of the ship, telling them of the victorious progress 
of tlie fight thus far ; and the cheers that came from below 
were followed by the forward leap of the ship, as she 
responded to the increased pressure of steam the willing 
and enthusiastic stokers coaxed out of the boilers. 

Leaving the " Teresa " and the " Oquendo " flaming and 
smoking on the beach, the chase swept on. The " Viz- 
caya " was still making a gallant running fight, and the 
greatest of all the Spanish ships, the magnificent " Cristo- 
bal Colon," named after the man who had given to Spain 
this western domain she was now in process of losing, 
the ship which alone Admiral Cervera had hoped to save 
from the wreck he foresaw, v/as racing along the coast 



278 Blue Jackets of '98 

near the shore, and protected from the American vessels 
in some degree by the " Vizcaya." While she fled, dis- 
aster fell upon the two torpedo-boat destroyers, " Pluton " 
and " Furor." And the story of the destruction of these 
vessels is also the story of the cool judgment and mag- 
nificent courage of Eichard Wainwright, late executive 
officer of the " Maine," then commander of the converted 
yacht " Gloucester." 

As the cruisers came out, Wainwright joined in the 
general cannonade with his little six- and four-pounders, 
but he did not join in the chase. With quick compre- 
hension of the situation, he determined that the torpedo 
destroyers were his fair game, and he determined to await 
their appearance, meanwhile letting steam accumulate in 
his boilers in order to have plenty of speed when the 
crucial moment should arrive. The destroyers were slow 
to come out. For some reason, yet unexplained, Cervera, 
schooled tactician as he was, failed to handle them in the 
only way in which they might be made of service. In- 
stead of bringing them out of the harbour on the lee, or 
protected, side of the heavier vessels, and letting them slip 
out when our ships were nearest, he left them to make 
their appearance alone and undefended. As if this were 
not enough to insure their impotence and their certain 
destruction, the destroyers themselves were manoeuvred 
with an entire lack of that audacity and even desperation 
which alone can make one of these vulnerable craft for- 
midable. Instead of dashing at the nearest American ship, 
and trusting to the rapidity of their progress and the 
small target they offered for their safety, both the " Plu- 
ton " and the " Furor " followed the example of the cruisers, 
and turned along the shore to the westward. A torpedo 
boat is often likened to a serpent, because of its sinister 
method of attack and of the deadly hurt which it can 
inflict. But, like the serpent, it is least dangerous in 
flight. Coiled and ready for a spring, a rattlesnake is a 
thing of deadly potentialities. Extended at full length, 



Blue Jackets of '98 279 

with its long, slender vertebrae exposed, and brittle to the 
lightest blow, it is easily slain. So with the torpedo boat. 
Coming head on, at a speed of twenty-five knots, with two 
deadly missiles ready to let fly, either one of which striking 
will end the stoutest warship, it is an enemy to unsettle 
the aim of opposing gunners. Eunning away, it is only 
an animate and interesting target. Cervera's torpedo de- 
stroyers ran away. The gunners on the larger American 
cruisers sent a storm of projectiles from the secondary 
batteries after them, but the real, serious attack was left 
to the little " Gloucester " and Wainwright. In a cloud 
of smoke from her own guns, the former yacht sped for- 
ward, receiving and ignoring shots from the batteries and 
the nearer Spanish cruisers. One 6-inch shell would 
effectually terminate her career, and many were fired at her ; 
but her captain had eyes only for the two destroyers, and 
only one desire, to come to close quarters with them be- 
fore they could either be sunk by our battle-ships or 
strike our vessels a blow. Either of the destroyers was 
more than a match for the " Gloucester." Their batteries 
alone were of twice the power, without considering at all 
the engines of destruction which they could let slip from 
their torpedo tubes. In a few minutes from the moment 
the enemy was sighted, Wainwright was engaged with the 
two destroyers at short range, and under the fire of the 
"Socapa" battery. The battle-ships which had been 
firing at them from their secondary batteries soon saw 
that the " Gloucester " was equal to the task, and desisted. 
In a very few minutes both destroyers began to smoke 
ominously, and the rapidity of their fire fell off. Then 
the " Furor " became erratic in her course, as though her 
steering-gear had been cut. Wainwright closed in sav- 
agely, and his men at their unprotected guns redoubled 
their efforts. Suddenly, amidships on the " Pluton," there 
shot up a prodigious cloud of smoke and flame, with a 
deafening roar and shock that could be felt across the 
water despite the thunders of the guns. A shell from 



28o Blue Jackets of '98 

one of the battle-ships — three afterwards disputed for the 
honour — had struck her fairly, and exploded either the 
magazines or the boilers, or both. Broken in two by 
the rending blast, she sank hke a stone. Balked of half 
his chosen prey, Wainwright pursued the other craft the 
more relentlessly. She was already clearly crippled, and 
made pathetic efforts to escape. At last, fairly shot to 
pieces, she hauled down her flag, and ran for the line of 
breaking surf, where her men leaped overboard to escape 
the fierce flames that were sweeping resistlessly from bow 
to stern below. Changed in an instant from a relentless 
enemy to a succouring friend, Wainwright manned his 
boats, and went to the rescue of the survivors on the 
burning ship. Many were saved, and the Americans had 
barely left the smoking mass of scorching steel and iron, 
when it blew up with a resounding roar, and the Spanish 
torpedo destroyers had vanished. They lasted just forty 
minutes under the American fire, and at no time had been 
a serious menace to any American ship. An officer on 
the " Pluton " afterwards told of the plans and the fate 
of the destroyers in an interview, some part of which may 
be quoted here : 

" The two torpedo-boat destroyers were to stay behind the 
armoured cruisers until the American ships closed in, and then 
they were to dart out, heading straight for the nearest enemy. 
That was the plan, but see how it failed! We were shot to 
pieces before we got within half the torpedo-striking distance 
of the American ships. We found ourselves riddled, and could 
not strike a blow in return. . . . Our vessel, without armour, 
offered no place of refuge. On one of the armour-clads a man 
feels somewhat safer on the lee side of a turret, or with the 
conning-tower between him and the enemy ; but our men were 
just as safe on the open deck, safer indeed than below, for the 
shots soon shattered our steampipes, and escaping steam scalded 
to death the stokers and engineers. . . . We had prepared 
our torpedo tubes, but before the 'Texas,' now the nearest 
enemy, was within 1500 yards of us — much too far to use a 



Blue Jackets of '98 281 

torpedo against her — our steering-gear was crippled, half of 
our crew were killed, and our engines were mortally hurt. We 
steered for a time by the twin screw. We then tried to get 
behind the ' Oquendo, ' not to save our lives, but to save our 
torpedoes until we could use them. But before we could take 
the position we intended, the ' Pluton ' became unmanageable. 
The ' Oquendo ' used smoke-producing powder at the begin- 
ning of the battle, solely to enable the ' Pluton ' and ' Furor ' 
to hide. But the smoke did not lie on the water. It rose in 
fleecy clouds that rendered our position all the plainer to the 
enemy in the clear strip of the blue, clean water below. . . . 
The biggest shells were fired so as to ricochet along the water. 
We could see them coming at us by the enormous splashes they 
made, and they came straight. Finally, a shell from the 
' Brooklyn, ' I think, literally stove the torpedo boat to splint- 
ers. It passed through the boiler-room, splitting the boiler 
itself, and letting out steam and scalding water upon the crew 
to stab them like sword-blades." 

The action had now continued for about three-quarters 
of an hour. The " Infanta Maria Teresa " and the 
" Oquendo " were blazing on the beach with their colours 
struck. The two torpedo destroyers were annihilated. 
The battle-ship " Indiana," which had been distanced by 
the enemy in his rush to the eastward, had been signalled 
to turn in toward the shore, and give aid to the survivors 
on the burning ships. Two Spaniards only were still 
afloat, — the " Vizxaya," running and fighting Ijravely in a 
hopeless struggle for life, and the great " Cristobal Colon," 
which was rushing, with the momentum of a planet in 
its course through space, down the coast to the westward. 
In the chase of these two vessels, the " Brooklyn " held 
the place of honour. Her station on the blockade when 
the enemy came out was such as to give her a command- 
ing position, and her speed kept her well to the front 
throughout. Next to her at the outset was the " Texas," 
a battle-ship which for years the newspapers had been de- 
scribing as unlucky and " hoodooed," but which in this 
battle developed marvellous speed and fought with reck- 



282 Blue Jackets of '98 

less gallantry. The " Oregon," third in the race at first, 
by a dash which no one thought possible for a ship of her 
weight and structure, passed the " Texas," and actually 
came up with the " Brooklyn," whose tars turned out on 
deck and turrets to cheer the wonderful fighter from a 
Pacific coast dockyard. The fire of these three vessels as 
they sped along, and that of the " Iowa," which was only a 
short distance in the rear, was concentrated on the un- 
happy " Vizcaya." She had passed inside the " Oquendo " 
and the " Teresa " when those two doomed ships were 
receiving the attention of the entire American fleet, and 
had, until they were sunk, escaped serious injury, but now 
with the fire of four of the biggest and best fighting- 
machines in the world concentrated upon her, the stanch 
and beautiful vessel began to go to pieces. Her great 
frame quivered under the repeated blows of the heavy 
shells that struck it and rung like a boiler-shop in full 
operation with the incessant clangor of the smaller pro- 
jectiles. An hour had passed. Of the American ships 
that started in the chase, only the " Brooklyn," " Texas," 
and " Oregon " were hanging like hounds on the flank of 
the quarry. The " Indiana " had been left behind. The 
" Iowa," too, had stopped to give aid to the burning and 
drowning men on the two blazing warships. The " Colon " 
was steaming ahead with no sign of weakness, but the 
" Vizcaya " seemed like a ship in distress. On her the 
fire of the three pursuers was concentrated. Admiral 
Schley, peering around the lee of the conning-tower on 
the " Brooklyn," said to his captain, " Get in close, Cook, 
and we '11 fix her." The range was then about 1 400 yards. 
A moment before Commodore Schley had asked George 
H. Ellis, a ship's yeoman who was assisting the navi- 
gator, what was the range. The shells were flying fast, 
but Ellis stepped unhesitatingly from behind the lee of the 
forward turret, where he was sheltered, and adjusting his 
stadimeter, turned with the report, "Fourteen hundred 
yards to the ' Vizcaya,' sir." There was a low moaning 



Blue Jackets of '98 283 

sound in the air as a shell came on, a vicious spat, and 
the man's headless body fell heavily to the deck. " Too 
bad," said Schley, sorrowfully ; but there was time for no 
regrets. It had been George Ellis's lot to be the one 
man to offer up his life in exchange for the victory of 
Santiago. 

The word was passed to the turrets and tops of the 
" Brooklyn " to aim at the " Vizcaya " only. The ship 
was carried in until the range was less than 1000 yards, 
or little over half a mile, and the effect of the shots at 
that distance began to tell. " I don't see any of the shots 
dropping into the water," complained one of the gunners 
to the lieutenant in charge of that turret. " Well, that 's 
all right," was the reply ; " if they don't drop into the water, 
they are hitting." And hitting they were. Inside the 
" Vizcaya " the beautiful woodwork, which had awakened 
the admiration and at the same time the professional 
disapproval of Captain Sigsbee when he visited her at 
Havana, was all in a blaze. The turrets were full of dead 
and wounded men, the machinery shattered, and the hull 
pierced below the water-line. Eeluctantly abandoning 
the fight, for he was a brave officer and a gentleman. 
Captain Eulate turned his ship's prow toward that rocky 
and inhospitable shore on which already lay piled the 
wrecks of the " Teresa," the " Oquendo," and the " Furor." 
As the ship swung about, a shell from the " Oregon " 
struck her fairly in the stern. The enormous mass of 
steel, charged with explosives of frightful power, rushed 
tlirough the steel framework of the ship, shattering every- 
thing in its course, crashed into the boilers, and exploded. 
Words are inadequate to describe the ruin that resulted. 
Men, guns, projectiles, ragged bits of steel and iron 
splinters and indescribable debris were hurled in every 
direction, while flames shot up fiercely from every part 
of the ship. Between decks she was a raging hell of fire, 
and when she struck the beach the watchers from the 
American men-of-war could see what looked like a white 



284 Blue Jackets of ^98 

line reaching from her bow to the water, which was in 
fact the naked men dropping one after another over the 
side to seek the cool rehef of the ocean from the fiery 
torment they were enduring, So the " Vizcaya " dropped 
out of the fight. Anticipating a little the course of our 
narrative of the fight, we may tell of the final death- 
struggle of the ship as it was described in conversation 
by Captain Evans after the war : 

" "We had put in toward the * Vizcaya ' after she was beached, " 
said " Fighting Bob, " " thinking that since the ' Colon ' was in 
the hands of our fellows we would see what we could do to save 
some of the poor devils of Spaniards who were grilling there in 
the burning ship. I had the boats lowered away, and the men 
went over to the ' Vizcaya ' and took off all the Spaniards they 
could reach. Some of them had almost to be pried off the 
ship, they were so panic-stricken. In one of the first boats 
that came to the ' Iowa ' was Captain Eulate. He was about 
half clothed, and had been wounded a little — nothing serious 
at all, a mere scratch. Why, the Spanish surgeon who ten- 
derly assisted him up our ladder was twice as badly hurt, — had 
his whole arm shot away, — but was sticking to his commander 
with dog-like fidelity. Well, Eulate was depressed, of course; 
but I tried to cheer him up, told him he 'd made a good fight, 
and had our surgeon look after him. But he was persistently 
gloomy. Finally I asked him to come down to my cabin and 
take a drink. He acquiesced, and just as he turned to leave 
the deck, stopped, looked over to where his ship was smoking 
and flaming away, and raising his whole arm in the air, said, 
in a sort of theatrical fashion, ' Adios, " Vizcaya " ! Adios, 
adios ! ' Well, sir, at that very instant the whole hull of 
that ship seemed to be lifted in the air by a most tremendous 
explosion, and she fairly vanished in a cloud of smoke and 
flying debris. I suppose her main magazine had been reached 
by the fire, but the event could not have occurred at a more 
dramatic moment if it had been timed and the explosion regu- 
lated by a stage-manager." 

Thus the "Vizcaya" dropped out of the fight, at 11.06 
according to the timekeeper on the " Brooklyn." One 



Blue Jackets of '98 285 

hour and a half had been the period of her endurance of 
the American shells. The " Colon " was now left alone. 
Thus far her career had not been glorious, for she had 
simply run away, not making any effort to stand and give 
battle to her pursuers, and not even keeping up a very fast 
fire from her guns. In her speed was her one hope of es- 
cape, and her captain trusted to it wholly. From the very 
first shot of the battle the Spaniards had done nothing but 
run. Their fire, such as it was, was only intended as an 
aid to their escape. Had Cervera come out of Santiago 
intent upon fighting a desperate battle, he might indeed 
have lost all his ships, but in all probability he would 
have taken at least one of the American vessels to the 
bottom with him. His running fight only resulted in the 
loss of all his ships without inflicting the slightest loss 
upon the Americans. The " Colon " adhered strictly to 
the plan which had thus far characterized the Spanish 
tactics. It was quickly evident to those on the foremost 
of the pursuing ships that there could be no escape for 
the fugitive. Even had not the Americans developed un- 
expected speed, the course of the ships was such that the 
" Colon " would inevitably be cut off. A cape jutted out 
into the ocean at some distance before her, which she 
would have to round. The " Brooklyn," being farther out 
to sea, was headed for that headland in a direct line, while 
the doomed " Colon " had a long curve to make to reach it. 
Commodore Schley saw that the prize was his, and began 
to lighten the strain on his men, who had fought so well. 
Firing was stopped, and the men were called out on the 
superstructure to see what had been done by the guns of 
the fleet and to watch the chase. Out of the turrets, up 
from the magazines and engine-rooms, poured the stalwart 
fellows, smoke-begrimed and sweaty. Far astern they 
could see the smoking wrecks of the " Oquendo " and 
" Teresa." Almost abeam was the " Vizcaya," with men 
dropping from every port. Ahead on the right was 



286 Blue Jackets of ^98 

the " Colon " fleeing for dear life, while the " Brooklyn," 
responding to the work of men below for whom there 
was yet no rest, rushed after relentlessly. As the men 
crowded on turret top and along the decks to see the 
wonderful spectacle, they all of a sudden and spontane- 
ously set up a cheer for Admiral Schley. The admiral's 
eyes moistened as he looked down upon them from the 
bridge. " They are the boys who did it," he said to one 
who stood beside him, and he spoke truly. Then the 
men cheered the " Oregon," which was coming up gal- 
lantly, and from that ship the cheers were returned. 
Signals of a social and even jocular character were ex- 
changed between the three ships that were still in the 
chase, for now all felt that not even the last of Cervera's 
ships could escape. A signal from the " Brooklyn " sug- 
gested to the " Oregon" that she try one of her 13-inch 
guns on the chase. The great cannon flashed and roared 
from the forward turret, and the shell, which rushed past 
the " Brooklyn " with a noise like a railway- train, fell 
short. On they sped a little farther, the " Oregon " 
visibly gaining on the fastest ship of the Spanish navy, 
a battle-ship built for weight and solidity overhauling 
a cruiser built for speed. Presently another shell was 
tried. It fell nearer the fugitive, near enough for the 
captain of the fleeing foe to read in its splash in the 
water the death-warrant of his ship. At such a moment 
some men would turn fiercely and sell their lives as dearly 
as might be, but that instinct was lacking to the Spaniard. 
Instead he turned his almost uninjured ship toward the 
shore and beached her, hauling down his flag as she struck. 
Either before the surrender or after, her engineer's crew 
opened and broke the sea valves so as to destroy the ship. 
If this was done before the flag was hauled down, it was 
a legitimate and proper act ; if after, it was dishonourable 
and treacherous. Captain Cook went in a boat to take 
possession of the prize, his crew being ordered not to 



Blue Jackets of '98 287 

cheer or exult over the vanquished. The ship had been 
struck but eight times, and not by shells of large calibre, 
and she would have been a useful prize but for this sly 
work below. There were plain indications that officers 
and men had been drinking heavily. An effort was 
made to save her by the " New York," which came up 
just after the surrender. Captain Chad wick, seeing the 
ship beached and fearing that she would slip off and sink 
in deep water, laid the nose of the " New York," up 
against her stern and pushed her gently but firmly up 
the shelving strand. The manoeuvre was useless. Be- 
fore another day the great cruiser had filled and rolled 
over on her side and lay a perfect wreck on the desolate 
and uninhabited shore of Cuba at the mouth of Eio 
Tarquino. It was the exact spot where the ill-fated 
" Virginius " expedition tried to land. More scores against 
Spain than that set down on account of the " Maine " 
were wiped out that day. 

So ended, after less than four hours' fighting, — for the 
"Colon" surrendered at 1.15 P. m., — a naval battle that 
possesses many extraordinary and unique qualities. It 
completed the wreck of Spanish naval power which had 
been in slow and interrupted progress since our Anglo- 
Saxon progenitors strewed the Channel with the wrecks 
of the Invincible Armada. It dealt the decisive stroke 
in the war which deprived Spain of her last remnant of 
American colonies. It was of absorbing interest to naval 
experts in all parts of the world, because it was the only 
considerable battle in which heavy men-of-war of the 
modern type and with modern armament had ever been 
pitted against each other on anything like equal terms. 
And it was unique in that while the defeated fleet lost 
six ships, more than 600 men killed and drowned, and 
1800 prisoners, many of them wounded, the victors had 
but one man killed and one wounded. Small wonder was 
it that when the flag of the " Cristobal Colon " went down 



288 Blue jackets of '98 

and the decks of the American ships were covered with 
men cheering in a very delirium of joy, gallant Captain 
Philip of the " Texas " called his officers and crew about 
him, and, baring his head, said in reverential tone : " I 
want to make public acknowledgment here that I be- 
lieve in God, the Father. I want you all to lift your 
hats and from your hearts offer silent thanks to the 
Almighty." 

Much that was picturesque in the story of this most 
remarkable naval battle of modern times must be passed 
over hastily. The gallant effort of the " New York " to 
catch up with the fighters and retrieve her ill-luck in 
having been absent when the battle began, merits a passing 
word. Though technically in command, Admiral Samp- 
son was by bad fortune absolutely out of the battle from 
beginning to end, near enough to see the fighting but too 
far away to join in it. He reached the leading ships just as 
they were closing in about the beached " Colon." Much 
might be said too of the gallantry shown by men of the 
" Iowa," " Indiana," " Gloucester," " Vixen," and " Erics- 
son " in rescuing the Spanish from their burning ships. 
Never perhaps in the history of war has such dreadful 
suffering fallen on defeated seamen. Scores were literally 
roasted alive, for the whole interior of the ships " Vizcaya," 
" Oquendo," and " Teresa," became like iron furnaces 
heated white hot. The wounded burned where they lay, 
for even the decks were red-hot. Men caught below, in 
engine or furnace room, by the jamming of the battle 
gratings were condemned to a slow and frightful death. 
The sight of the carnage and agony crazed men who were 
otherwise unhurt and in possession of their faculties, so 
that they were unable to intelligently respond to efforts 
for their rescue. Men clinging to a ladder on the side 
of a scorching hot ship had literally to be dragged away 
before they would loose their hold and drop into a boat 
below. The American Blue Jackets worked amid flames, 



Blue Jackets of '98 289 

on blistering decks, amid piles of ammunition continually 
being exploded by the heat, and under guns which might 
at any moment send out a withering blast. It is not too 
much to say that in their work of mercy the Blue Jackets 
encountered dangers quite as deadly as those they had 
met in the fury of the battle. 

The poor gunnery of the Spaniards saved our ships 
from any serious test of their shell-resisting qualities. 
The " Brooklyn," according to Commodore Schley's report, 
was struck by shells about twenty-five times, and bore in 
all some forty scars of the combat. But she was ready 
to continue, or to begin all over again, when the " Colon " 
turned over on the shore. The " Iowa " received two 
wounds, that did not imperil her structure at all, but 
which it seems impossible could have been sustained 
without loss of life. One shell exploded on the berth- 
deck and ripped things up in wholesale fashion. Another 
entered the coffer-dam, but fortunately did not explode. 
The " Texas " was hit three times, one shell smashing her 
chart-house and another puncturing her smoke-stack. 
The injuries to the other ships were even more trivial. 
When the complete destruction of the Spaniards is con- 
trasted with this comparative immunity of the American 
ships, the measure of our superiority in gunnery and our 
better fortune is suggested. An officer on the " Vizcaya " 
asserts that shots struck that doomed ship at the rate of 
one a second. But superior as our gunnery was, a table 
of hits compiled by an expert for the " Scientific American " 
from the official report of the Survey Board, shows how 
far we fell short of that ideal gunnery which figures so 
generally in newspaper accounts as " making every shot 
tell." After coimting with the utmost care all the shot- 
holes on the wrecks that were above water or visible, the 
Board reported the following " palpable hits," classified 
according to the size of the calibre of the striking 
shells: 

19 



290 Blue Jackets of '98 





Niimber of Hiti on each Vessel. 






d 

3 













J3 
^1 




15 'i;^ 


« 


Size of Gun. 










f! 




W 





13 


•0 


t 


a 


(55 


1^1 


S 







% 


U 



"3 




^§^ 


a 

3 




H 





> 


t> 


H 


iz; 


^ 


6-pounder . . 


17 


43 


13 


4 


77 


42 


1.83 


1-pounder . . 


2 








2 


13 


15 


4-inch .... 


1 


7 


4 


2 


12 


3 


4.00 


5-inch .... 


3 


3 


7 




15 


6 


2.50 


6-inch . . . . 


1 


1 






3 


7 


0.43 


8-inch .... 


3 


3 


5 




12 


18 


0.67 


12-inch .... 


2 








2 


6 


0.33 


13-inch .... 












8 


0.00 


Totals . . . 


29 


57 


29 


8 


123 


103 





The impressive facts shown by this table are, first, that 
our 13-inch guns did no execution at all, and our 12-inch 
guns scored only two hits ; second, out of at least 6000 
shots fired, only about 300 were effective. Allowance 
must be made for shots beneath the water-mark that 
could not be identified by the investigators and for those 
that did execution by bursting above the decks. But 
they change the results little, and the statistics of the 
wounds in the defeated ships demonstrate that, good as 
the Yankee gunnery was, it took many a shot to make 
a hit. It shows, too, that the maximum of execution was 
done by the rapid-fire and small-calibre guns. The 
slaughter on the Spanish ships and the flames which 
made them untenable came from the storm of small pro- 
jectiles which relentlessly searched out every part of their 
structures. So completely were they riddled by these 
projectiles, and so destructive was the work of the flames 
they kindled, that, despite the eagerness of the Americans 
to save and repair one ship as a trophy, the only one 
which seemed to offer the slightest hope that the endeavour 
could be made successful was the "Teresa." She was 



Blue Jackets of '98 291 

raised by Lieutenant Hobson after costly and tireless 
efforts, but on her way North to be refitted she encountered 
a storm and was abandoned by her commander as sinking. 
Nevertheless she floated sixty miles and went ashore on 
Cat Island, where after another survey it was thought 
inexpedient to try to raise her. So of the more than 
SI 2,000,000 worth of Spanish ships and fittings destroyed 
that day, the Americans were unable to save anything. 
For them is only the remembrance of a victory so com- 
plete and so extraordinary that no trophy is needed to 
keep it fresh in the minds of the people. The almost 
2000 prisoners were kept humanely and kindly cared for 
on the American ships until a great ocean-liner could be 
sent from the North to take them to their prison camp on 
an island in the harbour of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, 
the officers going to Annapolis. In their captivity they 
fared better, as we shall see, than the soldiers of General 
Shaftei's army in their hour of victory. 



CHAPTEK XIII 

Closing in — The Sufferings of Beleaguered Santiago — 
The Lagging Negotiations for Surrender — The Out- 
pouring OF Kefugees — The Bombardment — Surrender 
of the Spaniards — The Stars and Stripes above San- 
tiago — The Wrecking of the Army by Sickness — The 
Flight to the North — The Infamy of the Transports 
— Montauk Point and Camp Wikoff — Fever Camps in 
the United States. 

MEANWHILE about the beleaguered city the Ameri- 
can Hues were being drawn tighter and tighter. 
Reinforcements were landing at Siboney, and hurrying 
forward to the front. The news of the complete success 
of the navy so encouraged the men in the trenches that 
they stood ready to defend their positions at all hazards. 
The one moment when the Spaniards might have regained 
their lost ground — the afternoon of July 2d — passed 
without effort on their part, and thereafter the capture of 
the city became merely a matter of patience. 

In the city was dire distress among non-combatants. 
Food was scarce and dear, and the poorer classes were 
reduced to devouring the most revolting scraps. The 
sanitary condition of the town was most alarming. To 
the effects of starvation was added the terror of a bom- 
bardment. Before Cervera went out to destruction. Gen- 
eral Toral threatened that if the Americans should take 
the city by assault, he would turn upon it the guns of the 
ships, regardless of the thousands of women and children 
in its streets. This peril was averted by the result of the 
naval battle; but immediately thereafter came General 
Shafter's warning, that he intended to bombard the city 



Blue Jackets of '98 293 

from his trenches. Two days were given to the people to 
leave, — an act of humanity for which the general has been 
most unjustly condemned. It is true that the departure 
of the non-combatants left more food for the defenders 
and to that degree strengthened them ; but the time has 
never been, when American soldiers wantonly bombarded 
a city full of women and children without giving them an 
opportunity to escape, and it is to be hoped it never will 
come. Consul Ramsden describes as heart-rending the 
scenes on the roads leading out of the city the morning 
set for the departure of the people. Toral had ordered 
that no carts or other vehicles should be taken, so the 
ways were packed with young and old, sick and feeble, 
plodding along on foot. " The scene was terrible," wrote 
Eamsden in his diary ; " people flocking out, sick carried 
in chairs or as they could, children getting lost by the 
way, etc." Shelter was difficult to find, food still more so. 
El Caney, to which 18,000 to 20,000 fugitives flocked, was 
foul with the effluvium from unburied mules and horses, 
and even human victims of the battle. In the houses 
was not room enough for the people to lie down, and the 
nights were passed in sitting position on the floor. Food 
was scarcer than in the deserted town, and as the refugees 
had travelled on foot, none had more than three days' 
rations. The Red Cross Society, which had its agents 
on the ground, could not get its provisions up from the 
coast for lack of transportation, nor for that matter could 
the army. Small biscuits sold for $2 each, and $7 was 
refused for a chicken. On every hand children died for 
lack of food. General Shafter did all that could be done 
to alleviate the distress, though his first care was for the 
:army. Like distress was reported from Guavitas, Dos 
Bocas, and other neighbouring villages. In all, about 
'35,000 people had left Santiago, mostly, of course, women, 
children, or helpless persons. In a war-racked, impover- 
ished, and desolate country their sufferings were such that 
they soon began to appeal to the American commander 



294 Blue Jackets of '98 

for permission to return, preferring the perils of a bom- 
bardment to the slow agonies of starvation. 

The bombardment, indeed, had gone on but slowly. A 
few shots, and then a flag of truce, with renewed negotia- 
tions for a surrender, was about the daily routine. Some 
of the soldiers grew impatient. " Now that we 've got 
those dagoes corralled, why don't we brand them ? " in- 
quired one of the Eough Eiders in the language of the 
cattle camp. The almost hourly interchange of notes 
under flags of truce was jeered at from the trenches, 
where the hot, hungry, and water-soaked men were natur- 
ally anxious for a conclusion to their efforts and relief from 
their discomforts. General Shafter, however, pursued a 
course which was at once cautious and humane. To 
assault would have cost heavily in human life, the more 
so since Garcia and his Cubans had failed to head off the 
expected reinforcements from Manzanillo, and 4000 fresh 
troops under General Escario had entered the city on the 
night of the 3d. To push the bombardment with the as- 
sistance of the navy, would perhaps have hastened the 
surrender, but the American general was assured by the 
foreign consuls that Toral was eager to surrender already, 
and was actively urging such a course upon Madrid by 
cable. Shafter accordingly determined to wait a reason- 
able time, in hope of taking the town without further 
sacrifice of life. 

On the 6th of July the impatient men in the trenches 
saw that one of the flags of truce, at least, had borne fruit. 
Up a narrow trail from the city came a cavalcade of men, 
at the sight of the first of whom the crowd of soldiers 
who had been gathered there waiting in the heat for hours, 
went mad with joy. It was a throng of yelling, dancing, 
laughing, ay, and weeping, men that greeted Lieutenant 
Hobson and his seven comrades of the " Merrimac " exploit, 
when they came into the army's lines, after having been 
exchanged for seven prisoners taken at San Juan. As the 
band on the very foremost line struck up "The Star- 




^ y^ 



Blue Jackets of '98 295 

Spangled Banner," all the new-comers, and those who had 
gathered to welcome them, stood silent at a salute, but 
when the music died away bedlam broke forth. To crowd 
about the heroes, to make the tropical forests rin^ with 
cheers, to shake each one by the hand, seemed to be the 
dearest wish of every man in blue uniform that day. 
From the ambulance in which they held their triumphal 
progress, the seven happy Blue Jackets yelled words of 
compliment and congratulation to the tattered and dirty 
soldiers, who shouted back applause. It was a glorious 
episode in the lives of these men, and its culmination 
came when, reaching the fleet after dark, they found the 
ships' companies turned out as though an admiral, at least, 
were coming to visit ; and as their launch was seen ad- 
vancing from the shore, the cheers of their messmates 
made the hills of Cuba ring almost as had the thunderino- 
fire that Morro and Estrella had levelled against them 
nearly six weeks before. 

Day by day the American lines were growing stronger. 
The right had been extended until the city was bound in 
an iron ring, and men could get neither in nor out. The 
navy, freed from any apprehension of an enemy afloat, 
was able to give its undivided attention to the Spanish 
works, and on the 6th arrangements were made for the 
ships to bombard the town, while the troops did the same 
from their trenches. Every day, guns were placed in 
position along the American lines, which were now within 
three hundred yards of the Spanish position, and easily in 
range of the city. Three new batteries, twelve mortars, 
and the dynamite gun were thus trained on the belea- 
guered town, ready for the bombardment. On the 6th 
General Toral asked for terms of capitulation. The bom- 
bardment had been planned for this day, but at his urgent 
request for time to communicate with Madrid, it was de- 
ferred. The second day thereafter, he offered to surrender 
the city, but not his troops. They, according to the terms 
he suggested, were to be permitted to march away with 



296 Blue Jackets of '98 

their arms and unmolested, as far as Holguin. It seems 
strange, in view of the unconditional surrender of three 
days later, that this offer was favoured by General Shafter 
and all his division commanders. But by this time the 
continued rains and the pestilential climate were beginniag 
to tell upon the soldiers, and the gravest apprehensions of 
an epidemic in the trenches were felt. If yellow fever, the 
ally so long of the Cubans against the Spaniards, should 
now turn against the American invaders, the army might 
be sacrificed and Santiago lost, after all. So reasoned the 
commanders in the field ; but the authorities at Washing- 
ton, convinced that Spain was about ready to sue for peace, 
refused to consider the proposition, and Toral was so noti- 
fied, and warned to prepare for a resumption of hostilities 
at 4 P. M. on the 10th. Reinforcements continued to come 
from the United States. General Randolph, with the 
regular artillery, which would have been of the greatest 
service earlier, arrived, but was delayed at Siboney. The 
Ninth Massachusetts, Thirty-fourth Michigan, Eighth 
Ohio, First Illinois, and First District of Columbia volun- 
teers came, all eager to see some active service. On the 
afternoon of the 10th the bombardment began from shore 
and sea, and continued until noon the next day. Singu- 
larly, little injury was done. Some few houses were de- 
stroyed, and others badly damaged ; but the soldiers in the 
trenches suffered little. From the fleet the dynamite 
cruiser "Vesuvius" sent some of her monster explosive 
projectiles, but beyond making huge holes in the ground, 
and naturally shaking the nerves of the Spaniards, she 
accomplished little. The bombardment indeed was rather 
without spirit, since the idea had become firmly rooted in 
the minds of the commanding officers that the Spaniards 
intended to surrender. 

Both belligerents were suffering heavily from causes 
other than bullets and shells. In the American ranks 
malarial fever had made its appearance, and spread like 
wild-fire. In the hospitals were more than 3000 men, 



i 



Blue Jackets of '98 297 

down with wounds or fever. Men died for lack of medi- 
cines which were abundant eighteen miles away. Every 
day new cases were reported, and the surgeons began to look 
grave. The defenders of the town were in even more 
desperate condition. General Linares, who was still nomi- 
nally the Spanish commander, though prevented by a 
wound from active service in the field, in a despatch to 
Madrid advising surrender, said : " Troops weak ; sick in 
considerable proportions not sent to hospitals, owing to the 
necessity of keeping them in the intrenchments. Horses 
and mules without the usual allowance of forage ; in 
the wet season with twenty hours' daily fall of rain, 
in the trenches which are simply ditches dug in the 
ground, without any permanent shelter for the men, 
who have nothing but rice to eat and no means of 
changing or drying their clothing." He closed his pic- 
ture of the wretchedness of the troops with a recom- 
mendation for a surrender. The United States meanwhile 
had offered that if the Spaniards would surrender they 
should be returned to Spain at the expense of this 
government. 

General Miles, the major-general commanding the whole 
army, had by this time reached Siboney. A story which 
indicates something of the conditions under which the 
men in the trenches were existing, is told of his visit to 
the front. At one point a battalion of naked men turned 
out solemnly and saluted. Somewhat startled, the general 
inquired the meaning of this remarkable spectacle. He 
learned that as it rained every day and the men had no 
change of clothing nor any place in which to dry it, they 
had become accustomed to strip at the first shower, putting 
their clothes under the shelter tents and going in nature's 
garb until the downfall was over. The fact too that the 
clothing supplied the troops was intended for winter use 
in Nortli Dakota had something to do with their readiness 
to discard it. There was no change in the command of 
the army, owing to General Miles's visit. He had come 



298 Blue Jackets of '98 

simply on a visit of inspection, and left General Shafter's 
plans undisturbed. In company with the latter he rode 
out to a tree in the valley between the lines, where by 
appointment General Toral met them to discuss terms of 
surrender. The Spaniard quibbled so much on little points, 
and was so insistent upon time to consult Madrid, that 
General Miles impatiently told General Shafter he believed 
the whole discussion was for the purpose of gaining time, 
and recommended that an assault be ordered immediately. 
General Shafter, however, had been convinced, by conversa- 
tions with the foreign consuls, that the Spaniards really 
wished to yield, and he accordingly agreed to a final armis- 
tice until the next day at noon. For once the Spaniards 
were not dilatory. At nine in the morning came a flag of 
truce to say that Toral was ready to surrender, and at two 
Generals Wheeler and Lawton and Captain Miley, as com- 
missioners for the United States, met General Escario, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Fortan, and Albert Mason, the British 
vice-consul, who acted in a like capacity for Spain. The 
task of drawing up the articles of capitulation was a 
tedious one, consuming all that day and the better part of 
the next ; but the reward was greater than had been ex- 
pected, for it appeared the Spaniards were ready to sur- 
render not only Santiago, but all the troops in Eastern 
Cuba, thus including in the surrender at least 12,000 men 
against wh^m not a gun had been fired. By evening of 
the next day, July 16th, the details of the surrender were 
all formulated, and approval of the terms fixed came from 
Madrid. The city was to be turned over to General 
Shafter and the American forces the day following. The 
Spanish officers were to be permitted to keep their side 
arms, and all soldiers were to retain their personal prop- 
erty. The United States government assumed the task of 
transporting the surrendered troops, in all about 24,000, 
back to Spain. As General Shafter justly said in his de- 
spatch to the President announcing the surrender, this 
ended the war. There was not another battle worthy of 



Blue Jackets of '98 299 

the name, nor any further serious opposition to the Ameri- 
can arms in Cuba. 

The surrender took place, July 18th, on a level spot 
between the opposing lines. With General Shafter to the 
meeting-place went the general officers with their staffs 
and a detacliment of 100 men. General Toral brought out 
with him a similar escort. On the ridges crested by the 
American lines our army was drawn up under arms, — 
about 20,000 men. General Toral, who looked broken and 
worn, announced his surrender in the briefest formula that 
would express the idea. He did not deliver his sword, as 
the articles of capitulation had expressly protected the 
officers of the defeated army from this humiliation, but 
with his adherents he stood at " present arms " while making 
his brief address. There was no cheering on the ridges 
where stood the American troops watching this act in the 
tragedy in which they had played so great a part. This 
interview over, the official party rode into the city, past 
the ragged Spanish soldiers who lined the roads, and look- 
ing pityingly upon the groups of haggard half-starved 
Cubans who had barely managed to survive the privations 
of the siege. At noon, in the presence of a crowd that 
was rather stoHd than hostile, the Stars and Stripes were 
raised over the governor's palace, while the band played 
"The Star-Spangled Banner." There was but little ex- 
citement, even in the American lines. Perhaps the men 
knew that with victory won the hardest and most costly 
part of their service was yet to come. 

By this surrender a city of about 70,000 inhabitants in 
time of peace was won for the United States, — or rather 
for the Cubans, for whom the United States took up arms, 
— with a territory contiguous and surrendered with it of 
5000 square miles. Nearly 24,000 troops with their arms 
and accoutrements, saving those of the officers, were also 
delivered to the conquerors. Had our array been able to 
retire at that moment, the loss in proportion to the extent 
of the triumph would have been light. Examination of 



300 Blue Jackets of '98 

the enemy's line of defence showed how wise had been 
the action of General Shafter in postponing from day to 
day an assault in hopes of the surrender which finally 
came. The Spaniards seemed to have a genius for devis- 
ing defensive works. The whole territory before the 
American lines was cut with trenches and enmeshed with 
barbed wire extending in every imaginable direction. Dur- 
ing the days of battle the defenders had given abundant 
evidence of their bravery in the trenches. They lacked 
that quality which impels soldiers to the assault, but in a 
defensive fight they won the admiration of their foes. 
Had the American army been compelled to take the city 
by assault, 5000 lives at least would have been the price 
paid. Nor would the navy have been able to round out 
its victory of the 3d of July by an entrance to the bay 
without heavy loss. A reconnaissance made by Admiral 
Schley and Captain Cook as soon as the flag was hauled 
down over Morro showed that the fortifications were 
practically uninjured by all the shot that had been hurled 
at them. After a careful examination of the ground 
which they had so long and so fiercely pounded, the navy 
officers reported that " over two million dollars' worth of 
ammunition thrown at the batteries defending Santiago 
harbour was absolutely harmless in its effect, so far as the 
reducing of the batteries was concerned, and simply bore 
out the well-known fact that it is a waste of time and 
money to bombard earthworks." The mines in the 
channel were found intact and well placed. It is just to 
set down the fact that the Spaniards were still equipped 
for a vigorous and costly defence, for in the newspapers 
and in some of the books of military history published at 
the time General Shafter was severely criticised for having 
waited so patiently for Toral to consult his home govern- 
ment. It was thought that for the American army to 
march into Santiago at any time after July 3d would 
have been a mere promenade. The fact is, it would have 
meant a battle bloodier than any fought in Cuba. 



Blue Jackets of '98 301 

With the Spaniards disarmed and pacified, it might have 
been expected that the condition of the American troops 
about Santiago would at once become tolerable if not 
wholly comfortable. So, at any rate, the people at home 
thought, and they were not prepared for the stories of suf- 
fering, of dire sickness, and of death that began to come 
North from a camp supposed to be the scene of rejoicing 
over a complete victory. The pestilential climate which 
had enabled the hardened Cubans to stand out for so many 
years against the fresh troops sent by Spain to sicken and 
die, was beginning to tell upon our men. The rainy season 
had set in, and that meant that the trenches in which the 
men had been sleeping and living since the beginning of 
the siege were wet ditches, sodden and malarial. When 
the army embarked for Cuba, the most explicit scientific 
instructions were given to the soldiers for the preservation 
of their health against the ills of a tropical climate. They 
were to boil all water before drinking it, but they who of- 
fered the rule did not give the soldiers anything to boil 
the water in, nor suggest any way of building a fire where 
matches were scarcer than snowballs in Cuba, nor any 
method of keeping it going in constant rain without cover. 
So the men drank the water as they could find it, often 
from open brooks into which the offal of the camp drained; 
and as their rations were largely salted food, they drank a 
great deal. And the food! That was another subject 
upon which the prudent authorities on army hygiene had 
given explicit directions. The men were to eat only 
wholesome things ; but the commissary department some 
days left them with nothing at all to eat, and then sup- 
phed them with beef preserved in such a revolting way 
that the commanding-general of the army referred to it as 
embalmed beef. Vegetables bought for the army spoiled 
before they were delivered. Especially were the soldiers 
warned against the fruits of the country, but there were 
days when they could get nothing else. So, too, the 
caution against sleeping directly on the ground affected 



302 Blue Jackets of 98 

men little who were given no opportunity to make floors 
for their tents, and who furthermore slept in wet trenches 
most of the time. As for the warning against wet clothes, 
it was met in many instances by wearing no clothes at all, 
— the only way it could be heeded. 

Under ordinary circumstances Santiago is subject to 
the epidemic diseases of the tropics. At the time of the 
siege it was in a particularly unhealthful condition, its 
streets filthy beyond description and the air burdened 
with disease. For days during the negotiations leading 
up to the surrender, refugees from the city passed through 
our lines, leaving infection behind them. In Siboney and 
along the route of the army were the huts and houses of 
Cubans in which case after case of fatal yellow fever had 
occurred. These pest-houses, instead of being burned 
down, were used as headquarters, offices, and even hos- 
pitals, and frequently visited by our soldiers. Apropos 
of this fact, the superior caution of the navy may be 
noted. "When the marines were landed at Guantanamo, 
every house on the beach was burned with all its con- 
tents, and barrels of Spanish wine which were found 
there were spilled. All water was distilled, and every 
tent was floored. The navy commanders took no risks, 
and the marines stayed in camp in a region naturally as 
unhealthy as that about Santiago without one case of 
yellow fever in the thirty-five days of their occupation. 

But in the lines of the army the dread disease, and a 
virulent malarial fever akin to it, made their appearance 
even before Santiago fell. At that time the fever w^as 
making such headway in our ranks that had the Span- 
iards been well informed they might have held out with 
the certainty that a week's delay would put the army 
hors du combat. As a matter of record, in less than one 
week after the surrender there were 5000 men in the 
Fifth Corps ill with fever, and Colonel Eoosevelt reported 
that of his hardy troops not more than one-fifth were fit 
for duty. Not all the sick men were in the hospitals, of 



Blue Jackets of '98 303 

course, but their illness was none the less grave because 
they tried to suppress it. The malady spread until at 
last the number of new cases reported reached 850 in one 
day. Early in August eight general officers in the Fifth 
Corps joined in a " Eound Eobin," in which they declared 
that illness had so enfeebled the army that it was without 
strength, that an epidemic of yellow fever was in sight 
which would surely destroy it, and that unless moved to the 
United States it must inevitably perish. In contemporary 
publications the unusual and unmilitary character of this 
document was construed as an attack on General Shafter,but 
he has said that it was drawn up with his knowledge and 
with his hearty acquiescence as a more emphatic protest 
against the proposition of the War Department that the 
army should spend the summer in Cuba. So unqualified 
was the opinion of the officers on this subject that one even 
urged that the general should ignore the Washington 
orders, seize all ships that were available, and start forth- 
with for the North. The " Kound Eobin," however, proved 
sufficient. With the accounts sent in by correspondents 
of men dying like sheep amid an utter lack of the neces- 
sary surgical attention, and deprived of the food and 
dainties which alone could build up their wasted consti- 
tutions, it roused the whole nation to irresistible indigna- 
tion, and the management of the department under which 

' such a condition could arise, and which in the face of it 

j 

\ could seriously propose keeping the army in Cuba until 
• the few well soldiers should become sick and the sick 
should die, was bitterly condemned. A situation in the 
i camp which held the flower of the American army such 
I as was disclosed by General Shafter's own admission that 
r on August 8th, barely six weeks after landing, seventy- 
ii|' five per cent of his troops were unfit for service, was an 
\ intolerable, an inexcusable thing. So said every one with 
'i opportunity to give public expression to his views, and in 
4 the face of such general and just wrath the War Depart- 
ment could no lonij^er hesitate. The regiments at the 



304 Blue Jackets of '98 

front were ordered relieved as fast as transports could be 
sent to bring them home and the shipment of the Span- 
ish prisoners made a reduction of the force at Santiago 
safe. To hasten the latter condition, regiments of im- 
munes were sent to serve as a garrison for the city. 
According to General Shafter's published statement, the 
losses of the army — of 20,000 men — up to this time 
were, "13 officers, 296 men, and 9 civilian employees 
died of disease; 24 officers and 226 men were killed, 83 
officers and 1214 men were wounded, only 13 deaths re- 
sulting from wounds received in action." 

But now the flames of public indignation lighted by 
the revelations of inefficiency in those who directed the 
commissary and surgical arrangements of the Santiago 
campaign were fanned higher by the stories of suffering 
on the transports and hospital ships. It had been bad 
enough for the field hospitals to be inadequately supplied 
with medicines and surgical appliances, but much of that 
failure was excused on the plea of faulty transportation. 
So, too, the lack of proper food at the camps, though re- 
garded as an evidence that somewhere there had been 
incapacity, was condoned in view of the magnificent re- 
sults of the campaign. But when the transport "Seneca" 
came into New York from Santiago, a story was told that 
seemed to show incredible indifference to the health of 
the men who had fought for the country. She carried 
100 sick and wounded. The limited quantity of medical 
supplies she had was obtained from the Eed Cross ship 
at Santiago, as the authorities had supplied none for the 
transport. Her condensers were inadequate to supply the 
fresh water needed, and wounds had to be washed in salt 
water. There were no bandages aboard ; and when wounds 
were opened by the rolling of the ship, passengers tore up 
their clothing to supply bandages. An operation was 
necessary at one time during the voyage, and the surgeon, 
having no instruments, performed it with his pocket- 
knife. The cry of righteous wrath which this almost 



Blue Jackets of '98 305 

incredible story of official neglect aroused, had not died 
away, when the ship " Concho," saihng from Siboney, 
July 29th, with 175 convalescents, arrived. She was lit- 
erally a pest-ship. Her drinking-water was that shipped 
at Tampa when the Santiago expedition sailed early in 
June, and it had been stagnating in her tanks ever since. 
She had no ice. The conditions prevailing on the " Sen- 
eca" existed in equal barbarity on this ship. People 
began to ask whether Secretary of War Alger or the 
Spanish Mausers were the more deadly enemy of the 
American soldier. 

Events such as this, and the ever-increasing volume of 
testimony from Siboney, that the situation there was 
growing worse daily, at last stung the War Department 
into belated activity. At the eastern end of Long Island, 
where the fresh ocean breezes blow unceasingly across the 
narrow strip of land between the Atlantic and the Sound, 
a great camp was laid out for the reception of the home- 
coming soldiers. The spot was well chosen, — its one 
weakness being a lack of a natural water supply, though 
that was easily met by stationing a condeusing-ship in 
the harbour while wells were being driven. But the same 
incapacity that had decimated the army in Cuba by 
failure to plan transportation, commissary and medical 
service in proper proportion to the size of the problem 
involved, was manifested at Camp Wikoff. It was known, 
when the first load of lumber was placed on the ground, 
that this was to be a camp for sick and enfeebled soldiers. 
Nothing should have been permitted to stand in the way 
of havmg it ready in season and perfectly adapted to its 
purpose. But a contractor was allowed to quarrel with 
his workmen over a question of wages until a hospital 
was so much delayed that men sick with typhoid fever 
had no place to sleep. Departmental red tape so com- 
plicated the issue of supplies that within a hundred miles 
of the best market in the United States, sick soldiers 
were forced to eat bacon, hard tack, and worse than 

20 



3o6 Blue Jackets of '98 

doubtful beef, because all the rations issued for use in Cuba 
had not been consumed, and fresh rations could not be 
issued until these were eaten. When the transports 
bearing the shattered remnants of General Shafter's army- 
began to arrive, it was found that they were as over- 
crowded as the earlier ships that had come into New 
York. The most populous section of the United States 
thus had the horrors of war brought home to it, and the 
efforts of the people to remedy the stupid and positively 
criminal blunders of the War Department were at once 
noble and pathetic. Eich men and women sent great 
consignments of fresh vegetables to the camp where sick 
men were being fed on the coarse fare of stevedores. 
Whole neighbourhoods clubbed together to buy dainties 
for the soldiers. The people along the New England 
coast volunteered by hundreds to take the sick into their 
own homes, — a method of relief which, of course, army 
red tape prohibited. All that pfrivate initiative could do to 
correct official incompetence was done, but to the last the 
history of the War Department's management of Camp 
Wikoff was a record of stupidity and brutality. Pages 
could be filled with evidence of the justice of this char- 
acterisation. It is enough to close with a reference to 
the fact that the last act in the history of Camp Wikoff 
showed as little comprehension of the necessities of the 
case as the first. The troops were sent home by rail, the 
whole length of Long Island, over a notoriously uncom- 
fortable railroad, in the burning hot days of September, 
although there is an excellent harbour at Montauk Point, 
and New York was full of comfortable vessels that might 
have been chartered for transports. INIany of these troops 
were from seaboard States, and might have been taken 
to their own doors by water. For months after Camp 
Wikoff had become but a memory, men were dying at 
their homes from the result of the treatment there ac- 
corded them. 

I have referred to the superior skill and intelligence 



Blue Jackets of '98 307 

manifested by the navy in dealing with its problems of 
sanitation and hygiene. The contrast between its methods 
and those of the army could not better be drawn than by 
placing in close juxtaposition with this outline of con- 
ditions at Camp Wikoff the description, by Dr. Carroll 
Dunham, of the method by which the Navy Department 
prepared to take care of the prisoners taken from Cervera's 
fleet: 

" At Portsmouth, on less than two days' notice, barracks 
were built and every preparation made to receive 1100 Spanish 
prisoners of war sent up from Santiago, where they had been 
captured at the time Cervera's fleet was destroyed. When the 
prisoners arrived, their barracks had been built, roofed in, and 
furnished — barracks, not tents — the kitchens were not quite 
done, but the cooking-ranges were in place and ready for use. 
These Spaniards have been kept there for some two months in 
a comfort which would have saved many lives if our own soldiers 
could have fared as well as these captives of the navy." 

Not at Santiago or at Montauk Point alone did the men 
of the army pay a heavy price in health and life for the 
incompetence with which the bureaus of the War Depart- 
ment were honeycombed, — incompetence in some cases 
bred of long years of official idleness, in others the fruit 
of the appointment by the President of inexperienced and 
often notoriously inefficient persons to important offices as 
a reward for political services rendered by them or by 
their relatives. Many of the camps in which were kept 
the more than 200,000 volunteers who never saw active 
service nor ever left the borders of the nation, developed 
into pest-holes. Such notoriously was the case at the 
greatest camp of all, — that at Chickamauga. Lack of 
water, company camps improperly laid out so that conta- 
gion was spread by insects and even by the breeze, bad 
food, — the offscourings of Chicago packing-houses with 
which millionaires to increase their fortunes poisoned the 
soldiers of the nation, — unfit clothing furnished by con- 



3o8 Blue Jackets of '98 

tractors chosen through political favoritism and conscience- 
less in their zest to make money at the expense of the 
army, — all these conditions united to drag down to 
sickness and incapacity men who were picked out of 
thousands for their physical health. At Camp Alger, near 
Washington, like conditions obtained. Open sewers ran 
down the aisles between the tents in which the men 
slept, polluting the air and spreading the germs of typhoid 
fever everywhere. The story of the sanitary misman- 
agement of the war demands a volume to itself. It is 
summed up by the fact that ten times as many men were 
killed by disease as by the enemy. 



CHAPTER XIV 

Thk Porto Rico Campaign — Troops Employed — The Bom- 
bardment OF NiPE — Landing at Guanica — Plan of 
THE Campaign — Capture of Ponce — Friendliness of 
THE Inhabitants — Capture of Guayamo, Coamo, and 
Mayaguez — The Enemy's Stand at Aboncito — The 
News of Peace — Complete Success op the Campaign — 
The Peace Negotiations — The Protocol — Evacuation 
Commissioners. 

SANTIAGO having fallen, the people of the United 
States looked for the attack on Havana which all 
had supposed would be one of the first strokes of the war. 
But again it was postponed — this time in order that 
General Miles might invade and subdue Porto Rico. 
This island is the most easterly of the Lesser Antilles, 
and had at the time of the Spanish war a population of 
about 900,000. The last official census prior to the war 
was taken in 1887, and showed a population of 437,933 
whites, 246,647 mulattces, and 76,905 negroes. As in 
Cuba, the aboriginal population had wholly disappeared 
before the civilising methods of the Spaniards. In area 
the island is of about 3600 square miles. Its population 
is about as dense as that of Connecticut and a little more 
dense than that of Delaware. The climate, though hot, 
is more salubrious than that of Cuba, and the higher 
parts of the island are healthful for persons of northern 
birth. The principal city is San Juan, which it will be 
remembered was bombarded by Admiral Sampson during 
the search for Cervera. 

It will be remembered that the resolutions of Congress 
which preceded the war contained a paragraph expressly 
disavowing any purpose to make of the struggle an excuse 



3 lo Blue Jackets of '98 

for seizing the territory of Spaia. The United States 
declared themselves animated by motives of the purest 
philanthropy, and denied any ulterior plans for territorial 
aggrandisement. But as the war progTessed, there grew 
up among those in power in Washington a feeling that 
when victory was won and peace re-established the nation 
should have something to show for its sacrifices. Ethi- 
cally and in entire honour a free and contented Cuba 
would have been a sufficient exhibit ; but the Administra- 
tion thought the people wanted a slice of the spoils after 
the fashion of the land-grabbing nations of Europe, and 
the Porto Eico expedition was expressly planned to gratify 
this desire. The word was given out semi-officially that 
this island when captured -would not be handed over to 
its people for self-government, but would be kept by the 
United States as a nucleus for a colonial system. 

General Miles had taken with him to Siboney the 
material and the greater part of the personnel of his 
expedition. July 21st he sailed. He had with him an 
army made up largely of volunteer troops — the Sixth 
Illinois, Sixth Massachusetts, four light batteries of the 
Third and Fourth artillery (regulars), 275 recruits who 
had been sent for the Fifth Corps and arrived after the 
need for them was past. Battery B of the Fifth Artillery, 
60 men of the Signal Corps, and the Seventh Hospital 
Corps — in all, 3415 men. By way of transports and 
convoy he had the " Massachusetts," " Dixie," " Glouces- 
ter," " Cincinnati," " Annapolis," " Leyden," " Wasp," "Yale," 
and " Columbia." From Charleston about 3000 men had 
already sailed to join the expedition, and General Schwan's 
brigade set out from Tampa. These forces were to unite 
under command of General John R. Brooke, who sailed 
from Newport News about a week later with about five 
thousand men, including cavalry troops A and C of New 
York, the historic Philadelphia City Troop, and the Gov- 
ernor's Troop of Pennsylvania General Schwan's brigade 
was made up wholly of regular troops. It comprised 



Blue Jackets of '98 311 

batteries, troops, and companies from the Seventh Artil- 
lery, the Second Cavalry, and the Eleventh and Xineteenth 
Infantry. It was the plan to send 35,000 men to Porto 
Eico, — almost twice as many as were given to Shafter, 
although there were fewer Spaniards to be encountered 
and the country was not so difficult. The arrangements 
for engineers, surgeons, and supplies were also vastly more 
perfect and comprehensive than they had been for the 
Santiago expedition. Whether this seeming improvement 
in the methods of the "War Department was due to an 
iutelhgent profit from lessons hard learned, or whether it 
was that the major-general commanding the army was 
able to exact more of the authorities at "Washington than 
a mere junior major-general. could, is a question that was 
hotly debated at the time. Certainly General Miles went 
to Porto Eico equipped for any emergency. That the 
temper of the island people and the speedy negotiation of 
peace made his expedition a mere pleasure-jaunt, does not 
detract from the wisdom nor the skiU manifested in 
planning it. 

It had at first been planned to establish a base on the 
coast of Cuba. The port of Xipe, on the northern coast 
nearly opposite Santiago, had been selected for this pur- 
pose, and a naval expedition made up of the " Topeka," 
" Annapolis," " Wasp," and " Ley den," was despatched to 
take it. They engaged the batteries and one gunboat, 
the " Jorge Juan," which defended the bay, and very' 
speedily silenced aU opposition. The gunboat was sunk 
after a gaUant resistance occupying but fifteen minutes, 
and the fort showed a white flag after the second shell 
fell among its defenders. In the end Xipe was not used 
for the purpose planned, and the engagement, which took 
place on the 21st of July, has interest and importance 
only because it was the last naval battle off the coast of 
Cuba. 

On the 25th of July, after a voyage of four days, the 
portion of the Porto Eican expedition which had sailed 



312 Blue Jackets of '98 

from Sibouey with General Miles entered the port of 
Guanica and prepared to land. This was a surprise to 
every one on board except the few in the General's con- 
fidence, and it was a surprise to the people at Washington 
too when they heard of it, for the expectation had been 
that the expedition would be landed on the north side of 
the island near San Juan, while the point selected was 
as far from that city as possible. It is probable that 
General Miles concluded that the practice of following to 
the letter an elaborately formulated programme which 
had been in the hands of the enemy for some weeks, 
might properly be abandoned. Certainly the people of 
Guanica were quite as much surprised as any one could 
be when the fleet steamed into their quiet little post and 
the " Gloucester " let fly a terrific three-pounder at the 
only Spanish flag in sight. There was no defence to 
speak of, for there was no artillery at the point, and a 
landing-party from the " Gloucester," after a lively brush 
with some Spanish soldiers in the streets, soon occupied 
the town, building a barricade in the main street. When 
the American flag appeared over the one block-house, the 
transports came into the harbour, and the work of land- 
ing began. The town was found to be a picturesque little 
village of one street, lined with red-roofed and party- 
coloured houses. The people were amiable ; nothing was 
further from their minds than manifesting any hostilities 
to the invaders, and the volunteers for their part let their 
imagination run riot in inventing tales of the vast benefits 
which were to accrue to the people of Guanica when they 
became part of the United States. 

Among the many advantages which the army in Porto 
Eico enjoyed that had been denied to the army in Cuba, 
was a very exact topographical knowledge of the country. 
In May, Lieutenant H. H. Whitney of the Fourth Artil- 
lery had travelled through the island in many disguises, 
studying the land and the harbours, mapping out roads 
and gathering data that would be useful to an invading 




GKNERAL NKLSON A. MII.KS. 



Blue Jackets of '98 313 

army should the time for invasion come. All the material 
he had gathered was in the hands of General Miles, and 
the campaign could be, and was, planned with the exact- 
ness of a game of chess. The first point to be struck after 
the landing at Guanica was complete, was Ponce, a small 
town fifteen miles due east. Ponce had importance be- 
cause of its excellent harbour, and because from it a broad, 
level, and hard military road extended 85 miles to the 
metropolis of the island, and the chief seat of Spanish 
power, San Juan. Ponce fell a prey to the navy, Com- 
mander Davis with the " Dixie," " Gloucester," "Annapolis," 
and "Wasp," taking it on the 28th without resistance. 
Indeed, the habit of surrendering without resistance was 
found to be pleasingly prevalent in Porto Eico. There 
is a picturesque story that a beardless navy officer just 
out of the Academy compelled the surrender of Ponce 
by telephone from the port, making fierce threats of bom- 
bardment by the ponderous cannon of the " Gloucester ; " 
but the official record denies this glory to Ensign Curtin, 
and gives to Commander Davis of the "Dixie" the honour 
of receiving the surrender of the town. It was a bloodless 
victory in either case ; and when the troops came march- 
ing over from Guanica to occupy the town, they discov- 
ered that the inhabitants saluted them with volleys of 
flowers instead of bullets, and that there was not such a 
thing as a Spanish flag in the place. 

After a few days spent in devising a military govern- 
ment for Ponce and in getting the affairs of the city in 
orderly progress once more, General Miles began the seri- 
ous work of his campaign. This campaign was never 
finished, but so far as it did progress before the news of 
the armistice interrupted it it was successful, and con- 
ducted without varying a hair's breadth from the plan 
as originally formulated. The objective was the city 
of San Juan, at the other side of the island. But to 
take the city alone would not complete the purposes of 
the invasion, else it might have been done from the sea. 



314 Blue Jackets of '98 

or at any rate from a landing-place much nearer than 
Ponce or Guanica. The Spaniards all through the island 
had to be killed, captured, or pacified. Few were killed, 
many captured, more invited pacification. To have pos- 
session of a seacoast town while the enemy held the 
interior would be unprofitable ; hence the plan of cam- 
paign. This involved, briefly, the division of the army 
into four columns which should swing out to right and 
left of Ponce and converge on San Juan, driving the 
Spaniards before them into that city. There was no 
danger that the army thus divided would be beaten in 
detail, for the Spaniards had not force sufficient for the 
purpose, and the interior lines of communication would 
enable our troops to concentrate at the word of danger 
in sufficient force to meet any probable attack. It was 
clear that the enemy could expect no aid or even sym- 
pathy from the inhabitants. On the 31st General Miles 
cabled to Washington, " Volunteers are surrendering them- 
selves with arms and ammunition. Four-fifths of the 
people are overjoyed at the arrival of the army. Two 
thousand from one place have volunteered to serve with 
it. They are bringing in transportation, beef, cattle, and 
other needed supplies. The custom-house has already 
yielded $14,000. As soon as all troops are disembarked 
they will be in readiness to move." 

Every effort was made to maintain the friendship so 
freely proffered by the people. The customs regulations 
of the port were revised so as to encourage trade, and 
burdensome restrictions and taxes levied by the Spaniards 
were repealed. The natives were hired at good wages, 
and their property purchased when needed for army 
use at fair prices. The people found that the American 
troops brought order and prosperity, and the news pre- 
ceded the columns advancing through the island, with 
the result that everywhere the resistance met was only 
that made perfunctorily by the Spanish regulars. 

The military road from Ponce to San Juan passed 



Blue Jackets of '98 315 

through a point in the mountains called Aboncito, 
where the Spaniards, taking advantage of the nature of 
the ground, prepared to resist the American advance. 
General Miles's plan of advancing by separate but parallel 
roads furnished exactly the right method of meeting and 
overcoming this resistance, for as the columns to right 
and left of the centre advanced, the Spaniards would find 
themselves outflanked and would be compelled to retreat. 
The advance on the right was led by General Brooke, who 
went by sea to Arroyo, where he lauded with 1200 men 
and pressed northward into the interior. At a little town 
called Guayama they encountered 500 Spaniards, who 
fled after a show of resistance by which one officer and 
four men were killed. At the other extreme of the 
American line the regulars of General Schwan's division 
fought a skirmish with the enemy in the outskirts of the 
considerable town of Mayaguez, losing two men and 
capturing fifty. In the centre General Eoy Stone worked 
his way along to the northward, carrying Adjuntas in 
a midnight skirmish, and preparing for greater things by 
keeping 500 natives at work behind him changing the 
wretched trail over which his troops had advanced into an 
admirable road, — for in his own country this volunteer 
general and veteran of the Civil War was widely known 
as an expert road-builder. The town of Coamo on the 
road to San Juan was taken by the Sixteenth Pennsyl- 
vania Volunteers after a defence that was little more than 
perfunctory. Indeed the Spanish retreat was so precipi- 
tate that four unarmed correspondents entered the town 
and received the submission of its Alcalde before the 
American troops came up. A block-house in the suburbs 
engaged the attention of tlie artillery for a time, but soon 
burst into flames, whereupon the Spaniards fled. One 
detachment in an earthwork fought stubbornly enough 
to check the American advance until their commander 
— a brave man who rode about disdaining cover — was 
killed, when they promptly surrendered. There was 



3 16 Blue Jackets of '98 

little fight in the enemy at any stage of the Porto Eico 
campaign. 

What the Americans might have sujffered at Aboncito 
cannot be told. That was evidently the spot at which 
the Spaniards had planned to make their most determined 
resistance. From friendly natives came warnings of 
mines in the road, and torpedoes hidden in the bushes 
by the wayside. Toward this stronghold the converging 
columns took their way. General Wilson's men felt the 
enemy's sting first, coming into a zone of fire from artil- 
lery and rapid-fire guns posted on the mountain-sides 
about three miles in advance of the city. Wilson set his 
artillerists to drive the enemy out. The Spaniards were 
intrenched. Major Lancaster's battery went into position 
in an open field, and opened fire at a range of 2000 yards. 
The duel was lively, for the gunners on each side could 
see their enemy without glasses ; but comparatively little 
damage was done, and the sun went down with the Span- 
iards still in position. 

August 13th bade fair, when the sun rose, to see some 
hard fighting in Porto Ptico. General Wilson had drawn 
his lines in preparation for a sharp attack on the enemy 
at Aboncito. General Brooke confronted a strong force 
at Pablo Vasquez, near Guayama, and intended to assault 
the hill held by the enemy, knowing that it was vital 
to the plans of General Miles that he break through and 
effect a junction with Wilson. At Cape San Juan forty 
American sailors, with the help of shells from the ships 
off shore, were holding their ground against the assaults 
of eight hundred Spaniards. Near Guayama, B Battery 
of the Pennsylvania artillery was about to open the day's 
fighting with a shot at the line of earthworks faintly 
discernible on a distant hill. The guns were shotted and 
aimed ; the gunner of one stood with lanyard in hand 
awaiting the command to fire. There was a sound of 
a galloping horse on the road to the rear, and an officer 
came into view shouting something and waving his hand 



Blue Jackets of '98 317 

emphatically. " Cease firing ! Cease firing ! " the artil- 
lerists heard him shout as he came nearer. " What for ? " 
inquired the captain of tlie battery with natural curiosity. 
"Peace has been declared," was the response, which the 
soldiers of that particular command, who were just getting 
into action and desired to see what their fine new cannon 
could do in the field, did not receive with proper enthu- 
siasm. Carlyle says that if there is one thing more 
incredible than all others, it is that governments should 
be able to find men willing to give up their entire lives 
to studying the art of killing other men and getting ready 
themselves to be killed. In war the philosopher would 
have found a thing more incredible yet ; namely, that a 
sudden interposition of peace in time to prevent a battle 
which promised to be desperate and bloody is often hailed 
with disappointment by men who stand an excellent 
chance of falling in the fight they courted. The peace of 
August 13, 1898, came suddenly upon men in the act of 
battle on the American lines at many points. At Man- 
zanillo in Cuba the navy was vigorously bombarding the 
town. At Havana the batteries were engaging the 
blockading fleet, and one shell struck the " San Francisco." 
At far-off Manila, though of course the fact of the 
armistice was not known for days after its conclusion, the 
Spanish forces were engaged and defeated the day after 
the peace protocol was signed at Washington. 

So the expedition to Porto Ptico was ended abruptly by 
the interposition of diplomacy, yet not so abruptly as to 
deny to the American invaders ample opportunity to 
demonstrate their power to drive the Spaniards from the 
island. The plans of the commanding-general were being 
executed like clock-work when the end came. The 
commissary and medical departments showed no sign 
of that collapse which made the Santiago campaign 
disastrous even in the face of its success. General Miles 
summed up the whole in a paragraph of his report 
thus: 



3i8 Blue Jackets of '98 

" During nineteen days of active campaign on the island 
of Porto Rico a large portion of the island was captured by 
United States forces and brought under our control. Our 
forces were in such a position as to make the Spanish positions 
untenable, outside of that of the garrison of San Juan. The 
Spaniards had been defeated or captured in six different 
engagements which took place, and in every direction and 
position they had occupied up to that time. The success of 
the enterprise was due largely to the skill and good general- 
ship of the officers in command of the different divisions and 
brigades. Strategy and skilful tactics accomplished what 
might have occasioned serious loss in any other way. The 
loss of the enemy in killed, wounded, and captured was 
nearly ten times our own, which was only 3 killed and 40 
wounded. Thus the island of Porto Eico became a part of the 
United States." 

The campaign in Porto Eico was long enough, too, to 
demonstrate that the United States would have only a 
thoroughly friendly people to deal with in establishing its 
authority over the island. The towns in which there 
were no Spanish garrisons surrendered with such prompti- 
tude and were so eager to hoist the American colours that 
General Miles was compelled to telegraph to Washington 
for a fresh supply of flags. Everywhere there was haste to 
assume American airs. At Ponce one of the newspapers 
rubbed out its record of the past, and appeared with a new 
name, "volume one, number one," the day after the 
surrender. Every endeavour was made to encourage this 
feeling among the people, and the work done in establish- 
ing orderly conditions, in framing a military government, 
in building roads and enforcing h vgienic conditions, and in 
reforming the custom-house methods so as to encourage 
trade was even more important and quite as arduous as 
the work done with rifle and cannon. But the story 
of the reformation and development of Porto Eico is 
something distinct from this short chronicle of its 
conquest. 



Blue Jackets of 98 319 

The peace which came thus suddenly to the men at the 
guns in Porto Kico and Cuba had been a matter of current 
discussion at Washington and Madrid for nearly a month. 
Kumours that it might be sought by Spain filled the 
columns of the newspapers of the world, but were of 
course strenuously denied by the Spanish authorities. 
To the people of Spain, and particularly to the commercial 
and financial classes having interests beyond the borders 
of the country, the hopelessness of the conflict became 
apparent immediately alter the destruction of Cervera and 
the fall of Santiago. The government still clung to the 
forlorn hope of dragging some other European country 
into the quarrel with the United States, but with notable 
prudence and justice all held aloof, — a result that was by 
many ascribed to the avowed friendship of Great Britain 
for the United States at that time. It was evident that 
whatever nation came to the aid of Spain would have 
England also to deal with. As for the wishes and hopes 
of the United States, they were frankly enough for a 
speedy end to the conflict. President McKinley said 
immediately upon the news of the fall of Santiago, "I 
hope for a speedy peace now." 

It was not as speedy as it might have been, for that 
very delicate sentiment " Spanish honour " had to be 
handled most tenderly, and moreover there were political 
conditions in Spain which made the ministry desirous 
of proceeding somewhat cautiously. Negotiations were 
opened through the French Ambapsador at Washington, 
M. Cambon, who from the beginning of hostilities had 
acted for the Spaniards in this country. Just an after- 
noon call on the President by this gentleman with the 
remark that Spain had requested him to suggest that it 
was ready to open the question of a treaty, was enough 
to send Spanish securities upon all the bourses of Europe, 
and when a day or two later M. Cambon announced that 
he had been formally authorised by the government of 
Spain to represent it in the discussion of the conditions 



320 Blue Jackets of '98 

upon which peace should be resumed, everybody saw that 
the end of the war was at hand. The Spaniards were 
anxious that during the discussion of the preliminaries an 
armistice should be declared, and their papers bitterly 
berated the United States government for not agreeing to 
this ; but it was evident to the authorities at Washington 
that at the moment M. Cambon made his first overtures 
on the part of Spain — on the 26th of July — there was 
every reason to prosecute the war with energy. To stop 
pending diplomatic negotiations meant that the expedition 
of General Miles to Porto Eico would be paralysed, and if 
the negotiations failed it would be doubly hard to resume it. 
Accordingly they insisted that before the declaration of 
an armistice a protocol preliminary to an actual treaty 
should be agreed upon by the representatives of the two 
governments. This protocol should enumerate the con- 
ditions of peace which the United States would be wilUng 
to accept and which Spain would be willing to consider, — 
for it was made clear, by implication at least, that Spain, 
as the party suing for peace, would be the one compelled 
to make concessions and sacrifices. This protocol, after 
repeated conferences between members of the President's 
cabinet and the French Ambassador, was finally formulated 
and sent to Spain for the consideration of the Ministry. 
There was brief discussion there. By the 7th an answer 
sugsesting some slight changes in the document was 
received at Washington, and five days later in the 
President's room at the White House the commissioners 
for the two nations, Judge William R. Day, Secretary of 
State, and M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of France, 
affixed their signatures to the document which ended 
the war in fact, though not formally. The substance of 
this document, shorn of its oflBcial redundancies, will be 
sufficient here. It was drawn in six clauses : 

First. Spain renounced all claim to sovereignty or other 
rights in Cuba. 

Second. Spain to cede to the United States Porto Rico 




TORI'Kl)') i;i)Ar ■"KKU^SUN. 



Blue Jackets of '98 321 

and all other Spanish islands in the West Indies and one 
island in the Ladrone Archipelago, to be selected by the 
United States. 

Third. The United States to occupy Manila, its bay 
and harbour, until a treaty of peace should determine the 
disposition of the Philippines. 

Fourth. Spain to immediately evacuate Cuba and other 
West Indian islands. 

Fifth. Both nations to appoint peace commissioners to 
meet at Paris not later than October 1st to negotiate a 
treaty of peace. 

Sixth. Hostilities to be suspended on the signing of 
the protocol. 

The alterations in this protocol which Spain had 
unavailingly pleaded for included an article which would 
have relieved her of all debt incurred on account of Cuba 
and Porto Eico, a provision which would have saddled the 
people of the former island with a debt of $550,000,000 
incurred in the effort to make them submit to mis- 
government ; an article permitting her to retain possession 
of Luzon, the largest of the Philippine islands, and an 
article granting to her troops the right to leave Cuba and 
Porto Eico with the honours of war, and to remove all 
war material from those islands. To all of these pro- 
posed amendments the United States returned an em- 
phatic negative, and the protocol as finally signed was, in 
effect, that first suggested by the American government. 

Immediately upon the completion of the protocol, in- 
deed before the commissioners left the White House, the 
President affixed his signature to the proclamation announc- 
ing an armistice, and telegrams were sent to the com- 
manders in the field. How sudden a check they put on 
the operations of the army under Miles has already been 
related. The despatch to Admiral Dewey was cabled to 
Hong Kong, and thence carried to Manila by a fleet 
steamer, but it reached the seat of war only after a de- 
cisive battle had been fought. In that case, as in others, 

21 



32 2 Blue Jackets of '98 

Dewey profited by the slow coinmunication with Wash- 
ington. If the President's order had reached him on the 
13th instead of on the 16th, he would have been checked 
in the very act of taking Manila, and the political diffi- 
culties of his situation, which in any case became most 
perplexing, would have been multiplied fivefold. 

Very significant was the order sent at this time to 
Admiral Sampson. He was directed to abandon the 
blockade, and to take to New York the ships " New 
York," " Brooklyn," " Indiana," " Oregon," " Iowa," and 
" Massachusetts." The heaviest fighting-ships of the navy 
were thus ordered withdrawn from Cuban waters. The 
monitors were to be left in a safe harbour in Porto Ptico, 
and the marines were relieved from the post at Guanta- 
namo they had stuck to so persistently, and sent North. 
By a later order the " Texas " was added to the list of 
vessels ordered to New York, and when the fleet reached 
the entrance to the noble harbour of that port, they found 
a magnificent ovation awaiting them. At the first news 
that the ships and men by whom the great victory over 
Cervera had been won were to visit the harbour of the 
metropolis, the people of New York and all the neigh- 
bourhood cried out that there should be such a triumph 
as ancient Rome decreed to her home-coming conquerors. 
The Navy Department was persuaded to order the vessels 
to proceed in column up the broad expanse of the North 
Paver to a point opposite the stately tomb erected on the 
hill for the body of General Ulysses S. Grant. There 
they were to fire a salute, and turning, return to the navy 
anchorage at Tompkinsville. This insured to the millions 
of people who live within a few minutes' ride of the great 
city an opportunity to see the fleet of veterans, and right 
eagerly they availed themselves of it. New York was 
crowded the night before, until there seemed not roofs 
enough to cover the guests. The streets were gay with 
bunting, the docks and piers early in the morning were 
black with people, while on distant city roofs other crowds 



Blue Jackets of '98 323 

hung to precarious perches, and watched eagerly for the 
ships. Never, perhaps, in history, since the days of the 
gorgeous Roman pageants, did conquerors have a more 
brilliant reception. The air throbbed with the crash of 
cannon, the roar of cheering multitudes, and the shriek of 
steam whistles. Every imaginable craft was pressed into 
service by sight-seers, and about the ships, as they made 
their stately way up the river, crowded a fleet of yachts, 
tugs, great excursion steamers, trim launches, steam canal- 
boats, every imaginable thing that would float and move, 
all packed by a cheering throng. At night officers were 
banqueted, and the success of the navy drunk in brim- 
ming bumpers. For days thereafter, the Blue Jacket was 
the guest by common consent of the people of New York, 
and in doors and out the best of everything was freely 
forthcoming to any who wore the uniform of the United 
States navy. 

The first duty under the protocol was to provide for the 
immediate evacuation of Cuba and Porto Eic'o. To ac- 
complish this, commissions were named by each nation. 
The commissioners appointed on the part of the United 
States to effect the evacuation of Cuba were Major-Gen- 
eral James F. Wade, an officer who had been in command 
of the great camp at Tampa, during the war ; Eear Admiral 
William T. Sampson ; and Major-General Matthew C. 
Butler, a civil appointee to the army, but a veteran of the 
Confederate service, and a former United States Senator. 
The Porto Eico board was composed of Major-General 
John E. Brooke, who was already in service on that island ; 
Eear Admiral Schley, and Brigadier-General William 
W. Gordon, another Confederate veteran. The task was 
no easy one in either case, and the work of the Cuban 
commission was made additionally difficult by the action 
of the Spanish government, which threw repeated ob- 
stacles in the way of a prompt and peaceable evacuation 
of the island. It was well into January, 1899, before the 
last of the Spanish troops left Cuba, though before theii 



324 Blue Jackets of '98 

final departure the island was under the domination of 
the United States, and General Ludlow in Havana and 
General Wood in Santiago were struggling with the prob- 
lems presented by a people reduced to the point of starva- 
tion, communities in which the first essentials of sanitation 
were unknown, and a business situation which combined 
almost complete lack of money with almost equal lack of 
opportunities for employment. 



CHAPTEK XV 

Thk Philippines again — Dewey's Position in Manila 
Harbour — His Work in Diplomacy and War — The 
Part played by Aguinaldo — The Coming of the 
American Troops — The Quarrel with the Germans — 
The Capture and Occupation of Manila — Growing 
Discontent of the Filipinos and their Final Revolt — 
The Problems presented to the United States by the 
Situation in the Philippines. 

AT anchor in the harbour of Manila, with the Spanish 
fleet destroyed, the Spanish fortifications at Cor- 
regidor and Cavite demohshed or in the possession of his 
marines. Admiral George Dewey found himself at once 
master and victim of the situation. Without troops there 
was nothing more of a warlike sort for him to do. He 
could reduce the city, but he could not hold it, and a 
bombardment under such conditions would have been 
but wanton slaughter of the innocent. The Spanish 
military authorities gave prudent heed to the admiral's 
warning, that if his ships were fired upon, he would de- 
stroy the town, and no provocation was given. But the 
Spanish flag still floated defiantly from the corner of the 
bastion of the walled town, and Manila was still a Spanish 
city, though it lay at the mercy of the American com- 
mander. As for the country behind, that was the spoil 
alternately of the Spaniards and the insurgents. As the 
admiral himself described it, his authority extended just 
as far as one of his ships could throw a shell, and no 
farther. 

This situation was necessarily irksome, and the pro- 
longed delay in sending troops, which irritated even the 
people at home, must have been almost unbearable to the 



126 Blue Jackets of '98 

admiral. With notable patience and self-restraint, how- 
ever, he held his peace, making neither appeals nor com- 
plaints, and doing the best with the material at hand. 
The insurgents for a time seemed to offer a means for 
opening the way to Manila to our troops when they 
should arrive, and Aguinaldo was permitted to arm his 
men as fast as they were enrolled from the store of cap- 
tured arms in the Cavite arsenal This fact formed one 
of the counts in the insurgent indictment of the United 
States for bad faith when the relations between Aguinaldo 
and the American commanders reached the point of open 
war. 

Not for more than three weeks after the victory of 
May 1st did the first detachment of United States 
troops sail from San Francisco to Dewey's relief. The 
voyage consumed more than a month, so that for exactly 
two months the admiral was left with a hostile city under 
his guns, a force of undisciplined insurgents operating in 
the surrounding country, with at least a colour of counte- 
nance from him, and the warships of several European 
nations, some of which had openly expressed sympathy for 
Spain, anchored by his side, their commanders watching 
eagerly for the first sign of weakness, or the first disaster 
of which they could take advantage to intervene. Months 
after, when Manila was occupied by American troops and 
the United States flag was everywhere displayed and 
respected, Admiral Dewey said to a friend, looking con- 
templatively upon the wrecks of the Spanish ships, " That 
was the least of my troubles down here." 

The story of Dewey's diplomacy in Manila harbour 
during the long period of suspended war will, when it is 
fully told, be one of the most creditable chapters in the 
history of the American navy. In these later days of 
cables and telegraphs the commander seldom has an 
opportunity to display much individual initiative. To 
Dewey a great opportunity was given, and by him it was 
greatly improved. Against the persistent nagging of the 



Blue Jackets of '98 327 

German commander he set up a frankly expressed readi- 
ness to defend the rights and the dignity of his country's 
liag in distant waters at the mouth of the cannon, even 
though by his act the two nations should be plunged into 
war. His treatment of the insurgents, though sympa- 
thetic, stopped short of formal recognition, while in his 
relations with the Spanish authorities of Manila he bore 
himself with the firmness of one who knows that the 
victory is his, though he may have to wait patiently for 
its fruits. Nor was there any relaxation of the admiral's 
attention to strictly naval details amid all these puzzling 
diplomatic duties. Though his men could not get asliore, 
their daily regimen was so carefully watched that the 
health of the squadron remained perfect. Though the 
Spaniards were pledged to respect the ships on penalty 
of the destruction of the city, there was never a moment, 
night or day, when a single ship in the squadron could 
have been caught unaware by a torpedo attack. The 
two months' vigil of the American Blue Jackets in 
Manila harbour must ever stand as one of the finest 
achievements of naval history. 

I 

The grand strategy of war has so often been compared 
to a game of chess on a monster scale that the expres- 
sion has become stale, but one situation during the war 
with Spain so strikingly illustrates the analogy that it is 
impossible not to call attention to it. That in a war 
waged over the comparatively narrow territory of a single 
nation, or indeed over a single continent, the movement 
of every considerable force on either side would at once 
liave its effect in determining the action of an opposing 
force, even at a considerable distance, is only a common- 
place, but the swift thrust and parry that went on through- 
out this war between the very antipodes has never before 
been paralleled in the history of strategy. That the 
movements of a fleet in the Mediterranean Sea should be 
properly chronicled as a part of the operations in the 



328 Blue Jackets of '98 

Philippines seems at first sight incredible, but how just 
it is to award such a place to the story of the manoeuvres 
of Camara perhaps nobody is better able to testify than 
Admiral George Dewey. 

When Cervera sailed on his ill-fated voyage to the 
West Indies, there was left to guard the coasts of Spain 
what came to be known as the Cadiz fleet. Its most 
formidable ships were the " Pelayo," a battle-ship of the 
first class, and the " Carlos V," an armoured cruiser. A 
large number of cruisers, gunboats, torpedo boats and 
destroyers made up the squadron, which was under com- 
mand of Admiral Camara. On paper — that qualifying 
term must always be used in speaking of the Spanish 
navy — this fleet was formidable, and its presence at 
Cadiz compelled the retention along our northern coast 
of several cruisers even during the days when the block- 
ade of Cuba made the demand for ships in West Indian 
waters continually pressing. It was, as the naval phrase 
goes, " a fleet in being," and as such had ever to be 
reckoned with. Its influence upon the tactics of the 
American fleets extended not only to those in the Atlantic, 
but to the fleet in the far-away waters of the Philippines 
as well ; for by passing through the Suez Canal Admiral 
Camara could have brought his fleet into action against 
Dewey's squadron long before any reinforcements from 
our Atlantic coast could have reached jVIanila, and even 
before any ships from our Pacific seaboard could have 
made the long passage. Camara had, in short, the advan- 
tage of what is known in military terminology as an in- 
terior line of communication, and accordingly his fleet 
menaced both Dewey and Sampson at once. 

His first move, however, freed the latter from apprehen- 
sion, though for the time it added materially to the 
burden of worry upon Dewey's mind. Just as our forces 
imder General Shafter were landing at Daiquiri, news 
came that Camara had left Cadiz, and swiftly upon the 
heels of the first intelligence came the tidings that an 



Blue Jackets of '98 329 

English merchantman had seen the squadron steammg 
east in the Mediterranean. That meant, of course, that 
the Suez Canal was to be passed and the blow delivered 
against Dewey. The first effect of this discovery was to 
relieve the ships which had been guarding our northern 
coast, and to strengthen by so much the blockade of Cuba. 
But this advantage was more than offset by the apprehen- 
sion of disaster to Dewey, whose fleet, wholly destitute of 
armoured ships, was not — on paper — equal to that of 
the Spaniards. The coast-defence monitor " Monterey " 
was at the time on the way from San Francisco to re- 
inforce the American squadron at Manila ; but her speed 
being slow, like that of all ships of her class, the proba- 
bilities were that the Spaniards would arrive before she 
did. As a matter of fact, while the Board of Strategy was 
anxiously discussing this danger in Washington, word 
came that the " Monterey " had been compelled to put 
back into Honolulu to repair. 

The utmost that could be done then by the navy 
authorities at Washington was to hastily prepare another 
fleet to go in hot pursuit of the Spaniards. The organisa- 
tion and despatch of such a fleet had two advantages. 
As its course to the Suez Canal would take it past the 
coast of Spain, which had been stripped of all naval 
defence by the departure of Camara, apprehension of 
bombardment of their seaport towns might impel the 
Spaniards to recall their squadron. Even if this did not 
result, the American vessels, being faster than those of 
the enemy, could reach Asiatic waters so soon after 
Camara that Dewey, being duly warned, might avoid 
battle until a juncture could be made. Accordingly Com- 
modore Watson, with the flagship " Newark," was directed 
to form the squadron of relief, and the widest publicity 
was given to the purpose of the government to send a 
powerful fleet through the Mediterranean in pursuit of 
Camara. 

How far the mere announcement of the American plan 



330 Blue Jackets of '98 

of campaign affected the Spanish purpose cannot be told. 
Camara's expedition, threatening at first, soon became 
ridiculous, and ended in an almost inexplicable display of 
folly and vacillation. Arriving at Port Said, the squadron 
lay at anchor for several days, — difficulty in getting coal 
was the Spanish explanation of the delay, but later occur- 
rences suggest that there was never any serious purpose 
to make the voyage. Finally the ships were coaled, the 
heavy canal tolls paid, and the armada — a really formi- 
dable squadron of fifteen ships including torpedo boats and 
transports — majestically entered the great water-way. 
That was the day before Cervera's fatal dash at Santiago. 
The result of that action in West India waters was to 
free all our battle-ships for operations on the coast of 
Spain or for pursuit of Camara, and the work of supply- 
ing them with ammunition was rushed forward in order 
that they might be ready for this service ; but before it 
could be completed the amazing news came from Port 
Said that Camara had turned about and was coming back 
again, having paid the tolls both ways, $200,000, for 
no imaginable purpose. To this day it is not known 
what strategic end this singular and costly excursion 
through the canal was expected to serve. 

Meanwhile Dewey in Manila Bay had been studying 
the problem presented by the reported approach of Camara. 
Without cable facilities he was not as well informed as 
the Washington authorities of the vacillations of that 
remarkable commander. For several days all he knew 
was that a Spanish fleet outnumbering his, with two 
armoured vessels where he had none, with a formidable 
force of torpedo destroyers was steaming toward him. 
He knew the " Monterey " was on her way to reinforce 
him, and that the " Monadnock " would follow ; but he 
was aware of the extreme sluggishness of these vessels, 
and figure it as he would he was convinced that the 
Spaniards would arrive first. The commander, who had 
all the strategy of his attack on Montojo planned long 



Blue Jackets of '98 331 

before war was declared, was not the man to leave a 
problem of the importance of this unstudied. General 
Francis V. Greene, wdio accompanied the second army 
expedition to Manila, tells how the admiral purposed 
coping with the situation, which was complicated by the 
fact that at this time there were 2500 American soldiers 
landed on the shores of Manila Bay. Dewey was con- 
vinced that to meet the " Pelayo" without any battle-ships 
of his own would be suicidal. Accordingly he planned 
to abandon the harbour and take his fleet and the trans- 
ports which had then arrived around to the north of the 
island of Luzon, and thence cruise eastward to meet the 
" Monterey." That ship once added to his squadron, he 
would come back to Manila and give battle to the Span- 
iards. In the meantime the American troops thus left 
without naval support in a hostile country were to be 
taken up into the hills, and there intrenched to maintain 
themselves until the ships should return. The news of 
Camara's retreat reached Dewey only July 22d, or just 
as he was about to put this plan into effect. 

The Filipinos very early became a source of some ap- 
prehension to Admiral Dewey, who it must be remembered 
was absolutely without any information as to the policy 
of the United States government in dealing with the 
territory which he had brought to the point of conquest, 
or the insurgents who were making so gallant a fight for 
freedom. When Congress declared war for the purpose 
of re-establishing humane and civilised conditions in 
Cuba, no revolution was in progress in the Philippines. 
The leaders of the former insurrection were, as has been 
already noted, living in Hong Kong, watching, no doubt, 
for a favourable opportunity to reopen the struggle, but 
meantime making no sign. For this reason Congress did 
not put into the resolutions instructing the President to 
employ the armed forces of the United States any such 
disavowal of any purpose to acquire territory in the 



;^;^2 Blue Jackets of '98 

Philippines or any such promise of aid in the establish- 
ment there of an independent government as was em- 
ployed in treating of the situation in Cuba. In its relations 
to the Filipinos the United States was bound by no prom- 
ise, expressed or implied. Only the principles of national 
ethics and the dictates of expediency could affect its 
action. As there was, and is, some radical difference of 
opinion concerning alike the ethics and the advantages 
of the situation, it was impossible for the admiral to con- 
jecture what attitude the President and the country would 
assume towards the insurgents. Accordingly, as they 
became stronger, he became more cautious. It is impos- 
sible to free him wholly from responsibility for their 
presence in the field, for he brought them their most 
capable leader and he furnished them with most of their 
arms ; but he speedily came to doubt the wisdom of his 
own course and treated his wliilom allies with studied 
coolness. 

Before the arrival of the first expedition from the 
United States, Aguinaldo had made such progress in arm- 
ing and organising the natives that in a series of engage- 
ments around Manila the Spaniards were worsted, losing 
heavily and being driven into the lines immediately sur- 
rounding the city. Aguinaldo captured 1800 prisoners 
and an immense store of arms, including two batteries 
of artillery. By the last of May the exultant insurgents 
were within seven miles of the city, which their lines 
completely encircled, and their prisoners numbered almost 
3000. Then the first damper was put upon their enthusi- 
asm by Admiral Dewey himself. Fearing that if the 
city should be taken by the insurgents, there would result 
a sack and massacre which would compel the intervention 
of the other armed forces in the harbour, he sent word to 
Aguinaldo that the advance must be stopped. Between 
the Filipino front and the town lay the Malolele Eiver. 
This stream they were forbidden to cross. " If you do," 
said Dewey, " I will send the ' Petrel ' into the stream to 



Blue Jackets of '98 333 

bombard your lines and to shoot down your men." The 
order was for the time obeyed, but naturally it created 
great bitterness. But even thus checked, Aguinaldo kept 
up an active warfare, most harassing to the Spaniards, and 
resulting in greatly increasing his store of captives, whom 
he treated well and held for ransom. The Spanish gov- 
ernor. General Augustin, was at his wits' end. In the 
harbour was a fleet of American warships holding the city 
at their mercy. On the hills and in the forests completely 
surrounding the town were nearly 30,000 natives, desper- 
ate with the memory of centuries of wrong and drunken 
with the sense of victory within their grasp. There was 
no communication with the interior, — no hope of help 
from either sea or shore, nor any chance, however desper- 
ate, of escape. The water supply was stopped by the 
insurgents. Food shipments were stopped. The de- 
spatches sent to Madrid by General Augustin tell how 
fatal he felt his position to be, and show incidentally 
how considerable an ally the Americans had in the young 
insurrectionary leader, Aguinaldo. 

The first military expedition to Dewey's aid set sail 
from San Francisco May 25th, — an unconscionable delay 
which might have led to the most serious complications 
had a less capable commander than Dewey been holding 
the position in Manila. The cruiser " Charleston " con- 
voyed the expedition, which was composed chiefly of 
volunteer troops from Oregon and California, and a por- 
tion of the Fourteenth United States Infantry, all under 
command of Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson. 
Prior to this time Major-General Wesley Merritt, a West 
Pointer and a veteran of the Civil War, had been given 
command of the department of the Pacific, including all 
mihtary forces which were to take part in the Philippine 
expeditions ; but he did not accompany the first expedition. 
The plans of the administration for pressing the campaign 
in the Philippines involved the ultimate despatch thither 
of 20,000 men, — a colossal task for an army establish- 



334 Blue Jackets of '98 

ment which but a few months before had scarcely exceeded 
that number in its total enrolment. The difficulty of 
getting troops to Manila was further increased by the 
lack of suitable ships on the Pacific seaboard, and by the 
fact that war in Asiatic waters was so far from the minds 
of the Washington authorities, at the beginning of the 
conflict, that they had stripped the Pacific coast States of 
their volunteers. 

Once be^i^un, however, the despatch of military forces to 
Dewey's aid proceeded apace. General Greene with the 
second expedition — four transports carrying 3500 men, 
all volunteers except eight companies from the Eighteenth 
and Twenty -third United States Infantry — - sailed June 
15th and reached Manila July 17th. The third expedition, 
under command of Brigadier-General Arthur McArthur, 
sailed June 27th and arrived July 31st. It comprised about 
4000 men, mostly volunteers. Indeed, it may be noted 
here that if the campaign in Cuba was fought mainly by 
the regulars, the conquest of the Phihppines — both in 
the war with the Spaniards and the later sanguinary 
fighting with the insurgents — was effected by that vol- 
unteer army which has ever been the great military reli- 
ance of the people of the United States. The three 
expeditions thus far enumerated, comprised in all about 
10,000 officers and men. Other detachments of troops 
followed, — indeed the persistence of the insurrection re- 
sulted in compelling the United States government to 
exceed materially its first estimate of 20,000 for the Phil- 
ippines, but the capture of Manila was effected before 
any more troops reached the scene. 

Only the first of these expeditions from San Francisco 
was convoyed bj a ship of war, — a fact which, had the 
Spaniards been as enterprising as they were brave, might 
have resulted in disaster. All, however, reached Manila 
without even an incident to relieve the monotony of the 
long voyage, except General Anderson's expedition, which, 
by virtue of its naval force — the unarmoured cruiser 




(.KM I; \ 1, \\ K.SI.KV Ml'.i;i;l 1' I' 



Blue Jackets of '98 335 

" Charleston " — stopped on the way to capture a Spanish 
colony. The story is a curious one, and strikingly illus- 
trative of the slovenliness of the Spanish colonial system. 
In the western Pacific, ten days' moderate steaming 
from Manila and rather more than twenty days' from 
San Francisco, lie the Ladrone Islands, a dependency of 
Spain. The principal island is called Guam, and its chief 
town is known as St. Ignacio de Agano. Here were 
ancient and decrepit fortifications, and here, too, the 
Spanish colonial governor had his residence in a pictur- 
esque if somewhat dilapidated official palace. Into this 
harbour steamed the " Charleston," and let fly a six-pound 
shot at the Spanish flag that floated over the opera-bouffe 
fort. There was no response, nor was there any excite- 
ment. Presently a boat was seen coming from the shore 
and made for the " Charleston's " gangway. Out of it 
climbed the Spanish governor, and with great dignity 
asked to be presented to the commander of the " Charles- 
ton." He had come at once with a welcome and an 
apology, he said. The salute which the Americans had 
been so polite as to fire he knew should be returned, but 
unhappily his home government had neglected him and 
he had no powder with which to return it. He was 
highly sensible of the honour done his little colony by 
this call of a fine warship from the great American na- 
tion, and quite desolated by the sense of his inability to 
discharge the formal courtesies of the occasion, but would 
the captain not accept his apologies and do him the 
honour to dine at the palace ? All this and much more 
to the same ingenuous effect the Spanish governor said 
to his amazed auditors, who could hardly believe that he 
was ignorant of the existence of the war, and that he had 
mistaken their shotted guns for a formal salute. The 
luckless governor was soon undeceived, and with his offi- 
cials was carried off to Manila, while a force was left to 
hold the island. By the terms of the treaty which closed 
the war, Guam became an American possession, and will 



336 Blue Jackets of '98 

be turned into a naval station where, it may be presumed, 
enough powder will be kept on hand for saluting or other 
uses. 

A correspondent who was on the American flagship 
when the white flag was hoisted over the defences of 
Manila on August 13th reports that Admiral Dewey said 
at the moment, " I feel that I have won a greater victory 
to-day than that of May 1st." Perhaps to the men of 
the army who for weeks had been living in water-soaked 
trenches, alternately baked by the sun and drenched by 
heavy tropical showers, the while maintaining a sputter- 
ing warfare with the Spaniards, the assumption that the 
victory was won by the navy may be irritating, but to a 
great degree it was just. Much of the immunity from 
serious loss enjoyed by the troops was due to the moral 
influence of the ship's guns looking down on a helpless 
city, and the surrender, finally made after an almost 
bloodless contest, was the direct result of negotiations 
carried on between the defenders and the admiral. 

When General Merritt reached Manila, July 25th, and 
assumed command of the troops, he found this situation 
existing : In Manila were supposed to be about 12,000 
men. The city was beginning to suffer for both food and 
water, as supplies of each had been interrupted by the 
insurgents, who had completely hemmed in the town. 
The American forces — other than the navy — then on 
the ground numbered about 6000, and occupied the ground 
along the bay shore from Cavite toward Manila. The 
insurgents, as first on the ground, were in possession of 
the most advantageous positions for an attack on the 
Spanish lines, and completely shut off the American troops 
from the city. There had been no fighting except be- 
tween the insurgents and the Spaniards, for the enemy 
had carefully refrained from giving the admiral any 
cause to fulfil his threat of bombarding the town if the 
American ships or lines were fired upon. 



Blue Jackets of '98 337 

After reconnoitring the field, General Merritt agreed 
with Admiral Dewey that the attack on the city sliould 
be postponed until the arrival of the " Monterey " and the 
third expedition from San Francisco, which was then 
almost due. But it was held desirable to get the insur- 
gents out of the way, and to accomplish it if possible by 
diplomacy, for by this time Aguiualdo had become sen- 
sible of his strength and resentful of his grievances, real 
or fancied. To General Greene, whose line was " blank- 
eted " by the Filipinos, this task was assigned, and by him 
it was accomplished without much difificulty, by explaining 
to Aguinaldo that the heavier artillery of the Americans 
in the trenches occupied by his men would be vastly more 
effective against the common enemy than the antiquated 
guns which he had mounted there. The insurgent chief 
acceded to the suggestion, and on the 31st of July the 
Filipinos withdrew that portion of their lines which had 
rested on the bay shore, and their places were taken by 
Greene's brigade, which, not content with the advanced 
position thus gained, pushed still farther forward and 
brought on an engagement in which ten men were killed 
and thirty-three wounded. The engagement was at night, 
and was fought with a furious fire of musketry. The 
Americans, becoming convinced that the enemy was ad- 
vancing, fired 60,000 rounds of ammunition. The next 
day General McArthur's command arrived and was landed, 
and the work of pushmg forward the trenches continued. 
The country was a most difficult one either for intrench- 
ing or for marching, being given over mostly to the culti- 
vation of rice, which necessitates submerged fields. The 
roads are few and narrow, and the best line of approach 
to the enemy's position was along the beach, even though 
it was much of the time under water. From the 1st to 
the 7th of August the troops worked persistently at rec- 
tifying and advancing their lines, a sputtering fire being 
kept up meanwhile by the enemy. General Greene de- 
clares that at no time after the first of the month would 

22 



338 Blue Jackets of '98 

the issue of the conflict have been in doubt had the 
Americans charged the Spanish lines, but Admiral Dewey 
insisted that the attack should be deferred until the 
arrival of the " Monterey," and accordingly the time was 
occupied with preparations far more elaborate than the 
task really demanded. On the 7th all of General Mc- 
Arthur's troops were landed, the " Monterey " had arrived 
and completed the slight repairs necessary to fit her for 
active service, and the moment for bringing the long wait 
to a close seemed to have come. Of the issue of the con- 
flict there could be no possible doubt. The batteries of 
the ships enfiladed the Spanish trenches on the right, so 
that the advance of the Americans along the beach and 
the few narrow roads would be in a great measure covered. 
Seeing this clearly and hoping that the Spaniards possessed 
an equally correct appreciation of the situation, Admiral 
Dewey and General Merritt strove to avert bloodshed by 
sending to the Governor-General a summons to surrender, 
with a warning that in forty-eight hours the attack would 
be made if he refused. He was cautioned, furthermore, 
that if the night assaults on the American troops con- 
tinued the attack might be precipitated even before the 
expiration of the time set, and he was urged to send the 
women and children in the city away to places of safety. 
The response of the Governor-General showed that he 
appreciated the hopelessness of his position, but dared not 
surrender without at least a show of resistance. He 
pointed out that with the city surrounded by half-savage 
insurgents there was no place of safety to which he 
might send the women and children, and he asked that 
the time before the assault be extended to give him time 
to communicate with the government at Madrid. This 
was promptly refused, and the preparations for the attack 
began, the Spaniards meanwhile abandoning their practice 
of night attacks on the American lines lest the day of 
reckoning be hastened. 

It was during the preparations for the attack that the 



Blue Jackets of '98 339 

British squadron in the bay gave another of those frank 
expressions of good-fellowship for the Americans that 
have done so much to break down the ancient hostility 
between the two nations. The harbour was busy with 
shipping moving to anchorages out of reach of the ex- 
pected bombardment. The foreign consuls were actively 
engaged in embarking people of their nationalities on 
transports and taking them to places of safety out in the 
bay — and by the way an eye-witness notes that the 
number of German citizens thus cared for was ridiculously 
disproportionate to the powerful fleet which the Kaiser 
had thought it necessary to maintain there for their 
protection. A few hours before the time set for the 
attack, the British squadron of four ships, which had been 
anchored far across the bay from the Americans, weighed 
anchor and steamed over toward Cavite, where Dewey was 
moored. As the British flagship " Immortalite " steamed 
under the stern of the " Olympia," her band crashed out 
the strains of the " Star-Spangled Banner " and her men 
cheered the Yankees lustily. The American band re- 
sponded with " God Save the Queen " and equally hearty 
cheers, and then, perhaps by accident only, the British took 
up an anchorage directly between the American ships 
and the Germans. The incident was one move — a trivial 
one — in the diplomatic game which went on concurrently 
with the game of war in Manila harbour. 

The attack was not begun on that day, however. Some 
difficulty in securing an advantageous position for the 
troops under General McArthur compelled another delay. 
The time was not wholly lost, for before another forty-eight 
hours had passed Admiral Dewey had learned, through the 
Belgian consul, who was his intermediary in communicat- 
ing with the Spaniards, that the city would be surrendered 
as soon as there had been enough of an attack and a 
defence to satisfy " Spanish honour," and incidentally 
to save the commander from a court-martial when he 
reached home. It was arranged, accordingly, that the 



340 Blue Jackets of '98 

ships should not fire upon the town, but should confine 
their attack to Fort San Antonio and the trenches im- 
mediately in the American front. The United States 
troops meanwhile were to be gathered under cover in 
their trenches, ready for an assault if one should be 
necessary. After a short bombardment the admiral 
with the " Olympia " was to move up close to the city 
walls and display the international code signal " Sur- 
render." The response to this was to be a white flag 
on the corner of the Malate, the most advanced of the 
walls of the city. Should the Spaniards fail to display 
this sicrnal, then the Americans were to advance to the 
attack ; but if it was shown they would merely have to 
enter the city and take possession. While this pro- 
gramme was thoroughly understood by General Merritt, 
he nevertheless prudently made his dispositions for a real 
battle, apprehending that the Spanish officers might not 
be able to control their men, or that in some other way 
the arrangement might miscarry. 

The point in the Spanish line of defence menaced by 
the American attack was directly south of the city, where 
the Spaniards had a line of earthworks and barbed wire 
extending from Fort San Antonio on the beach to a 
block-house on the bank of a small stream which ran 
parallel with the sea-shore and about a mile away from it. 
From that point the Spanish lines turned sharply north- 
ward, enveloping the city and confronted at every point 
by the insurgents. The United States forces concerned 
themselves only with that part of the enemy's hue 
between the fort and the block-house. That was the 
most vulnerable point of attack, because the fort itself 
could have been demolished in half an hour by the fire 
of any of the men-of-war, and the whole line to the 
stream was within easy range of the cannon of the fleet. 
With this position carried, Manila would be at the mercy 
of the invaders, since nothing would remain to bar their 
advance except the antiquated walls of Malate. 



Blue Jackets of '98 341 

The day of battle came gusty and showery. The soil, 
already waterlogged, was made even more difficult for the 
passage of troops, and the frequent showers of ram hid 
from the gunners of the ships the targets offered them. 
About nuie o'clock in the morning the ships blossomed 
out with battle-flags at every point. With the " Olympia " 
in the lead, they steamed slowly down toward Fort San 
Antonio, the blare of the band from the British flagship, 
which accompanied them at a safe distance, lending an air 
of festivity to the scene. Soon the " Olympia," " Ealeigh," 
and " Petrel " opened on the fort, quickly enshrouding 
themselves in a cloud of yellow smoke, which hung heav- 
ily about them in the damp and sultry air. The " Mon- 
terey " had steamed nearer to the city, and confronted in 
silence the central battery, where were mounted four for- 
midable Krupp rifles. If the Spaniards held to their 
agreement, that battery would not open fire ; but the 
"Monterey," with her heavy armour and 12-uich guns 
was stationed there to attend to it if the Spaniards proved 
forgetful. The " Concord " was north of the walled town, 
her guns commanding the fort at the mouth of the Pasig 
Eiver, which intersects the city. Her part in the conflict, 
like that of the " Monterey," was destined to be a merely 
silent and precautionary one. The little gunboat " Callao," 
captured from the Spanish, lay close inshore, raking the 
enemy's trenches with her machine guns and preparing 
the way for the American troops who were to make the 
assault. For more than half an hour the bombardment 
continued without any answer from the shore. The 
American ships were putting in their heaviest shells, 
and great clouds of dirt could be seen thrown high in 
the air as the "Olympia's" 8-inch shells exploded fairly 
within the fort. The battle was as harmless and almost 
us unexciting to the sailors as target practice, for the de- 
fenders of the fort clung sullenly to their earthwork 
bombproofs and made not the slightest reply. At last 
there was a rattle of musketry from the shore, and after 



342 Blue Jackets of '98 

allowing the smoke to clear away, the men on the ships 
could see a column of men advancing up the beach toward 
the fort, in water up to their waists part of the time, but 
pressing forward with cheers, with colours waving, and 
with a band stoutly plodding along in their rear, from 
which there came faintly over the water the strains of 
that novel battle-song, " There '11 be a hot time in the 
old town to-night." 

This was the First Colorado Infantry, sent forward 
under orders from General Merritt of the night before to 
make a feint, or, if the Spaniards showed resistance, a real 
attack. Either because the understanding between the 
governor-general and the American commanders had not 
been communicated to the men in the fort, or because the 
Spanish officers were unable to control their men, a vigor- 
ous fire was opened on this column, but without checking 
its advance in the least. The Coloradans pressed on, 
throwing themselves flat to rest when they came to a 
piece of dry beach, and wading stubbornly through the 
surf that at points covered their sandy pathway. Now 
and then a man fell, but not many, for the Spanish aim 
was bad, and apparently only a part of the Spanish forces 
were firing. A small stream in front of the fort was 
promptly forded, and soon the watchers in the ships 
could see the Spaniards streammg out of the back of the 
fort, while the Colorado men with loud cheers rushed up 
and over the front. Almost instantly the Spanish flag 
came fluttering down, and a great American flag was run 
up to the top of the staff and saluted with cheers from 
the ships and the trenches. 

On the right of the American line, out of sight of the 
ships and with httle aid from their guns, the assailants 
were meeting a more serious resistance. There General 
McArthur's brigade was engaged. Massed in trenches, 
behind stone houses, and taking advantage of everything 
that off"ered protection, these troops waited until tliey saw 
the flag come down from Fort San Antonio. Then the 



Blue Jackets of '98 343 

guns of the Astor battery and a Utah volunteer battery 
were turned on the most formidable work in their front 
— a stone block-house — and quickly riddled it, after 
which the troops charged the Spanish lines and soon car- 
ried them. The Spaniards retreated before the advancing 
Americans, who did not stop in the captured trenches, but 
pressed ou toward the city, sustaining meanwhile a heavy 
fire from the woods that bordered the road and from every 
farm-house or other covert they encountered. By the 
time the Spaniards had been driven from every halting- 
place the brigade had lost 7 men killed and 37 wounded. 

Meanwhile the Colorado men with the First California 
and part of the Twenty-third Regulars had left Fort Anto- 
nio behind, and were pushing into the suburb of Malate, 
where they met a heavy fire from house windows and 
roofs. The situation was then a most anomalous one. 
In pursuance of the agreement with Admiral Dewey, the 
Spaniards had displayed a white flag on the corner of 
the wall of the old town, but directly under this flag the 
Spanish soldiers were continuing the fight, and the Ameri- 
can troops were responding with heavy volleys. The 
navy had ceased firing, and at this very moment oSicers 
representing Admiral Dewey and General Merritt were on 
their way to the city hall to meet, by prearrangement, the 
Spanish officials and formulate the terms of capitulation; 
yet there was fighting in the streets of Malate, and large 
bodies of Spanish troops were standing irresolute, with 
arms in their hands, uncertain whether to reopen the con- 
flict or not. The insurgents, who had not been much in 
evidence during the day, as the fighting was not on their 
lines, now began to crowd toward the breach in the Span- 
ish position, and announced their intention of entering 
the city with the victors, — a purpose which General 
Merritt promptly interdicted, instructing his brigade 
commanders to keep them out at any cost. By night, 
however, these complications were all untangled. The 
Spaniards everywhere were informed of the surrender, the 



344 Blue Jackets of '98 

last Spanish flag in tlie city was hauled down, American 
troops garrisoned every fort, and patrolled all the principal 
streets of the city, and the insurgents, nursing a not un- 
justifiable resentment, were left in their trenches, confront- 
ing not only their enemies the Spaniards, but their 
friends the Americans. The sufficient justification for 
the restraint put upon the insurgents is the fact, that had 
they been admitted to the city before the American 
authority was complete, and arrangements for the protec- 
tion of life and property perfected, they woidd beyond a 
shadow of a doubt have sacked and looted the town. 

The terms of capitulation were arranged the following 
day. In effect they granted to the Spaniards the honours 
of war. Manila and its suburbs were surrendered to the 
United States forces, together with all pubhc property, 
arms, and munitions of war. The Spanish officers were to 
be permitted to retain their side arms, horses, and personal 
property of every sort. The Americans charged them- 
selves for the present with the subsistence of the prisoners 
pending the decision of the Washington authorities as to 
shipping them back to Spain. The duty of policing the 
city, protecting private property, and reopening the port 
to commerce was also assumed by the conquerors. The 
details of the surrender thus completed, Governor-General 
Augustin made a hasty flight from Manila on the Ger- 
man flagship " Kaiserin Augusta " — an incident that for 
a time added to the bitterness felt against Germany in 
the army, but it afterwards appeared that the flight was 
with Dewey's knowledge and connivance. "When the 
German ship reached Hong Kong, however, her officers 
assured the American consul there that the situation 
at Manila was unchanged, although they had seen the 
American flag raised over the city some hours before their 
departure. Seemingly the German policy of unfriendli- 
ness could not stop short of petty falsehoods. 

The capture of Manila is almost unprecedented in the 
history of warfare, for the great value of the prize and the 



Blue Jackets of '98 345 

small expenditure of human life in the winning of it. A 
city of 300,000 inhabitants, heavily fortitied, was taken 
with a loss of twenty killed and 105 wounded, after a 
leisurely campaign covering 24 days. On the American 
side, exclusive of the navy, scarce 9000 men had been en- 
gaged, and they had taken 13,000 prisoners. Of arms and 
munitions of war there were captured 22,000 small arms, 
ten milhon rounds of ammunition, about 70 pieces of 
modern artillery, and several hundred antiquated bronze 
pieces. In the vaults of the city was about $900,000, — 
fair spoil of war. Nor was the extent of the triumph the 
greatest of the American achievements at Manila. 
Almost instantly conditions of peace were restored in the 
city. The strong hand of authority restrained alike the 
eager insurgents and the sullen Spanish soldiery. The 
custom-house was reopened, and shops took down their 
shutters. After the first moment of terror the inhabitants 
discovered that while the American occupation meant 
martial law it meant also protection to every man in the 
pursuit of his business. General Greene, who was most 
active in this work, writes : 

' ' Witliin one week from the time the articles of capitula- 
tion were signed every branch of the government except civil 
courts was in operation. The police stations were open, and 
American soldiers Avere on duty as patrolmen. , Police court 
was held every morning, and petty offenders were tried, and 
either acquitted, or convicted, sentenced, and sent to jail. 
The streets Avere being cleaned ; the prisoners of war were 
quartered and fed; public property was inventoried and 
counted ; pnhlic funds were secured and placed in the custody 
of officers under bonds ; the custom-house was doing a large 
business ; the streets were lighted ; water was delivered through 
the pipes ; the markets were open, and food in ample quantity 
was coming in from the country on one side and by sea on tlie 
other. . . . The day we entered the city all shops and buildings 
were closed, and they remained so the following day, which 
was Sunday. But on Monday a few venturesome shopkeepers 



346 Blue Jackets of '98 

threw open their doors, and finding that they were fully pro- 
tected, the others followed their example on Tuesday. That 
afternoon the newspapers made their appearance, and the 
tramways resumed operations. On Wednesday morning the 
banks opened their doors, under a guard of soldiers to preserve 
order, which, however, was withdrawn two days later as being 
no longer necessary." 

A curious fact about the capture and occupation of the 
city by the American troops is that it took place after the 
peace protocol had been formally concluded at Washing- 
ton, resembling therein the famous victory of New Orleans 
which was won by General Jackson several days after the 
signing of the treaty of Ghent which concluded the War 
of 1812. Had the cable to Hong Kong been intact, it is 
doubtful whether Manila would ever have been taken, for 
it would have been the duty of the authorities at Wash- 
ington to notify the forces in the Philippines immediately 
of the end of the war. There would have been a sorry 
time for the soldiers and sailors who had been working 
and waiting so patiently to put the finishing touch upon 
Dewey's victory of ]\Iay 1st, and the map of the world 
might have escaped a radical change. Certainly the 
United States would in that event have been freed from 
grave problems and heavy responsibilities which have 
come to them as the result of their new possessions in the 
Philippines. 

It is possible to give here only the most cursory account 
of the deplorable revolt of the Filipinos under Aguinaldo 
against the authority of the United States in the captured 
territory contiguous to Manila. As I have already pointed 
out, the insurgents became restive very early in the Manila 
campaign. As they gained in numbers and in confidence, 
they assumed authority which they could not maintain. 
During the long days when Dewey was waiting for troops 
from home it became only too clear that Aguinaldo 
thought the admiral greatly dependent upon him for 



Blue Jackets of 98 347 

support on shore. In more than one instance the insur- 
gent chief attempted to assert his power in a way annoy- 
ing to the admiral, but in every instance he was summarily 
rebuked. It was perhaps this tendency to independence 
shown by the Filipino leader that led the admiral to re- 
vise materially his first declaration, " These people [the 
Filipinos] are ten times better fitted for self-government 
than the Cubans." 

However that may be, the extreme care taken by Ad- 
miral Dewey and later by General Merritt to avoid any- 
thing which would seem like recognition of the Filipino 
leader in his official capacity — he had proclaimed himself 
Dictator — undoubtedly suggested to Aguinaldo that the 
bright hopes he had formed of a native republic under the 
protection of the United States were doomed to disap- 
pointment. Through his envoy Agoncillo he was kept 
informed of the progress of the peace negotiations at Paris, 
and saw the American commissioners there calmly bar- 
gaining for the sovereignty of the Phihppines, with ap- 
parently no thought of the rights or the wishes of their 
people. Against the terms of the treaty Agoncillo the 
diplomat filed a protest. Aguinaldo the soldier contin- 
ued to co-operate with the Americans against Manila, 
but manifested suspicion and resentment by studiously 
avoiding any communication with the United States 
commanders. 

Men who have known this remarkable leader have 
given the most conflicting reports of his character, and 
perhaps it is no more than natural that the estimates 
proceeding from American sources should have been 
almost uniformly eulogistic until the moment of his revolt, 
and thereafter almost invariably to his discredit. It is 
undeniable, however, that he is a man of marked native 
ability, which he has improved by arduous study of all 
that pertains to the tasks of the soldier or the statesman. 
He has power over men, and has ruled his followers with 
an iron hand. He has courage, and that lofty tempera- 



348 Blue Jackets of '98 

ment which enables its possessor to go down cheerfully 
for an idea. He is imbued with the spirit of national 
freedom, else he would not have staked all on a hopeless 
revolt against the power of the United States. 

It would be idle to deny that Aguinaldo and his follow- 
ers had some excuse for feeling themselves betrayed when 
they learned that the opportunity to form a government of 
their own was to be denied them. They were at the out- 
set treated with the utmost friendliness by the official rep- 
resentatives of the United States. The consul at Hong 
Kong was in constant communication with the Filipino 
leader, and furthered his plans for again taking the field 
against Spain. One of Dewey's ships brought him 
to Manila. His men were armed with rifles captured 
by the Americans. When a German ship checked 
a body of the insurgents in the act of capturing a 
Spanish post in Subig Bay, an American man-of-war took 
the post and delivered it over to the Filipinos. Perhaps 
in all this the representatives of the United States did 
not overstep the line between mofficial friendliness and 
official recognition, but the Filipinos can hardly be blamed 
for believing themselves an important factor in the Manila 
problem, — one that could not be ignored in the solution. 
The treaty of peace by which the United States paid Spain 
$20,000,000 to relinquish sovereignty in the Philippines 
gave to the revolutionists their first rude shock. A procla- 
mation in the form of a letter from the President to General 
Elwell S. Otis, who succeeded General Merritt after the 
capture of Manila, only converted into certainty the sus- 
picion of the insurgents that they were to be denied self- 
government. The President declared that the United States 
had succeeded to the sovereignty of Spain in the islands, 
announced that the Americans came, " not as invaders or 
conquerors, but as friends to protect the natives in their 
homes, in their employments, and in their personal and 
religious rights," and further announced that the " mission 
of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, 




GKXKRAI, 1,1. WEI. 1. S. OTIS. 



Blue Jackets of '98 349 

substituting the mild sway of justice aud right for ar- 
bitrary rule." In this was no word of comfort for the 
Filipino republic, which had been duly formed with 
Aguinaldo as President. The natives were prepared to 
admit that in exchanging the sway of Spain for the rule 
of the United States they had made a notable bargain, but 
they still cherished a hope that they, like the Cubans, 
might secure at least the opportunity to try a government 
of their own. Out of this sentiment grew inevitably an 
antagonism to the United States as bitter as any that had 
been felt for Spain. Feeling themselves deceived and 
outraged, unable with their limited horizon to discern the 
many reasons which had compelled the Americans to as- 
sume the position they had, the natives prepared to give 
battle to their new masters. 

The first serious defiance of the authority of the United 
States occurred at Iloilo, the second commercial port of 
the Philippines. It had been held by the Spaniards dur- 
ing the armistice, but on the 24th of December was 
evacuated. Immediately a force of Filipinos entered the 
town and occupied its fortifications, refusing to evacuate 
them at the demand of a detachment of American troops 
which had been sent as soon as notice of the evacuation 
was received. A week later Aguinaldo issued a procla- 
mation protesting against the American occupation of 
Manila, and calling upon all native Filipinos to continue 
the battle for liberty. Meanwhile Manila was honey- 
combed with plots. In one instance a Filipino in the 
service of the United States was noticed diligently organ- 
ising clubs in all parts of the town. " To help maintain 
American supremacy," he explained when questioned ; but 
a little investigation showed that they were revolutionary 
and designed to aid Aguinaldo. Outside the city the 
insurgents occupied the same trenches they had when 
they hemmed in the Spaniards and cut off their food and 
water. Now it was the Americans who were hemmed in, 
though a semblance of peace was preserved and the most 



350 Blue Jackets of '98 

imperative orders given to avoid a conflict. But the con- 
flict was as inevitable as fire when inflammable materials 
are exposed to heat. On the night of the 5th of February- 
there was a shot on the lines. From which side it was 
fired cannot be told with certainty, but as if it was a 
signal, it was followed by volleys and the United States, 
not yet fairly out of war with Spain, was at war with the 
Filipino insurgents. The outbreak was not unexpected, 
and the American commanders, by sea and shore, inflicted 
upon the new enemy such punishment as showed the 
insurgents that they no longer had Spaniards to deal 
with. As soon as day dawned the ships opened on the 
insurgents in the trenches. The " Monadnock," the 
" Charleston," the " Concord " and two captured gunboats 
were engaged, and their fire, with that of General Otis's 
troops, did cruel execution among the half-armed Fili- 
pinos. The enemy's loss was heavy. Though not defi- 
nitely reported, it is known to have extended into the 
thousands, and Aguinaldo was driven from his lines about 
Manila. But he was far from being crushed. 

At this time there were in the island of Luzon — the 
only one thus far affected by the revolt — about 30,000 
Filipinos under arms. In discipline and in equipment 
the different commands varied widely, some being mere 
bands of savages armed with bows and arrows, others 
having a semblance of European organisation and carrying 
the Mausers captured by the Americans from the Span- 
iards. The force was a formidable one, nevertheless, 
vastly superior to that with which Garcia and Gomez had 
kept the Spanish in Cuba in check for three years. With 
perfect knowledge of the country, with acclimated troops 
and holding possession of everything outside a narrow 
belt around Manila, Aguinaldo threatened to make grave 
trouble for the United States in establishing its authority 
over the new domain. 

Very quickly, however, the American commanders 
demonstrated to the insurgent general that he had men 



Blue Jackets of '98 351 

of a type very different from the Spanish to deal with. 
There was no building trochas, no clinging to the cities, 
no effort to subdue men under arms by starving women 
and children. The troops took up the new contest as if 
they had expected it. Blow followed blow, and the in- 
surgents were forced back away from the city and into 
the interior. Five days after the outbreak at Manila, 
the insurgent stronghold at Caloocan was taken, and the 
day following Iloilo was captured. There was fighting 
every day, the enemy's forces being diligently sought and 
attacked fiercely wherever found. Either because of a 
lack of self-control or through pure bravado, Aguinaldo 
failed to adopt the Fabian tactics which the Cuban insur- 
gents had employed so effectively. Confident of the 
strength of his forces, he seldom attempted to avoid 
battle, and accordingly his troops were pushed back day 
after day, losing heavily in every encounter. Early in 
February much of the sympathy which had been felt for 
him as a sincere and able if mistaken leader was alienated 
by the discovery of a plot among the Filipinos in Manila, 
to assassinate all foreign residents, regardless of sex, age, 
or nationality. The plot had progressed so far that the 
date for its execution was fixed, and its details were 
worked out with the utmost circumstance. Nations are 
not builded upon wholesale massacres, and a new St. 
Bartholomew would form but a sorry inauguration of an 
enlightened republic in the East. 

The discovery of this plot had immediate effect in 
strengthening the determination of the Americans to put 
down the revolt without mercy ; and the completion of the 
treaty of peace which soon followed, removed certain 
embarrassments in the way of the conquerors. Before the 
treaty the Tagals were rebellous Spanish subjects ; there- 
after they were in rebellion against the United States. 
Prior to the treaty General Otis could not negotiate with 
the insurgents, nor did he feel justified in waging a really 
aggressive campaign against them. The treaty once 



352 Blue Jackets of '98 

completed, however, the American forces took the field in 
earnest. By the middle of March all plans were ready 
for an advance into the interior of the island. On the 
13th the town of Pasig, which is on the river of the 
same name, was captured, and during the two weeks fol- 
lowing the fighting was continuous and deadly. 

By the 1st of April it became apparent that the United 
States had encountered in the Philippines a situation 
more grave than had ever confronted the nation, except 
at the outbreak of the Civil War. Expedition had followed 
expedition to the far-off islands, until, instead of the 20,000 
soldiers which had been thought enough to cope with the 
problem, we had nearly 45,000 there, including many 
regiments of regulars and a heavy fleet. To our people, 
unused to colonial wars and distrustful of a large army, 
this seemed a heavy price to pay for territory of doubtful 
value. It was, indeed, an expenditure of men in foreign 
warfare which might appall nations of a wider military 
experience than ours. The expedition of Lord Kitchener 
through the desert, which attracted the attention of all 
military Europe, numbered only about 8000 white troops, 
and some 12,000 natives. In their prolonged war on the 
frontiers of Afghanistan, the British employed only 32,000 
troops, of whom only about 10,000 were white. The 
French put only 15,000 men into Madagascar, and the 
British subjugated the Zulus with a scant 7000. Even 
the Spaniards held the Philippines with fewer soldiers 
than we found necessary, for when Dewey entered Manila 
Bay there were not more than 20,000 Spanish troops in 
all the islands. 

This condition naturally bred the greatest anxiety in 
the United States. The relatives of volunteers who had 
enlisted for 'the war with Spain bitterly denounced the 
policy which compelled these soldiers to remain in service 
months after that war was over, fighting a fight for which 
they had not volunteered and for which many had no 
sympathy. The so-called " anti-expansionists " or people 



Blue Jackets of '98 353 

who held that the United States should confine themselves 
within the natural continental boundaries, hailed each 
new embarrassment in the Philippines as additional proof 
of the justice of their contention that only disaster could 
follow the adoption of a colonising policy by the United 
States. About Manila the war was fought with bullets, 
at home it was waged scarcely less bitterly with pamph- 
lets, speeches, and editorials. The administration with- 
held any definite declaration of its policy beyond a 
declaration of purpose to first put down the revolt and 
then consider what should be done with the Philippines. 
While the army and navy were intrusted with the primary 
duty, a commission was appointed to proceed to the scene 
and consider the political methods which would best 
serve to give the islands an orderly and civilised govern- 
ment. The members of this commission were men of 
notable attainments and high character. President Jacob 
Gould Schurman, of Cornell University ; Professor Dean 
C. Worcester, of the University of Michigan, who had 
travelled extensively in the islands before the war ; Colonel 
Charles Denby, long the Minister of the United States to 
China, made up the commission, together with Admiral 
Dewey. The commissioners arrived at Manila on the 
4th of March, and great hopes were expressed that they 
would speedily affect an arrangement with the insurgents ; 
but the pertinacity of the enemy again disappointed Ameri- 
can expectations. Though beaten whenever brought to 
battle, they shifted their positions and fought on week 
after week, deaf to any suggestions of peace which in- 
volved their first laying down their arms. Though driven 
from their capital, Malolos, their villages burned, their 
ranks decimated in the most merciless fighting in which 
American soldiers have ever engaged, they stubbornly 
maintained their hopeless resistance ; and as these lines 
are being written, the subjugation of Aguinaldo and his fol- 
lowers, though promised for an early date, is still a thing 
to be accomplished. More men by far were lost in the war 



23 



354 Blue Jackets of '98 

against the insurgents than in that against the Spaniards, 
if the losses from disease be excepted ; more troops have 
been employed, the fighting has been fiercer, and to-day 
the results are almost barren. Of the outcome there can 
be no doubt. In the end the limitless resources of the 
great Republic and the discipline of its army and navy 
will prove too much for Aguinaldo's half-clad soldiery; 
but the contest has been costly and not wholly glorious, 
the civil problems which will follow it will be harassing 
and difficult, and the profit, either material or moral, 
attending all is more than problematical. 



CHAPTEK XVI 

The Peace Commission at Paris — The Completion of the 
Treaty — The Struggle in the American Senate — 
Some Lessons of the War — The Work of the Torpedo 
Boats — The Need for a Permanent Staff Organisa- 
tion — The Part played by the Militia — The Future 
OF the Army. 

IN outlining the course of events in the Philippines 
after the declaration of the armistice on the 13th of 
August, 1898, 1 have to some extent anticipated the course 
of the historical narrative. While Merritt and Dewey 
were advancing upon Manila, the civil authorities in 
Washington were busily engaged in negotiating the pro- 
tocol which resulted in preliminary peace ; and while the 
earlier lighting between the insurgents and the Americans 
in Luzon was in progress, the peace commissions of the 
two nations at war were meeting in Paris to formulate a 
treaty, which in its effect upon the distribution of national 
power is second in importance to scarcely any instrument 
of the sort ever negotiated. 

To all intents and purposes, the agreement upon the 
protocol ended the war except in the Philippines, where 
the news was slow to arrive. The armistice passed with- 
out incident into a permanent peace. Much in the way 
of formality had to be gone through with before the war 
could be declared at an end ; but the fighting stopped that 
13th day of August, and what remained to be done was 
the work of the diplomats. In an era of short wars this 
was one of the briefest. The Franco-Prussian war lasted 
five days over six months The Turco-Russian war of 
1877 had a duration of nine months. The war between 
Japan and China ended with the ignominious defeat of 



^S^ Blue Jackets of '98 

the latter in eight months. Our own struggle with Spain 
reached its conclusion in less than four months, though 
already — May, 1899 — the sharp conflict with the Fili- 
pino insurgents has occupied a like period and seems 
likely to continue months longer. It is to be borne in 
mind that this period of four months is that of active 
hostilities only. Formally and of record the war is pre- 
sumed to have continued until the interchange of ratifica- 
tions of the treaty, which took place at Washington, April 
11, 1899. 

The treaty as finally agreed to by the United States 
Senate and the Queen Eegent of Spain, who ratified it in 
the recess of the Cortes, followed closely the lines of the 
protocol. To formulate it, both governments appointed 
commissioners, who met in Paris in October. The United 
States commission included Mr. W. E. Day, who resigned 
the post of Secretary of State to undertake this task ; Mr. 
Whitelaw Eeid, editor of the " New York Tribune ; " 
United States Senators Gray, Frye, and Davis, and Mr. 
John B. Moore, secretary. For Spain appeared Senor 
Eugene Montero Eios, president. General E. Cerero, and 
Senors de Garnoca, Arbazuza, and de Villaurrutia. Into 
the details of the prolonged discussion it is unnecessary to 
go. The determination of the United States government 
to insist upon Spain's renunciation of all sovereignty over 
the Philippine Islands led to the most violent disagree- 
ment, and would doubtless have broken off the negotia- 
tions had not Spain's case been so obviously helpless. 
The Spaniards urged, with some measure of justice, that 
the protocol, which was supposed to cover all the demands 
of the United States, did not demand the actual abandon- 
ment of the islands by Spain ; but by this time public 
opinion in the United Stq-tes had so clearly signified the 
desire of the people that the Philippine Archipelago 
should at least be freed from Spanish dominion, that the 
American commissioners were unyielding. A prolonged 
and brilliant effort was also made by the Spaniards to 



Blue Jackets of '98 357 

saddle upon Cuba that part of the Spanish debt which 
was supposed to have been incurred for the good of the 
island, including the money spent and the money stolen 
in the various efiforts to put down Cuban rebellions. 
Against this, too, the American commissioners made a 
determined and successful resistance. It may be re- 
marked here that the peace commissioners — like any 
diplomats accredited to foreign countries in this era of 
swift cable communication — were, in fact, supernumerary 
fimctionaries. Their instructions were cabled from day 
to day, and they had but the shadow of personal authority 
So wholly were they a representative body, expressing 
only the will of the central authority at Washington, that 
their instructions were radically changed after a Western 
journey had convinced the President that the sentiment 
of the country favoured a plan for the Philippines different 
from the one he had originally contemplated. Diplomacy 
is a very difierent art in the end of the nineteenth 
century from what it was at the beginning. An ambassa- 
dor now, even a special one with so important a mis- 
sion as the negotiation of a treaty of peace, is but a 
mouthpiece. 

After weeks of hagghng, the peace commission formu- 
lated a treaty, signed it December 10th, and adjourned. 
The essentials of the treaty followed closely the lines laid 
down in the protocol, its chief differences being in the 
clauses deaUng with the Philippines. All claim to sov- 
ereignty in those islands was relinquished by Spain, and, 
in consideration of that action, the United States was 
bound to pay Spam 820,000,000. The future of the 
islands was left to the determination of the United States. 
Porto Eico was ceded to the United States, as were also 
all other West Indian islands then in Spain's posses- 
sion, excepting Cuba, which was given freedom, and in 
addition the island of Guam in the Ladrones. The cus- 
tomary clauses securing civil rights to the residents of 
the territories ceded, and providing for special privileges 



^S^ Blue Jackets of '98 

to the vessels of the ceding nation in the ports of the 
countries relinquished, completed the treaty. 

, After a bitter fight in the United States Senate, growing 
out of the opposition of many Senators and public men 
to what seemed to portend the actual annexation of the 
Philippine Islands to the United States, the treaty was 
ratified and signed by the President, February 10, 1899. 
In Spain the Cortes was not in session, and indeed there 
was some doubt whether a ratification would have passed 
that body. Accordingly, the Queen Eegent affixed her 
^signature to the document March 17th, and it became 
eifective. 

An historic document, indeed, is this Treaty of Paris, — 
one that marks an epoch in the development of the United 
States, one that signalises a day of disaster in the history 
of Spain. To Spain it is the final decree of expulsion 
from the western hemisphere. The enormous territory 
which the Spanish had held as the fruit of the endeavours 
of their hardy explorers was at last dissipated. First the 
great Louisiana Territory ceded to France had passed into 
the ownership of the United States. Then by purchase, 
though almost at the cannon's mouth, the United States 
freed themselves from a troublesome neighbour, and Spain 
lost Florida. Next, by successful revolution, Mexico 
broke away from the control of Madrid, and by war the 
United States acquired much of the territory which Spain 
thus lost. Followed then, in swift succession, the revolu- 
tions by which the flag of blood and gold was dragged 
from its places of authority in the States of South 
America. At last Cuba and Porto Rico alone were left 
to hapless Spain, and these, as we have seen, were held by 
her largely by grace of the United States, until her sins 
grew so intolerable that the very power which had long 
protected her in occupation of American territory was 
compelled by considerations of humanity to sweep her 
out of it. 

If to Spain the end of the war of 1898 seemed to mean 



Blue Jackets of '98 359 

submission to spoliation and the sacrifice of her historic 
possessions in two distant seas, to the United States it 
means new problems, new responsibilities, new duties, 
and perhaps new evils. The event marked our first 
acceptance of territory beyond seas — for Hawaii had 
been taken during the war, and Porto Rico by the very 
terms of the treaty became a part of the United States. 
The relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba and 
the Phihppines meant for the United States a grave 
and perplexing problem. For both countries we became 
thereby responsible. Though pledged to give the Cubans 
a chance to govern themselves, duty commanded that 
we should maintain such a supervision over their first at- 
tempts at self-government as to assure the continuance of 
order and the permanence of the government. Should 
the Cubans prove unfit for self-government, — a most 
improbable supposition, — or should they prefer annexa- 
tion to the United States, the graver question of our 
acceptance of the island as a State or a Territory would 
come up. But all the problems presented by the situation 
in the West Indies are dwarfed by those which the Phil- 
ippines present. Those huge and undeveloped islands, 
6000 miles from our nearest port, peopled by 11,000,000 
natives, mostly savages skilled in warfare and loving it, 
pestilential in climate, and of little profit in trade, were by 
a stroke of a pen, following an unexpected development of 
the war, made wards of the United States. For years 
their people had been in revolution against Spain, and 
with alacrity they revolted against their new rulers. For 
the first time in its history the nation foimd itself con- 
fronted with the necessity of sending its sons to a far 
distant and alien land to fight naked savages in a jungle. 
People began to ask, " Is it worth while ? " and the terri- 
tory which Dewey won from the Spaniards was described 
as another shirt of Nessus, very gay and beautiful in 
appearance, but which gave to him who put it on a fatal 
disease. The doubt was generally expressed whether 



360 Blue Jackets of '98 

Spain had not received $20,000,000 for ridding herself of a 
province which she could not govern and which brought 
her no profit, and whether the United States had not 
paid that sum for the doubtful privilege of suppressing a 
revolution. But in response, the question was asked, 
" Would you have us return the Fibpiuos to Spain, to 
extortion, to torture, and to death?" Only one answer 
to that question could be returned ; but as yet the final 
response has not been made to the more important query, 
which grows more insistent daily, " What shall we do with 
the Phihppines ? " 

A nation which enters upon a war braves the unknow- 
able. The issue of the conflict may perhaps be predicated 
with some certainty from an exact knowledge of the rival 
armaments, but the collateral results of the struggle de- 
velop most unexpectedly, and often in shapes which the 
most far-sighted statesman could not have foreseen, nor 
the most vivid fancy imagine. The United States em- 
barked on the war with Spain formally disavowing any 
purpose of territorial aggrandisement. It emerged the 
possessor of Porto Rico, Guam, and the populous Philip- 
pines. It went to war to save the starving reconcentra- 
dos, and the exigencies of the struggle compelled a 
blockade which only made their condition more pitiful. 
It entered upon the conflict denouncing Spain for attempt- 
ing to enforce an alien and hateful rule upon the Cubans, 
and it ended by enforcing upon the unwilling Filipinos a 
rule equally alien, and supported by cannon and rifles. 
Among the unexpected results of the war was the annexa- 
tion to the United States of the Hawaiian Islands. This 
fertile and beautiful archipelago in the Pacific had been 
for years knocking at the door of the Union, to which, 
indeed, it belonged by interest, by the character of its 
population, and by its geographical position. Constitu- 
tional scruples in the minds of certain Senators had re- 
sulted in the defeat or indefinite postponement of every 



Blue Jackets of '98 361 

effort to ratify an annexation treaty. But Dewey's victory 
gave the Hawaiian Islands a new importance. They 
afforded the only sheltered spot between San Francisco 
and the Asiatic islands where a ship could put in for 
coal or repairs, the only rendezvous in the Pacific for the 
expeditions which it was foreseen would soon he following 
one another to the new dominion. Accordingly, con- 
stitutional procedure was stretched until, in the minds of 
some, it broke. By means of a resolution of both houses 
of Congress, the annexation of the islands was ordered, 
and on the 16th of July the President signed the resolu- 
tions giving them legal effect. The cruiser " Philadel- 
phia " was despatched to the islands with the news, and 
on the 12th of August — the day the peace protocol was 
signed — the Hawaiian flag came down, and the Stars 
and Stripes went up over the government building in 
Honolulu for ever. There, as in the Philippines, the 
natives grieved over the downfall of their own govern- 
ment, but no resistance was made. For years the islands 
had been in form a republic, in fact a little oligarchy, 
all power being held by a few Americans who had seized 
the government by force from the hands of the native 
queen, Liliuokalani. Beyond the shadow of a doubt 
the administration of affairs by the United States will be 
to the advantage, both material and moral, of the islands 
and their people. 

The war taught its lessons, military, naval, and political, 
not only to the nations concerned in it, but to all con- 
siderable powers. Perhaps the naval operations and 
combats were watched with the greatest interest, since 
this was the first opportunity ever presented for studying 
the value in combat of the complicated and delicate fight- 
ing-machines which compose modem navies. It is proba- 
ble that one result of the war will be to destroy the 
favour — manifested it must be said only in the United 
States — in which ships of the monitor type are held. 



362 Blue Jackets of '98 

Admiral Sampson curtly says that in his operations in the 
West Indies he was only hampered by the " Amphitrite " 
and " Terror." Captain Mahan, in his review of the 
naval lessons of the war, aptly points out that, however 
useful the monitors might be for harbour defence, they 
cannot be held for that purpose only ; and as soon as they 
have to move, their slowness and small coal capacity make 
them a source of anxiety to the fleet commander who is 
burdened with them. It is true that the " Monadnock " 
and the " Monterey " crossed the Pacific safely ; but they 
did so at so sluggish a pace that, as we have seen, Admiral 
Dewey was all but compelled to abandon his hard-won 
position lest the armoured vessels of Camara might arrive 
first. The thorough efficiency of the battle-ship for 
every use to which a monitor could be put was as fully 
demonstrated as was the inefficiency of the monitors 
when assigned tasks normally belonging to battle-ships. 
The work of the torpedo boats and destroyers during 
the war left the efficiency of that arm of the naval ser- 
vice in grave doubt. The Spanish torpedo boats accom- 
plished nothing. Perhaps it was because they were 
handled without either intelhgence or dash, but the fact 
of their impotence remains. The one instance in which 
a Spanish vessel of this type made a really determined 
effort to torpedo an American ship was at San Juan, 
June 22d, when the " Terror " attempted to destroy the 
auxiliary " St. Paul " commanded by Captain Sigsbee. 
Although the threatened vessel afforded a huge target 
and was armed only with comparatively light guns, the 
torpedo boat was unable to get into effective distance of 
it, and was driven back to port in a sinking condition 
without an opportunity to let fly one of its deadly mis- 
siles. In this case there were dash and bravery in the 
Spanish attack, but not intelligence. Had the attempt 
been made at night, a different story might be told. At 
any rate, this was the nearest approach to the use of a 
torpedo boat for the purpose for which it was designed 



Blue Jackets of '98 363 

during the war. At Santiago repeated efforts were made 
to take the " Furor " out of the harbour at night, to break 
Sampson's rigid blockade ; but the glare of the American 
searchlight defeated the purpose, and when the two 
destroyers came out with the other ships on the 3d of 
July, they fled like their companions, and like them died 
impotently. 

On the part of the Americans constant use of torpedo 
boats was made for every purpose except that for which 
they were designed. They served as messengers and as 
blockaders ; they bombarded fortifications, as in the case 
of the " Winslow " at Cardenas, and the " Porter" at San 
Juan ; they helped in cable cutting, and they examined 
rivers and harbours under the enemy's fire. The United 
States was not rich enough in vessels to employ each 
class on the service for which it was especially designed, 
and accordingly work was put on the torpedo boats for 
which they were not fitted, and the performance of which 
exposed their officers and crews to the greatest discom- 
fort and danger. 

But if on neither side did the torpedo boat prove in 
action the reason for its existence, a sort of moral proof 
was afforded by certain incidents of the war. The officers 
of the ships about Santiago harbour will bear testimony 
to the nervous strain which the mere knowledge of the 
existence of the torpedo destroyers with Cervera caused. 
One night a train gliding along the line close to the 
water's edge called out a furious fire from the fleet, 
because an officer thought it was a torpedo boat lurking 
in the shadows. Another night the white foam breaking 
on a ledge of rocks was similarly honoured for the same 
reason. If these errors show how constant is the menace 
in the possession of torpedo boats by the enemy, a graver 
blunder, narrowly averted, came near giving a sorrowful 
demonstration of the murderous power of the weapons 
of these midgets when rightly used. 

It was during the first week of the blockade of 



364 Blue Jackets of '98 

Havana, and the torpedo boat " Porter," commanded by 
Captain John C. Fremont, was acting as a picket. Out 
of the darkness there loomed up the form of a big ship, 
obviously from her outline a man-of-war. It was early 
in the war, and neither Fremont nor any of his officers 
had any definite knowledge where the Spanish squadron 
might be. The little low-lying leaden-hued " Porter " was 
invisible from the big ship. The cruiser lay at her 
mercy. But the vital question with which the minds of 
the men on the torpedo boat was charged was whether 
it was an enemy or a friend they saw before them. They 
pushed forward to within one hundred and twenty yards, 
and at eight hundred yards their torpedo would have 
been effective. Then they flashed the signal that all 
American men-of-war understand, and to which all usually 
speedily reply. There came no answer. Seemingly the 
men on the greater ship neither saw the little boat 
almost submerged in the water, nor did they catch sight 
of the glowing lamp which offered friendship or threat- 
ened danger according to the response returned. The 
torpedo boat drew nearer and nearer. Captain Fremont 
repeated his signal and still received no return. Had he 
let slip a missile, the ship before him would have gone to 
the bottom as went the " Maine." But being prudent and 
well informed as to the course of the war, he felt con- 
vinced that the enemy could have no ship of such great 
bulk in those waters. Therefore he held his fire, and 
swinging his craft around so that the stranger would 
come between him and the famt glow of the stars in the 
sky, he saw that she had three smoke-stacks. No Spanish 
ship had more than two, so that the question whether 
it was an enemy they confronted was thereby immediately 
settled. As it turned out in the end, the ship was the 
" New York," and with all her 500 men she had been for 
an hour almost absolutely at the mercy of a httle craft 
that carried only thirty-two. 

This incident shows what might have been accomplished 



Blue Jackets of '98 365 

by boats of this class had occasion arisen. The occasion 
did not arise, and so they did whatever service came first 
to hand, their officers with true American adaptability 
forcing the little vessels into the performance of duties for 
which they were but httle fitted. It is not likely, how- 
ever, that the fever for torpedo boats will again reach the 
point at which it stood before the Spanish war. It was 
clearly demonstrated that by day none of these craft 
could approach near enough to a ship of war to deliver 
an effective blow, and the modern devices for illuminating 
the neighbourhood of a warship at night seem to have 
made the chances for successful torpedo attack very 
small. 

If the war had ended with the signing of the peace 
protocol, it is probable that the people would have felt it 
had demonstrated the grave weakness of the militia in 
time of actual hostilities. In the Santiago campaign the 
victories were won almost wholly by the regular troops. 
Of the three volunteer regiments engaged, the " Eough 
Eiders " alone acquitted themselves with credit. There 
was noticeable, immediately after the close of this cam- 
paign, a very general inclination to underestimate the 
worth of volunteer forces, and to urge that the regular 
army establishment be largely increased. The hard fight- 
ing against the Filipino insurgents changed that national 
attitude. There the volunteers were in the vast majority, 
and they fought with a steadiness and gallantry that no 
regular troops could outdo. It is still too early to write 
the history of the war against the Tagals, but when it is 
written it will crown the American volunteer with such 
glory as he has had no opportunity to win since the dark 
days of the Civil War. 

But if the volunteers failed at Santiago, the regular 
army in two of its most important branches proved itself 
far from impeccable. The transportation and commissary 
departments of the army approached as near absolute 



366 Blue Jackets of '98 

failure as could be possible without disaster. It is need- 
less to recount here the story of the delays in getting 
troops and supplies to the points of rendezvous, or to 
rehearse the pitiful narrative of the wrecking of the army 
by bad food and faulty sanitation. It is enough to note 
that the one great mihtary lesson of the war was the need 
for a permanent and highly trained staff, able to cope 
swiftly with all the details of the mobilisation, equipment, 
and subsistence of great bodies of troops. This should be 
distinctively the function of the regular army ; the miHtia 
being trained rather in the less technical branches of mili- 
tary science. In some such device for dividing between 
the national guard and the regular army establishment 
the duties and responsibilities of military organisation in 
war-time probably hes the solution of the army problem 
in the United States. The antagonism of the people to a 
large standing army is ineradicable. Even in the glow of 
triumph over Spain Congress refused to accede to the Presi- 
dent's request for a regular establishment of 100,000 men. 
It is unquestionable, therefore, that the course for those 
who are interested in the development of our military 
resources to pursue is to plan systematically for a closer 
co-operation between the militia and the regular army. 
By the terms of the army bill passed in the last days of 
the congressional session, the President is authorised to 
maintain a regular army of about 65,000 men for two 
years to come, and to enlist new volunteers to the number 
of 35,000. At the end of the time fixed, in default of 
new legislation, the regular army will be reduced to its 
normal peace footing, and all volunteers will be discharged. 

When the people of the United States, unwillingly and 
after long and earnest consideration, turned aside from the 
paths of peace to take up the sword, to which for almost 
half a century their hands had been strangers, they de- 
clared they were going to war in the cause of humanity. 
They knew they were about to make heavy sacrifices, and 



Blue Jackets of '98 367 

in some ways the sacrifice has been greater than the most 
apprehensive among them imagined. But in the end the 
great purpose of the war will be amply fulfilled. If terri- 
tory has come to us unexpectedly, its tenants — whether 
in Porto Eico or the Phihppines — will be far better off 
than under the almost barbarous rule of Spain. If the 
inevitable savageries of war have inflicted upon Cubans 
and Fihpinos sufferings more poignant even than they 
endured before our intervention, it has been such suffer- 
ing as the surgeon inflicts to perform a radical cure. 
There need be no fear of a recurrence or continuance of 
the evil, as was inevitable under Spanish rule. The 
people whom we have rescued from Spain, and even the 
half-civilised people whom we are now striving to rescue 
from themselves, wiU find nothing but profit in their 
new situation. Whether to the citizens of the United 
States the results of the war will prove so unmixed a 
blessing, cannot be said with equal certainty. We have 
entered upon a new national pohcy, and its fruits will be 
slow to ripen. Distant colonies, in lands already densely 
populated with alien races, and in a zone which has never 
been the scene of successful nation-building, offer problems 
which may weU daunt even the indomitable American 
spirit. The story of the war with Spain is only the least 
important part of the narrative of the results of our inter- 
vention in Cuba. The history of what we have done and 
shall do in our new possessions to justify our entrance 
upon them, and the record of the effect, if any, upon our 
home institutions, will be the more important chapter of 
the historical narrative. Loyal Americans will not fear 
that the chapter, when written, will be other than a 
glorious part of our national annals. 



THE END 



K' X 



1 78 



■^ 

















-^^0^ 



•'"^¥". %,s^* /■'* 



-^0^ 

.*1°<. 




'oV 



O *.«o^ 0^ '^^ "... 













■ ff- 










